IR 05000286/1979023
| ML19323H154 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 02/27/1980 |
| From: | Jerrica Johnson, Kister H, Rebelowski J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19064A091 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-286-79-23, NUDOCS 8006120147 | |
| Download: ML19323H154 (18) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMiilSSION i
0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No. 50-286/79-23 Docket No. 50-286 Category C
License No. DPR-64 Priority
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Licensee: Power Authority of the State of New York
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10 Columbus Circle New York, New York 10019 Facility Name: Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3 Inspection at: Buchanan, New York Inspection conducted: September 30 - October 27, 1979 Inspectors / fM d 17'hO rJ. Reb loQski, Resident Inspector date signed W
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J.' Johnson, Reactor Inspector date signed
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date signed
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Approved by: W /
N2 M d I-MTh H. Kister, Chief, Reactor Projects Section date signed No. 4, RO&NS Branch Inspection Summary:
Inspection on September 30 - October 27, 1979 (Report No. 50-286/79-23)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of plant operations including:
log and record reviews; tours of the facility; observation of refueling activities; observation of maintenance activities; review and observation of steam generator supports; witnessing of surveillance testing; observation of physical security;Bulletin 79-14 observations; emergency planning operation and independent inspec-tion effort in area of containment spray actuation. The inspection involved 75 inspector-hours by the resident inspectors.
Results: Of the ten areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were found in seven areas; three apparent items of noncompliance were found in three areas (Infraction - Access control; Infraction - Failure to adhere to procedure; Deficiency - Failure to remove identified combustibles).
Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted J. Bayne, Resident Manager J. Dube, Security and Safety Supervisor D. Halam; Site Quality Assurance Engineer W. Hamlin, Assistant to Resident Manager W. Hutchinson, QA Engineer J. Kelly, Rad and Environmental Superintendent W. Josiger, Technical Services Superintendent E. Tagliamonte, Operations Superintendent J. Vignola, Maintenance Superintendent S. Zulla, Superintendent of Power 2.
Review of Plant Operations a.
Shift Logs and Operating Records The inspector reviewed the following logs and records for the period September 1-30, 1979:
Senior Reactor Operators Log
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Jumper Log
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Significant Occurrence Reports
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Flux Difference Log Sheets
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Reactor Coolant Leakage Surveillance Sheets
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Rod Position Indication Sheets
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Thennal Power Calculation Sheets
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Containment Leakage Calculation Sheets
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High Radiation Area Locked Gate List
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Control Room Log Sheets
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Conventional Area Log Sheets
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Nuclear Area Log Sheets
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Chemistry Log
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The logs and records were reviewed to verify the following items:
Log hook reviews are being conducted by the staff.
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Instructions in the Night Order Book did not conflict with Technical
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Specifications.
Significant Occurrence Reports confirm compliance with Technical
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Specification reporting and LC0 requirements.
Log book entries involving abnormal conditions are sufficiently
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detailed.
Acceptance criteria for the above review includad:
Technical Specifications
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Station Administrative Procedures
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Applicable Parts of the Code of Federal Regulations
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Facility Procedures
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Inspector Judgement
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
b.
Plant Tour At various times during the inspection, the inspector toured the following accessible plant areas-Control Room / Control Building
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Fuel Handling Building
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Auxiliary Feed Pump Building
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Turbine Building
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Transformer Yard
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Containment Building
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The following observation / determinations were made:
Radiation protection controls:
step-off pads, storage / disposal
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of protective clothing, and control of high radiation areas were observed for adequacy in all areas toured.
Fluid leaks: all areas toured were examined for evidence of
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excessive fluid leaks.
Piping vibrations:
all areas toured were examined for evidence
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of excessive piping vibration.
Control Room and Nuclear Plant manning:
these areas were observed
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to determine compliance with regulatory requirements.
Selected valve positions / equipment start positions were observed.
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Discussions with watch personnel pertaining to reasons for selected
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lighted annunciators:
the SR0 was questioned to determine if he was knowledgeable of the reasons for all lighted annunciators.
Seismic restraint oil levels: a sampling of plant hydraulic
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restraints was performed.
Monitoring instrumentation: Control Room instrumentation including
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radiation monitoring, nuclear instrumentation, and SI lineups were observed.
Plant housekeeping conditions / cleanliness were noted.
(See
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Paragraph c.)
