IR 05000282/1986006
| ML20207E376 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
| Issue date: | 07/11/1986 |
| From: | Hard J, Patterson J, Simonds G, Snell W, Williamsen N NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20207E352 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-282-86-06, 50-282-86-6, 50-306-86-06, 50-306-86-6, NUDOCS 8607220311 | |
| Download: ML20207E376 (27) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Reports No. 50-282/86006(DRSS); 50-306/86006(DRSS)
Docket Nos. 50-282; 50-306 Licenses No. DPR-42; DPR-60 Licensee: Northern States Power Company 414 Nicollet Mall Minneapolis, MN 55401 Facility Name:
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Inspection At:
Prairie Island Site, Red Wing, MN Inspection Conducted: June 16-19, 1986 Y'
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Inspectors:
J.
. Patterson Team Leader
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W.$~4Ml b 7/u/sG-N. R. Williamhen (d. fI -
7/"/S4 G. E. Simond, (HQ)
Ld.LO/ f'e 7h8 6 J. E. Hard, (SRI)
LAJ. $I Approved By:
W. G. Snell, Chief
/[/BI, Emergency Preparedness Date t
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Inspection Summary l
Inspection on June 16-19, 1986 (Reports No. 50-282/86006(DRSS);
50-306/86006(DRSS))
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Areas Inspected:
Routine announced inspection of Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant emergency preparedness exercise involving observations by seven NRC representatives of key functions and locations during the exercise.
The inspection was conducted by five NRC inspectors and two consultants.
Results:
No violations, deficiencies or deviations were identified as a
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result of this inspection.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted NRC Observers and Areas Observed J. Patterson, Control Room, Technical Support Center (TSC),
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
J. Hard, Control Room M. Moser, Control Room, TSC F. Victor, TSC N. Williamsen, Operational Support Center (OSC), Post Accident Sampling System (PASS)
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G. Simonds, OSC
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R. Hadley, TSC, EOF Northern States Power Company E. Watzl, Plant Manager
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D. Mendele, Plant Superintendent, Engineering and Radiation Protection R. Lindsey, Plant Superintendent, Operations and Maintenance
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M. Agen, Prairie Island Training Department C. Gjermo, Power Production Training Department (Corporate)
M. Ladd, Administrator, Emergency Preparedness (Corporate)
T. Amundson, Superintendent of Training, Prairie Island M. Reddemann, Technical Training Supervisor F. Fey, General Superintendent, Radiological Protection (Corporate)
D. Schuelke, Plant Superintendent, Radiation Protection L. Finholm, Nuclear Training Administrator
D. Larimer, Radiation Chemistry Supervisor A. Johnso1, Radiation Protection Supervisor R. Holthe, Shift Supervisor W. Gauger, Instrumentation and Control Supervisor D. Reynolds, Supervisor, Operations Training A. Smith, Consulting Scheduling Engineer, Shift Technical Advisor D. Gauger, Technical Instructor W. Waldron, Senior Operations Specialist R. Pearson, Senior Production Engineer G. Kolle, Radiation Protection Instructor J. Sorensen, Production Engineer G. Malinowski, Radiation Protection Coordinator T. Asmus, Engineer (Emergency Planning)
M. Werner, Operations Instructor H. Nelson, Engineer All of the above individuals attended the exit meeting on June 18, 1986.
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2.
Licensee Actions on Previously Identified Items Related to Emergency Preparedness (Closed) Open Items No. 282/86002-01; 306/86002-01:
Four individuals including a Shift Supervisor (SS), a Shift Emergency Communicator (SEC),
and two individuals from Radiation Protection did not have their required annual Emergency Plan training as identified in the January 1986 inspec-tion. The licensee had identified this training need and had taken steps to correct it, thus avoiding a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.
The inspector confirmed that these four individuals completed
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the required training in January 1986. This was done through interviews with Training Department instructors and a review of training records.
This item is closed.
3.
General An exercise of the licensee's Northern States Power Corporate Nuclear Emergency Plan and-the Prairie Island Nu;1 ear Generating Plant Emergency Plan was conducted at the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Dlant on June 17, 1986, testing the licensee's capabilities to respond to a hypothetical accident scenario resulting in a major release of radioactive material. Attachments to this report describe the exercise objectives and give a narrative summary of the exercise scenario. This wts a full-scale exercise integrated with a test of the Emergency Plans of the State of Minnesota. The State of Wisconsin participated on a partial basis. Also participating was Dakota County, Goodhue County and the City of Red Wing in Minnesota, as well as Pierce County, Wisconsin.
