IR 05000295/1987006

Insp Repts 50-295/87-06 & 50-304/87-07 on 870318-0416. Violation Noted:Failure to Follow Operating Procedures Which Resulted in Unplanned Automatic Start of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps 2B & 2C

ML20215M523
Person / Time
Site:	Zion  File:ZionSolutions icon.png
Issue date:	05/06/1987
From:	Forney W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20215M511	List: IR 05000295/1987006 ML20215M509 ML20215M521
References
50-295-87-06, 50-295-87-6, 50-304-87-07, 50-304-87-7, IEB-85-002, IEB-85-2, IEIN-86-106, NUDOCS 8705130291
Download: ML20215M523 (13)

Text

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D U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report Nos. 50-295/87006(DRP);50-304/87007(DRP)

Docket Nos. 50-295; 50-304 License Nos. DPR-39; DPR-48 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company P. O. Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Zion Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Zion, IL Inspection Conducted: March 18 through April 16, 1987 Inspectors: M. M. Holzmer P. L. Eng N. R. Williamsen J. H. Neisler Approved By:

b8 hk W. L. Forney, Chie re r/4//7 Reactor Projects Section IA Date Inspection Sumary Inspection on March 18 through April 16, 1987 (Report Nos. 50-295/87006(DRP);

50-304/87007(DRP))

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced resident inspection of licersee action on previous inspection findings; sumary of operations; minor fire in turbine building; automatic start of 2B and 2C auxiliary feedwater pumps; operational safety and engineered safety feature (ESF) system walkdown; surveillance observation; maintenance; licensee event reports (LERs); IE Bulletins; training; modification program; Federal Field Exercise; and response to Region III Request Results: Of the 13 areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified in 12 areas, and 1 violation was identified in the remaining area (failure to follow operating procedures - paragraph 5). The failure to follow the procedure resulted in the unplanned automatic start of the 28 and 2C AFW pump I2DR ADOCK 0500

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DETAILS Persons Contacted

• G. Plim1, Station Manager

• E. Fuerst, Superintendent, Production T. Rieck, Superintendent, Services

• Kurth, Assistant Station Superintendent, Operations R. Johnson, Assistant Station Superintendent, Maintenance J. Gilmore, Assistant Station Superintendent, Planning

• R. Budowle, Assistant Station Superintendent, Technical Services L. Pruett, Unit 1 Operating Engineer N. Valos, Unit 2 Operating Engineer M. Carnahan, Training Supervisor R Cascarano, Technical Staff Supervisor

• C. Schultz, Regulatory Assurance Administrator V. Williams, Station Health Physicist

• J. Ballard, Quality Control Supervisor

• W. Stone, Quality Assurance Supervisor

• Indicates persons present at exit intervie . Licensee Actions on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)

(0 pen)Openitem(295/86022-04(DRP);304/86020-05(DRP)): Safety Related Mechanical Snubber Inoperable for More than 72 Hours. The event happened during initial functional testing of mechanical snubbers, when the Technical Staff had snubber #1 SI0O8-RS 1 removed for testing on September 17, 1986, per TS 4.22.1.A.3. Prior to that time, only the hydraulic snubbers had been removed for functional testing and all hydraulic snubbers that were required to be operable during modes 5 and 6 were appropriately labeled. The mechanical snubbers, however, were not so labeled and the responsible Technical Staff engineer on September 17, 1986, did not realize the safety significance of the snubber. On September 22, 1986, a shift supervisor recognized that the snubber was required to be opecable and on that same date it was re-installed. The corrective action specified in LER 86-036-00 (dated October 14,1986) included providing a list of safety related mechanical and hydraulic snubbers required to be operable during nodes 5 and 6 of plant operation; this list was to be made part of Technical Staff Surveillance procedure TSS-15.6.48. This list has been ccmpiled and reviewed but revised procedure TSS-15.6.48 has not been issued ye This will remain an Open Item pending NRC review of the procedure as issue . Summary of Operations Unit 1 The unit began the report period in hot shutdown (mode 3) and was put on the grid on March 20, 1987, ending a 198 day refueling and maintenance

