IR 05000277/1981018
| ML20010F252 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 08/21/1981 |
| From: | Blough A, Cowgill C, Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20010F225 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-277-81-18, 50-278-81-19, NUDOCS 8109090533 | |
| Download: ML20010F252 (12) | |
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50-278/800205 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 50-278/810706 0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I 50-277/81-18 Report No. 50-275/81-19 50-277 Docket No. 50-278 DPR-44 c
License No.0PR-56 Priority Category
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Licensee:
Philadelphia Electric Ccmoany 2301 Market Street Philadelphia. Pennsv1vania Facility Name: Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3 Inspection at: Delta, Pennsylvania Inspection conducte : Julv 1 - August 3,1981 Inspectors:
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III, Senior Resident Inspector
'dat'e sig:,ed G
P-V-st A. H. tHough, Resident Inspector date signed
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date signec
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Approved by:h "h.'fMCabe, Jr., Chief, Reactor Projects
/ dat'e signed
[fSectionNo.2B,DRPI Inspection Summary:
l Inspection on July 1-August 3,1981 (Combined Inspection Report Nos. 50-277/81-18 l
and 50-278/81-19)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, onsite regular and backshift inspections by the resident inspectors (43 hours4.976852e-4 days <br />0.0119 hours <br />7.109788e-5 weeks <br />1.63615e-5 months <br /> Unit 2; 42 hours4.861111e-4 days <br />0.0117 hours <br />6.944444e-5 weeks <br />1.5981e-5 months <br /> Jr't 3). Areas inspected included accessible portions of We Unit 2 and Unit 3 facilt' es, operational safety, event followup, radiation protection, physical security, control room observations, LER review, IE Cfrcular followup, outstanding item followup, committee activities and periodic reports.
Results: Noncompliances:
none in eight areas, three in three areas, (failure to restore valve lineups fol;owing surveillance testing, Detail 3; failure to maintain fire doors closed and fire stations clear, Detail 3; and failure to adhere to contam-inated arc controls, Detati 6).
Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
810909 533
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted W. Corse, Assistant Site Q. A. Engineer J. K. Davenport, Maintenance Engineer G. F. Dawson, I&C Engineer
'E. Firth, Outage Planning R. S. Fleischmann, Assistant Station Superintendent A. Fulvio, Results Engineer N. Gazda, Health Physics, Radiation Protection Manager F. 11; Polaski, Reactor Engineer S. R. Roberts, Operations Engineer D. C. Smith, Outage Coordinator S. A. Spitko, Site Q. A. Engineer S. Q. Tharpe, Security Supervisor
- W. T. Ullrich, Station Superintendent A. J._Wasong, Test Engineer H. L. Watson, Chemistry Supervisor J. E. Winzenried Technical Engineer Other_ licensee employees were also contacted during the inspection.
- Present at exit interviews on site and for summation of preliminary inspection findings.
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2.
previous Inspection Item Update (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (80-04-09 and 80-04-11), review licensee
l installation of low pressure alarm feature for containment vent valve seals. The alarm feature has been installed. The inspector reviewed
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system operating procedures and discussed the feature with operating
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l personnel. No unacceptable conditions were identified.
(Closed) Inspector Follow Item (278/80-03-01), verify LER issuance and
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review licensee action on high conductivity. The inspector reviewed i
LER No. 3-80-04/3L and the licensee corrective actions for this event.
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No unacceptable conditions were identified.
I (Closed)InspectorFollowItem(277/80-03-01), verify that controls are l
established to specify evaluation of increases in activity (e.g., RBCW system). The intent of this item is incorporated into IAL 81-18, which was noted for in-depth review by combined reports 81-07 and 81-09.
This item is therefore closed.
(Closed) Inspector Follow Item (80-28-04 and 80-20-04), review adequacy of protected area perinetcr surveillance.
The inspector has observed checks of the protected area perimeter.
No inadequacics were identified. This item is closed.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (79-20-03 and 79-22-04), modification of containment isolation valves to provide mechanical stops restricting valve opening.
Mechan-ical stops have been installed.
They consist of snap rings to limit valve l
opening to 37 degrees to assure that valves can close under design basis l
accident conditions.
The rings may be removed, by procedure, when the reactor is in a cold condition.
The inspector reviewed system procedures, discussed this matter with operating personnel and members of the technical staff, and spot-checked that snap rings were in-place when required by plant conditions.