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4.
General Observations a.
Procedures This exercise was conducted in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E requirements using the Prairie Island Emergency Plan and the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs).
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b.
Coordination The licensee's response was generally coordinated, orderly and timely.
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i If the events had been real, the actions taken by the licensee would have been sufficient to permit the State and local authorities to take appropriate actions to protect the public health and safety.
c.
Observers Licensee observers monitored and critiqued this exercise along with seven NRC obscrvers and a number of Federal Emergency Management l
Agency (FEMA) observers.
FEMA observations on the responses of State and local governmental organizations will be provided in a separate report.
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Critique A critique was held with the licensee and NRC representatives on June 18, 1986, the day after the exercise.
The NRC discussed the observed strengths as well as areas for improvement, during the exit interview.
A public critique was held on June 19, 1986, in Red Wing, Minnesota, to present the preliminary onsite and offsite findings of the NRC and FEMA exercise observers, respectively.
5.
Specific Observations a.
Control Room Immediately prior to the exercise, the Control Room Lead Controller had the participants demonstrate by " hands-on" walk-throughs where plant operating information, annunciators, radiation alarms, and strip chart data were located.
This demonstration was effective and adequately demonstrated by the Control Room crew.
Once the exercise started, all simulated instrumentation readings were given to the participants via pre printed data sheets.
Good team work and coordination was demonstrated by the Shift Supervisor (SS) as initial Emergency Director (ED) and his emergency shift crew.
The Alert Classification was correctly made based on a fire in one of the two diesel generators which had a potential to affect the plant safety systems.
However, a short explanation of the reason for the Alert should have been included in the announcements.
The Shift Technical Advisor (STA) contributed by reviewing the Critical Safety Functions and helped to analyze the extent of the emergency on plant systems.
The Emergency Director should have called upon the counsel and input from the STA more frequently.
Notifications to offsite agencies were made within the required time utilizing the correct notification forms.
Support staff were competent, responsive and had a good positive attitude throughout the exercise.
A distracting element was the axial offset test that was being conducted during the exercise.
Such tests should not be scheduled on the reactor unit involved in the annual exercise.
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Some of the Control Room actions were inordinately slow.
For example, more prompt action should have been taken to attempt to manually close the open containment isolation valve.
Also, 34 minutes was too long a time to get the containment recombiners in service following the appearance of measurable hydrogen in the containment.
Data Sheets were distributed every 15 minutes and the prior sheets were discarded to prevent a mixup.
A small status board conspicuously located with some key reactor parameters posted on it would have been visually beneficial to the emergency crew.
Good transfer of command and control was made to the TSC Emergency
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Director from the Unit 2 SS, who was the initial ED.
The announcement was clear and concise and took place after the two individuals had
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briefly discussed the current and projected plant emergency status.
Overall, the Control room did a thorough job and demonstrated their objectives satisfactorily.
b.
Technical Support Center (TSC)
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The Technical Support Center was activated and functional in less than fifteen minutes after the announcement of the alert.
The staff was
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familiar with their duties and with the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures and carried out their duties efficiently. There were
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frequent consultations between the Emergency Director (ED) and the
Operations Supervisor, discussing the plant conditions relative to the
Emergency Action Levels (EALs) to confirm that the existing emergency
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classification was still correct. Accountability and evacuation of
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plant non-essential personnel was satisfactorily completed in less than 30 minutes, although Security personnel were not notified of the completion and continued verifying badges for at least 10 minutes
after completion of accountability. The assembly point for evacuation
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was carefully chosen to avoid unnecessary radiation hazards.
The Emergency Director utilized the various TSC support groups very well.
Status boards were kept current. The ED had open discussions
to establish priorities and formulato corrective actions to mitigate i
the results of the accident.
The Reactor Vessel Level Indication
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System (RVLIS) was an important tool for the ED in evaluating plant
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conditions.
Dose assessment capability was quickly established, a continuous air
monitor (CAM) was started, and MIDAS (Meteorological Information and
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Dose Assessment System) was activated. There was excellent communi-cation and cooperation with the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
concerning dose assessment.
However, in some other areas, communication was substandard.
For example, the announcements of transfer of command and control to the TSC from the Cuntrol Room and later to the EOF were vague.