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outage. The unit operated at power levels up to 100% for the remainder of the inspection perio Unit 2 The unit began the report period at about 75% power (mode 1) and was coasting down in preparation for a scheduled refueling and maintenance outage. On March 25, 1987, the unit was taken off the grid to begin the scheduled outage. The unit ended the report period in the refueling mod No violations or deviations were identifie . March 27, 1987 Unusual Event - Minor Fire in the Turbine Building (93702)

On March 27, 1987, at about 8:00 a.m. a fire on the 617 elevation on the Unit 1 side of the turbine building was reported to the' Shift Control Room Engineer. At approximately 8:05 a.m. a fire on the 560 elevation of the turbine building was reported to the shift engineer. Due to recent maintenance on the Unit 1 turbine and generator seal oil systems and ongoing insulation replacement on piping in the area, the shift engineer was concerned that a fire could propagate throughout the building and declared an Unusual Even The Zion fire department was immediately notified and arrived onsite at 8:09 a.m. Investigation revealed a minor fire from a smoldering cardboard box located on the Unit 1 side of the 609 elevation of the turbine building. The smoke generated by the fire had been carried throughout the Unit 1 side of the turbine building via the ventilation system which caused the fire to be reported at more than one locatio The fire was extinguished by members of the plant fire brigade. The Unusual Event was terminated at 8:15 Corrective actions included a letter to all employees regarding the use and disposal of smoking materials, reduction of combustible materials by unpacking containers, and a review of the station smoking policy to determine the feasibility of no smoking areas in the turbine buildin No violations or deviations were identifie . April 3,1987 Automatic Start of the 2B and 2C Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW)

Pumps (93702)

On April 3, 1987, at about 8:50 a.m. the 28 and 2C auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps automatically started while draining the Unit 2 steam generators (SG) in preparation for outage work. At the time, Unit 2 was in cold shutdown (mode 5). The AFW pumps started because the operator failed to place the control switches in the " pull-to-lock" position prior to beginning the SG draining. When the level of one of the SG's reached 10% narrow range level, the 28 and 2C AFW pumps started as designed. After the shift identified that the pumps were running, they were secured and their control switches were placed in pull-to-loc . _ _ . . _ . _ _ -

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Steam generator draining is performed using the blowdown (BD) system as specified in 50I-36, " Steam Generator Blowdown". The procedure for placing the BD system in service is the same for SG draining as for normal operation, except for a note which refers to steps 4.3.1 through 4.3.3 of 501-10, " Auxiliary Feedwater", when placing BD in service for SG draining. These steps of 501-10 disable the AFW pumps to prevent their automatic start during SG draining by placing the pump start switches in pull-to-lock. The licensed operator assumed that BD was to be placed in service in the usual way and did not refer to either S01-36 or S0I-1 Consequently, the start switches for the 2A, 2B and 2C AFW pumps were not placed in pull-to-lock prior to drainin In addition, the Shift Control Room Engineer (SCRE) who was responsible for supervising the licensed operator failed to assure that proper procedures were being followe Failure to follow the requirements of the note in S0I-36 is a violation ofTechnicalSpecification6.2.A.1(304/87007-01(DRP)).

A similar event occurred on May 12, 1986 (see LER 295/86022). Corrective action for that event was to provide a revision to GOP-4, " Plant Cooldown" which would ensure that AFW pump switches would be placed in pull-to-lock prior to SG draining. Implementation of that corrective action was

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performed by a contract individual who placed the caution in the S0Is

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mentioned above. Review of the S0Is was performed without reference to the commitment in LER 295/86022. To prevent recurrence, the licensee

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intended to revise GOP-4 as it had criginally intended. In addition, the licensee intends to revise the Zion Administrative Procedure (ZAP)

governing procedure changes to cause a copy of the commitment tracking item which initiates a procedure change to accompany the procedure change *

during the review process to ensure that procedure changes meet consnit-ment One violation and no deviations were identifie . Operational Safety Verification and Engineered Safety Features System Walkdown (71707 & 71710)

The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control rocm operators from March 18 through April 16, 1987. During these discussions and observations, the inspectors ascertained that the operators were alert, fully cognizant of plant conditions, attentive to changes in those conditions, and took prompt action when appropriate. The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the auxiliary and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenanc The inspectors by observation and direct interview verified that the physical security activities were being implemented in accordance with the station security pla ..