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The ipspector had no further questions.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (81-16-04 and 81-17-04), revision to containment ventilation valve procedures were needed to ensure conformance to commitments.
- The inspector reviewed system and startup/ shutdown procedures, all revised June 19,1981, to verify consistency with the licensee's commitments.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
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(0 pen) Inspector Follow Item (277/30-32-05), review upgrading of safety relief valve acoustic monitors in accordance with Till action plan.
NRC correspondence
dated December 18, 1980 set a completion date of June 30, 1981 for Unit 2 equip-ment upgrading.
The inspector reviewed Modification Package #575, which indi-cated that the required work (MRF #2-1-C-0-199) was completed by June 25, 1981.
The inspector also observed control room indications and discussed system operacion with licensed operators. The~ inspector will also review data regard-ing the qualification of the equipment..
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3.
Plant Operations Review
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Logs and Records (1) Documents Reviewed
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A sampling review of logs and records was made to:
identify
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significant changes and trends; assure that required entries were being made; verify that operatirg orders and night orders conform to Technical Specification requirements; check l
correctness of comunications concerning equipment and lock-out status; verify jumper log conformance to procedural requirements; and verify conformance to limiting conditions
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for operations.
Logs and records reviewed were:
l (a) Shift Supervision Log, July 1 - August 3,1981 (b) Reactor Engineering Log - Unit 2, July,1981 (c) Locked Valve Control Log l
(d) Reactor Operators Log - Unit 2 - July 1 - August 3,1981
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l (e) Reactor Operators Log - Unit 3 - July 1 - August 3,1981
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(f) C0 Log Book - July 1 - August 3, 1981 (g) STA Log Book - Sampling, July,1981 (h) Night Orders - Current Entries (i) Radiation Work Permits (RWP's) - Various in both Units 2 f
and 3, July,1981 l
(j)* Maintenance Request Forms (MRF's) - Units 2 and 3, (Sampling)
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Ignition Source Control Checklists (Sampling), July,1981 (1) Operation Work & Information Data - July,1981 Control room logs were reviewed pursuant to requirements of
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Administrative Procedure A-7, " Shift Operations." Frequent l
initialing of entries by licensed operators, shift supervision,
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and licensee on-site management constituted evidence of licensee
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review.
Logs were also reviewed to assure that plant cenditions including abnormalities and significant operations were accurately and completely recorded.
Logs were also assessed to determine that
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matters requiring reports to the NRC were being processed as sus-pected reportable occurrences.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
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- (2 )'~ Facilit Tours
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(a) During the course of this inspection, which also included shift turnover, the inspector conducted daily tours and made observations of:
. -- Control Room.(daily)-
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-- Turbine Building
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-- Reactor Building - (accessible areas)
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-- Diesel Generator Building l
-- Yard area and perimeter exterior to the power block, including Emergency Cooling Tower and torus dewatering tank
-- Security Building, including CAS, Aux SAS, and control point monitoring
-- Vehicular Control
- The SAS and power block control points
-- Security Fencing
-- Portal Monitoring
-- Personnel and Badging
-- Control of Radiation and High Radiation areas including locked door checks
-- TV monitoring capabilities
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Off-Shift Inspections during this inspection period and the areas examined were as follows:
DATE AREA (IXAMINED July 6 Unit 3 Reactor Building tour, Control room observations July 9 Control Room observations, Unit 2 Reactor Building tour July 10 Control Room observations July 14 Tour' of Turbine Building July 16 Control Room observations July 21 Control Room observations, tou:- of Unit 3 Reactor Building July 29 Unit 3 Torus tour July 30 Control Room observations July 31 Ccntrol Room observations, tour of Unit 2 and Unit 3 Reactor Buildings August 2 Control Room observations, tour of Unit 2 and Unit 3 Reactor Buildings
-- Control Room Manning.
On frequent occasions during this inspection, the inspector confirmed that requirements of 10CFR 50.54(k), the Technical Specifications and commitments in the NRR letter of July 31, 1980 for minimum staffing were satisfied. The inspector frequently confirmed that a senior licensed operator was in the control room complex.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
-- Fluid Leaks.
On July 6, the inspector noted a small leak at a union in the air supply to torus vacuum breaker 3502A.
When notified, shift supervision inspected the leak and initiated a maintenance request.
No other significant fluid leaks were identified which had not also been identified by the licensee nor for which necessary corrective action had not been initiated.
