IR 05000277/1981009
| ML20009D149 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 07/01/1981 |
| From: | Blough A, Cowgill C, Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20009D148 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-277-81-09, 50-277-81-9, 50-278-81-10, NUDOCS 8107230229 | |
| Download: ML20009D149 (12) | |
Text
,
-.
.
-
-
,
'*i-50277-810413
-
-
-T 50278-810414 50277-810422 50277-810427 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
'
0FFICE 0."
i:SPECTION AND dNFORCEMENT Region I
- 50-277/81-09 1 Report No.159-278/81-10 50-277 Docket No. 50-278 DPR-44 c
license No.DPR-56 Priority Category c
Licensee: Philadelphia Electric Company 2301 Market Street Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Facility Name: -Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3 Inspection at: Delta, oennsylvania April 8-30, 1981 Inspection conduc
.
Inspectors:
LJ /
h hu-4 6 Sf/
.
j/
a date signed C. J / Cowg
.
III, Senior Resident Inspector c-)5 J2P/
R A.R.-Blo6gh,lResidentInspector date signed
.
'
date signed Approved by:
f 0 /L (ta,1 7 /1 la E. C.~McCabe, Jr.,' Chief, Reactor Projects date signed Section No. 2B, DRPI
!
Inspection Summary:
Inspection of April 8-30,1981 (Combined Inspection Report Nos. 50-277/81-09 and 50-278/81-10)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, onsite regular and backshift inspections by the resident-inspectors (43.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> Unit 2; 69.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> Unit 3).
Areas inspected inchdc<t accessible portions of the Unit 2 and Unit 3 facilities, operational safety, evcct followup, radiation protection, physical security, control room observations, LER review, response to NRC orders, outstanding item followup and periodic reports.
Results: Noncompliances:
None.
8107230229 810702 )
PDR ADOCK 05000277, G
PDR;
/
Region.I-Form 12 (Rev.: April.77)
._
,
_ _
....
.
..
.__:._ _ _.._,___. _ _ _ _.._ _._. _ __._._._-
.
.
.
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted M. J. Cooney, Superintendent, Generation Division (Nuclear)
W. Corse, Assistant Site Q. A. Engineer J. K. Davenport, Maintenance Engineer G. F. Dawson, I&C Engineer
- R._ S. Fleischmann, Assistant Station Superintendent A. Fulvio, Results Engineer N. Gazda, Health Physics, Radiation Protection Manager C. P. Lauletta, Training Coordinator W. C. MacFarland,-Engineer - Construction Division F. W. Polaski, Reactor Engineer S. R. Roberts, Operations Engineer D. C. Smith, Outage Coordinator S. A. Spitko, Site Q. A. Engineer S. Q. Tharpe, Security Supervisor W.
E'. Tilton, Refuel Floor Supervisor
- W. T. Ullrich, Station Superintendent A. J. Wasong, Test Engineer H. L. Watson, Chemistry Supervisor J. E. Winzenried, Technical Engineer Other licensee employees were also contacted during the inspection.
- Present at exit interviews on site and for summation of preliminary inspection findings.
2.
Outstanding Items Update (Closed) Infraction (79-15-01 and 79-17-01) improper certification of respiratory protection training on security badges for one individual.
Licensee review of this item resulted in deletion of security badge labels to certify respiratory protection training.
Current control methods were reviewed in combined report 80-32 and 80-24 and found to be adequate.
During tours the inspector noted workers and Health Physics Technicians referring to the " Current Respiratory Qualification List".
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
(Closed) Infraction (277/77-23-02), failure to initiate shutdown with three of four diesel generators inoperable on June 13, 1977.
The licensee con-ducted' group discussions and issued letters to operating personnel to stress both the importance of prompt response to annunciators which could have impact on limiting conditions for operation (LCOs) and the need to initiate shutdown immediately when the LCOs are not met.
The inspector determined that operators and shift supervision are cognizant of these matters.
Oper-ators were found to be knowledgeable regarding annunciators (see Detail 3)
.
.
..
,
and have been observed to promptly investigate alarms which could affect LCOs. Review of plant operations has verified that shutdowns have been initiated when required.
