IR 05000289/1974021
| ML19256D413 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane |
| Issue date: | 04/26/1974 |
| From: | Brickley R, Hannon J, Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19256D410 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-289-74-21, NUDOCS 7910180759 | |
| Download: ML19256D413 (7) | |
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U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
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DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY OPERATIONS
REGION I
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RO Inspection Report No:
50-289/74-21 Docket No:
50-289 Licensee:
Metropolitan Edison Company License No:
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Three Mile Island Unit 1
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PO Box 542 Category:
B-2 Location:
Middletown, Pennsylvania 19603
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Type of Licensee:
Type of Inspection: Routine, Announced Dates of Inspection:
4/20-4/22/74 Ntes of Previous Inspection:
4/11-12; 4/i6,17/74 M'2[~2, Reporting Inspector:
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. N. Hannon Accompanying inspectors: N /N N,ed M-86-N
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R. H. Brickley (j Date Date
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Date
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Date
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Other Accompanying Personnel:
Date Reviewed By:
dC. k M b ti f 2t. l74 E. C. McCabe, Senior Reactor Inspector Date Reactor Operations Branch
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SUltfARY OF FINDINGS
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Enforcement Action None Licensee Action on Previous 1v Identified Enforce =ent Actions
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Not inspected
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Design Changes None identified Unusual Occurrences Broken Underwater Light
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Glass from a shattered underwater light was retrieved from the
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reactor vessel without incident.
(Detail 4)
Other Significant Findings
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A.
Current Findings
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The early phases of the fuel loading were witnessed with no defi-ciencies noted.
(Detail 2)
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B.
New Unresolved Items Deficiencier in the licensee's program for indicating operating status of equipment were found to exist.
(Detail 3)
C.
Status of Previous 1v Reported Unresolved Items
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Not inspected Managemeat Interview The manage =ent interview was held at the site on April 22, 1974 with the following attendees:
Metropolitan Edison Company Mr. J. G. Herbein, S tation Superintendent
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Mr. R. L. Su=rers, Plant Engineer
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General Public Utilities Service Corporation Mr. C. L. Roshy, QA Specialist Mr. W. T. Sturgeon, QA Specialist The following su=marizes items discussed,.which were acknowledged by the licensee in each case:
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A.
Inspection Purpose The inspector outlined the scope of the inspection and reviewed with the licensee those items that were covered during the it.spection.
(Detail 2)
B.
Calibration Program
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The inspector expressed concern with the licensee's program for control of out-of-calibration safety related instrumentation.
(Detail 3)
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C.
Retrieval of Broken Glass in Reactor Vessel The inspector reviewed * the documentation involved with the recovery of the broken glass and resumption of fueling operations. (Detail 4)
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
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Metropolitan Edison Company Mr. M. Beers, Shift Supervisor
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Mr. J. Chaustik, Shift Supervisor Mr. W. Cotter, Project Engineer Mr. R. Deakin, Radiation Protection Supervisor Mr. R. Ebert, Health Physics and Chamistry Mr. J. R. Floyd, Operations Supervisor Mr. T. Illjes, Auxiliary Operator Mr. Janouski, Health Physics Senior Technician Mr. W. E. Potts, QC Supervisor
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Mr. M. Snyder, Instrumentation Foreman Mr. J. Wallace, Shif t Supervisor Mr. D. Weaver, Instrumentation Foreman General Public Utilities Services Corporation Mr. S. Levin, Project Engineer Babeock and Wilcox, Inc.
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Mr. J. Phinney, Site Manager
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2.
Initial Fuel Loacing The early phases of initial fuel loading were witnessed, including observation of fuel handling and shif t turnover operations on three different shifts.
A.
Overall Crew Performance (1) Training The licensee was observed to be conducting fuel handling
evolutions with a du=my fuel assembly for each cperator involved in the fueling evolution.
(2) Personnel Access Control
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Only personnel on the Radiation Work Permit (RWP) were allowed to proceed onto the bridge in the fuel pool area.
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(b) A radiation control point (which also served as a tool control point) was established near the fuel A clean pool to control potential contamination.
area was established upon entering containment where protective clothing was provided and dosimeter read-ings were logged.
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(c) A security guard verffied proper clearance before
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entry into either the reactor building or the fuel handling building.
Escorts were provided for con-struction workers.
(3)
communications The licensee was observed to maintain continuous phone connunications between fueling stations.
