IR 05000289/1973007
| ML19256D491 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 08/27/1973 |
| From: | Folsom S, Howard E, Tillou J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19256D488 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-289-73-07, 50-289-73-7, NUDOCS 7910180816 | |
| Download: ML19256D491 (11) | |
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U. S. ATO !IC ENERGY C0:0!ISSION DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY OPERATIONS
REGION I
RO Inspection Report No.:
289/73-07 Docket No.: 50-289
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Licensee:
Metronolitan Edison Company License No.: CPPR-40 P. O. Box 542 Priority:
Reading, Pennsv1vania 19603 Category:
B Midd'etown, Pennsylvania (Three Mile Island 1)
Location: j
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Type of Inspection: Routine, Unannounced Dates of Inspection: July 23-25, 1973 Dates of Previous Inspection:
June 26-28, 1973 8 I/ 73 Reporting Inspector:
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Seth A. Folsom, Reactor Inspector DATE DATE
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c-Accompanying Inspectors: N\\1 // ) <Yr.. -
f-7/-7.3 DATE J. H. Tillou, Senior Inc actor, Facility Construction & Engineering Support Branch DATE
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Other Accompanying Personnel:
ncne DATE Reviewed By:
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Emru,G f-27-73 G
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E. M. Howard, Chief, Facility DATE Construction & Engineering Support Branch
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SU?OLiRY OF FI?!DT::GS Enforcement Action None Licensee Action on Previous 1v Identified Enforcement 'datters A.
All items listed in Mr. J. G. Miller's May 15, l973 letter to Mr.
J. P. O'Reilly were resolved during the inspection.
( De ta ils,
Paragraph 2)
Desien Channes
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None
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Unusual Occurrences None G
Other Sienificant Findings A.
Current Findines
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1.
The exterior surfaces of the containment concrete have grease spots in 30 locations, indicating leakage of filler caterial from the tendon sheathing.
(Details, Paragraph 3)
2.
The containment tendon tensioning program is continuing, with all vertical and done tendons tensioned, and w'.th 60 of the horizontal tendons tensioned. Some of the bear. Tg plar.es have been displaced up to 0.143" during tensioning.
% tails,
Paragraph 4)
3.
The dredging of the silt from the river pump intakt was cor-tinuing, and was expected to be completed in Septenber, 1973.
One of the river pump motors has burned out twice.
(Details, Paragraph 7)
B.
Status of Previous 1v Reported Unresolved Items 1.
The review of the dynamic stress calculations on the main steam safety and relief valves has been completed, and field changes to the piping completed.
This item is resolved.
(Details, Paragraph 5)
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A total of 63 of the 65 safety-related valves had been measured for vall th! '<. ness, employing an ultrasonic measuring technique with a 17'. accuracy.
The personnel performing the work were qual-ified in accordance with AS"T-TC-lA.
The details and records were available at the site.
Fifteen measurements were made on each valve in accordance with standard valve measurement loca-tion sketches.
No deficiencies were identified.
/ Details, Paragraph 6)
'ianacement Interview The management interview was held at the site on July 25, 1973.
Personnel Attending General Public Utilities Service Comoany
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Mr. G. L. Kopp, Quality Assurance Specialist Mr. J. A. Renshaw, Quality Assurance Specialist Mr. W. S. Shepherd, Project Site Manager (Acting)
Mr. M. J. Stromberg, Site Quality Assurance Auditor e
Mr. J. E. Wright, Site Quality Assurance Managt r Mr. J. H. Wright, Resident Civil Engineer Burne & Roe Mr. D. McAfee, Quality Assurance Engineer, Mechenical Mr. M. G. Pace, Quality Assurance Engineer, Civil United Engineers & Constructors Mr. V. E. Cichocki, QA/QC Coordinating Superintendent Mr. R.
L. Hawkins, Quality Assurance Engineer Mr. D. C. Lambe rt, Field Supervisor, Quality Control Mr. B. E. O'Connor, Quality Control Engineer, Documentation Mr. J. Spinak, Lead Quality Assurance Engineer The following items were discussed. Note that the Management Interviews for Units 1 and 2 were held concurrently but are reported separately.
The following are Unit 1 items:
A.
The inspector stated that he had found that the safety-related valve wall thickness verification program was incomplete since only 63 out of a total of 65 valve records were available for examination.