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The inspectors observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. From March 18 to April 16, 1987, the inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the auxiliary feedwater, containment spray, and safety injection systems to verify operabilit The following comments and observations were discussed with the licensee during the inspection period or at the exit meeting:

Improvement is needed in the completeness of information on PT-14 forms, " Inoperable Equips,ent Surveillance Tests". .A sample of PT-14's reviewed revealed that some lacked detail when specifying the reason for being out of service (00S); some blanks were not filled in; TS references were to chapters, but did not reference the section within the chapte *

Housekeeping improvements were noted in that penetration pressuriza-tion air compressors and receivers had been recently painted. Some previously identified leaks on the Unit 1 steam dump valves were - ,

correcte *

Response to NRC concerns was prompt for: cleanup of anticontamina-tion clothing which was found adrift in the auxiliary building; how changes made to the surveillance requirements in PT-14s were made; and minor radiological control deficiencies identified during tours -

of the auxiliary buildin *

A new position was established during the_ inspection period to coordinate improvements to the material condition of the plan This is considered a positive step. NRC will watch the progress of plant condition to evaluate effectiveness of this chang *

Material conditions identified during the inspection as needing -

F improvement include: minor lube oil leaks on the IA, IB and 1C AFW pumps; heat sensor for the IB AFW pump motor not properly mounted; backup of laundry outside the laundry room; fluid leaks were found on the deck from the 0A component cooling pump and lake discharge tank drain pumps; the valve stem protector for 0CD-0101 was loose and in contact with the ste These reviews and observations were conducted to verify.that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under Technical Specifications,10 CFR and administrative procedure No violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspector observed Technical Specifications required surveillance

testing on the chemical and volume centrol (CVCS), safeguards and

auxiliary power logic, and diesel generator (DG) systems and ver0fied

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that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that

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test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results confonned with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than tra individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne The inspector also witnessed portions of the following test activities:

TSSP 57-86 - Stroke testing of valves 2 MOV VC-112 B & C for IEB 85-03 TSSP 58-86 - Stroke Testing of Valves 2 MOV VC-112 D & E for IEB 85-03 PT-11 - Diesel Generator Loading Test TSS 15.6.35-2 - Manual Actuation of the Safety Injection and Safe Shutdown Systems and Diesel Generator Loading Test The following comments and observations were discussed with the licensee during the inspection or at the exit meeting:

While current-traces were not required in response to IEB 85-03 (TSSP57-86&58-86), the use of calibrated strip chart and clamp-on ammeter would permit valid trend comparisons. The equipment used was not calibrate *

TSSP 57-86 & 58-86 contained lined-out changes which were not t initia11e *

Gauge numbers for instrumentation used during TSSP 57-86 and 58-86 should be included in the procedur ,

No violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

Station maintenance activities on safety related systems and components listed below were observed or reviewed to ascertain whether they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes or standards and in conformance with Technical Specification The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality g control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by

'r qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemente , _-

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Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performanc The following maintenance activities were observed or reviewed:

Repair of fuel oil leak on 7R cylinder of IB Diesel Generator (DG)

Electrical setup of current-traces for 2MOV VC-112 D & E (Work RequestNo.Z58994).

