IR 05000247/1979013
| ML19259D309 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 08/23/1979 |
| From: | Caphton D, Higgins J, Tanya Smith NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19259D306 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-247-79-13, NUDOCS 7910170645 | |
| Download: ML19259D309 (8) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No. 50-247/79-13 Docket No. 50-247 License No.DPR-26 Priority Category C
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Licensee: Consolidated Ediso.1 Company'of New York, Inc.
4 Irvina Place New York, New York 10003 Facility Name:
Indian Point Station Unit 2 Inspection at: Buchanan, New York Inspection conducted:
July 17-19,1979 Insp ectors :
I d.INM M-0- >147 J. C. Hjg i ', Reactor Inspector date signed d7 lo ehi/n T. H. SmMh, Reactor Ins ector date signed I. 4, h eM 8 - 3-1 '7 f T
M a eactor Inspector date signed 85/7
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Approved by:
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D. L. Captfton, Chief, Nuclear Support d&te signed Section No.1, RO&NS Branch Inspection Summary:
Inspection on July 17-19.1979 (Report No. 50-247/79-13)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by regional based inspectors of refueling activities, outage maintenance, integrated leak rate test procedure review, and follow up on outstanding items.
The inspection involved 67.5 inspector-hours on site by three NRC regional based inspectors.
Results:
No items of nor. compliance or deviations were identified.
il60146 SV5 7910170
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Consolidated Edison
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J. Curry, Training Of ficer
- E. Dadson, Manager Central QA
- J. Halpin, Maintenance Engineer J. Kuirk, Refueling Engineer
- C. Limoges, Reactor Engineer
- J. Makepeace, Technical Engineering Director
- F. Repose, Construction QA Coordinator
- M. Shatkouski, Plant Manager Westinghouse D. Cathcart, Nuclear Fuel Division Engineer USNRC
- W. Baunack, Reactor Inspector
- T. Rebelowski, Resident Reactor Inspector The inspectors also interviewed other licensee personnel including control room operators, technical, and administrative staff personnel during this inspection.
- denotes those present at the exit interview 2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Unresolved item (247/77-26-03):
Calibration records for thermo-meter SN 68122.
This item has been resolved by the licensee's receipt of calibrated thermometers and the review of calibration to NBS documentation.
(Closed) Inspector followup item (247/78-08-01):
Containment spray piping restoration.
This item has been resolved by the licensee revising Check-Off List COL-12 to include positioning of the flanged elbows.
(0 pen) Unresolved iten (247/78-08-02):
SNSC review of plant modifications.
The inspector reviewed the SNSC resolution, item 2.a in SNSC r..inutes 147, and found it to be acceptable based on the quality of maintenance implemen-tation procedures reviewed.
This item will remain open pending additional inspector review of procedure implementation.
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1160 147
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(Closed) Unresolved item (247/78-08-03):
SNSC review of surveillance procedures.
These procedures were reviewed by appropriate committee members before it was a requirement to review by a convened quorum.
New or revised procedures now require formal SNSC review.
This item is considered to be resolved.
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3.
Refueling Activities i
a.
Procedures Reviewed The inspector reviewed the following procedures and records as part of the inspection in the refueling area:
S0P 17.1, " Preparations for Core Refueling" - Completed copy.
50P 17.2, " Core Refueling" - In use copy, Revision 5.
Procedure No. QA-10, Appendix A, " Cleanliness Requirements for Refueling Elevation" - latest copy.
Safety Evaluation NS-2-79-046, Project No. 90043, " Cycle 3/4 Refueling Indian Point Unit #2".
Letter from D. Speyer to C. Limoges, dated 4/10/78, " Indian Point Unit No. 2 - Results of Visual Inspection of Fuel Assemblies" for 8 as-semblics.
HPP 2.4, " Containment Entry and Egress", Revision 1.
50P 10.6.2, " Containment Entry and Egress", Revision 3.
PT-A2, " Containment Structural Inspection".
b.
General The inspcctor verified by direct observation and record review that fuel handling activities were being conducted in accordance with ap-proved procedures and Technical Specification (TS) requirements.
Items inspected included:
(1) Plant staffing, including that in the control room and in the refueling area, was as specified in the TS's; (2) Refueling area housekeeping was satisfactory; (3) Communiccitons were maintained between the refueling bridge and the control room;
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(4) Vessel water level and clarity were acceptable; (5) Fuel insertion was conducted in accordance with procedures; (6) Source range monitoring was performed per the TS's;
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(7) Radiation monitoring was acceptable; (8) Containment integrity was maintained; (9) Reactor coolant temperature and boron concentration were per the TS's; (10) A Senior Reactor Operator with no concurrent duties directly supervised the fuel handling; (11) Fuel accountability was as specified; and, (12) Ventilation was maintained as required by the TS's.
With the exception of the below item, the inspector had no further questions on the refueling.
c.
Potential Grid Strap Damage During the previous refueling the licensee identified 8 fuel assem-blies (letter dated 4/10/78 in paragraph 3.a above) with minor damage to the fuel assembly grid straps.
This damage was determined to be insignificant and the assemblies were reused.