The inspector observed sump status, alarms, pump-out rates, and held discussions with licensee personnel.
No unacceptable conditions were identifie *
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Off.%rmal Alarms.
Selected annunciators ware discussed with control
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room operators and supervision to assure they were knowledgeable of plant c1nditions and that corrective action, if required, was being taken.
Examples of specific alarms discussed durino the report period were:
Computer and Cable Spreading Room Cardox System Deactivated;
'B' Reactor Feed Pump High Vibration; Diesel Driven Fire Pump trcuble; Reactor Water Cleanup Demineralizer 'nlet Conductivhy, High; Liquid Nitrogen Tank Level, High/ Low; and Refueling Water Storage Tank, Low Temperature. The operators were knowledeable of alarm status and plant conditions.
Piping Vibration.
No significai.t piping vibration or unusual
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conditions were identified.
Monitoring Instrumentation.
The inspector frequently confirmed that
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selected instruments were operating and indicated values were within Technical Specification requirements. On a daily basis when the inspector was on site ECCS switch positioning and valve lineups, based on control room indicators and plant observations were veri-fied.
Examples of instrumentation observed included flow setpoints, breaker positioning, PCIS status, and radiation monitoring instru-ments.
At 8:15 a.m., July 2, the inspector noted that a Unit 2 RCIC turbine exhaust drain line isolation valve (AO-2 -137) indicated shut, where-as the normal position was open.
L' hen notified,the operator reopened the valve and stated that surrillance testing involving RCIC turbine automatic isolation signals (which shut the drain line isolation valve)
had been done about 5:30 p.m. the previous day.
Failure to return the
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system to normal lineup following testing is an item of noncompliance (277/81-18-01 ).
In reviewing the surveillance test ST2.2.05 " Functional Test of RIS 2-13-84, revision 10, dated June 8, 1981, the inspector noted that verification of proper restoration of system lineup is, by procedure, neither complete nor independent.
This is inconsistent with TMI Action Plan Item I.C.G.
This matter is unresolved pending further licensee evaluation (277/81-18-02).
Fire Protection.
On frequent occasions the inspector verified the
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liccaSae's measures for fire protection.
The inspector observed control room indications of fire detection and fire suppression systems, spot-checked for proper use of fire watches and ignition source controls, checkei a sampling of fire barriers for integrity, and observed fire-fighting equipment stations.
On July 7, the inspector noted the following discrepancies while touring the Diesel Generator building:
-- Accumulation of combustibles, including serveral cardboard
'xes and a packing crate,in Bay No. 1
-- tare extinguishers at station DG-104 in Bay No. 3 had not received June 1981 monthly inspection sianoff.
(0ver100 other fire stations checked had received inspection).
This information was provided to the shift superintendent for followup.
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On July 14, 1981 the inspector noted that a fire door (door number 228) was open on the 135-foot elevation.in the Radwaste Building between the decontami-nation room and the filter room. This fire door was clearly marked, " CAUTION--
FIRE D0OR--KEEP CLOSED". The door was actually blocked open..The inspector noted that there was no one in the vicinity of the door and that no activities were in progress that might require that the door be kept open.
The inspector reported the open door to.a senior licensee representative who then had the block removed and the door-closed.
On July 28, 1981 the inspector noted that a fire door was open between the Turbine Building 116-foot elevation and the laundry. While the inspector was in the area two contract workers passed through the door and made no attempt to shut it.
The inyector asked one of the individuals if he was aware that the door was a fire door and required to be closed.
The individual stated that he was not aware of
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the requirement.
The individual then closed the door.
The inspector noted that a sign stating, " CAUTION--FIRE D00R--KEEP CLOSED," was clearly in view on the door. The inspector reviewed Philadelphia Electric Company letter, S.L. Daltroff (Vice President, Electric Production) to T. A. Ippolito, chief, Operating Reactors Branch #3, NRR, dated February 16, 1979; and NRR letter, R. W. Reif, Chief, Operating Reactors Branch #4 to S. L. Daltroff dated August 14, 1980 These letters discuss the fire protection program at Peach Bottom Atomic rower Station.
Included in the letters is a discussion of fire doors for safe'y-r. elated areas.
The open fire doors identified by the inspector are included.
reach Bottom administrative procedures require that fire doors be kept closed.
On July 31, 1981 while conducting tour of Unit 2 and 3 Reactor Buildings the inspector noted that material was being temporarily stored in the vicinity of
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several fire stations.