Following completion of maintenance on the 1 B DG the inspector verified that the systems had been returned to service properl No violations or deviations were identifie . Licensee Event Reports (LER) Followup (92700)

Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, inmediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications. The LERs listed below are considered closed:

UNIT 1 LER N DESCRIPTION 86026 RayChem Splice Kit Installation 86044 Inadvertent ESF Actuation Due to Switching Instrument Bus 112 87003 Inoperable Safety Related Snubber, 1 RHRS-1129, on the Residual Heat Removal System UNIT 2 LER N DESCRIPTION 86005-01 Diesel Generator Auto Start following Loss of Power to 4 KV Engineered Safety Feature Bus Regarding LER 295/86026, on May 19, 1986, environmentally qualified heat shrink type electrical splices were found to be improperly installe Based on an analysis as part of On-Site Review OSR/031/86, the licensee determined that there was no safety significance, and the LER was submitted for information only. Based on the results of the licensee's safety analysis and inspection results reported in the LER, the reportability determination is correct. The environmental qualification and corrective actions pertaining to RayChem electrical splices were

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-reviewed in Inspection Report 295/86016(DRS);304/86015(DRS)andare tracked as Unresolved Items 295/86016-01(DRS);304/86015-01(DRS)aswell-as Open Items 295/86016-02(DRS);304/86015-02(DRS)and 295/86016-03(DRS);

304/86015-03(DRS) pending further inspectio Regarding LER No. 295/86044-00-L, " Inadvertent ESF Actuation Due to Switching Instrument Bus 112", the licensee's innediate corrective action was to provide additional operator training regarding the significance of unnecessary challenges to Emergency Safety Feature (ESF) components. The long tenn corrective action is to revise the Zion Electrical Distribution (ZED) to state that de-energizing the refueling radiation monitor will result in closing the containment purge isolation valves. This will remain an Open Item pending NRC reviewoftherevisedZED(295/87006-01(DRP)).

Regarding LER No. 295/87003-00," Inoperable Safety Related Snubber, No. 1 RHRS-1129, on the Residual Heat Removal System,", this event occurred on January 5 1987, with Unit 1 in mode 5 when a contract maintenance mechanic conducting in-service inspection got permission from an individual on the Maintenance Staff to remove the snubber. The Maintenance Staff individual failed to recognize the safety significance of the snubber and did not request Operations to issue a PT-14. The PT-14 would have tracked the snubber removed from service in order to ensure that the snubber was returned to service prior to the time limits of the Limiting Conditions for Operation (72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, per TS 3.22.2).

On February 9, 1987, with Unit 1 in mode 5 during a visual inspection by the licensee, the snubber was found to be disconnected and the licensee recognized that this snubber (#1 RHRS-1129) was required for modes 5 and 6 of plant operation. The snubber was restored to service the same da The licensee's proposed corrective action was adequate and included a change to Maintenance procedure PM-017-1N which would (1) transfer responsibility for all snubber disconnects to the Station Snubber Coordinator, (2) include the list of safety related snubbers required to be operable during(modes thisreport),and 5 and 6, per 3) require Maintenance andTSS 15.6.48 (see Operations Paragraph approval before #2 in disconnecting such snubber The safety significance of this event is low. Snubber il RHRS-1129 is located on line ISIO15-14" which is the common suction line from the reactor coolant loop A hot leg to the residual heat removal pump The snubber is used to protect a section of residual heat removal piping from a low probability seismic event which did not occur during the time frame specified above. Other supports adjacent to the disconnected snubber were inspected and verified in good working orde Additionally, the licensee stated that an engineering analysis by a contractor had shown that if a seismic event had occurred, the subject pipe stresses and adjacent support loads would not have increased beyond acceptable function design level .

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A copy of_ the engineering analysis referred to above was requested of

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the licensee on April 2, 1987. As of the exit meeting on April 16, 1987, the analysis had not yet been provided. Subsequently.an inspector from the NRC Region III office agreed to incorporate a review of the engineering analysis for snubber No.1 RHRS-1129 with other reviews that will be done at the Chicago office of the contractor who did the engineering analysis. The-review of this engineering analysis will be-an open item pending completion of NRC review of the licensee's analysis (295/87006-02(DRP);304/87007-02(DRP)).