For example, on April 20, with the 'E-l' diesel generator blocked for annual inspection, the 'B' Core Spray loop failed surveillance testing -- a plant shutdown was immediately initiated as required by Technical Specification LCOs.
The shutdown proceeded until the Core Spray problem (instrument inaccuracy) was correcteo and loop testing completed. The inspector had no further questions regarding this item.
-(Closed) Inspector Follow Item (81-07-07 and 81-09-06) review licensee's schedule for IAL 81-18 items.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's response, dated April 16, 1981, to the immediate action letter and determined that each item is adequately addressed and that completion schedules are acceptable.
3.
Plant Operations Review a.
Logs and Records (1) Documents Reviewed A sampling review of logs and records was made to:
identify significant changes and trends; assure that required entries were being made; to verify that operating orders and night orders conform to Technical Specification requirements; check
. correctness of communications concerning equipment and lock-out status; verify jumper log conformance to procedural requirements; and to verify conformance to limiting conditions for operations.
Logs and records reviewed were:
(a) Shift Supervision Log - April 8-30, 1981 (b) Reactor Engineering Log - Unit 2, April, 1981 (c) Reactor Engineering Log - Unit 3, April, 1981
(d) Reactor Operators Log - Unit 2, April 8-30,1981 (e) Reactor Operators Log - Unit 3, April 8-30,1981 (
(f) CO Log Book - April 8-30, 1981
-
(g) Night Orders - Current Entrics (h) Radiation Work Permits (RWP's) - Various in both Units 2 and 3, April,1981 j
(i) Maintenance Request Forms (MRF's) - Units 2 and 3, (Sampling),
April,1981 i
!
.
-
- - -
...
-
_.. -.
.
-
--.
--.
.-.
.
..
,
(j) Ignition Source Control Checklists (Sampling), April,1981 (k) Operation Work & Information Data - April,1981 Control-room logs were reviewed pursuant to requirements of Admin-
-istrative Procedure A-7, " Shift Operations." Frequent initialing of entries by licensed operators, shift supervision, and licensee on-site management constituted evidence of licensee. review.
Logs were also reviewed to assure that plant conditions including abnormalities and significant operations were accurately and completely recorded.. Logs were also assessed to determine that matters requiring reports to the NRC were being processed as suspected reportable occurrences.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
(2) Facility Tours During the course of this inspection, which also included shift turnover, the inspector :onducted daily tours and made observations of:
-- Control Room - (dai'y)
-- Turbine Building - (all levels)
-- Reactor Building - (accessible areas)
-- Diesel Generator Building i
!
-- Yard area and perimeter exterior to the power block, including Emergency Cooling Tower and torus dewatering tank
-- Security Building, ' including CAS, Aux SAS, and control point monitoring
,
-- Vehicular Control
-- The SAS and power block control points
-- Security Fencing
'
-- Portal Monitoring
-- Personnel and Badging l
-- Control of Radiation and High Radiation areas including locked l.
door checks
,
-- TV monitoring capabilit %
I l
_
_., _. _, _,...
, _...-...__._.
_. _
. _ _ _.. _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _.
_. _... _ _ -.
.
4".m
..
..
.
Off-Shift Inspection during this inspection period and the areas examined were as follows:
DATE AREAS EXAMINED April 12,1981 Control Room Observations April.13,1981 Tour of Turbine Building
.
April 14, 1981 Tour of Unit 3 Reactor Building April 15,1981 Tour of Unit 2 Reactor Building April 17, 1981 Control Room Observations, Unit 2 Reactor Building tour, Unit 3 Reactor Building tour (including refuel floor)
'
' April 20, 1981 Control Room Observations
.
April 22, 1981 Control Room Observations April E4, 1981 Control Room Observations April 27,'1981 Control Room Ot.servations April 28, 1981 Control Room Observations April 29,1981-Control Room Observations April 30,1981 Control Room tour, protected area tour, SAS observations.
-- Off-Normal Alarms.
Selected annunciators were discussed with control room operators'and supervision to assure they were knowledgeable of plant conditions and that corrective action, if required, was being taken.