The licensee
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made an effort to upgrade the phone-talking procedures in use during fuel handling to minimize confusion.
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B.
Technical Specification Requirements (1)
Shift Supervision Responsible licensed personnel were verified to be in
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control of plant activities, including a Senior Reactor Operator directly supervising fuel handling in the Reactor
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Building, and both a Senior Reactor Operator and a licensed Reactor Operator in the Control Room.
(2) Adherence to Approved Procedures (a)
Initial Fueling Procedure IFP-401 controlled the loading sequence and was being followed by supervisory personnel.
(b)
Health Physics Procedure 1623, Personnel Control During Initial Fuel Handling, was found to indicate the location of the control access point in the Reactor Building errcneously.
The licensee stated
that an exception would be taken to the procedure in this case.
The inspector had no further questions at this time.
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(3) Nuclear Instrumentation (a)
The two auxiliary channe.ls of nuclear instrunentation
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were observed to be operating and data was being re-
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corded by technicians from instrumentation located in the reactor building.
(b) One of the two installed source range detectors (NI-1) was observed to be operating and data was being recorded in the control roem.
The other channel (NI-2) was reportedly out of co= mission with the high voltage power sdpply de-energized.
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(4) Neutron 'fultiplication Surveillance (a) Taree plots of inverse multiplication were being re-corded, one for each of the source range channels in operation.
(b) Response checks on the instrumentation were con-
ducted satisfactorily less than 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> prior to commencing fueling operations on 4-20-74, and the inspector verified that an appropriate entry was made in the fuel handling log.
(c) Neutron instrumentation was calibrated on 4-19-74 and plateau curves for each of the detectors were reviewed by the inspector.
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(5)
Boron Concentration Surveillance (a) Boron samples were being taken on the Decay Heat Removal (DHR) System every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
Other boron samples were collected on an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> basis, including the transfer canal, the fuel pool, and the reactor vessel.
(b) Typical readings reportedly varied from 2184 ppm to 2281 ppo, indicating close agreement.
(5) Plant System Status (a) The inspector verified by observation that the DHR
System was in the required line-up for fueling, as documented by Form IFI-209-Part B-Appendix L, DHR System Valve line-up.
(b)
Supervisory Personnel were found to be knowledgeable
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of the operational status of critical systems.
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(c) A portable area monitor was placed on the main bridge in the Reactor Building as a back up to RM-G7, which was observed to alarm spuriously.
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Record Keeping (1) A procedural change to allow recording the DHR Fu=p Suction temperature instead of the fuel pool and reactor pool te=peratures was verified to have been made in accordance with applicable procedures and the necessary
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approvals had been obtained.
(2) A log of items carried into the vessel bridge area was being maintained for accountability of tools and other loose items.
(3) Fuel loading records were observed to be kept current, as
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well as the fuel display. boards.
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(4) The control room log was reviewed with the control room operators and methods were discussed that could result in improved record keeping.
The inspector had no further
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questions at this time.
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3.
Calibration of Safety Related Instru=entation
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Source Range Nuclear Detector NI-2 was observed to be de-energized with no apparent indication for the operator that it was undergoing maintenance, that it was de-energized, or tha.t it was out-of-calibration. Work Request 1304 was subsequently provided to crouble-shoot NI-2.
However, the high voltage power supply had been de-
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energized prior to the generation of the work request due to instru-ment malfunction, and therefore the instrument was out of service for some time before a tag was placed on the NI cabinet indicatirg maintenance was in progress. No indication was provided at the local rcad-out in the control room to indicate that the instrument was out of service or out of calf bration, although the control room operators were aware of the status of NI-2.
The inspector stated that while this condition did not jeopardize the fueling operation, since minimum instrumentation requirements were satisfied, it could nevertheless lead to operational dif-ficulties unless a uniform =ethod was established to alert the operators when safety related instru=entation is out of calibra-
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tion.
The licensee acknowledged this statement and agreed to evaluate the problem and propose a solution.
This matter is unresolved pending review of the licensee's proposed ' solution.
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4.
Broken Glass in Reactor Vessel The inspector observed the restored glass bulb that had been recovered from the reactor vessel. A licensee representative stated that he was satisfied that all of the glass had been recovered, and that an Abnor=al Occurrence Reporc, 74-01, would be issued to report the incident.
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The inspector reviewed the procedure that had been written to control the broken glass recovery, along with the administrative controls that had been invoked to preclude a recurrence, and had no further questions at this time.
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