IR 05000277/1979030
| ML19321A617 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 04/16/1980 |
| From: | Blough A, Greenman E, Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19321A602 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-277-79-30, 50-278-79-33, NUDOCS 8007230736 | |
| Download: ML19321A617 (10) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
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Region I 50-277/79-30 Report No.
50-278/79-33
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50-277 Dc:ket No.
_50-278 DPR-44 C
License No. OPR-56 Priority Category C
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Licensee:
Philadelphia Electric Company 2301 Market Street Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19101 Facility Name: Peach Bc,ttom Atomic Power Station Units 2 and 3 Inspection at: Delta and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Inspection conducted: December 1 - December 31, 1979 i
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Inspectors:
E. G. Greenman, Resident Reactor Inspector date signed Y
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A. R. BlolTgh, Resis. ant Reactor Inspector date' signed date signed Approved by:
P.O./L.Gd.)w tiff (,fFo E. C. McCabe, Jr., Chief, Reactor Projects date signed Section No. 2, R0&NS Branch
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fnspection Summary:
Inspection on December 1 - December 31, 1979 (Combined Insoection Recort Nos. 50-277/79-30,
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and 50-278/79-33)
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Arcas Inspected:
Routine, onsite regular and backshift inspection, including corporate office, by the resident inspector ( 58 hours6.712963e-4 days <br />0.0161 hours <br />9.589947e-5 weeks <br />2.2069e-5 months <br /> Unit 2; 58 hours6.712963e-4 days <br />0.0161 hours <br />9.589947e-5 weeks <br />2.2069e-5 months <br /> Unit 3).
Areas inspected included plant operations, facility tours, control rocm inspections, review of periodic and special reports, radiation protection, reactor chemistry, physical security, LER review cnsite, followup on prior identified items, Emergency Planning and Annual Emergency Crill observation, and IE Bulletin followup.
Results: Noncompliances - Mona in eight areas, three in three areas (Infraction - inadequate vehicle controls (2.790d), Detail-3; infraction - failure to follow RWP require.:ents, Detail 7; and deficiency - failure to record actual running totals for reactor water chloride and coaductivity analysis, Detail 3).
Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
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800723023G
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted W. Barley, Health Physics
.B. Clark, Engineer - Electric Production M. J. Cooney, Superintendent
. Generation Division
- R. S. Fleischmann, Assistant Station Superintendent N. Gaz6, Health Physics S. Robertc, Results Engineer D. Smith, lutage Planning J. Spencer Maintenance Engineer
- W. T. Ullrich, Station Superintendent Other licensee employees were contacted during the inspection.
These included engineering personnel, administrative personnel, reactor operators, shift supervision, maintenance personnel, contractors, health physics personnel, and security personnel.
- denotes those present at exit interviews.
2.
Previous Inspection Item Update
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(Closed) Unresolved Item (278/79-29-01) - Welder qualification records did not substantiate that a welder had been qualified using an open-butt weld joint, although he had performed welding and rework.
The inspector reviewed Non-Conformity Report No. PB3-5, completed October 31, 1979.
This nonconformity involved the rework of the root of the CRD nozzle cap to nozzle weld by the welder during welding of the root. The weld passed PT, RT, and VT in accordance with applicable ASME Section III requirements. The inspector also reviewed the Record of Welder Performance Test dated October 4, 1979, indicating accept-ability based on radiography results. The inspector concluded that the NDE performed on the weld was sufficient to meet welder qualification requirements of ASME Section I -and had no further questions on this item.
3.
Plant Operations Review
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a.
Logs and Records 1.
Documents Reviewed A samp.ing review of logs and records was made to:
identify
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significant changes and trends; assure that required entries were being made; to verify that operating orders and night orders conform to Technical Specification requirements; check correctness of communications concerning equipment and lock-out status; verify jumper log conformance to procedural requirements; and to verify conformance to limiting conditions for operations.
Logs and records reviewed were:
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Shift Supervision Log, December 1-31, 1979 b.
Unit 2 Jumper Log - Current Entries
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c.
Unit 3 Jumper Log - Current Entries
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d.
Reactor Engineering Log - Unit 2
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e.
Reactor _ Engineering Log - Unit 3 f.
Reactor Operators Log Unit 2 - December 1-31, 1979 g.
Reactor Operators Log Unit 3 - December 1-31, 1979
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ACO Log Book - December 1-31, 1979
..i. Night Orders - Current Entries j.. Radiation Work Permits (RWPs) - Various in both Units 2.and 3 k.
Maintenance Request Forms (MRFs) - Units 2 and 3, i
December, 1979
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Fire System Status Sheets (Sampling) - December, 1979 m.
Operation Work & Information Data - December, 1979 Control room logs were reviewed pursuant to requirements of Procedure A-7, " Shift Operations".
Frequent initialing of entries by licensed operators, shift supervision, and licensee on site management constituted evidence of licensee review.
Logs were also reviewed to assure that plant conditions including abnormalities and significant operations were
accurately and completely recorded.
Logs were also assessed to determine that matters requiring reports to the NRC were being handled as suspected reportable occurrences.
The inspector, subsequent to a review of shift logs, referenced above, investigated a personnel staffing problem that occurred
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on December 23, 1979 and had an impact on shift manning. At
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approximately 8:00 AM, the Unit 2 Assistant Control Operator left'the site in response to a family medical emergency.