LSSS/LCO: eouipment status or operating parameters were observed
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for conformance to the LSSS/LC0 requirements.
Shift turnovers of control room operators and watch supervisors
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were observed on regular and back shifts.
Fire fighting and emergency equipment for operability.
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Acceptance criteria for the above items included:
Technical Specifications Table 6.2.1
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AP-10, Work Permits, Radiation Exposure Authorizations, Operating
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Orders AP-21.5, Confines of the Control Room
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AP-27.2, Housekeeping
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AP-27.3, Fire Protection
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Inspector Judgement
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c.
Control of Combustibles The licensee describes his management policies in the area of Housekeeping in Administrative Procedure 27.2 and Fire Protection in Administrative Procedure 27.3.
During tours of the plant the following examples of items observed by the inspector were:
(1) Six barrels of residual diesel lubrication oil (open covers) were found stored in the control building - Elevation 15'-480V switch-gear room.
(2) Combustibles in the form of oil soaked absorbent pads and rolls of flammable absorbent pads were found in the diesel generator rooms. Also, two barrels of residual oil and plastic transfer hoses were not properly stored.
(3) The oil storage room in the turbine hall was found to contain combustibles (empty paper cartons).
(4) Control Room Panels - back boards - accumulation of papers, cigarette wrappings (combustible), loose screws and fuses (possible shorting of circuitry), and remnants of wirirg used during instru-ment modifications were observed, i
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These examples of lack of management control of combustibles is consi-dered an item of noncompliance at the deficiency level in that, licensee did not implement the requirements of Administrative Procedure 27.3, Paragraph 5, which addresses Combustible Material Control (50-286/79-23-03).
3.
Refueling Activities The inspector witnessed the Fuel Handling Activities on October 6, 1979.
a.
Pre-Fuel Handling Activities The inspector reviewed and verified that surveillance testing involving the following pre-fueling had been completed.
3 PTR 30 FSB R-5 Monitor 3 PTR 32D HEP and Charcoal Filter Test 3 PTR 32C Fan Testing Check List 3 PTR 32 Charcoal Absorber Filter Test 3 PTR 32A HEPA Filter Efficiency 3 PTR 51 FSB Air Filtration System Inspection These systems involved Fuel Storage Emergency Ventilation System, Control Room Air Filtration System, 6ad Containment Air Filtration System.
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b.
Fuel Handling Activities The inspector observed the handling of five fuel cells and included the following movements:
From initial core position to sp9nt fuel pool; from initial' core position to new position in core; and, associated use of upenders and operation of fuel canal operations.
The following observations were notea-(1) Refueling procedures were available in Control Room and Containment with proper changes annotated.
(2) Core maps, status boards, and status sheets were observed sd in use by refueling crew.
(3) Reactor components were protected.
Properly racked head bolts were observed and storage of internals were satisfactory.
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(4) Prior to the inspectoi's examination of refueling bridge crane platform, the licensee procedures required the removal of all loose objects within rope off area around refueling cavity.
These procedures were enforced by the licensee.
The bridge crane was observeu to be free of loose objects.
(5) The training of the reft;eling crew was documented in the refueling procedure.
(6) A check of boron concentration determination was made by the inspector. Minimum boron concentration at the time of inspection was 2215 ppm.
Previous review indicated refueling boron ppm was achieved on September 28, 1979.
(7) Reactor coolant activity was less than 0.05 uCi/cc.
(8) Background from refueling water was less than 25 mrem /hr.
(The inspector noted that over core area background from nearby internals were also monitored.)
(9) Technical Specification Section 3.8 was verified by observation of status of:
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(a) Air locks; (b) Containment isolation v61ves, monitoring radiation levels in containment; (c) Source range monitors were monitored in the control room and containment; (d) RHR was in operation; (e) Tave was < 1400F; (f) Boron concentration was 2215 ppm; (g) The time requirements for the hours subcritical were met; (h) Containment vent and purge systems were previously tested; and, (i) Requirements for load teGil of fuel handling equipment were previously perforsdI, The inspector did not identit3 sny w as of noncompliance during his observation of refueling activities.
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4.
Maintenance Activities The inspector observed activities involving Steam Generator tube plugging preparations in order to verify that:
The activities were being conducted in accordance with approved proce-
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dures.
Administrative approvals were obtained prior to initiating work.
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Proper rad!ological controls are established for worker protection.
