IR 05000282/1986011
| ML20207P215 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
| Issue date: | 01/07/1987 |
| From: | Defayette R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20207P194 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-124, TASK-OR 50-282-86-11, 50-306-86-13, IEB-86-003, IEB-86-3, IEIN-86-053, IEIN-86-53, NUDOCS 8701150244 | |
| Download: ML20207P215 (11) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
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Reports No. 50-282/86011(DRP); 50-306/86013(DRP)
Docket Nos. 50-282; 50-306 Licenses No. DPR-42; DPR-60 Licensee: Northern States Power Company 414 Nicollet Mall Minneapolis, MN 55401 Facility Name: Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Inspection At: Prairie Island Site, Red Wing, Minnesota Inspection Conducted: October 12, 1986 through December 13, 1986 Inspectors:
J. E. Hard M. M. Moser
//7 [7 Approved By: R
, Chief Reactor Projects Section 2B Date
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Inspection Summary Inspection on October 12, 1986 through December 13, 1986 (Reports No.
50-282/86011(DRP); 50-306/86013(DRP))
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of previous inspection findings, plant operational safety, maintenance, plant i
security, surveillances, ESF systems, facility modifications, refueling activities, training program, corporate management concerns, followup of Licensee Event Reports, and IE Bulletins.
Results: One violation was identified in 12 areas inspected.
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PDR ADOCK 05000282 O
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- D. McCarthy, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer
- D. Gilberts, Sr. Vice President, Power Supply
- C. Larson, Vice President, Nuclear Generation
- K. Albrecht, Director, Power Supply Quality Assurance
- W. Anderson, Assistant Administrator, Nuclear Security Services
- T. Bushee, Supervisor, Media Services
- S. Northard, Senior Consultant, Special Nuclear Programs
- P. Kamman, Superintendent, Nuclear Operations Quality Assurance
- J. Bridgeman, Quality Assurance Engineer
- E. Eckholt, Senior Nuclear Safety / Technical Services Engineer
- E. Watz1, Plant Manager D. Mendele, Plant Superintendent, Engineering and Radiation Protection R. Lindsey, Plant Superintendent, Operations and Maintenance
- A. Hunstad, Staff Engineer A. Smith, Senior Scheduling Engineer M. Balk, Superintendent, Operations D. Schuelke, Superintendent, Radiation Protection G. Lenertz, Superintendent, Maintenance J. Hoffman, Superintendent, Technical Engineering
- K. Beadell, Superintendent, Quality Engineering M. Klee, Superintendent, Nuclear Engineering S. Redner, Materials and Special Processes Engineer D. Youngdahl, Manager, Production Plant Maintenance R. Maurer, Westinghouse ECT Team R. Marlow, Conam Inspection J. Funanich, Conam Inspection F. Garofolo, Westinghouse, ECT Team R. Conklin, Supervisor, Security and Services D. Vincent, Project Manager, Nuclear Engineering and Construction J. Goldsmith, Superintendent, Nuclear Technical Services A. Vukmir, Site Services Representative, Westinghouse The inspectors interviewed other licensee employees, including members of the technical and engineering staffs, shift supervisors, reactor and auxiliary operators, QA personnel, and Shift Technical Advisors.
- Denotes those present at the exit interview on December 15, 1986.
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- Denotes Corporate personnel who were visited on December 2, 1986.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)
(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-282/86005-06(DRP)):
Failure to Follow Procedures During Relay Testing. Appropriate corrective action was l
taken.
l (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-306/86007-02(DRP)):
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3.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
Unit I was base loaded at 100% power excepc for reductions for weekend load following and surveillance testing and one reactor trip on December 12, 1986. Unit 2 commenced a refueling outage on October 23, 1986 and was back on line on November 24, 1986.
The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs, conducted discussions with control room operators, and observed shift turnovers.
The inspector verified operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed equipment control records, and verified the proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the auxiliary building, turbine building and external areas of the plant were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, and to verify that maintenance work requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.