Examples of specific alarms discussed during the report period were:
Radwaste Tank High Level; Rod Withdrawal Block, and Scram Discharge Instrument Volume Hot Drained.
The operators were knowledgeable of alarm
. status and plant conditions.
---Control Rocm Manning.
On frequent occasions during this inspection, the inspector confirmed that requirements of 10CFR 50.54(k), the
. Technical Specifications and commitments to the NRR letter of July 31, 1980 for minimum staffing were satisfied.
The inspector frequently confirmed that a senior licensed operator was in the control room complex.
No unacceptable conditions were identifie....
_ _ _ _ _ _
__
.
..
,
-- Fluid Leaks.
No significant fluid leaks were identified which had not also been identified by the licensee nor for which necessary corrective action had not been initiated.
The inspector observed sump _ status, alarms, pump-out rates, and held discussions with licensee personnel. Fo unacceptable conditions were identified.
-- Piping Vibration.
No significant piping vibration or unusual conditions were identified.
-- Monitoring Instrumentation. The inspector frequently confirmed that selected i.istruments were operating and indicated values were within Technical Specification requirements. On a daily basis when the inspector was on site, ECCS switch positioning and valve line-ups, based on control room indicators and plant observations were verified.
Examples of instrumentation observed included flow setpoints, breaker positioning, PCIS status, radiation monitoring instruments, Scram Discharge Volume level instruments, and suppression pool parameters.
No' unacceptable conditions were identified.
-- Fire Protection.
On frequent occasions the inspector verified the licensee's measures for fire protection.
The inspector observed control roem indications of fire detection and fire suppression systems, spo+.-checked for proper use of fire watches and ignition source controls, checked a sampling of fire barriers for integrity, and observed fire-fighting equipment stations.
The-inspector toured the Unit 3 torus on April 16.
The following hazardcas conditions were identified:
-- air hoses running along walkways;
-- isolated cases of inadequately restrained catwalks and ladders;
-- no indication of recent portable fire extinguisher inspections;
-- air leak from one airline filter station.
The inspector questioned whether lumber in use was flame retardant.
This information was provided to the licensee, who then conducted additional torus and drywell inspections and initiated corrective actions. The inspector reviewed licensee inspection discrepancy lists, discussed the items with licensee personnel and attended the daily outage meeting on April 17 to verify that licensee corrective action was either completed or in progress for all items.
The inspector reviewed documentation of fire treatment and licensee safety department acceptance of scaffold boards for use in the torus.
The inspector had no further questions in this matte,
_
_.
.
_.
. <
..
.
' b.- Followup on Events Occurring During the Inspection (1) HPCI Room Flooding - Unit 3 About 10:20'a.m. on-April 14, with the HPCI pump and turbine disassembled for maintenance, the room flooded through the pump
.
suction to a depth of 12 feet in about 10 minutes.
Control room operators received the "HPCI Room Flood" alarm and electrical ground alarms, noted Condensate Storage Tank (CST) level dropping rapidly, and dispatched.an operator to manually isolate the CST.
- Workers in the HPCI room safely evacuated the area.
Shortly thereafter, the HPCI room carbon dioxide fire suppression (CARD 0X)
system initiated (apparently due to an electrical fault from the water), even though it was locally disabled.
Elevations below the 135-foot level, and later the entire Reactor Building, were evac-uated to protect personnel from the carbon dioxide. An inspector monitored immediate corrective actions in the control room.
A
' region-based radiation protection specialist inspector observed certain response actions outside the control room -- these are detailed in IE Combined Inspection Report. 50-277/81-10 and 50-278/81-11.
The inspector observed that all personnel had been accounted for, with no. injuries reported. The inspector reviewed results of storm sewers samples taken to confirm that no radioactive. liquid was' escaping the Reactor Building -- no activity was detected in these samples.
Ventilation exhaust
- radiation monitors indicated no abnormal release of airborne radioactivity. Airborne activity in the Reactor Building was slightly above minimum detectable.
