IR 05000282/1986010
| ML20213C953 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
| Issue date: | 10/27/1986 |
| From: | Jackiw I NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20213C939 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-282-86-10, 50-306-86-12, IEB-86-002, IEB-86-2, NUDOCS 8611100368 | |
| Download: ML20213C953 (8) | |
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U.S.-NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Reports No. 50-282/86010(DRP); 50-306/86012(DRP)
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Docket Nos. 50-282; 50-306 Licenses No. DPR-42; DPR-60 Licensee: Northern States Power Company 414 Nicollet Mall Minneapolis, MN 55401 Facility Name: Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Inspection At: Prairie Island Site, Red Wing, MN Inspection Conducted: August 17, 1986 through October 11, 1986 '
Inspectors:
J. E..Hard
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M. M. Moser Approved S :
)N Jackiw, C
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Reactor Projects Section 28 Date/' '/
Inspection Summary Inspection on August 17, 1986 through October 11, 1986 (Reports No. 50-282/86010(DRP); 50-306/86012(DRP))
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of previous inspection findings,. plant operational safety, maintenance, plant security, surveillances, ESF systems, facility modifications, fire protection, offsite sirens, corporate management concerns, followup of Licensee Event Reports, and IE Bulletins.
Results: No violations were identified in 12 areas inspected, hhkNDok l2
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DETAILS
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Persons-Contacted
- C. Larson, Vice President, Nuclear Generation
- F. Tierney, General Manager, Nuclear Engineering and Construction
- T. Parker, Principal Nuclear Safety and Technical Engineer
- R. Zerban, Manager, Corporate Security E. Watzl, Plant Manager
- D. Mendele, Plant Superintendent, Engineering and Radiation Protection
- R. Lindsey, Plant Superintendent, Operations and Maintenance
- A. Hunstad, Staff Engineer A. Smith, Senior Scheduling Engineer M. Balk, Superintendent, Operations D. Schuelke, Superintendent, Radiation Protection G. Lenertz, Superintendent, Maintenance J. Hoffman, Superintendent, Technical Engineering
- K. Beadell, Superintendent, Quality Engineering M. Klee, Superintendent, Nuclear Engineering R. Conklin, Supervisor,. Security and Services D. Vincent, Project Manager, Nuclear Engineering and Construction J. Goldsmith, Superintendent, Nuclear Technical Services A. Vukmir, Site Services Representative, Westinghouse The inspectors interviewea other licensee employees, including members of the technical and engineering staffs, shift supervisors, reactor and auxiliary operators, QA personnel, and Shift Technical Advisors.
- Denotes those present at the exit interview on October 14, 1986.
- Denotes Corporate personnel who were visited on September 12, 1986.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92702)
(Closed) Violation, compensatory measures (282/85009-01; 306/85007-01):
Appropriate corrective measures were taken.
(Closed) Violation, Assessment Aids (282/85009-02; 306/85007-02):
Appropriate corrective action has been taken.
(Closed) Violation, Detection Aids - Protected Areas (282/85009-03; 306/85007-03): Appropriate corrective action has been taken.
(Closed) Violation, Failure to follow procedures re:
Radwaste System (282/85019-01; 306/85018-01): Corrective measures described in the inspection report have been completed.
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Operational Safety Verification (71707)
Unit:1 was-base. loaded: at 100% power except for reductions for' weekend load following and surveillance testing.
Unit 2 commenced coastdown on
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August 26, 1986 for a refueling outage with power at 60% at the end of
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the. report period.
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-The inspection observed control-room operations, reviewed applicable logs, conducted discussions with control room operators, and observed
- shift turnovers. The inspector verified operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed equipment control records, and verified the t
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- proper return to service of affected components. Tours of tha' auxiliary
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building, turbine building and external areas of'the plant were conducted-
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to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards,
and to verify that maintenance work requests had been initiated for
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equipment in need of maintenance.
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L On September 4, 1986 it was discovered that the discharge valve on the C A
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motor driven fire pump was closed.
Investigation determined that it ha'd been left closed for some 29 hours3.356481e-4 days <br />0.00806 hours <br />4.794974e-5 weeks <br />1.10345e-5 months <br /> after having-been utilized by v
construction contractors on September 3, 1986. The discharge valve was
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opened which restored the fire pump to the normal operational configuration. No Notice of Violation will be issued since this item was
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j identified by the' licensee and adequate corrective actions were taken.
