IR 05000247/1979009
| ML19210D495 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 10/03/1979 |
| From: | Baunack W, Keimig R, Rebelowski T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19210D474 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-247-79-09, 50-247-79-9, NUDOCS 7911270173 | |
| Download: ML19210D495 (13) | |
Text
.
.
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No. 50-247/79-09 Docket No. 50-247 License No.DPR-26 Priority
--
Category C
Licensee:
Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.
4 Irving Place New York, New York 10003 Facility Name:
Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2 Inspection at:
Buchanan, New York Inspection conducted:
Apl oil 29-August 18, 1979 l
n Qfn
/
/
Inspectors:
- / 'MC f/2fN9
. Rebplowski, Resident Inspector
'date' signed RPW L
sh,
'
W. BaungcK, Reactor Inspe'ctor ddte signed (June 14,' 1979 to July 20,1979)
date signed
,,
Approved by:
F
/8-3-79
/No.1, RO&N Chief,/)6 actor Projects Section date signed R. Keimi Branch V Inspection Summary:
Inspection on April 29 - Auoust 18, 1979 (Report No. 50-247/79-09)
Areas Inspected:
Routine inspection by the Resident Inspector of shift logs and operating records; plant tours; fire drills; steam generator inspection; observa-tions of critical fire a eas; refueling activities; observation of physical security; review of periodic reports; environmental protection operations; preparation for refueling; pipe support base plate anchor bolt testing; and, sensitive leak rate test.
The inspection involved 98 inspector-hours on site by the NRC Resident Inspector.
Results:
Of the fourteen areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were identi-fied in 12 areas; two items of noncompliance were identified in two areas (Deficiency -
Failure to log installation r,f a jumper, Paragraph 2.a; Infraction - Failure to test a containment isolation valve, Paragraph 8).
1396 064 Region I Form 12
(Rev. April 77)
7 9112,70 ( h/
I q
.
.
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted J. Barnes, Ebasco, Lead Engineer A. Brescia, Electrical Supervisor L. Burbige, Engineering, Senior Engineer J. Curry, Training Director A. Decker, Technical Engineer J. Dragosits, Master Construction Inspector W. Ferreira, QA Engineer L. Kawula, Test and Performance Engineer K. Kim, Ebasco, Engineering W. Lettmoden, Watch Supervisor G. Liebler, Senior Engineer, Radiation Safety C. Limoges, Reactor Engineer J. Makepeace, Technical Engineering Director W. Monti, Manager, Nuclear Power Generation Department J. Mooney, I&C Engineer A. Nespoli, Operations Engineer M. Shatkouski, Plant Manager R. Vogle, HP Supervisor S. Wisla, Chemistry and Radiation Safety Director The inspector also interviewed and observed other licensee employees including members of the operations, technical services, health physics, security and maintenance staffs and corporate personnel including nuclear engineering stcff members.
2.
Review of Plant Ooerations a.
Shift Logs and Operating Records The inspector reviewed the following logs and records for the period of April 22 to July 31, 1979.
Senior Reactor Operator Log
--
Watch Supervisor Log
--
Conventional Nuclear Plant Operator Log
--
Nuclear Plant Operator Log
--
1396 065
Night Order Book
--
Jumper Log
--
,
Significant Occurrence Reports
--
Flux Difference Log Sheet
--
Reactor Coolant Leakage Surveillance Sheet
--
Rod Position Indication Log
--
Thermal Power Calculation Sheet
--
Containment Leakage Calculation
--
Quadrant Power Tilt Calculation Sheet
--
High Radiation Area Locked Gate List
--
Control Room Log Sheet
--
Conventional Area Log Sheet
--
Nuclear Area Log Sheet
--
Central Control Room Cold Shutdown Log Sheets
--
Conventional Area Log Sheet Cold Shutdown
--
Condenser Delta T Logs (July 18-22,1979)
--
Nuclear Area Log Sheet Cold Shutdown
--
The logs and records were reviewed to verify the following items:
Log book reviews are being conducted by the staff.
--
Instructions in the Night Order Book did not conflict with Tech-
--
nical Specifications.
Significant Occurrence Reports confirm compliance with Technical
--
Specification report and LC0 requirements.
1396 066
.
Log book entries involsi g abnonnal conditions are sufficiently
--
detailed.