Scott Air Packs (self-contained. breathing apparatus) were used for entries, due to the oxygen deficient atmosphere.
The inspector requested that the licensee make periodic inspections of the 88' and 91'-6" elevations of the Unit 2 Reactor Building to verify no leakage of water into equipment rooms of the operating unit. This was done, and no in-leakage was noted.
The 'icensee also periodically checked 88' and 91'-6" elevation rooms at Unit 3.
A small amount of leakage to other rooms was detected but was not enough to threaten equipment.
. The inspector verified that Unit 3 fuel pool cooling was fully operational and that sufficient makeup water was available for both units. On April 14 and 15, the water in the HPCI room was processed through via the radwaste system and returned to the CST, which was kept isolated pending review of the causes of the event.
i 1~
-,.
. _ _.,. _.
,__...,_.___,,,._,_m
. _, _,, _ _.., _ _ _..... _ _ _ _ _, _, _ _,,
_ _ _ _ _ _, _.,. _ _ _. -. _
_
- - - _ -
i
.
.
l
A comprehensive licensee analysis of the event is underway and will be reviewed in a subsequent report (278/81-10-01).
However, the inspector reviewed aspects of the event having immediate safety importance.
The basic cause of the event was examined.
At the time the event occurred, a blocking permit was being applied that involved pulling l
ECCS fuses and could have resulted in a HPCI initiation signal.
This would have given an "open" signal to the HPCI pump suction valve.
The suction valve was, in fact, found open tien the room was entered on April 15, following dewatering.
The feed switch for the valve motor was found locked open, but this may have been opened after the event, as a plant operator acted to de-energiza all equipment in the room, because of the electrical grounding.
The HPCI pump suction valve was tagged shut by two blocking permits for HPCI system work, but only the control room switch was tagged.
Therefore, automatic opening of the valve was not precluded.
These inadequacies in isolating the maintenance area allowed this vent to occur.
The inspector reviewed a letter from the station superintendent dated April 16, which discussed the event, stressed the importance of thorough review of blocking points for maintenance, reviewed stipulations of the licensee's "Pe mits and Blocking Handbook",
instructed personne'. to use approved blocking sequences if available, and requires shift supervision to review each permit j
for technical adequacy.
The effectiveness of these corrective i
measures will be rc>iewed in a subsequent inspection (278/81-10-02).
The inspector reviewed provisions to prevent flooding in one ECCS equipment room from affecting equipment in other rooms.
Water-tinht doors are installed in ECCS rooms, as ciscussed in the FSAR.
Unit startup procedures require performance of system procedure 5.15.1 " Internal Flooding Protection of ECCS Rooms", revision 1, I
!
dated September 8,1980, involving verification that the doors are shut and dogged.
An additional potential for room-to-room leakage, identi fied during facility pre-operational phase, is drain system communication.
To preclude this, the licensee has covered or plugged selected floor and equipment drains.
The licensee indi-cated that startup procedures would be revised to include verifi-cation checks for these items.
The issue of ECCS room drain communication will be further reviewed in a subsequent inspection (278/81-09-01 and 278/81-10-03).
On April 28, the inspect.or interviewed several people who were in the HPCI room at the start of the event.
All participants were in general agreement regarding the sequence of events.
Workers exited the room via two routes.
One group exited into the RCIC room.
Two members of this group received " error" signals from the security computer as the group attempted to proceed through to the sump room.
A third man's key card unlocked the door, and all then passed thrcugh.
____ _ _ _ _ _.... _
..
,
_-
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _.
,.
...
-
,
-
(In a separate discussion,Lthe. Assistant Station Superintendent stated that-the door. had been programmed too restrictively for
<
security purposes, but the problem had been since corrected.)
1Three other workers delayed exiting the HPCI room for a few~ minutes,
- hoping the leakage would stop..They'then waded through the water, w
nearly chest deep 3 and exited into a stairwell up to the RBCW room.
One man said he was knocked to his knees by a barrel in the turbu-
' ' lent water, and some Later splashed over his head. All' men said they had been found not. contaminated.
Whole body counts had ' veri-
- fied no internal deposition.