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Just prior to the recent gaseous release at Kewaunee that was caused by-i.
mistakenly connecting argon gas to the VCT hydrogen cover gas manifold, a l
review of all bottled gases was undertaken at Prairie Island by the resident inspectors. A wide variety of compressed gases are used in addition to the usual nitrogen, oxygen, hydrogen, and helium and are essentially custom blends used for calibration of various plant
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i instrumentation. The Prairie Island VCT hydrogen cover gas system utilizes an arrangement of preconnected banks of hydrogen bottles located in a dedicated facility specifically designed for that purpose. A
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detailed review of the plant's methods of using various gas bottles
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concluded that the probability of the Kewaunee type of error occurring l
here (incorrect cylinder usage) is extremely' remote.
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l No violations or deviations were identified.
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Maintenance Observation (62703)
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Routine maintenance activities (on safety-related systems and components)
listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that'they were conducted i
in accordance with approved conformance with Technical Specifications.
The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting
conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service, approvals were obtained prior to initiating the
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work, activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were
inspected as applicable, functional testing and/or calibrations were
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performed prior to returning components.or systems to service, quality I
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control records were maintained, activities were accomplished by qualified personnel, radiological controls were implemented, and fire
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prevention controls were implemented.
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Portions of the following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed during the irispection period:
Reactdr[C4clant System (RCS) instrumentation (in containment)
22 diesel ' cooling water pump preventive maintenance Diesel generator.01 and D2 corrective and preventive maintenance Charcoal filter bank filter replacement Freeze seal applications on two component cooling lines
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'NoWiolatioris or deviations were identified.
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Surve[liance(61726)
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The inspector witnessed portions of surveillance testing of safety-related systams and components. The inspection included verifying that the tests,were' scheduled and performed within Technical Specification tequirements, observing that procedures were being followed by qualified operator.s, that" Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs)
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were not violated, that system and equipment restoration was completed, and that test results were acceptable to test and Technical Specification requirements.
On September 8, 1986, the emergency diesel generator D1 failed to start while performing a biweekly surve.111ance. The cause of the failure was determined to be a faulty fuel check valve which was replaced.
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Portions of the following surveillances were observed / reviewed during the inspection period:
SP 1708 emergency lighting test SP 1032 safeguards logic test SP 2224 computer annual surveillance SP 1093 diesel generator functional test SP'2102 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump test SP 2100 motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump test No violations or deviations were identified.
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6.
ESF System Walkdown'(71710)
The inspector performed a complete walkdown of the accessible portions of both eraergency diesel generator systems.
Observations included confirmation of selected portions of the Licensee's procedures, checklists, plant drawings, verification of correct valve and power
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supply breaker positions to insure that plant equipment and instrumentation a're properly aligned, and review of control room and local system indication to ensure proper operation within prescribed limits.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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Facility Modifications (37700)
On August 25, 1986 while preparing to isolate diesel generator D-4
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(backup power source for non-safety related plant equipment), a personnel error occurred during the process of racking out the 4 kilovolt bus breaker.
This resulted in an overcurrent condition which caused extensive damage to the generator. The licensee has replaced the generator and is proceeding with preop testing.
No violations or deviations were identificd.
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Fire Protection (64704)
At 10:00 a.a. on October 4, 1986, the detectors for Fire Detection Zone 75 were found to be bypassed and were promptly switched to normal operation.
It is unlikely that this condition had existed for more than a shift or two since the bypass switch positions are monitored each shift. Though the bypassing of this zone withcue establishing a fire watch is a violation of Technical Specification 3.14, a Notice of Violation will not be issued since the situation was identified by the licensee, was of minor severity, was reported to NRC and promptly corrected, and was not a repeat violation.
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Offsite Sirens (82301)
At 3:30 p.m. on October 11, 1986, siren NSPW-1 which is located in Wisconsin a few miles from Red Wing, MN activated spuriously. After sounding for 30-60 minutes, the siren shut itself off. No siren testing was in progress at the time. Calls from concerned citizens prompted the local radio station to contact the plant Unit I shift supervisor who confirmed that there was no plant emergency.