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The inspector reviewed the following documents:
Procedure RE-HPI-1.2, Steam Generator Explosive Tube Plugging, Revision
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Radiation Exposure Authorization No.1546, Steam Generator Tube Plugging.
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Procedure 3 PM-0-RCS-1A and B, Eddy Current Inspection and Explosive
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Plugging of Steam Generator Tubes, Revision 0.
Westinghouse Procedure No. MRS 2.3.2 GEN-9, Explosive Plugging of
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Steam Generator Tubes, Revision 2.
Federal and New York State explosive permits.
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The inspector interviewed the senior watch supervisor, senior reactor operator, health physics supervisor, and the vendor maintenance supervisor to determine whether all personnel involved were aware of the requirements of the above listed procedures.
The inspector questioned the licensee concerning the availability of copies of the approved procedures and the precautions for controlling radio trans-missions near the explosive mixtures.
These items were resolved immediately and the inspector had no further questions in this area.
5.
Steam Generator No. 31 During the removal of the manway cover on Steam Generator No. 31, a stud was broken.
In order to remove the broken stud, a portable drilling rig was mounted on the Steam Generator (SG) support structure.
In order to provide adequate clearance, portions of the SG support structure were cu '
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The licensee's maintenance department failed to perform a formal engineering evaluation prior to the modification of the structure and did not adhere to the procedures /steplist sequence.
The licensee's Quality Control Department has identified the problem and did issue a Deficiency and Corrective Action Report (DCAR) and a Nonconfor-mance and Corrective Action (NCA) recommendation.
The inspection review of licensee action to return structure to its previous condition was reviewed and the following items remain unresolved, a.
Licensee completion of action to prevent recurrence of departures from procedures (50-286/79-23-04).
b.
Licensee's examination of previous cuts on structural support members that were identified by the licensee's staff during the exit meeting.
The effort on the steam generator support analysis previously submitted in the area of fracture toughness and pctential for lamellar tearing as previously requested by the NRR in a September 14, 1977 letter on steam generator and reactor coolant pump support materials.
This item remains unresolved pending licensee's complete review of his analysis submittal to ensure that all modifications to steam generator were inputed as data base points for use during analysis (50-286/79-23-05).
6.
Surveillance Testing The inspector witnessed activities involving performance of surveillance test 3 PT-R-13, Recirculation Pump Functional Test, and 3 PT-R-29, Station Battery Load Test.
The inspector accompanied the operator who was making preparations for a.
a valve lineup in the Containment Building. Upon reviewing the approved copy of the procedure, 3 PT-R-13, Revision 1, dated October 16, 1979, the inspector noted several errors and pointed them out to the operator.
These errors included the following:
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Procedure Paragraph 2.7 required the technician to complete
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Sections 3.0 and 4.1 of the data sheets. There were no data sheet Sections 3.0 and 4.1 listed.
Procedure Paragraph 3.5 required the valve 994B to be open yet
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the valve lineup in the data sheet Section 6.0 required valve 994B to be closed (these two sections both were for the pre-test lineup).
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The effective date of the procedure was listed as November 16,
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1979, yet the test was being conducted on October 16, 1979.
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The operator imediately suspended his preparation for the test and submitted the procedure for revision.
TP c inspector expressed his concern to the licensee of the review of procedures in general prior to approval and stated that this item is unresolved pending review by the inspector of the approved procedure change and a review of the completed surveillance test (50-286/79-23-02).
b.
The licensee's Technical Specifications Section 4.6, Emergency Power System Periodic Tests, Specification 4.6.B.4 requires that at each refueling outage that each battery shall be subjected to a load test and visual inspection of the plates. As a result of the inspector's review of Surveillance Test Procedure 3 PT-R-29A, Revision 1, Station Battery Load Test, it was noted that the data sheets failed to record the imposed load during the eight hour discharge test. The licensee agreed to a test procedure change that would document applied loads.
The inspector had no further question: in this area.
The inspector observed the testing of Battery No. 31 during the discharge test. The following observations were made:
Instrumentation used to monitor test and impose specific loads
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were in calibration and were traceable to National Bureau of
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Standards certifications.
Test prerequisites were met.
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i Test load circuitry was per figure in procedure.
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Battery electrolyte levels were at the required levels.
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Initial battery voltage was recorded.
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Individual cell data was being recorded as re minute sets of data recording were witnessed) quired (two-twenty i
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Personnel involved in tests were knowledgeable of procedure and
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procedure was available and in use at the testing area.