The licensee stated that the records for the two remaining valves were now available ac the site, and would be shown to the inspec-tor at the conclusion of the Management Interview.
This was found O
later te be inaccurate since the records could not be produced for the inspector's review.
(Derails, Paragraph 6)
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The inspector stated that he had been inforced that there were no plans to determine the quality of the concrete behind the tendon bearings plates which had shown as much as 0.143" displacement during tensioning.
He repeated his previous request for an engi-neering justification for the 0.250" maximum displacement specified in the tendon tensioning manual.
The licensee stated that the archi-tect-engineer had confirmed the basis for this tolerance, and had proposed surveillance of further displacement of the three bear-ing platec which exhibited the greatest displacement.
This surveil-lance would continue through the Containment Structural Integrity Test. No other investigation work was planned.
(Details, Paragraph 4)
C.
The inspector stc;ed that during this inspection he had examined the status of some of the previously identified items, and the following were now considered resolved:
1.
Review of dynamic stress calculations on =ain steam safety and relief valves.
(Details, Paragraph 5)
2.
All items listed in Mr. J. G. Miller's letter of FMy 15, 1973 to Mr. J. P. O'Reilly.
The licensee acknowledged this information.
(Details, Paragraph 2)
D.
The inspector stated that the containment grease leakage problem had been examined during the inspection, and that this would be carried as an unresolved item.
The licensee' acknowledged this infor=ation.
(Details, Paragraph 3)
E.
The inspector asked that he be notified when the initial fuel charge arrives. The licensee agreed to do this.
F.
The inspector asked whether the licensee had been informed by Licens-ing as to the acceptability of the terminal strips in the cable spreader room, and the location of the " clean" instrument power motor-generator set.
The licensee stated that there had been no coc=unica-tion with Licensing on these subjects.
G.
The inspect'or stated that it had been reported that one of the river pump motors, No. EJ-17 had burned out twice, and asked whether the intake structure silting was a factor. The licensee stated these were considered separate problems.
The.nspector stated that this would be carried as an unresolved item.
(Details., 'aragraph 7)
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The Managecent Interviews for Units 1 and 2 were held concurrently, O
but would be reported separately.
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O DETAI LS
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1.
Persons Contacted General Public Utilities Cc=nanv Mr. F. Ge==inger, Quality Assurance Engineer Mr. G. L. Kopp, Quality Assurance Specialist Mr. P. Levine, Quality Assurance Engineer Mr. R. Neidig, Assistant Project Engineer Mr. J. A. Renshaw, Quality Assurance Specialist Mr. A. Salcido, Quality Assurance Engineer Mr. W. S. Shepherd, Project Site Manager (Ac ting)
Mr. M. J. Strc= berg, Site Quality Assurance Auditor Mr. J. E. Wright, Site Quality Assurance Manager
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Mr. J. H. Wright, Resident Civil Engineer Burns & Roe O
Mr. D. McAfee, Quality Assurance Engineer, Mechanical Mr. M. G. Face, Qualit:.. rance Engineer, Civil United Enaineers & Constr _cors Mr. F. Aldrich, Piping Supervisor Mr. M. Byers, Quality Control Engineer, Welding Mr. V. E. Cichocki, QA/QC Coordinating Superintendent Mr. L. Dozier, Assistant Piping Superintendent Mr. J. Gilley, Quality Control, Records Mr. W. Carney, Senior Quality Control Engineer, Welding Mr. R. L. Hawkins, Quality Assurance Engineer Mr. D. C. Lambert, Field Supervisor, Quality Control Mr. R. Mason, Site Job Engineer Mr. B. E. O'Connor, Quality Control Engineer, Documentation Mr. J. Schmidt, Quality Control Records Mr. J. Spinak, Lead Quality Assurance Engineer Mr. S. Suggs, Piping Superintendent 2.
The following items contained in Mr. J. G. Miller's letter of May 15, 1773 to Mr. J. P. O'Reilly were resolved during the inspection based upon an examination of the procedures, fie?d i:aplacentation, and re-cords by the inspector.
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The reported failure to notify RO of itees damared in the June, 1972 flood was found to be due to a misunderstanding as to which items were damaged by the flood, and those damaged by the rains preceding the flood.
2.
Field observations of separation of safeguards cables under con-soles CC and CR indicate that cable separation now conforms to the specification requirements.
3.