The ED announced that the TSC, and subsequently the EOF, were " ready" to assume a task, but never announced when the command and control of that task was actually transferred. The TSC log, however, indicated that the transfer had i
been accomplished. Also, at times the Control Room (CR) appeared to function independently of the TSC. On several occasions when the TSC
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staff was evaluating a proposed action, the CR went ahead and actually did it, without receiving instructions from the TSC.
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On several occasions the ED temporarily exited the TSC without announcing either the fact of his departure nor wno had command in his absence.
The E0 allowed the telephone to interrupt his briefings, sometimes in mid-sentence, although he could have had the TSC
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Coordinator screen the calls.
Communication at the beginning of the exercise was inhibited by the lack of clear identification of players.
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There were position titles on the desks, but they were quickly covered
up by procedures and other papers. Also, the declaration of a Site i
Area Emergency was delayed for approximately five minutes because it
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was time for the periodic briefing of the TSC. The ED should have set a clear priority for emergency declarations. When the Site Area Emergency was declared, there was no explanation to the plant
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personnel of the reason for the declaration.
c.
Operational Support Center (OSC)
The OSC was activated and fully functional in a timely manner. The OSC Coordinator was knowledgeable of his duties and responsibilities.
Eating and drinking were not allowed until habitability was established.
The OSC Coordinator properly anticipated future events such as having a personnel list made up in the event evacuation / accountability would soon be required. He also warned the OSC personnel that with the
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plant conditions as given, the core damage was going to be severe. He
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showed good discretion in asking for confirmation of a reactor coolant system pressure of only 50 psi. However, he should have exercised
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more control over the OSC facilities.
For example, his briefings were
timely and adequate, but because of the noise from the air condition-ing system it was difficult to hear him. Usually someone present i
turned off the A/C unit when the OSC Coordinator was giving a briefing, but on those few occasions when no one voluntarily turned the A/C off,
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i the Coordinator never ordered the unit to be turned off. Also, the
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Coordinator, himself, was not always aware of where the various inplant teams were located.
There was no status board for team location. The only way to keep track of the teams would have been to ask the appropriate supervisor and/or ask the Radiation Protection Technician who kept the " Time
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Keeper's Work Sheets" on her desk, one stack of time sheets for
personnel within the OSC and another stack for personnel who were out on teams.
Knowing the location of the teams could be crucial in an event where the radiation levels were increasing rapidly.
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The OSC was properly equipped. A sufficient number of personnel were
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on hand, such as maintenance, HP, electricians, etc. Assignments of
personnel to tasks were specific and clear and the tasks were completed promptly.
Exposure of personnel was properly monitored via the " Time L
Keeper's Work Sheets." However, there were two shortcomings in the
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facilities.
First, there were no status boards for equipment out of
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service nor for the location of the inplant teams.
Secondly, the arrangement of the OSC, with cabinets above eye level separating the
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OSC into two compartments, made briefings difficult and forced the OSC t
Coordinator to sometimes give a briefing twice, once in each portion i
of the OSC. On this latter problem, the licensee stated that the arrangement of the OSC is under management consideration and a i
redesign is under way that will improve communication within the OSC.
Personnel response was good within the OSC staff.
For example, the
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individual sent out to investigate the fire in the diesel room was
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very prompt and he never asked the Controller if he might simulate bringing the equipment, he actually brought out two fire hoses plus a i
portable fire extinguisher. Most of the teams were very good in j
taking along the equipment they would need in a real event. The only i
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exception was the team that changed out the electrical breaker.
This team did the changeout very promptly, but they simulated wearing the protective clothing which is necessary for installing a breaker on a hot bus, and the team did not inform the Controller of the simulation until midway through the task.
The team that took the post accident liquid sample properly utilized the procedures and the equipment.
The elapsed time from the OSC getting the request to delivering the results to the TSC was less than two hours.
Good ALARA was shown in planning a route for the team.
However, some of the preparatory work that the team did in a high radiation area should have been done before they entered that area.
Health Physics practices were generally good.
A frisking station was set up at the OSC and all of the players utilized it.
One of the teams in a contaminated area properly bagged their instruments before returning to access control and then took smears and counted them before releasing the instruments for further service.
However, the team that did the electrical breaker changeout never asked the controller what the dose rate was.
Also, one of the teams properly put on labcoats, shoe cover, etc., but they wore only the light-weight cotton glove liners and never put on the " working gloves" which were required by the posted Radiation Work Permit.
