IR 05000289/1974008

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Insp Rept 50-289/74-08 on 740220,22,27,28 & 0301. Noncompliance Noted:Preoperational Test Data & Lack of Documentation Re Discrepancies
ML19256D400
Person / Time
Site: Crane Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 03/20/1974
From: Davis A, Spessard R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML19256D394 List:
References
50-289-74-08, 50-289-74-8, NUDOCS 7910180750
Download: ML19256D400 (13)


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U. S. ATCMIC ENERCY C0:OtISSION DIRECTORATE OF REGUL\\ TORY OPERATIONS

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REGION I

RO Inspection Report No:

50-289/74-08 Docket No:

50-289 o

Licensee:

Metropolitan Edison Company License No:

CPPR-l.0 Three Mile Island - Unit 1 Priority:

Category:

B.1 Location:

Middletown, Pa.

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Type of Licens.2:

B&W, 871 MWe, PWR

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Type of Inspection:

Routine, Announced

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f tes of Inspection: February 20, 22, 27, and 28 and March 1, 1974 Dates of Previous Inspection: February 19-22 and ?5,27, 1974

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Reporting Inspector x.

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dpessaru, neactor aspec;or Date

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Accompanying Inspectors:

Date Date Date

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None Other Acccmpanying Personnel:

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A Revicued By:

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n. Davis, Senior scacter inspector, heactor Date Opc ations Branch 1448 004 J5D

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SUERRY OF FINDINGS

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Enforcement Actica A.

Violatio-Preoperational test data in TP203/4 and TPl72/2B were reviewed and approved by ethe TEG in apparent violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI.

During the inspection, these items were reviewed by cognizant licensee repr sentatives who considered the test results acceptable. The test data was re-evaluated and found acceptable by the TEG.

(Management Interview Item B and Paragraph 2.c.(1) &

(2))

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This item is closed.

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B.

Safety Items None identified Licensee Action on Previously Identified Enforcement Items

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Not inspected

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Unusual Occurrences

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A.

The one remaining Nuclear Service River Water Pump ("A" Pu=p)

failed durir hnt functional testing at normal operating te=perature and pressure, ano the backup system (Secondary Service River Water Pump) was put in service. Ne plant limits or precautions were exceeded.

Preliminary examination revealed a cracked motor end bell, cracked coupling, sheared pump shaft, and displacement of the motor-pu=p foundation by one-fourth inch.

Investigation is continuing, but it is believed that a foreign object caught between the i=peller and the pu ?.

Licensee considers this event reportable per 10 CFR 50.55 (e). This matter will be reviewed during a subsequent R0 inspection.

B.

Both Diesel Generators cor2d not be started in the E=ergency Service mode during surveillance tests.

Prior to these surveillance tests the Diesels had been started, var:ed up, and shut dcun, and following shutdown there were no alarmed conditions relative to their standby (Auto) status.

These startups had been previously perft reed on several occasions and have also been perfor=ed since the occurrence.

Investigatien is continuing, and this includes a design review of the circuitry by CAI.

Licensee considers this event reportable per 10 CFR 50.55(e).

This matter will be reviewed during a subsequent RO inspection.

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  • Other Sict.ificant Findinc,s -

A.

Current

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J ': > ;reoperational test procedures are final approved, and of the preoperational tests have been cocpleted.

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graps 2.a & b)

2.

Several completed preoperational tests were reviewel by RO:I and found to be acceptable.

(Paragraph 2.c)

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Two preoperational tests were witnessed b) RO:1, and no deficiencies relative to test performance were identified although outstanding test deficiencies occurred.

(Paragraph 2.d)

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All initial startup test procedures are preliminary and/or

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final approved.

(Paragraph 3)

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5.

Previous licensee commitments to RO:I relative to the ECCS Testing Program were reviewed and found to have been imple-mented.

(Paragraph 5)

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6.

Hot functional testing at normal operating temperature and

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pressure has been ec=pleted, and plant cooldown was initiated to make preparations for the performance of the Reactor Buil'ing Structural Integrity and Integratcc Leak Rate Tests. The overall results of hot functional testing were revie. red, and outstanding test deficiencies with proposed retest requirements were identified.

(Paragraph 6)

B.