On November 3, 1986, with Unit 2 in cold shutdown for refueling, the licensee discovered that the turbine building sump continuous composite sampler isolation valve had been inadvertently closed and as a result, no sample had been collected for the previous week.
This violated the radioactive liquid waste sampling frequency requirement of T.S. Table 4.17-3.
The turbine building sump had been discharging to a landlocked drainage area rather than to the river.
Samples of the liquid in the drainage area were taken immediately and the activity was less than detectable. The isolation valve was tagged open restoring operation of the composite sampler. No notice of violation will be issued since this item was identified and reported by the licensee, fits in Severity Level IV or V, was not a violation that could reasonably be expected to have been prevented by the licensee's corrective action for a previous violation, and adequate corrective actions were taken.
The Unit 1 core experienced axial xenon oscillations from November 2-12, 1986. The oscillations occurred for a period of about 26 hours3.009259e-4 days <br />0.00722 hours <br />4.298942e-5 weeks <br />9.893e-6 months <br /> and were divergent from November 7 to November 11. Had they not been checked by manual control action, the permissible 5% band about the target axial flux difference would have been exceeded.
However, manual control action eliminated the oscillations within one cycle.
Existing core physics codes do not predict that such oscillations should be expected to occur.
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l The licensee is studying the matter and has stated that the results of the study will be published.
This is an Open Item (282/86011-01).
On November 16, 1986 following NIS power range axial offset calibration, the Unit I reactor was operated for a number of hours at power levels in l
excess of the maximum authorized by the license. The maximum instantaneous power level was computed to be 101.01% and the average over an eight-hour shift was 100.15%. The operating crew appears to have followed the applicable procedures for the situation.
The cause of this overpower condition is possibly related to a change in core leakage between the power at which the NIS monitors were calibrated (97.2%) and full power.
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This matter is being investigated. This is a violation of the conditions listed in.the Facility Operating License and is a failure to have adequate procedures in place as-required by Technical Specifications (282/86011-02(DRP)). See Notice of Violation.
At 3:53 p.m. on December 12, 1986, while I&C technicians were setting up to monitor oscillations in the turbine E-H controller, the E-H controller was disabled causing a turbine trip and a reactor trip. Safety systems responded as expected to the trip. Both source range detectors needed
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to be replaced before restart. The reactor was critical at 6:15 a.m. on
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December 13 and the generator placed on line at 10:04 a.m.
At 3:15 p.m.,
i Unit I resumed full power operation.
4.
Show Cause Order - Radios in Control Room On October 20, 1986 the NRC issued to Northern States Power Company an Order to Show Cause why radios or other electrical / electronic equipment
used to provide background music in the control rooms at Prairin Island and Monticello should not be removed. (See letter from James M. Taylor to Donald W. McCarthy.) In their response, the licensee noted that the
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Prairie Island control room radio had been removed on July 29, 1985.
(See letter from Dennis E. Gilberts to James M. Taylor dated November 12, t
1986). On November 12, 1986, 29 of the 42 licensed control room operators petitioned the NRC to request a hearing on the Order to Show Cause.
(See letter to James M. Taylor from the control room operators, undated). At the end of the report period (December 13), a response to i
that petition had not yet been received.
(282/86-R1-01-R; 306/86-R1-01-R)
5.
Maintenance Observation (62703, 62700)
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Routine maintenance activities (on safety-related systems and components)
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listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted j
in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, and industry i
codes or standards, and in conformance with Technical Specifications.
The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting I
conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service, approvals were obtained prior to initiating the r
work, activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were
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performed prior to returning components or systems to service, quality control records were maintained, activities were accomplished by qualified personnel, radiological controls were implemented, and fire prevention controls were implemented.
During the Unit 2 refueling outage, all tubes in steam generators 21 and 22 were insoected using eddy-current techniques.
In 21 generator, four i
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tubes had through-wall indications ranging from 46-54% and were plugged.
These indications were all at the first cold leg support plate.