Control Room was knowledgeable of test in progress.
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A review of the test _results will be performed prior to licensee return _to operation.
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7.
Review of Periodic Reports a.
Monthly Operating Report The inspector reviewed the monthly operating report for September, 1979. This review included an examination of logs and records including Significant Occurrence Reports to ascertain that the summary of operating experience was properly documented.
The inspector verified that:
The corrective action was adequate for resolution of the identified
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items; The information in the report was identified as licensee event
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reports where required per Technical Specification G.9.1.6; and, The operating report included the requirements of TS 6.9.1.5.
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b.
Findings The inspector observed in the section for Unit Shutdowns and Power Reductions, that shutdocin No. 36, dated September 14, 1979, was listed as a scheduled shutdown for refueling. The unit was planned to be shut down on September 14, 1979, for a refueling outage; however, during a review of the Senior Reactor Operator Log, it was noted that
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after the power reduction had taken place and the turbine was taken off the line, a reactor trip occurred from 4% reactor power due to a steam line AP safety injection signal. This event is described in Significant Occurrence Report No. 9-3-35, and was caused by operation of atmospheric steam dumps while controlling Tave with the turbine off the line. One dump valve (No. 34) stuck open with the other three shut causing a steam line A Pressure large enough to generate the safety injection signal.
The licensee stated that all safety injection systems functioned normally, that the cause was due to moisture in the I-P converter for No. 34 steam dump valve (which was subsequently repaired), and that this was not a reportable event as described in the Technical Specifi-cations.
The inspector verified that this was not a reportable event but expressed his concern over describing this shutdown in the Monthly Report as a
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l scheduled shutdown without further qualification.
The inspector had no further questions in this area.
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'2 THIS PAGE, CONTAINING 10 CFR 2.790 INF0P.MATION, NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE, IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK.
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THIS PAGE, CONTAINING 10 CFR 2.790 INFORMATION, NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE, IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLAN _ _ _ _ _ -.
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9.
Inadvertent Activation of' Containment Spray At 1458 hours0.0169 days <br />0.405 hours <br />0.00241 weeks <br />5.54769e-4 months <br /> on October 1,1979, the Unit 3 containment evacuation alarm was sounded by the control room operator.
Containment was evacuated due to
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an inadvertent pressurization of the spray header during performance of procedure SOP-RP-21, which allows transfer of water from the Refueling Water Storage Tank to the refueling cavity via the containment spray pumps.
Prior to the fuel shuffle procedure SOP-RP-21, Revision 1, September 24, 1979, Filling the Refueling Cavity, requires the installation of an inline spool piece in one of two containment spray pipes at 95' elevation in containment building. A lineup was performed by the licensee with the spray line 51 assumed to have had the inline spool installed.
On activation of Containment Spray pump No. 31, water was discharged from containment spray header.
Pump activation and spray was less than one minute.
The cause of the inadvertent containment spray was attributed to an incorrect determination that the spool piece was located in line 51 when in fact it was located in line 15. As a result an incorrect lineup was performed and the inadvertent spray occurred.
Sixty-three persons were in containment at the time of the event; of them, twenty-three were at the 95' level. The majority of spray was contained at the 95' level of containment with additional leak paths at containment walks and stairwells to the lower levels.
Isotopic samples of the Refueling Storage Tank (source of spray water)
indicated that the level of activity was as follows:
5.2 x 10-5 uCi/cc total with Cobalt-60 at 2.8 x 10-5 uCi/cc,the
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predominant contributor; Particulate, 2.15 x 10-10 uCi/cc; and,
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Iodine, 6.48 x 10-11 uCi/cc.
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No personnel were contaminated.
Note: Lineup of the system did previously isolate the sodium hydroxide tank prior to the event.
The inspector was in the turbine hall at the time of the event and entered the control room at 1500 hours0.0174 days <br />0.417 hours <br />0.00248 weeks <br />5.7075e-4 months <br />. The following observations were made:
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a.
Procedure SOP-RP-21, Filling the Refueling Canal, was not readily available and the procedural step list was not being maintained by control room operator, b.
The inspector determined, through interview of the operator, that the Containment Spray Pump start was ordered from the containment by the watch foreman without verification of lineup by the control room personnel.