This information was broadcast by the radio station. The cause of the spurious activation is believed to have been a problem in the electronic circuit boards mounted on the siren.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Licensee Event Reports Followup (92700)
Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications:
(Closed) 282/86010-06 Inoperability of D1 emergency diesel generator and 22 diesel cooling water pump at the same time
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(Closed) 306/86012-04 Auto start of No. 21 motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump during electrical troubleshooting 11. Meetings with Corporate Management (30702)
On September 12, 1986 the Senior Resident Inspector met with NSP officials at the corporate offices.
Subjects discussed included:
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Operator morale 2.
Modification control process 3.
Fitness for duty implementation 4.
Davis-Besse Task Force conclusions 6.
Other areas Operator Morale At the request of RIII management, the licensee met with NRC officials in the RIII office on August 20, 1986 to discuss the factors surrounding the applications by a large number of Prairie Island plant operators for transfer to jobs outside the nuclear plant.
The following points were made during the discussions:
31 operators out of.a total of 62 applied for positions at the
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Red Wing Steam Plant
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18 of those'who applied hold NRC licenses
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4 operators, all with licenses, will be transferring to the Red
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Wing Plant in March 1987 Reasons given for wanting co transfer include:
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Money - The license premium is not adequate.
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Stress - In a fossil plant there is less stress than in the nuclear plant; e.g., maintaining an NRC license (especially requalification), NRC rules and regulations, too much overtime, attention to detail.
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Management does not support the operators and there is a lack of trust of some management people.
Licensee agreed that management hasn't paid the attention to detail
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in this area that they should have.
Operators currently in training will replace the ones who are
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leaving.
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Corrective actions are being explored along the following lines:
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An increase in premium for maintaining an NRC license.
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Increasing the size of the operations staff.
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The addition of six Shift Managers.
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Organization changes in the operations department.
12. Security On October 7, 1986, the resident inspectors observed a plant security exercise (i.e. a simulated bomb planted in a vital area). Local law enforcement with an explosives trained dog as well as the Twin' Cities Bomb Squad participated. At the critique which followed, it was generally agreed to have been a very successful and beneficial exercise for all of the participants.
13. Safety Audit Committee Activities (40701)
The senior resident inspector ~ attended the quarterly meeting of the offsite safety committee (SAC) on September 4, 1986. This committee makes in-depth inquiries regarding plant activities. All regulatory requirements appear to have been met.
14. Allegation On April 23, 1986, NRC Region III received an anonymous call from an individual with an allegation regarding meter calibration for Monticello and Prairie Island.
(See NRC letter to NSP dated June 4, 1986). An investigation of the allegation was completed by the NSP Power Supply QA Department. The report of this investigation, Audit Report No. 86-33-3, has been reviewed by the resident inspector. On the basis of this review and of NSP's commitment to update Maintenance.and Testing procedures (See NSP letter to NRC dated October 6, 1986 attached to this report), the allegation is closed.
15. Followup (92701)
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Periodic Inspection of Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation By memo dated August 29, 1986, W.G. Guldemond requested the resident l
inspectors to conduct an initial as well as periodic inspections of j
maintenance and testing of the seismic monitoring instrumentation as l
a result of recent operability / reliability concerns. The initial inspection has been completed and the requested seismic instrumentation data package is being forwarded to Region III.
The annual inspection of.the seismic monitoring instrumentation has been added to the Prairie Island Master Inspection Plan.
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IEB 86-02 " Static -0- Ring Differential Pressure Switches" Incomplete Licensee Response
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By memo dated September 3, 1986, C. E. Norelius requested all senior resident inspectors to review the licensee's response to IEB 86-02 to determine if the response specifically addresses "important to safety" applications, and if not to request that the licensee submit a revised response. The Licensee response to IEB 86-02 dated July 25, 1986 only addressed " safety related" applications and consequently a revised response was requested'
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dated September 30, 1986 addressed "important to safety" and per the original response indicated no SOR Model 102 or 103 differential pressure switches were installed.
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Exit Interview (30703)
The inspectors met with licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the inspection on October 14, 1987. The inspectors discussed the purpose and scope of the inspection and the findings.
The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with_ regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any document / processes as proprietary.
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