Status of Previously Reported Unresolved Ite 1 None relative to preoperational testing activities.

Management Interview

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An exit interview was conducted on March 1,1974 at the conclusien of the inspection.

Items discussed and personnel in attendance were as follevs:

Licensee Reoresentatives J. Herbein, Station Superintendent, Met-Ed G. Miller, Test Superintendent, CPUSC M. Stremberg, Site Auditer, GPUSC T. Sturgeon, QA Specialist, GPUSC RO:I Renresentative L. Spessard 1448 00L6

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DETAILS

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Persons Contacted Metrocolitan Ediser Ceccany, J. iterbein, Station Superintendent J. Floyd, Supervisor of Ope. tions J. Wallace, Shift Supervisor

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M. Ross,

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R. Porter,

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i. Beers, General Public Utilit'es Service-Corporation J. Barton, Startup a:.d Test Manager

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G. Miller, Test Superintendent

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R. Toole, Assistant Test Superintendent

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H. Nelson, Technical Engineer W. Behrle, HFT and PET Pros am Coordinator T. Faulkner, Senior Test Planner S. Poje, Shif t Test Engineer

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T. Hawkins, "

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Preoperational Test Procedures

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Status of Test Procedure Approval *

Based on a review of records and discussions with cognizant

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licensee representatives, the inspector deternined that TP150/3 and SP267/5 had been approved for performance by the TEG and TP302/1 had been deleted frcs the MTX by TCH-44 which w.s approved by the TEG. With respect to TP302/1, the espability of the in-core monitor chopper is to be demonstrated and witnessed at the vendor's shop on March 20, 1974, and delivery of the chopper to the Three Mile Island site is scheduled t'or late April 1974. All preoperational test procedures have been approved for perfornance.

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Status of Pre: erational Testine Preoperational Tests Cenpleted and Accepted 32%

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Under Review 12%

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in Progress 36%

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not Started 20%

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RO Inspection Report No. 50-289/74-02, Paragraph 2.a.

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RO:I Review of Completed Precocrational Tests The inspector conducted a detailed review of the following completed preoperational test procedures (Official Field Copy)

which have been accepted by the licransee:

TP401/1 Diesel Generator Startup Test TP203/4 Decay Heat Renoval System Functional Test TPl72/2B Centrol Building Ventilation System Functional Test, Part B Chilled Uater TP200/6 Reactor Coolant Pump Initial Operation Test SP123.8 In-Core Detector Hardling Tests TP301/3A Nuclear Instrumentation Pre-Op, Calibration (Source Range)

TP301/3B (Intermediate Range)

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TP301/3C (Power Range)

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TP204/3 Reactor Building Spray System Functional Test TP600/1 Unit Heatup Test

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No apparent deficiencies relative to Test Instructio-, No. 9 and 18 were identified, test requirements were satisfactorily performed, and test results were satisfactory with the following exceptions:

l gy (1) TP203/4

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The acceptance criterion for pump DH-P1B recirculation flow

. D/P at shut off head, as stated in the TP (Step 11.1.2.13)

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Data recorded in the TP for this was 250 + 15 ft.

condition (Step 10.1.2.13.a) was 232 ft.

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This variance

was not identified as an exception, and its evaluation, if any, was not documented. Additionally, the inspector questioned the pu=p flow curve for bath pumps, as drawn in

Enclosure 3 of the TP, in that test data recorded in the TP did not appear to be fully supportive.

For example, data at

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shutoff head conditions with recirculation flow were actually about 7 f t. below the design curve (418 f t. H O), but had been

plotted slightly above the design curve, and data for pump flow conditions of abcut 3000 gpm were plotted above the H O), but data for this condition were design curve (352 f t.

no.t contained in the TP.

Data for intermediate points were plotted correctly.

These items were discussed with cognizt-.t licensee representatives, and following their review the inspector was infor=ed tF_t the data at shutof f head conditions had been plotted incorrectly, that data obtained for the 3000 gpm flow conditions including the flow path used had apparently nit been included in the TP, 1948 008

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and that the variance relative to recirculation. flow D/P

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was an apparent oversight.

The representatives were in-formed that these items constituted a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, which requires test results to be documented and evaluated to assure that test requirements have been satisfied.

The repr. entatives stated that the test results were considered to be acceptable.