The inspector entered the containment at sl320 hours on October 2, for the purpose of observing of effects of spray. The following items were noted:
a.
Exposed lagging in the area of the steam generator feed nozzle was wet.
b.
Vessel head was sprayed, Numerous areas of stagnant water at ti e 95 level were observed.
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Test instrumentation at 45' level had been sprayed.
e.
Upon observation of the containment spray lines in which the inline spool was installed, it was noted that the lines did not bear any piping identification as to line 15 or 51.
f.
Discussions with watch foreman indicated the following departures from procedure:
(1) Procedure SOP-RP-21, Revision 1, Filling of Reactor Cavity, Step 8.9, requires the vent valve located on the blind " Tee" to be opened to vent out all air until spray header is full. The vent valve should then be closed.
The licensee opened the vent valve, however, no liquid was vented which indicated that there was no flow and a possible problem with the valve lineup. The faulty lineup was apparently not recognized and the licensee proceeded to start containment spray pump which resulted in directing the water to the spray header instead of the refueling cavity.
(2) The licensee also departed from AP-4, which requires that the procedure be out and in use as noted in Paragraph IV.D, under tasks, which states that, " Extensive operations must be performed in a specified sequence." The licensee did not adhere to the sequence in that the system lineup was not verified to be correct prior to starting the containment spray pump.
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The failure to adhere to Procedure SOP-RP-21 and AP-4 is considered to be an item of noncompliance at the infraction level (50-286/79-23-06).
10. Verification of Safety ~Related Piping Systems (IE Bulletin 79-14)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions in response to IEB 79-14 (revised and supplemented). This review included the following:
The organization and qualifications of personnel who developed inspection
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requirements.
Documentation of inspection elements.
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Observation of inspections (field inspections) in progress.
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a.
Description of Licensee's Procram The licensee's program for verification of safety related piping system drawings is a two part process. The inspection is done by a contractor according to a station generated procedure.
The inspection results are then forwarded to the licensee's A/E (UE&C) for evaluation.
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Inspection The inspection (field verification) at the site is supervised by a QA Engineer who has been temporarily assigned to the Technical Services Saperintendent for this effort. The latest revisions to piping system drawings are assembled into line packages and distributed to inspection teams for verification.
j Field verification is perfomed according to station procedure 3 PT-V14, As Built Verification of Seismic Class I and II Piping Supports, Revision 3.
This procedure details the inspection tequirements for both isometric drawings and individual support /
seismic restraint drawings. After field verification is complete, the marked up and corrected /or verified drawings are returned to the QA Engineer supervising the inspection.
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Evaluation of Results i
The QA Engineer at the site reviews the completed inspection packages, initiates any necessary minor repairs, and forwards completed packages to the A/E (UE&C) via Federal Express.
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The licensee stated that the A/E would perform the analytical engineering evaluation, any necessary notification of nonconfor-mances, also also initiate the request for support modifications if necessary.
The inspector was unable to verify the licensee's program for specifying/ approving the following items:
Documentation of seismic analysis used by the A/E (UE&C).
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Acceptance criteria used by the A/E during the engineering
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evaluation.
Program for updating drawings as a result of field verifica-
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tions.
Pending a review of the licensee's control of the A/E activities listed above, this item is unresolved (50-286/79-23-01).
b.
Observation of Field Verification The inspector observed inspections in progress in the Containment Building for the following lines / systems:
Line No.
System 350 Safety Injection 17B Seal Water 846 Safety Injection
Seal Water No items of noncomr.iance were identified, however, the inspector will continue to observe the licensee's activities in this area during future inspections.
11.
Emergency Planning Operations The inspector observed the licensee's actions in response to several bomb threats received at Indian Point Station during this period.
This observation included a review of the following items:
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Implementation of station proce,dures for bomb threats.
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The performance of notifications and the coordination of activities of
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local authorities.
Inspection of the Emergency Control Center (ECC) and verification that
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equipment included therein was operable.
The inspector questioned the licensee concerning the condition of the emergency lighting in the vicinity of the ECC and the condition of the air supply in spare MSA air bottles.
This area will be reviewed during future inspections.
The inspector had no further questions in this area.
12. Unre:olved Items An item about which more information is required to detcmine acceptability is considered unresolved.
Paragraphs 5, 6, and 10 of this report contain unresolved items.
13.
Exit Interview
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At periodic intervals during the course of the inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss inspection scope and findings.
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