During the current refueling the licensee experienced some difficulty when withdrawing and inserting fuel assemblies from the core, apparently due to leaning and bowing assemblies and rubbing between assemblies.
Westinghouse Electric Corporation, the fuel supplier, recommended that fuel assembly motion during refueling be stopped immediately for any unusual or significant increases or decreases in load greater than 250 pounds. Many instances cf unusuai/significant load changes were logged by the licensee during the core shuffle.
The inspectors also witnessed the handling of several assemblies with significant underloads and overloads (up to 600 pounds).
The inspector stated that the conditions experienced during the current refueling should be formally evaluated by the licensee in conjunction with the fuel supplier for potential grid strap damage, since damaged grid straps could impair the structural integrity of the assemblies.
Additionally, the inspector stated that fuel assemblies accessible in the spent fuel pool, which had been noted,ts having experienced overload trips or major rubbing when handled, should be inspected to verify the structucal integrity of the grid straps.
The licensee's representative acknowledged these comments and stated that the fuel supplier would be consulted to determine required actions.
This item is unresolved.
(247/79-13-01).
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4.
Maintenance Activities a.
The inspector reviewed the work packages associated with the following outage related modifications:
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Reactor trip circuit modification (ESG 78-2-16)
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Electrical separation of air ejector isolation valves (ESG
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77-2-09)
Hydrogen recombiner modification to low flow bypass (MMC 78-2-04)
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The packages were reviewed to verify they included the following:
Administrative approvals for removing system from service
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Required hold points for QA inspection
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Provisions for post maintenance testing
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Materials certification review
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Provisions for conformance to LC0 requirements of the Technical
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Specifications Housekeeping controls
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Provisions for return to normal system alignments
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Method for reporting identified deficiencies b.
The inspector witnessed portions of the shop fabrication of piping associated with the hydrogen recombiner modification.
The work was visually observed to be accomplished in accordance with approved procedures.
The inspector also verified the qualifications of per-sonnei performing the work.
5.
Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test (CILRT) Procedure The inspector reviewed the latest draft of the CILRT procedure PT-3Y1, Revision 3, " Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test (" Type A")" for con-formance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix J, ANSI N45.4, Indian Point 2 Technical Specifications, and current NRC positions.
The licensee intends to perform the CILRT at Pa (47 psig) during the current refueling outage.
With the exception of the below items, collectively designated as open item (247/79-13-02), the inspecter had no further questions on the draft procedure at this time.
1160 150
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a.
Acceptance Criteria Section V.B.3 of Appendix J specifies the requirement for analysis and interpretation of CILRT results.
The inspector informed the licensee of the NRC position on the acceptance criteria for the CILRT.
The measured leak rate at the 95% upper confidence level plus any required corrections / additions must be less than 0.75 La.
Corrections or additions include lines found leaking during the test and isolated, systems in operation or water-filled during the CILRT but not in operation post LOCA, and conservative corrections due to liquid level increases inside containment.
b.
Data Evaluation The present procedure states that the method of data analysis to be used is the total time method.
The inspector informed the licensee of the NRC position which requires that data be analyzed using the mass point technique, c.
Volume Changes The procedure requires that pressurizer level and containment sump level be monitored during the CILRT, however, it has no provision for correcting the measured leak rate if levels increase.
d.
Test Pressure The procedure does not verify that test pressure is greater than Pa (47 psig) at the start of the test, after stabilization is completed.
e.
Draining The procedure contains insufficient guidance to ensure that r009 ired penetrations are drained of water inside, outside, and between con-tainment i';olation valves as required by paragraph III.A.1.d of 10 CFR 50 Appendix J.
f.
Data Rejection During the CILRT outlying data may be rejected provided definitive data rejection criteria have been established.
Currently, there are no such criteria in the procedure.
g.
Valve Lineups The hydrogen recombiner and containment air sample systems are not vented outside containment as required by 10 CFR 50 Appendix J, paragraph III.A.1.d.
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The procedure currently isolates the containment pressure transmitters from the containment atmosphere.
This isolates a potential leakage path which would be exposed under post-accident conditions.
6.
Plant Tour At various times during the inspection, the inspectors toured the following accessible plant areas:
Contrc
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Primary Auxiliary Building
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Turbine Building
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Security Control Building
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The following observations / determinations were made:
Radiation Protection Controls:
step off pads, storage / disposal of
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protective clothing, and control of high radiation areas were ob-served for adequacy in all areas toured.
Control Room and Nuclear Plant Operator Station Manning:
these
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areas were observed to determine compliance with regulatory require-ments.
Seismic Restraints:
a sampling of plant hydraulic restraints were
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inspected for oil level and general overall condition.
Plant Housekeeping Conditions / Cleanliness.
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No items of noncompliance were identified during the olant tours.
One unsatisfactory condition was observed and brought to the attention of plant management.
The inspector visually obteived several areas inside the primary containment where the stainless steel covering, which protects the containment liner insulation, was loore thereby exposing the insula-tion.
This item is unresolved (247/79-13-03).
7.
Unresolved Items Items about which more information is required to determine acceptability are considered unresolved.
Paragraphs 3.c and 6 of this report contain unresolved items.
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8.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (see Detail 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on July 19, 1979.
The findings of this inspection were discussed during the exit meeting.
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