The following item is suggested for improvement:
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Status boards for equipment out of service and for the location
and task of inplant teams should be considered for the OSC.
d.
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
Access control was established early at the rear entrance to the E0F where field monitoring teams would arrive.
Frisking was required before entry.
Security control was established at this entrance and The E0F Coordinator is the the main entrance in a timely) manner. initial Emergency Manager (EM, as The activated the E0F and made it functional prior to the permanent EM taking over.
When the Monticello Radiation Protection Support Supervisor (RPSS) relieved the interim Prairie Island RPSS he was well briefed and the transition went smoothly.
Communications and coordination was very good within the various E0F technical support groups, between the EOF and the TSC, and between the E0F and the Minnesota and Wisconsin State radiation health officers.
Communications, whether for offical emergency notifications, or to discuss other aspects of the emergency including radiation-related data, were conducted in a professional manner using appropriate data and terminology.
The offsite team dispatcher did an excellent job in directing the teams, identifying sampling points and informing.the teams of significant plant conditions.
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The Radiation Protection Status Board, which listed the sequence of important events, did not always agree with the Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) data sheets.
As an example, the first PAR differed from the Status Board as to which sectors were sheltered; sectors E and J versus sectors J through E.
Also, the issuing time of
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the first PAR was listed in different places as 0930, 0945, and 0955
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hours.
To avoid confusion, a primary information source should be established and other postings and listings should agree with it.
The Radiation Protection Support Supervisor maintained very good communications with the State Representatives, discussing release data with them sampling-related data, and other relevant information.
However, some overly-lengthy telephone conversations were held with the State representatives after the release was stopped and a downgrade PAR was being discussed.
Depending on the subject matter, some of
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these communications should have been delegated to a support person in order to free up the RPSS.
He is a key policy and decision maker in the E0F and could have been used more frequently as counsel to the EM in the E0F, to the ED in the TSC, and to the Corporate Headquarters group.
Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure in F3-8, Sections 6.1.5 and 6.2.11 (Revision 3) specifies a 3-way conference call between the EOF and the Minnesota Team Coordinator and the Wisconsin State Radiologi-cal Coordinator " Prior to or simultaneously with the transmittal of protective action recommendations." However, during the exercise discussion prior to issuing a downgrade PAR, (which would have allowed unrestricted access to all sectors) took approximately 90 minutes.
This was acceptable for a downgrade, only.
Initial PARS made while the emergency was still escalating and a radioactive release was continuing, were made in a timely manner.
Site evacuation for plant personnel was considered and actions were simulated to move personnel to the EOF. Good discussion and actions regarding evacuating for 5 to 10 miles in affected sectors were held
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in a three way conference call with both of the State radiological health representatives.
Status briefings by the Emergency Manager were held frequently and were substantive in content.
The EM included Communications and Logistics in each briefing.
The Technical Support Supervisor served as the technical information data link to the Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) and to the Corporate Headquarters group.
This assured the JPIC of receiving important plant data and otherkeyinformationlustasquicklyastheStateofMinnesota,which also has a telephone line to the E0F.
The General Emergency was declared and properly announced by the EM based on a loss of two of three fission barriers, containment and loss of the primary coolant boundary.
After the one day time advance remedial efforts had succeeded in eliminating any radioactive release to atmosphere.
E0F supervisors and staff, after obtaining current plant data and conditions and conferring with the TSC decided to de-escalate to a Site Area Emergency.
EmergencycondItionsforthe appropriate EAL were addressed as closely as possible for a
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de-escalating emergency mode. An actual announcementof downgrading to a Site Area Emergency was never made by the EM, only discussed informally with radiation protection and technical support groups.
These announcements should be made in the same format as the escalating emergency announcements.
Initial recovery /re-entry plans lacked sufficient depth. The Lead Controller in the EOF was asked by the NRC Team Leader to enlarge the discussions of recovery plans by including the Emergency Director and the Radiological Emergency Coordinator from the TSC. A good discussion with interactions between representatives of both emergency response facilities was conducted for approximately one-half hour.
Conclusions and contemplated actions were specified.
f.
Exercise Scenario and Control The exercise scenario was sufficiently challenging in that it included operational problems, a diesel generator fire, a lightning strike, and the possibility of evacuating the city of Red Wing, Minnesota.
The pace was varied, and engineering and other technical responses were made in an orderly fashion.
Communications generated with the State radiation health officers included plume direction, radiation levels offsite, and other radiological data which added to the realism of the scenario information. Overall the scenario was satisfactory and events which developed led to emergency responses by the licensee which met their 13 objectives.