Included was fire station 135-21 on the 135-foot eleva-tion of the Unit 2 Reactor Building.
This station had a large mobile cart and container obstructing access to this station.
The inspector identified the conditions to shift supervision.
On August 2, 1981 the inspector noted that the cart and container had not been moved from in front of fire station 135-21.
Administrative procedures require that access to fire stations not be impeded.
The failure to maintain the fire station clear and fire doors closed is an item
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l of noncompliance.
(81-18-03 and 81-19-01 ).
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Followup on Events Occurring During the Ipspection Drywell Fire - Unit 3
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At 9:35 a.m., July 6, a small fire occurred in the Unit 3 Drywell l
when sparks from grinding ignited plastic sleeves covering airline
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hoses on the floor (135-foot elevation).
The fire was extinguished l
in about two minutes.
There were no injuries, personnel contamina-l tions, or equipment damage. The licensee's Emergency Plan Implement-ing Procedures categorize this as an Unusual Event. The inspector verified that the licensee had carried out emergency plan procedures,
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including required notifications. Activities at the Reactor Building 135-foot elevation drywell access were also observed. The inspector
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discussed the event with licensee management, who indicated that thorough
drywell inspections for other fire hazards would be conducted, and.cor-rective actions taken; and, the possibility of using.different, non-flammable plastic sleeving material would be investigated.
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IE Circulars Which Require No Written Response
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l IE Circular 80-02, " Nuclear Power Plant Staff Work Hours." This circular l
was clarified and. incorporated into the TMI Action Plan.
The licensee's
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commitments were reviewed in combined reports 81-16 and 81-17.
The inspector had no further questions regarding this circular.
5.
Review of Licensee Event Reports (LER's)
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The inspector reviewed LER's submitted to the NRC:RI office to verify that the details of the event were clearly reported, including the accuracy of i
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determined whether further information was required from the licensee, l
whether generic implications were indicated, and whether continued operation of the facility was conducted in accordance with Technical Specifications and j
did not constitute an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10CFR 50.59.
Report accuracy, compliance with current reporting requirements and applica-
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bility to other site systems and components were also reviewed.
The follow-l ing LER was reviewed:
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LER No.
LER Date Event Date Subject l
3-80-04/3L March 6, 1980 February 5,1980 During startup, reactor water conductivity increased l
and exceeded technical speci-
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fication limits, necessitating plant shutdown.
Licensee corrective actions included plant shutdown, operation of cleanup systems to restore normal chemistry prior to startup, and consultation with
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Procedures were changed to require more extensive condensate and feed system cleanup prior to startup and flushing of indi-I vidual feedwater heater strings prior to use.
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Radiation Protection
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During this report pericd, the inspector examined work in progress in accessible areas of the Unit 2 and Unit 3 facilities. Areas examined included:
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Health Physics -(HP) controls b.
Badging c.
Usage of protective clothing d.
Personnel adherence to RWP requirements e.
Surveys f.
Handling of potentially contaminated equipment and materials Additionally, inspections were conducted of usage of friskers and portal I
monitors by personnel exiting various RWP areas, the power block, and the licensee's final exit point. More than 75 people were observed to meet frisking requirements of Health Physics procedures during the month. A sampling of high radiation doors was verified to be locked as required.
Compliance with RUP requirements was verified during each tour; special emphasis was placed on RWP adherence at the Unit 3 Drywell, Torus, and Refuel Floor. Over 20 RWP's were checked during the month, over one hundred line entries were reviewed to. verify that pcrsonnel had provided the required information; and about 40 people working in the RWP aisas were observed to be meeting the applicable requirements.
While conducting a tour of the Unit 3 Reactor Building on July 13, the l-inspector observed conditions at the vicinity of the personnel access
hatch to the Unit 3 Drywell. Three individuals were preparing a step-oti pad and clothing removal area for one access point to the suppression pool.
The inspector observed that one of the individuals was not wearing l
any protective coveralls. Additionally, he was wearing only one pair of green rubber glove 4 which had holes at the end of the fingers, and one
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set of plastic boots. This individual was actively involved in preparing
'the step-off pad. Tne inspector noted that the area in which the individual
~ was working was clearly marked as contaminated.
Instructions for entering
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the area were marked on the posting and included:
2 pairs of plastic shoe covers, coveralls, surgeons cap, two pairs of protective gloves and taping of the wrists and ankles.