Procedure NCP-22, has been revised April 16, 1973, to include in paragraphs 4.2, 5.4, 6.1 the quantitative acceptance criteria for process instrument sensors and associated lines.
4.
The UE&C Procedure No. QC-15 has been revised May 3,1973 to include requirements for quarterly field audits of listed tools, gages, and instrucents and to include check lists to record whether the intent of the procedure had been satisfactorily ac-complished.
The inspector examined the records of three recent audits of conforr:nce to this procedure.
5.
The UE&C Procedure ECP-10 and its implementation was reviewed by G
the inspector in the field.
Surveillance of stored and installed
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electrical equiptent was being maintained. The quality control records were confirmed by examination of tags on representative motors and related equipment in the field.
6.
Procedure ECP-6 has been revised on June 11, 1973 to require notifi-cation of the Quality Control Supervisor prior to the initial start of installation of engineered safeguards equipment.
7.
The maintenance, including rotation and lubrication of stored and installed safeguards =otors has been revised. Complete lists of motors and their maintenance status are being naintained. The inspector examined the quality control records and compared them with the status tags in the field.
3.
The licensee had notified the inspector on July 20, 1973 that grease spots had been observed at various locations on the exterior surfaces of the containment.
The grease was believed to be emanating frem vertical hair line cracks in the concrete, and appeared to be the tendon filler material which had been pumped into all vertical ten-dons. At this inspection, each of the grease spots was examined by the inspector.
Leakage appeared to be minimal and some of the leaks appeared to have stopped.
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-6-The licensee had a program of charting the location and size of each grease spot, in an effort to determine the probable cause.
An in-vestigation of the tendon filler material used was also underway.
It greasing of the tensioned dome and horizontal tendons delayed pending completion of the grease leak investigation.
This will be carried as an unresolved item.
4.
The 20" by 20" bearing plates in the contain=ent tendon tensioning syste= were fotnd by the licensee to have been deflected into the surrounding concrete, in some instances, during tendon tensioning.
The deflection, measured by dial indicating gages on two sides of the bearing plate, was 0.143" in one instance, and several were found to exceed 0.100".
The Inland-Ryerson Tendon Tensioning Spec-ification permitted a maximum deflection of 0.25".
At the previous inspection, the inspector questioned the validity of this specifica-tion, and asked the licensee if it was planned to investigate the
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reason for the tendon deflection.
The licensee at that time said that this would be considered.
At this inspection the licensee stated that the architect-engineer G
had evaluated the bearing plate deflection and in a letter of July 11, 1973 to the licensee had stated that the 0.25" maximum deflec-tion was satisfactory.
The letter concluded with the following,
"However, for additional assurance that we do not have a problem behind these bearing plates, we recommend that three (3) of the plates with the highest deflectica be selected and monitored until after the Structural Integrity Test.
Measure =ents should be made and recorded to indicate any change in the bearing plate relative to the surrounding concrete".
The inspector questioned the wisdom of waiting until the completion of the Structural Integrity Test to insure the integrity of the concrete, and strongly urged that the licensee re-examine the posi-tion taken on this matter. No change in the licensee's position was indicated during the inspection.
The tendon tensioning program was continuing. At the time of the inspection, all vertical and dcme tendons had been tensioned, and 60 of the horizontal tendons had been tensioned.
5.
During a previous inspection the licensee had been recuestad to provide documentation to show that dynamic stress calculations had been parformed on the design of the main steam piping and relief values, including the pressurizer relief valve. At this inspec-tion the licensee provided a letter dated June 21, 1973 from the O
architect-engineer which stated "Furthermore, the stress analysis for each system has been done end the results indicate that the thermal stresses and combined stresses due to seismic, deadload, internal pressure and safety valve reaction are within the allowable values stipulated in USAS B31.1."
This item is resolved.
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The Three Mile Island site valve wall thickness measurerent progra=
vas accomplished by the CONAM Testing Laboratory according to their procedure No. NIP-016 Revision 2, "UT Wall Measurecent of Nuclear Reactor Piping System Valves" (9-1-72).
The measure =ents were made utilizing a Sperry Reflect-o-scope Model UM-721 Model 50B721 with a digital readout codule and barium titanate transducers in ranges of 5 to 15 G.
Calibration standards in ranges from 0.100 to 3.50 inches were prepared from 304 cast stainless steel, 316 forged stain-less steel, and cast carbon steel with equipment recalibration re-quired for each valve in the anticipated thickness range for the material used. Accuracy of the readings by ultrasonic techniques was verified by Mandel-panoff-Roclniell Associates to be within 17..