9.
Exit Interview The inspection team held an exit interview on June 18, 1986, the day after the exercise. Those who attended are listed in Section 1.
The NRC team leader discussed the preliminary findings of the exercise.
The inspectors discussed the content of the report to determine if the licensee thought that any of the information was proprietary. The licensee
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Attachments:
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N.S.P. Exercise Objectives l
and Guidelines l
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Narrative Summary l
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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
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EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Rev. 0
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NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY SECTION II: EXERCISE OBJECTIVES AND GUIDELINES
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PI EXERCISE 86 II Page 1 of 15
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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
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EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Rev. 0 1986 II. EXERCISE OBJECTIVES AND GUIDELINES Northern States Power Company (NSP) in conjunction with State, county and city agencies will exercise its Emergency Response Plan on June 17, 1986. The-exercise will include the mobilization of the organizations named below such that the capability to adequately respond to a simulated accident at the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) can be verified.
As a result of coordination between Northern States Power and the following agencies: Minnesota Division of Emergency Services and Department of Health, Wisconsin Division of Emergency Government and Department of Health and Social Services; objectives and guidelines have been developed for the conduct of this exercise. NSP's objectives and guidelines are contained in the text of this section.
Exercise participants will include the following NSP organizations:
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Northern States Power Company 1.
Onsite Emergency Response Organization a.
Control Room b.
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Operations Support Center
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Corporate Emergency Response Organization Emergency Operations Facility a.
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Headquarters Emergency Center B.
Dakota, Goodhue/ City of Red Wing, and Pierce Counties and supporting local agencies, as identified in their Emergency Response Plans for the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, will participate in a full-scale capability.
C.
State of Minnesota - Division of Emergency Services and supporting agen-cies, as identified in the Minnesota Emergency Response Plan for nuclear power plants, will participate in a full-scale capability.
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D.
State of Wisconsin - Division of Emergency Government and supporting agen-cies, as identified in the Wisconsin Peacetime Radiological Emergency Res-ponse Plan for nuclear power plants, will participate in partial capacity.
Active participation in the exercise will only be required of the above listed organizations.
If the exercise scenario requires that any other organizations and/or officials be contacted, they shall be contacted only for the purpose of checking communications.
Guidelines have been developed for the conduct of the exercise which reflects capabilities of the various participating organizations to meet the objectives set forth below. Each objective is followed by a paragraph which defines the
" extent of play" by the participants.
Plant and Corporate Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) are also listed which may be used to support the objective.
PI EXERCISE 86 II Page 2 of 15
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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING-PLANT ~ ~~
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EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Rev. 0 1986 FOR THE NSP (LICENSEE) EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION:
1. Identification and Classification of the Emergency Objective:
Given simulated accident conditions, PINGP personnel shall correctly identify and classify the emergency as an NUE, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY, or GENERAL EMERGENCY as specified in PI EPIP F3.2.
Guideline: When given initiating conditions of an emergency action level, the Shift Supervisor / Emergency Director will classify the emergency consistent with NSP's emergency classification scheme. The postulated plant conditions will necessitate at least an ALERT Emergency Action Level.
- The following EPIPs may be used to support the objective stated above:
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EMERGENCY PIAN EXERCISE Rev. 0 1986 2. Accident Notifications Obj ective:
Given simulated accident conditions, PINGP and NSP Corporate personnel shall promptly complete accident notifications to the appropriate State and County / City agencies (15 minutes), the NRC (1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />), PINGP personnel and Emergency Response Organization (30 minutes), and NSP Corporate Emergency Response Organization (I hour).
Guideline: Appropriate State and County / City agencies include the states of Minnesota and Wisconsin, Dakota County, Pierce County, and Goodhue County / City of Red Wing.
Initially these notifications will be made by the Shift Emergency Communicator (SEC) at the plant. Off-site Communicators at the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) will assume these responsibilities as it becomes fully operational.
- The following EPIPs may be used to support the objective stated above:
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F3-5 Notifications F3-24 Record Keeping F3-29 Emergency Security Procedures A.2-702 Response to an Emergency at Prairie Island (Monticello EPIP)
CORPORATE
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EPIP 1.1.2 Notifications EPIP 1.1.8 Communications Equipment and Information i
EPIP 1.1.3 Public Information I
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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
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EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Rev. 0 1986 3. Emergency Response Organization and Facility Activation Objective:
Given simulated accident conditions, PINGP and NSP Corporate per-sonnel shall activate at least the TSC and OSC within I hour and the EOF within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
Guideline: The scenario is simulating initiating conditions during regular daytime working hours. Upon notification, the participants will demonstrate actual startup times for each emergency center.