This event differs from an earlier event being tracked as Open Item 295/86022-04(DRP); 304/86020-05(DRP) (see Paragraph 2) in that the present event (January 5,1987) occurred during in-service inspection when a member of the Maintenance Staff failed to recognize the safety

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significance of a hydraulic snubber; the September 17, 1986, event occurred during initial functional testing of a mechanical snubber when a member of the Technical Staff failed to recognize that the snubber was required to be operable during modes 5 and 6.' Therefore. the corrective action for the earlier LER (in 1986) did not necessarily

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encompass the 1987 event.

i The failure to comply with the 72-hour LCO of TS 3.22.2, as reporte in LER 87003, is considered a licensee-identified _ violation (N /87006-03(DRP)). The event will remain an Open Item pending NRC

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review of the revised procedure PM-017-1N (295/87006-04(DRP);

304/87007-03(DRP)).

, No violations or deviations were identified.

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1 Inspection and Enforcement Bulletins (IEB) (92703)

(Closed) IEB85-02.(304/85002-88) UndervoltageTripAttachments(UVTA)_ ,

of Westinghouse DB-50 Type Reactor Trip Breakers. The inspector verified by review of the reactor trip schematic drawings and discussions with the l'

electrical group leader of the Technical Staff that the shunt trip modification had been installed on Unit 2. The UVTA device and the shunt

, trip device operations are tested monthly according to the PT-5 series procedures, " Reactor Protection Logic Tests". Reactor trip breaker force

margin tests are performed during each refueling outage pursuant to

! procedure E015-1, " Reactor Trip Breaker Maintenance". Based on the i licensee's installation of the shunt trip modification on Unit 2 reactor trip breakers and the periodic testing required by procedures, this

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bulletin and TI 2515/72 are closed.

No violations or deviations were identifie '1 Training (41400)

i- -During the inspection period, the inspectors reviewed abnormal events and unusual occurrences which may have resulted, in part, from training deficiencies. Selected events were evaluated to determine whether the classroom, simulator, or on-the-job training received before the event

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l was sufficient to have either prevented the occurrence or to have mitigated its effects by recognition and proper operator actio Personnel qualifications were also evaluated. In addition, the inspectors determined whether lessons learned from the events were incorporated into the training progra Events reviewed included the events discussed in this report. In addition, LERs were routinely evaluated for training impact. No events reviewed this period were found to have significant training deficiencies as contributor On March 19, 1987, the resident inspector attended a Generating Station Emergency Plan (GSEP) training session for members of the licensee's staff who are scheduled to participate in the June,1987, Federal Field Exercise (FFE). The training session was held in the Technical Support Center (TSC) and was conducted by the Zion GSEP Coordinato Improvements in the TSC were discussed as were the logistics of the FFE. Staff responsibilities were clarified as requested by trainees. The GSEP Coordinator stated that additional GSEP training prior to the FFE was planne No violations or deviations were identifie . Revised Modification Program (37700)

On March 30, 1987, the resident inspector staff attended a licensee orientation session on the new modification program as described in the recently revised Quality Assurance Procedure 3-51, " Design Control for Operations Plant Modifications," and the Nuclear Stations Directive, NSDD-M14, Revision 0, " Design Control for Operations--Plant Modifications." The orientation session addressed the reasons why the modification process was changed, a brief explanation of the major changes to the process, and the impact on various groups at the statio Major changes to the modification program at Zion included the addition of specific documentation requirements and use of three separate walkdowns for each modification. These are: the designer's walkdown, the installer's walkdown and the user's walkdown. The session also delineated the responsibilities of the newly formed Station Modification Review Consnittee (SMRC) which are to review and prioritize proposed modifications as well as to increase the level of management involvement in the modification process. The new modification process will be implemented at the Zion Station by May 2, 1987. Training sessions for each department involved in the modification process will be completed prior to program implementation. The licensee stated that the new modification process will be implemented at all CECO site No violations or deviations were identifie . Federal Field Exercise Meeting (30702)