Acceptance criteria for the above review included inspector judgement and requirements of applicable Technical Specifications and the following licensee procedures:
QAD-3, Plant Surveillance and Log Keeping Policy"
--
SA0-126, " Jumper Log"
--
SA0-124, " Reporting of Anomalous Conditions"
--
SA0-105, " Work Permits"
--
The following findings resulted from the above review:
During the review of Work Permits 86590, 86653, and 86590, relating
--
to diesel generator maintenance, it was noted there were some differences in how work permits were cleared.
This was discussed with licensee representatives, who stated that Station Administra-tive Order 105, Work Permits, Revision 5, would be reviewed and clarified, and that the proper use of work permits would be included in training programs. This matter will be reviewed during a future inspection.
During the review of the Watch Supervisors and Jumper Logs, it
--
-
was noted that a jumper installed in the bearing lift pump control circuit was not entered in the Jumper Log as required by Station Administrative Order 126, Jumper Log.
It was noted that the administratively required tagging was performed and approval was obtained for the installation of the jumper.
The failure to log an installed jumper in the Jumper Log as required by Station Administrative Order 126 is considered to be an item of noncom-pliance at the deficiency level (247/79-09-01).
During the review of Sicnificant Occurrence Repcrts re'ating to
--
Work Activities Affecting Penetration Fire Barriers, the mainten-ance of a continuous fire watch as required by the Technical Specifications was questioned by the inspector.
The licensee reviewed this matter and determined that the required fire watch was present.
The need for additional training in the area of the performance of work affecting fire barrier integrity was discussed and the licensee stated that training would be provided in this area to personnel involved with Penetration Fire Barrier Mainten-ance, Repair and Modification.
U96 067
.
b.
Plant Tour At various times during the inspection, the inspector toured the following accessible plant areas:
Ccntrol Room
--
Primary Auxiliary Building
--
Turbine Building
--
Intake Structure
--
Security Control Building
--
Diesel Generator Room
--
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump R00m
--
--
Containment Building Fuel Storage Building
--
The following observations / determinations were made:
Radiation protection controls:
step-off pads, storage / disposal
--
of protective clothing, and control of high radiation areas were observed for adequacy in all areas toured.
Fluid leaks: all areas toured were examined for evidence of
--
excessive fluid leakage.
Piping vibrations:
all areas toured were examined for evidence
--
of excessive piping vibration.
Control Room and fiuclear Plant Operator station manaing:
these
--
areas were observed to determine compliance with regulatory requirements.
Selected valve position / equipment start positions. wore observed.
--
Discussions with watch personnel pertaining to reasons for selected
--
lighted at:nunciators:
the Watch Supervisor was questioned to determine if he was knowledgeable for the reasons for all lighted annunciators.
l3'lb Obb
.
.
Seismic restraint oil levels:
a sampling of plant hydraulic
--
restraints was performed.
Monitoring instrumentation:
Control Room instrumentation including
--
Control Rod Positions, Accumulator Tank Levels and Pressures, Reactor Coolant AP, Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation, Contain-ment Temperatures and Pressures, and various on-line recorders were observed including source range channels during refueling.
Plant housekeeping conditions / cleanliness were noted.
--
LSSS/LCO: equipment status or operating parameters were observed
--
for conformance to the LSSS/LCO requirements.
Shift turnovers of control room operators and watch supervisors
--
were observed on regular and back shifts.
Acceptance criteria for the above items included inspector judgement and requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(k), Regulatory Guide 1.114, applicable Technical Specifications and the following licensee procedures:
SA0105, " Work Permits"
--
SA0114, " Station Fire Protection Systems"
--
SA0 116, " Housekeeping Policy"
--
SA0126, " Jumper Log"
--
SA0 128, " Security Plan Implementation"
--
During the tour of the containment, it was noted that the recombiner outlet ducts were directed vertically upward.
This configuration would permit containment spray water to enter the recombiner discharge in the event containment spray were used.
This was discussed with the licensee who stated the discharge elbows would be rotated to the horizontal position to preclude this from o(. curring.
The subsequent rotation of the discharge elbows to the horizontal direction was verified by the inspector.
c.
Fire Drill A fire drill was conducted on June 2, 1979.
Involved in the drill were four neighboring town fire companies.
1396 069
The fire d:ill simulated the loss of the on site fire loop main.