Several men had received additional
'" error" signals while exiting various. security. areas.
Each remem-
.bered later that an area may be exited in an emergency, regardless
.of security computer status.
Security system operations as related to emergency situations will be reviewed in a subsequent inspection (81-09-02 and -81-10-04).
(2) Unit 2 Recirculation Pump Seal Failure
,
On April' 22' Unit 2'B' recirculation pump seal assemply failed, which caused drywell pressure to increase to.l.6 pounds beforo the pump could be turned off and' isolated.
After the pump was-
~
Lisolated, drywell pressure stabilized and a normal plant shut-down was conducted.
A drywell fire alarm actuated about the time the pump seal failed.
Drywell atmosnhere was less than 2% oxygen when the alarm occurred, and there was no evidence of abnormal equipment operation during the shutdown.
The licensee inspected the area. surrounding the pump and the vicinity of the alarm on initial: entry-into the drywell and found ao evidence of fire in the drywell.
Prior to seal failure recirculation pump motor
. vibration alarms were received.
The licensee is evaluating the recirculation' pump seal failure, motor conditions, and the dry-weli' fire alarm ' actuation.
The results of these evaluations
'
-will be reviewed. -(277/81-09-03).
1(3) : Radioactive' Waste Discharge Line Break On April. 27,1981 a routine planned monitored discharge of liquid effluent was halted when water was seen flowing from the ground near the buried 4-inch discharge pipe.
Termination of the dis-charge' stopped the' leakage, which was downstream of the radioactive
-
waste monitors and on owner-controlled property.
Some of the leak-
-age was' observed to flow into the discharge canal, the original destination of-the release. The inspector reviewed water samples.
taken-in the area,.which indicated Cs-134, Cs-137, Co-60, and 2n-65 in an isotopic' mixture resulting in about 60 per cent of the values
.of 10CFR20, Appendix B Table II (Maximum permissible concentration
'~
for release to unrestricted areas).
The inspector toured the area
_
--.
._.
,
.
..
,
'
on April 27 to verify th'at radiological control over the area had been established.
The damaged section of pipe was unearthed and replaced.
The inspector reviewed results of samples of the excavated soil and, in consultation with region-based special-ists, determined that reuse of the soil to backfill the mainte-nance' area was acceptable. The inspector identified no unacccpt-able conditions.
4.
Followup on NRC Orders to Licensees On January 9,1981, the NRC transmitted an Order for Modification of License concerning BWR scram discharge systems. This order supplemented requirements of IE Bulletin 80-17 and specified that, within 90 days, an automatic system shall be operable to initiate control rod insertion by rapidly dumping the control air system header if the air pressure decreases below a prescribed value. This should preclude a degraded control air
. pressure from allowing rapid filling of the Scram Discharge Volume, without scram, via partially opened scram outlet valves.
The inspector noted that a system to meet these requirements had been installed at Unit-2 by Apri! 9 and, on April 13, discussed the system with operating shift personnel to verify they were knowledgeable in its operation. The licensee's response to this order, including Unit 3 provisions, will be further review d within the scope of the routine inspection program.
5.
Review of Licensee Event Reports (LER's)
The inspector reviewed LER's-submitted to the NRC:RI office to verify that the details of the event were clearly reported, including the accuracy of the description of cause and adequacy of corrective action.
The inspector determined whether further information was required from the licensee, whether generic i plications were indicated, and whether m
continued operation of the facility was conducted in accordance with Technical Specifications and dia not constitute an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10CFR 50.59.
Report accuracy, compliance with current reporting requirements and applicability to other site systems and components were also reviewed.
The following LER's were reviewed:
l LER No.
LER Date Event Date Subject 2-81-25/lP April
, 1981 April 13,1981 Mounting Brackets for Reactor
and 2-81-25/1T April
, 1981 Building - Torus vacumn breakers do not meet DBE requirements.
!
On April 13, 1981 the licensee was informed by its architect engineer that i
the air-operated Reactor Building to Torus vacumn breakers potentially l
could fail under Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) conditions.
The defective
~ component was the mounting bracket for the valve air operator. Although the valves fail open on loss of air supply, valve response to a bracket
.
failure could not be positively predicted.