In 22 generator, 20 tubes had through-wall indications ranging from 45-56% and were plugged.
These indications were all at the first or second cold leg support plate.
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Portions of the following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed during the inspection period:
Impeller replacement, 22 circulating water pump Reactor vessel head bolt removal Reactor upper internals removal Installation of new incore thimbles Replacement of reactor vessel missile shield Fuel transfer system final adjustments and checkout Seismic event monitor triaxial accelerometer replacemant
"D" panel modification Raychem splice inspection and replacement No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Surveillance (61726)
Quality Assurance audits by the licensee have uncovered situations where the literal requirements of Section 4.0 of the Technical Specifications have not been met:
1.
Valves between RWST and containment spray pumps shall be test operated during the spray pump monthly test (T.S.4.5.8).
Plant practice has been to test these valves during each refueling outage as part of the Section IX inspection program.
Plant
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staff will be requesting changes to the Technical Specifications for approval of the current testing scheme. Also, the plant staff will be making electrical modifications to make valve testing easier. An LER is to be prepared on this subject.
2.
Isolation valves for the accumulators and the valves between boric acid tenks and the safety injection puaps are required
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to be tested for operability at each refueling shutdown (T. S. 4. 5. B. 31. f). However, the accumulator isolation and boric acid line
'C" valves are not included in surveillance tests because during normal operation these valves are open with their_ power supplies locked out; these valves do not have an emergency operating function.
Licensee will be requesting a technical specification amendment to excempt these valves from the testing requirement.
3.
Technical Specification 4.5.A states the method to be used to i
l initiate tests of various safety systems. However, procedures
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used in the conduct of these tests are at variance with the specific requirements.
The Licensee is planning to request an amendment to their Technical Specifications to reflect the testing practice.
Although the situation discussed above involves technical violation of regulatory requirements, a notice of violation will not be issued since the situation was identified by the licensee, fits into Severity Level IV or V, was reported when required, will be corrected in a reasonable l
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time period, and is not a violation that could reasonably be expected to have been prevented by the licensee's corrective action for a previously violation. This is an Open Item (282/86011-03; 306/86013-01(DRP)).
The inspector witnessed portions of surveillance testing of safety-related systems and components. The inspection included verifying that the tests were scheduled and performed within Technical Specification requirements, that procedures were being followed by qualified operators, that Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) were not violated, that system and equipment restoration was completed, and that test results were acceptable.
Portions of the following surveillances were observed / reviewed during the inspection period:
SP 2116 Monthly power distribution map SP 2083 Integrated safety injection test SP 1112 Steam exclusion damper test SP 1040A Seismic event monitor test test SP 1730 Motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump cross connect test SP 1728 Siren encoder validation No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
ESF System Walkdown (71710)
The inspector performed a complete walkdown of the accessible portions of both containment spray systems. Observations included confirmation of selected portions of the Licensee's procedures, checklists, plant drawings, verification of correct valve and power supply breaker positions to insure that plant equipment and instrumentation was properly aligned, and review of control room and local system indication to insure proper operation within prescribed limits.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Refueling Activities (60705, 60710, 86700)
Prior to the handling of fuel in the core, the inspectors verified that all testing required by the technical specifications and licensee procedures have been completed. During fuel movement, the inspectors verified that core monitoring, boron concentration, refueling canal water level, and containment integrity were maintained as required by Technical Specifications and licensee procedures.
The inspectors witnessed refueling operations during several shifts, observing:
proper use of approved refueling and fuel shuffle procedures, adequate shift manning in the control room and at the refueling platform.
The inspectors observed proper radiation controls, good housekeeping, and protection against foreign objects falling into the reactor in the refueling area.
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Associated with the Unit 2 refueling were the following activities which were observed in part by the inspectors:
Receipt inspection of new fuel assemblies Replacement of Upper Internals Reactor Vessel Head Removal Reactor Fuel Shuffle using new SFP transfer equipment Reactor Criticality Zero Power Physics Testing Reactor On-line No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Facility Modifications (37700)
The new plant computer (ERCS) has been installed and testing was in progress at the end of the report period. This computer is to meet NUREG-0737, Supplement I requirements and must be fully operational by December 31, 1986. The status as of that date will be included in the next routine inspection report.