These fully staffed and functioning emergency centers include the Tech-nical Support Center (TSC), Operational Support Center (OSC),
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), and Headquarters Emergency Center (HQEC). NSP representatives will also be present at the MN State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and Joint Public Infor-mation (JPIC) in St. Paul, Mn.
The transfer of the appropriate offsite responsibilities (e.g. communications, dose assessment, protective action recommendations) from the Onsite Emergency Organziation to the Corporate Emergency Response Organization will be demonstrated.
- The following EPIPs may be used to support the objective stated above:
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F3-1 Onsite Emergency Organization F3-4 Responsibilities During an ALERT, SITE AREA, or GENERAL EMERGENCY F3-6 Activation and Operation of TSC F3-7 Activation and Operation of OSC F3-29 Emergency Security Procedures A.2-702 Response to an Emergency at Prairie Island (Monticello EPIP)
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EPIP 1.1.1 Corporate Emergency Response Organization EPIP 1.1.5 Startup and Operation of EOF EPIP 1.1.8 Communication Equipment and Information EPIP 1.1.6 Emergency Organization Shift Turnover EPIP 1.1.7 Startup and Operation of HQEC EPIP 1.1.15 Transition Into the Recovery Phase PI EXERCISE 86 II Page 5 of 15
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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Rev. 0 1986 4. Accident Assessment Obj ective: Given simulated accident conditions, PINGP and NSP Corporate per-sonnel shall demonstrate assessment of plant operational parameters and radiological data.
Guideline: Plant conditions and events will be assessed in the Control Room, TSC, and EOF throughout the exercise.
Radiological assessment will include sampling and sample analysis on site and at the EOF. Offsite dose projections will be performed throughout the exercise by the use of the Meteorological Information and Dose Assessment System (MIDAS). These results will be communicated to the appropriate state agencies.
- The following EPIPs may be used to support the objective stated above:
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F3-2 Classifications of Emergencies F3-6 Activation and Operation of TSC F3-7 Activation and Operation of OSC F3-8 Recommendations for Offsite Protective Actions F3-13 Offsite Dose Calculation F3-17 Core Damage Assessment F3-20 Manual Determination of Radioactive Release Concentrations F3-24 Record Keeping During an Emergency e
F3-26 Operation of the Recall Display Computer CORPORATE -
EPIP 1.1.4 Emergency Organization Records and Forms EPIP 1.1.5 Startup and Operation of EOF EPIP 1.1.11 Accident Assessment EPIP 1.1.7 Startup and Operation of HQEC i
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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
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EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Rev. 0 1986
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5. Accident Mitization Objective: Given simulated accident conditions, PINGP and NSP Corporate personnel shall demonstrate mitigation of the accident.
Guideline: Decision making and problem solving will be demonstrated at the various emergency centers by the appropriate participants, e.g.
control room operators, Shift Technical Advisor (STA), and Shift Supervisor in the control room; Emergency Director and TSC staff in the TSC; Emergency Manager and EOF staff in the EOF; and Power Production Management in the HQEC.
Corrective actions will be formulated in attempt to mitigate the accident; however, some unforseen corrective actions that may defeat the scenario may not be permitted by the exercise controllers.
- The following EPIPs may be used to support the objective stated above:
PLANT -
F3-4 Responsibilities During an ALERT, SITE AREA, or GENERAL EMERGENCY F3-24 Record Keeping During an Emergency l
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EPIP 2.1.5 Startup and Operation of EOF l
EPIP 1.1.7 Startup and Operation of HQEC l
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EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Rev. 0 1986 6. Protective Action Decision-Making Obj ective:
Given simulated accident conditions, PINGP and NSP Corporate per-sonnel shall develop and promptly communicate protective actions for onsite and EOF personnel and offsite protective action recommendations for the protection of the health and safety of the public.
Guideline: Simulated plant conditions will warrant a plant evacuation of non-essential personnel to an onsite assembly point.
Personnel accountability will be performed.
Recommended protective actions for the general public offsite will be formulated and communicated to the appropriate state agencies with regard to the plume exposure pathway. The general direction of the plume will be southeast, towards the City of Red Wing.