The inspector asked the individual if he had read the posted instructions prior to entering the area. He replied that he had not and was directed to leave the area by Health Physics technicians.
The. inspector noted that the area where the. individual was working was directly in front of the control desk used by Health Physics technicians who were con-trolling access to the Unit 3 Drywell.
He also noted that the Health Physics technician at the station did not direct the individual to leave the contam-inated area until questioned by the inspector. The failure to adhere to posted controlled area requirements is contrary to station Health Physics procedures and is an item of noncompliance (278/81-19-02). The inspector discussed the occurrence with Health Physics supervision and expressed con-cern.that the Health Physics technicians in the area were not ensuring proper adherence to clothing requirements.
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Physical Security The inspector spot-checkco. compliance with the accepted Security Plan and implementing procedures, including operations of the CAS and SAS, over 25 spot-checks of vehicles onsite to verify proper control, observation of protected area access control and badging procedures on each shift, inspec-tion of physical barriers, checks on control of vital area access and escort procedures. No unacceptable conditions were identified.
8.
Review of TMI Action Plan (TAP)
The inspector reviewed the status of licensee action on Item 1.C.6., " Procedures for Verifying Correct Performance of Operating Activities," to verify that the licensee is meeting his NRC commitments.
It is required (from NUREG-0737) that licensees' procedures be reviewed and revised, as necessary, to assure that an effective system of verifying the correct performance of operating activities is provided as a means of re-
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l ducing human errors and improving the quality of normal operations.
Such
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a verification system may include automatic system status monitoring, human verification of operations and maintenance activities ' independent l
of the people performing the activity, or both.
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A licensee letter dated December 22, 1980 committed to implementation of procedures by January 31, 1981. Administrative procedure A-41, " Procedure for Control of Safety-Related Equipment," dated January 30,1981, was I
reviewed.
This provides for double verification of proper removal of equipment from service, of operability of redundant components or systems
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is required, and of proper return of equipment to service.
Independent
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verifications can use control room status monitoring or in-plant checks and are recorded on either duplicate blocking permits or separate system lineup checkoff lists.
Independent verification is performed by either
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licensed operators or qualified auxiliary operators.
For surveillance test-l ing, double signoffs on the procedure are used.
Surveillance test forms I
will be revised, to provide spaces for separate signoffs, during a system-atic procedural review.
Shift superintendent or shift supervisor authori-zation is required for removal of equipment from service.
Licensed opera-
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tors were found 'o be knowledgeable regarding these procedures.
The licensee's commitment and implementing procedures regarding TAP Item I.C.6 are considered acceptable. The inspector noted, however,that for surveillance i
l testing, double signoffs may not aiways result in an independent verification l
'of system / component restoration from testing (see unresolved item in Detail 3).
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g, committee Activities The inspector observed portions of_a PORC meeting on July 29, 1981.
The meeting; which consisted primarily of review and discussion of. modifications, upset reports, and NRC correspondence; was conducted in a professional manner.
A quorum existed, in accordance with Technical Specifications and station administrative procedures.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
10.
In-Office Review of Monthly Operating Reports The following licensee reports have been reviewed in-office onsite.
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Monthly Operating Report for:
June 1981 dated July 13, 1981 This report was ieviewed pursuant to Technical Specifications and veriff;d to determine that operating statistics had been accurately reported and that narrative summaries of the month's operating experience were contained therein.
j No unacceptable conditions were identified.
11. Unresolved Items Unresolved items are items about which more information is required to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations. An l
unresolved item is discussed in Detail 3.
12. Management Meetings -- Preliminary Inspection Fin' ings d
l A summary of preliminary findings was provided to the Station Superintendent
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.at the conclusion of the inspection.
During the period of this inspection, licensee management was periodically notified of the preliminary findings by.
I the resident inspectors.
The dates involved, the senior licensee represent-l ative contacted, and subjects discuss. were as follows:
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Senior Licensee
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Date Subject Representative Present July 10,1981 Routine Discussion Station Superintendent l
July 13,1981 Worker in Contaminated Area Radiation Protection Manager l
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July 14, 1981 Fire Door Engineer-Maintenance l
July 17, 1981 Routine Discussions Station Superintendent July 23,1981 Routine Discussions Station Superintendent
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July 28, 1981 Fire Door Engineer-Maintenance August 3, 1981 Summary of Findings Station Superintendent
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