All CONAM personnel were qualified in accordance with the CONAM procedure number CUT-P-1 to-ceet the require =ents of ASNT-TC-lA, in addition to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of special training, and a performance qualifi-cation test for reliability in conducting valve wall ceasurecents.
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The CONAM valve wall thickness inspection sheets included a Polaroid rhoto of each valve, the standard layout for reasurc= nt locations of the most suspect areas of globe, gate, check or safety / relief valves.
These covered the body and bonnet, in addition to the in-
let and outlet nozzle pressure boundaries.
The work accc=plished on installed valves and other valves in the warehouse, appeared to have been perforced in a professional and reliable manner.
Certain valves which had not been delivered by the supplier, or which were in the warehouse and were not yet uncrated, were returned to the supplier and were in accordance with the requirements of the purchase order.
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MPR Associates had conducted a comparative evaluation of UT ceasure-ments against the direct micrometer =easurecents on eleven valves, sizes 2" to 12", and these included samples of globe, gate, check and safety valves in both stainless steel and carbon steel.
The UT error produced an average of 4 percent, always in the conserva-tive direction. By calculation of the standard deviation of the UT ceasurements from the direct micrometer ceasuremencs a maximum error of 5 percent is obtained. When this standard deviation of 5 percent (based on a two sigma banduidth) is related to the average UT error of 4 percent in the conservative direction, the maximum deviation of the UT error from the direct measurement will be 1 per-cent which is less than the required AEC 2 parcent, and the UT data may therefore be utilized with no correction factor.
The entire program is documented in a MPa Associates letter dated January 25, 1973 entitled " Justification for As-measured Valve Thicknessr s Without Applying a Correction Factor.
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A listing of all Category I valves in the reactor coolant pressure boundary,1" in diameter and larger, was prepared by Gilbert Associ-ates the Architect-Engineer; and B&W the NSSS Contractor.
This list-ing including the tag or identification number, the size and type valve, the supplier, the code, the pressure rating, the systdm pres-sure and temperature, and the minimum specified wall thickness re-quirements. This list includes 65 valves to be measured.
Documents were available and revieued by the inspector which covered the qualification of each UT inspection technician.
In accorde.nce with CONAM procedure No. CUT-P-1 " Procedure for Certifying the UT Personnel" the inspector verified that qualification according to this procedure would produce proficiency equal to, or in excess of, that required by ASNT-TC-1A qualification.
Detailed records and documentation was produced covering ( ' of the 65 valves, the documentation reviewed included:
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Valve wall thickness inspection sheets b.
A photo of each measured valve Identification of calibration standard used for each valve c.
d.
Standard layout sketches showing the precise location for each UT measurement and globe, gate, check, and safety / relief valves it was.noted that these sketches require measurements of the most " suspect" areas of the body, bonnet, inlet and out-let nozzle pressure boundary area.
e.
Vendor documentation and valve wall thickness me trements for 9 Dresser globe valves, 2 Crane Chapman 10" coack valves, 7 Crane Chapman 2-l/2" stop and check valves, and 1 Crane Chap-man 4" check valve.
f.
United Engineers and Constructors vendor inspection records and vendor releases verifying the wall thickness measurements as supplied by the vendor in his documentation with each valve.
The records covering the Dresser 2" valve No. RCV 9.3 and Dresser 2" valve No. RCN-21 were stated to be Onsite" but cou?d not be produced for the inspector's audit.
Therefore contrary to statements made during the exit interview the valve wall thick-ness program at Three Mile Island is incomplete until these two valves listed on the valve master sheet are properly documented and reviewed by an RO:I inspector.
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The river pump intake was found to be heavily silted when the cof ferdan logs were removed in Dece=ber, 1972. A program of dredging in the intake area had been started, and was expected to continue through September, 1973. The dredging operation was encountering only silt, 1th no rocks or other large objects.
The electric motor on River Water Pump IC burned out on '!ay 15, 1973, and folicwing repairs burned out again on July 19, 1973.
The burnout had been ascribed to a faulty motor winding, and not to the pressure of silt in the intake.
This appeared to be con-firmed by the fact that the other 17 pumps in the intake screen house had been operating without difficulty, and with normal amperage. This will be carried as an unresolved item.
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