On April 15, 1987, the resident inspectors attended a meeting regarding the Federal Field Exercise (FFE) to be held at Zion in June,1987. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss lessons learned from the Tabletop

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, exercise held earlier this year and to determine the manner in which the States, Federal agencies, and CECO will coordinate and handle various aspects of the FFE. Specific topics addressed . included description of the flow of information gleaned during the FFE and clarification of the role'of the cognizant federal agency (CFA) in the decision making process with regards to dose assessment and protective measures recommendation The list of meeting attendees is attache No violations or deviations were identifie . Response to Region III Requests (92701)

In a memorandum from E. G. Greenman to Region III resident inspectors

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dated January 30, 1987, resident inspectors were directed to obtain information from their respective licensees regarding licensee response to IE Notice 86-106, "Feedwater Line Break". The information was to

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Whether the licensee had a program to determine whether large-diameter feedwater, condensate and connected piping is subject

to thinning of the piping wall.

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The conditions and factors considered for this progra *

The extent to which measurements have been-taken to date, and the

results of those measurement The inspector determined that Zion has a program in place for secondary piping which considered all the factors in IEN 86-106. Measurements are j- taken on a sampling basis during refueling outages, and to date, three l cases of wall erosion were detected and repaired. This information was

provided to Region III in accordance with the request. This item is considered close 'No violations or deviations were identifie . Open Items

Open Items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee which

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will be reviewed further by the inspector and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. Three Open Items disclosed during this inspection are discussed in paragraph . Licensee Identified Violations In accordance with 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix B, General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions, the NRC will not generally issue a notice of violation for a violation that meets all of the following tests: It was identified by the licensee: It fits in Severity Level IV or V;

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. It was reported, if required; It was or will be corrected, including measures to prevent recurrence, within a reasonable time; and It was not a violation that could reasonably be expected to have been prevented by the licensee's corrective action for a previous violatio One licensee identified violation disclosed in this inspection is discussed in paragraph 9 of this repor '

17. Exit Interview s

The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection on April 16, 1987 to summarize the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The licensee acknowledged the inspectors' comments. The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as proprietar Attachment: List of Attendees of Meeting Held 4/15/87 I

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ATTACHMENT-ATTENDEES AT FFE MEETING HELD AT ZION APRIL 15, 1987

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A. B.. Davis _ .

NRC, Region III C. J. Paperiello -

NRC, Region III

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E. G. Greenman NRC, Region III R. Lickus NRC,' Region III

'W. L. Axelson

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NRC, Region III W. D. Shafer- NRC, Region III

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W. Snell NRC, Region III C. Sakenas NRC, Headquarters i

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K. Perkins NRC, Headquarters J. Hickman NRC, Headquarters T.~ McKenna NRC, Headquarters B. Sheron NRC, Headquarters R. Emc NRC, Headquarters

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E. Weiss NRC, Headquarters C. W. Miller - Illinois Department of Nuclear Energy R. R.-Wight Illinois ' Department of Nuclear Energy G. N. Wright Illinois Department of Nuclear Energy

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W. F. Wolf DOE, Headquarters G. L.-Combs DOE, Headquarters M. Grace DOE, Chicago E. J. Jascewsky DOE, Chicago R. Buddecke

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FEMA, Region 5 W. Weaver FEMA, Region 5 M. E. Sanders FEMA, Headquarters

.H..Calley: EPA,. Headquarters G. Bickerton . USDA, Headquarters 1- .C. Malina - USDA, Headquarters-W. Kordek - BDM (FEMA Contractor)

J. A. Micka State of Wisconsin, Radiation Protection L

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L. J.-McDonnell State of Wisconsin, Radiation Protection L. D. Butterfield CECO J. C. Golden CECO

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