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(2) TPl72/23 In steps 9.1.2.5 and 9.2.2.6 of the TP Purge System Tests for Chillers AH-C-4A/4B are performed, and following Steps 9.1.2.5.c and 9.2.2.e.c is a caution state =ent relative to condenser pressure, which states "0SSERVE CONDENSER PRESSURE

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GAUGE. DO NOT EXCEED 9 PSIG CONDENSER PRESSURE." Con-denser pressure is recorded in Steps 10.1.2.5.b.4 and

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10.2.2.6.b.4 of the TP; however, acceptance criteria relative to the Purge System Tests stated in Section 11 of the TP do not address condenser pressure, but do address temperature different il between condenser saturatien temperature and flow conttol chamber temperature. Data recorded in Steps

,s 10.1.2.5.b.4 and 10.2.2.6.b.4 indicated acceptance criteria i

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(temperature differential)'were met; however, condenser pressure recorded in Step 10.1.2.5.b.4 was 10 psig which exceeded the limit established by the caution statement.

- This variance was not identified and its evaluation, if any, was not documented.

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This matter was discussed with cognizant licensee represent-atives, and after their reciew the inspector wc inforced of the following: During the Chiller AH-C-4A Purge Syste= Test, the temperature differential was such that Steps 9.1.2.5.c, d. and e did not have to be perfor=ed, and the caution statements, which follows Stt 9.1.2.5.c, was apparently overlooked; the caution limit of 9 psig was incorrect and should have been < 15 psig; and lack of acceptance criteria relative to condenser pressure was an oversight.

The licensae representativas were infor ed that this =atter constituted a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, which requires a test program to be performed in accordance with written test procedures which incorporate acceptance limits contained in applicable design documents and test results to be evaluated to assure that test require =ents have been satisfied.

The r presentatives stated that the test results were considered to be acceptable.

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'00R BRGINAL (3) SP123.8

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The purpose of this test was to determine the suitability of the path which had been designed to provide for the replacecent of failed In-core Monitor Detectors. The design path was from EL 305' of the Intermediate Building via a guide assembly to and thru the In-core Reactor Building Penetration (about EL 355' ) to the cable guide ttbes. The test results disclor,ed that this prth was unac'ceptable, and a field change request (FCR 9308) was

issued to correct this deficiency.

The proposed fix is to relocate the guide assembly so that the cable is fed from the turbine floor, which is the sace elevation as the Reactor Buildic.

etration.

FCR #308 is not expected to be completed pa closing the Reactor Building, so the

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first opportunity to test the method will be durin the c

first refueling. The inspector made a visual inspecticn of the design path and the new proposed path. Based on these

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observations, the inspector concluded that the proposed path provided easier access to the penetration and that to demonstrate the suitability of the proposed path by testing should not be a problem. The licensee representatives were

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on this catter at; this time.

The inspector verified that the following completed preoperational test prccedures (Official Field Copy) have been accepted by the licensee in accordance with the requirecents of the Test Manual:

J TP254/2 Nitrogen Supply System Functional Test TP210/12, Part 2 Nuclear Chemical Addition System Functional Test SP320/1 Integrated Control System Pre-Op. Calibration F1106/4 Aux Boiler Functional Verification d.

RO:I Review of the Performance of Preoperatioral Tests (1) TP600/ll Emercency Feed Svstem and OTSG Level Control Test This test was conducted as part of the Hot Functional Test Program, and its purpose was to verify operations of the E=ergency Feedwater System and the Integration Control Systen in accordance with desip.

The inspector w_tnessed the perfor=ance of Section 9.4 of this procedure namely the demonstration of the steam driven emergency feedwater pu=p to pump emergency feedwater to the hot OTSG's at a pressure of 1015 psig.

Sections 9.1-9.3 and part of Section 9.5 of the procedure had been completed 1448 010

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prior to the testing witnessed by the inspector.

Also, Section 9.4 had been previously conducted; however, a steam leak prohibited personnel fro = obtaining the required flow data from local instrumentation so a retest was necessary.