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During excavation work being done for a new warehouse facility outside the Protected Area, a 50 pair telephone cable running between the plant and substation was severed. During this same excavation, a ground cable for an underground bank of 4ky power cables was also severed. Some degradation of emergency communications occurred when the telepnone cable was cut. The locations of these cables seem to be accurately identified on the substation area drawings. The failure to adequately review these locations with respect to the proposed excavation is indicative of a continuing problem of controlling work activities which have been noted in previous inspection reports. The last time this problem was discussed was in Inspection Reports No. 282/86007 and 306/86007 which were issued in July 1986. At that time, the licensee's corrective action was to stop work and institute additional controls over construction work onsite.
It appears, however, that those controls may not be adequate. This is an Open Item (282/86011-04; 306/86013-02).
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10. Allegation
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The resident inspection staff received a verbal allegation from a plant l
employee that brazing has been done in the plant on safety-related l
components by uncertified brazers. The licensee is investigating the
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allegation. (282/86-XX-01-G; 306/86-XX-01-G)
11. Notifications and Communications (82203)
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During the routine weekly siren test on October 29, 1986, 12 sirens
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in Goodhue County did not receive the cancel signal which was sent from the Sheriff's office. This failure to receive a cancel signal is also
an indication that those sirens could not have been activated with a radio signal.
Repairs were make to the transmitter the same day.
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On October 11, 1986, an individual siren in Pierce County activated spuriously and operated for nearly an hour before being silenced.
The problem is believed to have been in one of the circuit boards in the siren controls. The board was replaced.
No violations or deviations were identified.
12. Operator Morale In response to a November 3,1986 posting of additional job openings at the Red Wing Generating Plant, 37 more plant personnel, mostly from Operations, applied for the openings.
Nine of these applicants have NRC licenses. The openings are to be filled in mid-1987. The inspector reviewed the status of actions being taken by the licensee to improve operator morale.
(See also Inspection Report 282/86010; 306/86012)
1.
Negotiations are in progress with the local union regarding a possible increase in premium for operators maintaining their NRC licenses.
2.
The size of the Operations staff is being increased by new hires to replace those who have left and who are planning to leave.
3.
The assignment of a Shift Manager to each crew may be delayed because of the impending loss of additional licensed operators.
4.
Plant organizational changes are to be implemented by the end of the first quarter of 1987.
13.
Security See classified attachment to this report.
14.
Licensee Event Reports Followup (92700)
Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and r
review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine i
that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective j
action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications:
(Closed) 282/85010-LL Reactor Trip During Restart (Closed) 282/86002-LL Core Exit Thermocouple Connectors found Assembled Incorrectly (Closed) 306/86005-LL Inoperability of Effluent Samole Due to l
Mistakenly Closed Valve
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(Closed) 282/85011-LL One Containment Isolation Valve Failed LLRT.
The required revision to LER 282/85005 was submitted on June 24, 1985.
(Closed) 282/86005-LL Reactor Trip Because of Steam-Feedwater Flow l
Instabilities at Low Power (0 pen)
282/86007-LL Deficiencies Seen in Raychem Splices (Voluntary)
(0 pen)
282/86008-LL Operation at Overpower l
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282/86009-LL Failure to Perform Required Valve Tests (0 pen)
282/86010-LL Reactor Trip During EH Trouble Shooting l
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15. IE Bulletin Followup (92703)
(Closed) IEB 86-03 (282/86003BB; 306/86003BB) Potential Failure of Multiple ECCS Pumps Due to Single Failure of Air-0perated Valve in Minimum Flow Recirculation Line.
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Responses and actions required by this Bulletin have been completed.
16.