The inspector witnessed the following items:
'
Initial report of fire.
--
--
Arrival of fire companies.
Laying of approximately 1500 ft of hose taking suction from
--
a pond off site.
--
The delivering of water through various relaying pumping un ts.
A critique was held at the conclusion of the drill, and recommenda-tions as to method of handing hose through the fence obstruction and recommendation for a permanent suction connection at the pond are to be reviewed by the licensee.
The inspector had no further questions on this item.
d.
Steam Generator Inspection The licensee eddy current testing program of the steam generator tubes required the plugging of 23 tuoes due to criteria established of passing a.610 ET probe.
Three additional tubes were plugged due to errors in tube identification during plugging operations.
The number of tubes plugged per steam generator are as follows:
No. 21 No. 22 No. 23 No. 24 3 tubes 10 tubes 6 tubes 7 tubes The licensee is committed to vend a report of tube plugging to NRR.
The inspector had no further questions on this item.
e.
Plant Fire Protection The licensee experienced two small fires that were reported to the inspector.
(1) The isophase cooling fan No. 21 was found smoking by the vatch at 4:18 a.m. on May 2, 1979.
The fire brigade responded to extinguish the fire. The isophase coolant system redundant fan and heat exchanger were placed in service.
No damage was sustained by any other equipment.
The unit remained at full power througnout the event.
1396 070
.
.
.
.
(2) The Boric Acid Evaporator Feedpump motor was found on fire by the watch at 4:45 a.m. on August 9,1979, and was extinguished by the fire brigade at 5:04 a.m.
The licensee review of the effect on the PAB filters indicated no contamination or reduction in filter efficiency. The inspector had no further questions on this item.
f.
Observation of Critical Fire Areas During the plant tours of Control Room, Cable Spreading Room, Switchgear Room, Battery Room, and Tunnel Penetration areas, the following deter-minations were made to verify that:
No cor5ustible material was stored in the subject areas.
--
Fire watches were established during control room modifications.
--
Location of fire extinguishers were unobstructed and pressures
--
were satisfactory.
No items of concern were identified.
g.
Refueling Activities On various occasions during facility tours, the following refueling activities were observed:
Fuel handling operations.
--
Preparations for removal of a foreign object from reactor vessel.
--
Pressurizer safety valve testing.
--
Refueling area housekeeping.
--
No items of noncompliance were identified.
3.
Observation of Physical Security The resident inspector made observations, witnessed and/or verified, during regular and off-shift bours, that the selected aspects of the security plan were in accordace with regulatory requirements, physical security plans and approved procedures.
1396 071
.
.
a.
Physical Protection Security Organization Observations and personnel interviews indicated that a full time
--
member of the security organization with authority to direct physical security actions was present, as required.
Manning of all three shifts on various days was observed to be as
--
required.
All physical security members observed appeared capable of per-
--
forming their assigned tasks.
b.
Physical Barriers Selected barriers in the protected area (PA) and vital areas (VA) were observed and random monitoring isolation zones was performed.
Obser-vations of truck and car searches were made, c.
Access Control Observations of the following items were made:
Idehtification, authorization and badging
--
Access control searches
--
-
Escorting
--
.
Communications
--
Compensatory measures when required
--
d.
Preparation and Actions Relating to Anti-Nuclear Demonstration The inspector reviewed Indian Point Station's preparation for the announced anti-nuclear demonstration that occurred on August 5,1979.
The review included the following augmented areas:
Compensatory measures
--
Conmunications
--
Access control 6 0/2
--
.
Physical barriers
--
Organizational review
--
Arrangements for off-site agency support
--
Emergency medical facilities
--
The Resident Inspector verified implementation of licensee actions by observations on site on August 5,1979.
No penetration of the protec-tive area fencing was identified.
e.
Findings No items of noncompliance were identified.
4.
Review of Periodic Reports a.
Monthly Operating Reports The Monthly Operating Reports for March, April, May, and June were reviewed. The review included an examination of selected Maintenance Work Requests and an examination of significant occurrence reports t~o ascertain that the summary of operating experience was properly docu-mented.
b.
Findings The inspector verified through record reviews and observations of maintenance in progress that:
The corrective action was adequate for resolution of the identified
--
items; The information in the reports was identified as licensee event
--
reports where required per TS 6.9.1.7; and, The Operating Report included the requirements of TS 6.9.1.6.