- The following EPIPs may be used to support the objective stated above:
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F3-8 Recommendations for Offsite Protective Actions CORPORATE
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EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Rev. 0 1986 7. Post-Accident Sampling and Analysis Objective: Given simulated accident conditions, PINGP personnel shall obtain and analyze various inplant liquid and air type samples.
Guideline:
Inplant post-accident sampling will include sample analysis of reactor coolant, containment atmosphere, and shield building vent, as appropriate.
- The following EPIPs may be 'ised to support the objective stated above:
PLAhT -
F3-23 Emergency Sampling F3-23.1 Emergency Hoteell Procedure PI EXERCISE 86 II Page 9 of 15
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PRAIRIE ISIAND NUCI. EAR ENERATING PIANT EMERGENCY PIAN EXERCISE Rev. 0 1986 8. Onsite Radiological Monitoring Objective:
Given simulated accident conditions, PINGP personnel shall perform radiological surveys onsite (inplant and out of plant).
Guideline: Onsite radiological monitoring will include radiation and contami-nation (Beta and Gamma) surveys, sampling for particulate, iodine, and gas, as appropriate.
- The following EPlPs may be used to support the objective stated above:
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F3-14.1 Onsite Radiological Monitoring OR F3-14.2 Operations Emergency Surveys
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EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Rev. 0 1986 9. Emergency Radiation Exposure Control Objective: Given simulated accident conditions, PINGP and NSP Corporate per-sonnel shall maintain a program of emergency radiation exposure control.
Guideline: Emergency exposure management and control will be demonstrated by the issuance of TLDs and dosimeters in the plant and the EOF.
Continuous air monitors will operate in control room, TSC, and EOF.
- The following EPIPs may be used to support the objective stated above:
PLANT -
F3-12 Emergency Exposure Control F3-14.1 Onsite Radiological Monitoring CORPORATE
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EPIP 1.1.17 Personnel Monitoring at the EOF
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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Rev. 0 1986 10. Offsite Monitoring Objective: Given simulated accident conditions, PINGP and NSP Corporate personnel shall monitor offsite radiological releases through a program of surveying, sampling, and analyzing.
Guideline:
PINGP will dispatch at least two field monitoring teams for off-site radiological monitoring. Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant will assist in offsite monitoring upon notification and arrival to the EOF.
Offsite radiological monitoring will include plume search, Beta /
Gamma surveys, contamination surveys, and air sampling.
Offsite samples will be transported to and analyzed in the EOF countroom.
- The following EPIPs may be used to support the objective stated above:
PLANT -
F3-15 Responsibilities of the Radiation Survey Teams During a Radioactive Airborne Release CORPORATE
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EPIP 1.1.10 Offsite Surveys EPIP 1.1.5 Startup and Operation of EOF EPIP 1.1.18 Control of Radioactive Materials at the EOF EPIP 1.1.12 Implementation of the Radiological Environ-mental Monitoring Program
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1986 11. Assembly and Accountability Objective: Given simulated accident conditions, PINGP personnel shall demon-strate a plant evacuation and perform personnel accountability within 30 minutes following a plant evacuation.
Guideline: Upon declaring a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency, plant evacuation and personnel accountability will be completed within 30 minutes.
(Note: Shift operations personnel will not be evacuated.)
Once on-site assembly and accountability procedures have been completed, non-participating personnel will be allowed to return to their normal work stations.
If the evacuation of non-essential plant personnel is warranted, this procedure may be simulated.
- The following EPIPs may be used to support the objective stated above:
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F3-9 Emergency Evacuation F3-10 Personnel Accountability
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ENERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Rev. 0 1986 12. Access Control Obj ective: Given simulated accident conditions, PINGP and NSP Corporate personnel shall maintain access control into the plant and EOF respectively throughout the emergency.
Guideline: Access control will be demonstrated by both NSP and Security personnel at the plant, EOF, and HQEC throughout the simulated emergency.
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- The following EPIPs may be used to support the objective stated above:
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F3-4 Responsibilities During an ALERT, SITE AREA, or GENERAL EMERGENCY CORPORATE
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EPIP 1.1.17 Personnel Monitoring at EOF
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l EPIP 1.1.7 Startup and Operation of HQEC EPIP 1.1.18 Control of Radioactive Materials at the EOF I
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EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Rev. 0 1986 13. Interfaces with Support Organizations, Representatives of the News Media, and Government Agencies Objective:
Given simulated accident conditions, PINGP and NSP Corporate personnel shall demonstrate interface with outside support organi-zations, news media representatives, and government agencies in a timely manner using appropriate communication channels.