The inspector's observations included perforcance of the Shif t Test Engineers and Met Ed shif t personnel before, during aad after test perfor=ance, heatup of the Reactor Coolant System to establish test conditions, plant response during t est perfor=ance (two atteepts were =ade to accomplish test requirements), and a visual inspection of the Etargency Feedwater and > bin Ste m Systets. Additionally, the inspector reviewed the Official Field Copy of TP600/ll. The inspector's findings were as follows:

(a) No deficiencies relative,to Test Instruction No. 9

were idettified.

(b) The test requirecent contained in Section 9.4 of the procedure was not verified because of operability i

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problems with valves in the > bin Steam and E=ergency Feedwater Systems and packing problems on the steam driven emergency feedwater pump. Additionally, during the second testing atte=pt, the two 3x6 inch Main Steam Safety Valves (Setpoint 1040 psig) apparently lifted-prematurely and then resented. The setpoint of all ' bin

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Steam Safety Valves had been tested prior to this test.

These problems were documented in accordance with Test Instruction No. 9.

(c) Raw test data indicated that test requirements con-tained in Sections 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, and 9.5 of the pro-cedure had been verified.

Resolution of identified problems and uncompleted test require-ments contained in Sections 9.4 and 9.6 (deconstration of the stess driven e=ergency feedwater puri to operate at 15.2 psig steam throttle conditions and pump 370 gpm at 190 feet TDH)

of the procedw were discussed with cc.nizant licen 2e representatives.

The inspector was informet af the following:

(a) Valves MS-V10 A & B have a torque switch problem (setting provides too much force to close).

This problem will be cort. cted following plant cooldown, and the valves will be retested during the post fuel loa-precritical testing program to verify proper stroke with full D/P.

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(b) The steam driven ecergency feedwater pucp wil be checked for proper shaf t aligntent with adjustments made as required following plant colddown, and pump performance using auxiliary steam will be verified prior to fuel loading.

Additionally, Sections 9.4 and 9.6 of TP600/11 including demonstration of emergency feedwater pump acceleration time to governor speed (<30 seconds) will be rerun during the post fuel load precritical testing program to verify outstanding test requirements.

(c) The setpoint of all Main Steam Safety Valvcs will be checked end reset as required during the post fuel load

precritical testing program.

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(d) The proposed testing diskussed in (a), (b), and (c) above

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is subject to the review and approval of the TUG since raw test data has not reviewed by this orgcnization.

The inspector informed the licensee representatives that he (~1 had no further questions on the proposcd testing progran at this time and that data obtained during this testing would

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be reviewed during subsequent RO inspections following review and acceptance by the TWG.

(2) TP800/36 (EFT) Shutdown From Outside The Control Roon As Modified For Hot Functional Testine The purpose of this procedure was to deconstrate the ability to cool down the plant with control of all necessary systems remote from the Control Room and to familiarize the operating personnel with the basic method to accomplish the cooldcun as established by Emergency Procedure No. 1202-37.

Addi-tionally, during the Initial Startup Testing Program, this test will be conducted at a reactor power level of 15%.

Prior to the performance of this test the inspector reviewed TR800/36 (EFT) and discussed the test require =ents, which included a dry run of these requirecents, with cognizant licensee representatives.

During these discussions, particular attention was given to operator actions both inside and outside the Control Rocm and plant design features (control capability an/ instruce ration) recote to the Contr-Room, as described in Section 7.4.6 of the FSAR.

The inspector's findings and licensee representative's committents, as appropriate, were as folicws:

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(a) No deficiencies were identified with respect to the test requirements of TPS00/36 (HFT).

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(b) Operator actions prior to departing the Control Room could be accomplished fron outside the Control Roem in the unlikely event that it beca=e necessary to do

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Cognizant licensee representatives stated that Emergency Procedure NO. EP 1202-37 would be revised to provide alternate actions from outside the Control Room for those operator actions nor= ally taken prior to departing the Control Roem.

(c) Ins'trumentation for vital plant parameters lectted at

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the alternate control station consisted of a digital readout syste with corresponding conversion graphs.

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Cognizant licensee representatives stated that appro-priate indicators were on order and should be installed by June 1, 1974.

Additionally, interim measures con-sisting of periodic cocpc ' son checks are to be instituted for this temporary instru:aentation until the percanent m(j instrumentation is installed.

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The inspector witnessed the performance of this test from both the Control Room and the alternate control station..