--
The inspector had no further questions on the reports reviewed.
5.
Environmental Protection Operations The inspector witnessed the licensee's sampling of various environmental medias in accordance with his Environmental Technical Specifications on June 5,1979.
1396 073
.
.
The sampling points offsite included:
Eastview, 15 miles SE of plant.
--
Croton Point, 7.5 miles SSE of plant.
--
Furnace Dock, 3.5 miles SE of plant.
--
The samples collected were:
Rain water for ganina spectrum analysis (GSA).
--
TLD badges for direct gamma.
--
Air sampling filters for particulate.
--
River water for GSA.
--
The environmental stations inspected were found to be satisfactory in that:
All air samplers were in operation.
--
TLD's were in place.
--
Collectors for samples of rainfall were available.
--
Additional samples of drinking water were cotained at Eastview for Tritium Analysis.
The site Environmental Laboratory records of sampling were discussed with management personnel and use of available equipment was discussed.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
6.
Preparation for Refueling The inspector reviewed the following approved procedure for technical adequacy:
Maintenance Procedure 2-CM-2.4, Reactor Disassembly and Reassembly
--
for Refueling, Inservice Inspection and/or Extraordinary Maintenance, Revision 1, January 25, 1978.
Station Operating Procedure (50P) 17.3, Revision 2, May 10,1979.
--
1396 074
.
S0P 17.5, Manipulator Cran 2 Operation, Revision 3, May 10,1979.
--
S0P 17.6, RCC Change Fixture Operation, Revision 3, May 10,1979.
--
S0P 17.7, Fuel Transfer System Operation, Revision 1, May 10,1979.
--
S0P 17.10, Guide Tube Cover Removal and Replacement, May 10, 1979.
--
S0P 17.13, Thimble Plug Handling Tool, Revision 1, May 10,1979.
--
S0P 17.21, New Fuel Assembly Handling Tool, Revision 0, May 10, 1979.
--
No items of noncompliance were identified.
7.
Pipe Support Base Plate Anchor Bolt Testing The licensee, in response to IE Bulletin 79-02. Revision (1), June 21, 1979, has promulgated a test program based on an acceptable technique of randomly selecting one anchor bolt for testing in each base support plate.
a.
The inspector reviewed the following procedures which were used to meet the Bulletin requirements:
Procedure 01, Inspection and Testing of Existing Concrete Expansion
--
Anchor Bolts.
Procedure 02, Field Tracing and Marking of Seismic Category I Pipe
--
Lines.
Procedure 05, Replacement of Existing Shell Anchors with Wedge
--
Anchors.
Questions which arose during the review of procedures were brought to the attention of the licensee and will be included in final evaluation of data line packages.
b.
Observation of Testino The inspector witnessed eight tension tests per Procedure 01, Inspection and Testing of Existing Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts.
Included were the Self-Drilling Type Anchors and Wedge Type Anchor tests.
No failures occurred in the tests witnessed.
The inspector had no further questions at this time.
\\
lH6 U/5
.
.
e
8.
Sensitive Leak Rate Test The licensee testing of containment integrity includes type A, B, and C tests.
Included in the Type B test is a sensitive leakage rate test that verifies penetrations weld channels and certain double gasketed seals and isolaticn valve interspaces.
The procedure for conducting Test PTR 11, Sensitive Leakage Rate Test, was > eviewed and lineup verification was performed by the inspector.
The following items were identified by the inspector:
a.
The procedure, as written, did not verify that the pressurization medium was not bypassing the data collection flow meters.
The licensee changed the procedure to add blanks at solenoid valves S0V 1194 through S0V 1197, where the potential for bypass flow existed.
b.
The test includes the pressurization of areas between containment isolation valves on the containment building pressure relief line.
The valves are PCV 1190,1191, and 1192.
Upon review of pressurization sequence, valve PCV 1191, which is the first valve outside containment, was found not to have been leak rate tested in accordance with the Type C requirements for testing during each reactor shutdown for refueling or within the last two years as specified in Technical Specifications Section 4.4.VI.
The above failure to test a containment isolation valve is considered an item of noncompliance of an infraction level (50-247/79-09-02).
9.
Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the course of the inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss inspection scope and findings.
1396 076