Each air-operated valve is
!
in-line with a mechanical valve.
Technical Specifications al. owed one
_.
-
-.. - - - - -
- -. -
. -.
.
-
- -..
o
..
vacuum breaker to be inoperable for periods up to seven days. The condition described required a shutdown within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
The licensee requested an emergency change to the facility technical specifications to allow operation under these conditions until corrective modifications could be effected. On April 14, 1981 by letter to the Vice President, Electric Production, PEC0, NRC:NRR authorized continued plant operation until April 20, 1981, based on the extremely small probability of a design basis earthquake in conjunction with a scenario requiringttorus vacumn breaker operations.
Facility operation was authorized until April 27, 1981, provided one of the two vat.uum breaker's was made operable prior to April 20.
One of the two valves was made operable on April 18, 1981.
The Unit was shutdown on April 22, 1981 and the licensee committed to restoring the remaining torus vacuum breaker prior to plant startup. The unit remained shutdown for the remainder of the month.
The inspector identified no unacceptable conditions.
6.
Radiation Protection During this report period, the inspector examined work in progress in accessible areas of the Unit 2 and Unit 3 facilities. Areas examined included:
a.
Health Physics (HP) controls
.
b.
Badging c.
Usage of protective clothing d.
Personnel # erence to RWP requirements e.
Surveys f.
Handling of potentially contaminated equipment and materials Additionally, inspections were conducted of usage of friskers and portal monitors by r"sonnel exiting various RWP areas, the power block, and the licensee's..nal exit point.
More then 80 people were observed to meet
'
i frisking requirements of Health Physics procedures during the month.
A sampling of high rediation docrs was verified to be locked as required.
Compliance with RWP requirements was verified during each tour; special emphasis was placed on RWP adherence at the Unit 3 Drywell, Torus, and l
Refuel Floor.
Over 20 RWP's were checked during the month, and about 30 people working in RWP areas were observed to be meeting the applicable
'
requirements.
No un6ccaptable conditions were identified.
7, Physical Security The inspector spot-checked compliance with the Accepted Security Plan and implementing procedures, including operations of the CAS and SAS, over 20 spot-checks of vehicles onsite to verify proper control, observation of
.
protected area access control and badging procedures on each shift, inspection of physical barriers, checks on control of vital area access and escort procedures.
No unacceptable conditions wert identified.
l i
I
,
.-,
,
.
.
... - -
-
-.
-.
- -..- -.-
.
,
.
...
.
8.
In-Office Review of Monthly Operating Reports The following licensee reports have been reviewed in-office onsite.
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Monthly Operating Report for:
March 1981 dated April 14, 1981 This report was reviewed pursuant to Technical Specifications, and verified to detennine that operating statistics had been accurately reported and that narrati'le summeries of the month's operating experience were contained therein. No unacceptable conditions were identiff 9d.
9.
Management Meetings a.
Pre?iminary Inspection Findings, A sumary of preliminary findings was provided to the Station Superin-tende'it at the conclusien of the inspection.
During the period of this inspection, licensee management was periodically notified of the pre-liminary findings by the resident inspectors. The dates involved, the senior licensee representative contacted, and subjects discussed were as follows:
Senior Licensee Date
'ubject Representative Present
'
April 13,1981 Reactor Building Vacuum Breaker Station Superintendent April 16,1981 Routine discussions Station Superintendent April 24, 1981 Routine discussions Assistant Station Superintendent April 30, 1981 Routine discussions Station Superintendent b.
Attendance at Management Meetings Conducted by Region-Based Inspectors The resident inspectors attended entrance and exit interviews by region-based inspectors as follows:
Inspection Reporting Date Subject Report No.
Inspector April 14"(Entrance) Outage Health Physics 50-277/81-10 R. Nimitz April 16 (Exit)
and 50-278/81-11 April 20 (Entrance) Physical Security 50-277/81-17 G. Smith April 24 (Exit)
and 50-278/81-11
.-
- - - -
-
-..
-.
..- -..-
. -.. -.-