- No deficiencies relative to Test Instruction Nc 9 were identified, and the test was performed in a safe and orderly r:anner.

For test purposes the operating Reactor Coolant Pu=ps (RC-PlA, B & C) and the operating Makeup Pump (MU-P1B)

were not tripped prior to evacuating the Control Room.

Operator actions prior to departing the Control Room were performed in a slow, deliberate manner and were accomplished in 49 seconde (obtained by stop watch).

The test was initiated at a Reactor Coolant System temperature of 510 F and the cooldom was terminated af ter 45 minutes when this temperature

reached 470 F.

During this test various cooldown rates were established to det.'nstrate adequacy of controlincluding the ability r.o s abilize lant conditions.

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Initial Startuo Test Procedures Based on a review of records and discussions with cognizant licensee representatives, the inspector determined that all of these procedures were preliminary and/or final approved. The epresentative statt.d all procedures would be final approved by March 31, 1974.

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.er's (STE) Log Book The inspector reviewed the contents of this log for the period February 1-27, 1974.

No deficiencies relative to Test Instruction No. 17 were identified.

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ECCS Testing Procram Based on a r'eview of c.ttinent preoperational test procedures, the incpector observed that previous licensee co==itr2nts to R0:1, as described in RO Inspection Report No. 50-289/73-22, Paragraph 3.f,

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had been completed or had been included in a procedure which was

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scheduled for performance following cooldown from hot functional testing.

Licensee representatives were inforned by the inspector that be nad no further questions on this matter at this time.

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Hot Functional Testine Program

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During this RO inspection, Phase VI (5320F, 2155 psig testing) was in progi s and co-pleted and Phase VII (Second RCS Cooldown) was initiated.

Plant conditions and Met Ed shift pi sonriel were observed

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by the inspector on various occasions during the inspection, and the activities observed were accomplished in a safe and orderly manner.

Inspc~ction find 4.ngs relative to specific tests witnessed 1.y the inspector were previously discussed in Paragraph 2.d,(1) and (2).

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The overall results of the program at the time of this R0 inspection were discussed with cognizant lice ~nsee representatives, and the infor-c. tion provided to the inspector is ccasidered o be preliminary

'since th.se test results had not been reviewed oy the TWG. The overall results appear to be satisfactory; however, the following deficiencies have been identified.

a.

The letdown isolation valve (MU-V3) will not fully close above 1550 PSID.

This is an air operated valve, and a design change (add a stiffer spring) is to be made following cooldown from hot functional testing.

This valve will be retested during the post fuel load precritical testing progr. a to verify closure against maxi =um operational differential pressure.

b.

Problems were identified with components in the E=ergency Feed-water System.

These problems and the retest requirements were previously discussed in Paragraph 2.d.(1).

c.

Insulation on the Pressurizer h ad has been found to b-inadequate by tc r.perature profile ceasure=ents and heat loss calcu' atiens,

i.e., tecperatures in the range of 180-2000F have been experit.nced

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versus a design of 140 F.

This has caused operating problems with isolation valve (RC-V2).

The insulation require ents have 1448 J14

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been re-evaluated by GAI, and modifications will be made following

cooldown from hot functional testing.

Hear loss tests will be rerun during the post fuel load precritic; testing progra: to verify adequacy of the modifications.

d.

Problems relative to pipe hangers and restraints were identified and corrected as they occurred.

There are approximately 100 restraints which have not been installed. These will be installed,

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and the current program will be continued during the post fuel load precritical testing and the power ascension testing progracs.

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With respect to the control rod drivc system, certcin position

in teation tubes have been identified as proble=s and one CRD motor stator has failed.

These items are to be corrected following cooldown f rom hot functional testing, and -during this period

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a program involving teggar tests of additional CRD motors is to be co=pleted.

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F.eactor Coolant Pump (RC-PlD) was tagged out prior to co pletion of hot functional testing because of excessive vibration.

Final balcncing of this pump and the remaining 3 pu=ps, if necessary,

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will be accomplished during the post fuel load precritical testi.'s program.

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The inspector inforced the licensee representatives that he had no further questions on the identified deficiencies and the proposed testing program at this ti=e and that the hot functional test results would be reviewed during subsequent RO inspections fol.i.oving review and acceptance by the TWG.

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