Followup of IE Information Notices and Bulletins (92701)
IE Information Notices and IE Bulletins are received directly by the Plant Manager. Duplicate copies are received from Corporate Headquarters.
Handling of these documents is by a staff engineer in the plant. He keeps records on Bulletins and Notices which have been received, assigns them to plant individuals for review and action, prepares responses where i
appropriate,. and maintains a computerized tracking system. The inspector spot checked the plant records to assure that appropriate action had been taken by the licensee. The inspector also noted that the latest IEN and IEB had been received by the licensee.
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IE Information Notice 86-53 addressed problems involving the improper installation of heat shrinkable tubing manufactured by Raychem.
Refer to Section 18 of this report for additional details.
17. Part 21 As noted in memo to P. Pelke, TSS, dated November 6,1986, problems with Valcor valves of the type discussed in the Valcor Engineering Part 21 Report of April 14, 1986 were experienced at Prairie Island in about
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This replacement effort was completed in March 1986.
18. TMI Followup Items (92701)
During the week of September 29, 1986, a team consisting of six NRR representatives and one AE0D representative visited the Prairie Island site to perform an in-depth examination of the auxiliary feedwater system with respect to Generic Issue No.124, " Auxiliary Feedwater System Reliability." By letter dated November 26, 1986, from George Lear, Director, PWR Project Directorate #1, Division of PWR Licensing-A, the results of the review found that the auxiliary feedwater systems of Prairie Island Units 1 and 2 are adequately designed, maintained, and operated and adequately address the concerns of Generic Issue 124. This conclusion was based upon the implementation of eight recommendations discussed in the safety evaluation and agreed to by the licensee. As of the end of the report period (December 13), one of the eight recommendations has been implemented with the remaining recommendations scheduled to be incorporated by July 1, 1987.
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.During the week of November 17, 1986, an inspection team consisting of two region based inspectors, one IE representative, one National Laboratory representative, and two contract personnel visited the Prairie Island site to perform an inspection for compliance with 10 CFR 50.49 (Environmental Qualification of Electric Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants). The inspection consisted of Detailed Reviews of E.Q. Files, Procedural Review, the Maintenance and Surveillance Program, QA and Training, and Procurement and Upgrading followed by a plant walkdown and visual inspection of selected Raychem splices and electrical components. The E.Q. inspection is the subject of Inspection Report 50-282/86012 and 50-306/86014(CRS).
19. General Employee Training (41990)
The inspector audited a session of the training given to both NSP and contractor people who do not work routinely at the plant.
Included in the 6-hour session were a general plant orientation and discussions on the work control system, QA program, industrial safety rules, NRC rules and regulations, plant security, fire protection, emergency plan signals and actions, radiation protection, respiratory protection, and other topics.
Instructio1 was given in donning and removal of anti-contamination clothing and the attendees were required to demonstrate that they could properly do this. This training is currently in the program certified by INPO.
20.
Licensed Operator Training (41701)
The inspectors participated in a number of simulator training sessions in order to more fully evaluate the ef fectiveness of the licensed operator training program. Approximately sixteen hours of simulator time was provided to the inspectors by several different training instructors.
For the most part, the procedures provided at the simulator were current and in agreement with those in the plant control room. The training instructors were found to be very capable and professional during the simulator sessions. The inspectors found the training sessions to be very beneficial in terms of both monitoring plant control room operations and also as a substitute for the NRC's TTC simulator requalification training.
21. Meeting with Corporate Management (30702)
On December 2, 1986 the Senior Resident Inspector met with various NSP officials at the Corporate offices. The following subjects were discussed:
1.
Operator morale 2.
Modification control process 3.
Recent security events 4.
Recent plant events 5.
Raychem splice inspection program 6.
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22. Exit Interview (30703)
The inspectors met with licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph 1 at the. conclusion of the inspection on December 15, 1987. The inspectors discussed the purpose and scope of the inspection and the findings.
The inspectors also discussed the likely information content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection. The licensee did not identify i
any document / processes as proprietary.
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