Guideline: The appropriate communication systems will be used, e.g. tele-phones, ENS phone, HPN phone, and fascimile transceivers.
Appropriate plant conditions will be communicated to the States.
Field survey data will be shared with the State Health Department.
Plant architectural and design engineering organizations will be notified and kept informed of the plant's major problems. Advice from these organizations will be considered if so offered.
Simulated press releases will be prepared by MN Public Information officers and NSP Communications Department and will be released at the Joint Public Information Center (JPIC).
Spokespersons from NSP and MN DES will be present.
County / City representatives are encouraged to be present at the JPIC.
- The following EPIPs may be used to support the objective stated above:
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F3-5 Emergency Notifications CORPORATE
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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Rev. 0 1986
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PART 1:
NARRATIVE SUMMARY
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EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Rev. O 1986 t-TIME EVENT SUMMARY 0710 Initial Conditions to Control Room.
1.
Unit 1 is at 100% power.
2.
Unit 2 is at 100% power 3.
Wind is from the West-Northwest (282a) at 10 MPH and it is raining.
4.
Unit 1 IM transformer is out of service due to severely cracked insulators.
5.
Unit 1 core is in the middle of life.
6.
Charging area radiation monitor R-4 is out of service.
7.
Letdown Line radiation Monitor R-9 is out of service.
8.
12RXBT is out of service.
9.
21 BAST is out of service due to level transmitter replacement and 121 BAST is currently lined up to Unit 2.
All events below are for Unit 1.
0725 Routine chemistry sample results (taken at 0630) indicate a dose equivalent Iodine-131 primary coolant specific activity of 380 uCi/ gram.
0740 An Alert should be declared due to F3-2 Condition #5, Severe Loss of fuel cladding.
A plant shutdown begins due to exceeding the Technical Specifications for maxi-mum coolant activity.
0755 All notifications to the States and counties should have been completed.
0800 Lightning strikes the IR Transformer and disables it.
The reactor trips.
0830 The rain shower has stopped.
0900 A large LOCA develops in loop A hot leg.
Safety In-jection initiates.
Containment Isolation initiates but vacuum breaker isolation CV-31621 fails to close. A low level radioactive release begins.
0901 Safety injection Accumulators inject and are expended.
BAST is quickly emptied and the RWST loses inventory rapidly as the SI, RHR pumps and Containment Spray pumps discharge to the RCS and containment spray header.
PITC/EP86 V-1 Page 2 of 3 EXERCISE /86
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Rev.0 1986 0910 A General Emergency should be declared due to F3-2 Condition F6, Loss or 2 of 3 Fission Product Barriors.
0922+
RHR loop 11 is removed from service to realign it for recirculation mode. RWST has been draining contin-uously since the beginning of the LOCA.
0926+
After the realignment is completed, RHR pump 11 fails to operate due to failure of breaker 15-4 0936 Attempts to align RHR loop 12 fail when operators are unable to open MV-32076 from the containment sump.
0940 The EOF should be fully staffed and operational.
1015 Containment radiation monitors show very high levels of activity and that the level of radioactive release to the environment is increasing substantially. The RWST has been emptied and the core is uncovered. Severe fuel damage occurs.
1028 Breaker 15-4 to RHR pump 11 has been replaced and RHR train A is functioning in recirculation mode.
Radioactive release continues through the failed vacuum breaker.
1230 The Exercise is stopped:
1-DAY TIME ADVANCE BRIEFING June IS,1986.
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e No radioactive release is occurring.
Operators were
able to isolate containment by closing the valve to the vacuum breaker thus terminating the release to l
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the environment.
This was accomplished at 1300 i
yesterday, t
Unit I is at Cold Shutdown Condition.
- Reactor is on RHR cooling and stable (MV-32076 was
opened on RHR loop 12).
Offsite an1 blent dose rates are normal background.
- The radioactive plume has dispersed.
The event classification has not been changed as
yet from a General Emergency.
1300 Exercise resumes - Simulated Time 1300, on the following f
day.
Control Room personnel raay terminate drin in-i volvement. After the ED A EM discuss present plant t
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conditions, they may decide to deescalate the emergency and initiate the Recovery Phase.
il 1400 Based on environmental sample results NSP and States agree on Reentry.
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