His duties were assumed by the Control Operator, and the Shift
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Supervisor assumed dual responsibility as both Control Operator and Shift Supervisor. The plant was operated with this manning
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for about three hours until an additional licensed operator
could be summoned to duty.
The required control room positions were never left vacant.
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- Technical Specification 6.2.2 states in part, "Each on-duty shift shall be composed of at least the minimum shift crew composition shown in Figure 6.2-2".
Figure 6.2-2 lists a total
of five licensed positions per shift:
one Shift Superintendent j
(SLO), one Shift Supervisor (SLO), one Control Operator (LO),
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-two Assistant Control Operators'(LO). Only one of the two
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members of shift supervision need be licensed provided a second SLO is available on site. The Technical Specifications make no provisions for situations involving personnel emergencies or operator injuries. This matter has been forwarded to NRC management and is considered unresolved pending determination as'to the intent of the Technical Specification with respect to single licensed operators performing dual roles and evaluation of the need for provisions in the-Technical Specifications-to
' cover this type of situation (277/79-30-01 and 278/79-33-01).
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The licensee is submitting a Technical Specification clariff-
-cation to NRR based upon G.E. Standard Technical Sp(lifications.
Additional items related to requirements contained ir, Procedure A-7 remain unresolved pending licensee procedural revision review.
Reference (277/79-26-01 and 278/79-28-01).
2.
Facility Tours
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a.
During the course of this inspection, which also included
. shift turnover, the inspector conducted daily-tours and made observations of:
Control Room - (daily)
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Turbine Building - (all levels)
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Reactor Building - (accessible areas)
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Diesel Generator Building
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Yard area and perimeter exterior to the power block,
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including Emergency Cooling Towei and torus dewatering tank construction Security Building, including CAS, Aux SAS, and control
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point monitoring Lighting, including off-shift Sunday darkness conditions
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Vehicular Control
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The SAS and power block control points
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Security Fencing
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-- Portal Monitoring Personnel and Badging
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Control of Radiation and High Radiation areas including
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locked door checks TV Monitoring capabilities
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THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK, IT CONTAINED 2.790 INFORMATION, NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSUR..
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Monitoring Instrumentation. The inspector frequently,
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during conduct of tours, confirmed that selected instru-mentation was operable and indicated values were within Technical Specification limits.
On a daily basis when the inspector was on site, ECCS switch positioning and valve lineups, as well as breaker status, were reviewed based on control room indication, alarm status, in-plant checks and observations to determine operability.
Valve Positioning.
The inspector independently verified
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that valves and breakers in selected safety-related systems were maintained locked as required by the licensee's system and were being properly maintained.
SBLC status was verified for both Units 2 and 3.
Particular emphasis was placed upon potential for mis-positioning of safety-related breakers.
No missing valve handles for manual operated valves were identified.
Plant Housekeeping and Fire Protection.
The inspector
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observed housekeeping conditions, firehose station, and equipment status and observed the licensee's fire pro-tection procedures and practices, as well as the usage of fire watches.
Fire Safety Inspections.
Procedure A-30, " Plant House-
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keeping Controls", requires the Safety Department to inspect annually for housekeeping deficiencies that could impact upon plant safety.
The report generated by the last inspection completed August 23, 1979 was revieued to determine whether housekeeping was adequately addressed along with other issues.
The report identified housekeeping problems with potential safety implication, namely fire safety in several areas of the facility and also in other site structures. The housekeeping deficiencies have been corrected and the licensee's correction of other discrepancies remains in progress.
Timeliness of the licensee's response to this audit is considered unresolved pending inspector review of current housekeeping inspections (277/79-30-03 and 278/79-33-03).
Piping Vibration.
No significant piping vibration or
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unusual conditions were identified.
Anchor plates, bolts, and seismic restraints were
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observed.
Reported conditions are dis::ussed under Non-Routine Event Review (Detail 4).
Fluid Leaks.
No significant fluid leaks were identified
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which had not been identified by the licensee and for which corrective action had not been take ~.
Off-Normal Alarms.
Selected annunciators were discussed
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with control room operators on a daily basis when the inspector was on site. Safety significance was assessed.
Operators, as well as supervision, were knowledgeable of plant condition. The inspector confirmed that corrective action, if required, was being taken.
b.
Reactor Water Chemistry Analysis of the Time Reactor Water Chloride and Conductivity Are Above Limits The inspector reviewed surveillance test ST 7.2.3.C, revision 1, dated May 9, 1979 to determine compliance with the Technical Specifications. A sampling of the data sheets from performances of this test for each unit was also reviewed.
It was noted that the data sheet does not properly match the procedure in that a line of the data sheet, " Enter running totalson next week's sheet" is not referenced in the procedure.
This item is considered unresolved pending procedural changes currently being considered by the licensee (277/79-30-04 and 278/79-33-04).
It was further noted that in one performance of the test on each plant (2-79-4-1 and 3-79-4-1), a step of the procedure was performed improperly.
Step D.1. states in part, " Enter ' running totals' from the previous week on first line of data sheet".
In the two referenced ca:es, all zeros, rather than the proper running totals were entered.
This failure to adhere to Surveillance Test procedures constitutes a deficiency level item of noncompliance (277/79-30-05 and 278/79-33-05).
4.
Non-Routine Event Review The inspector reviewed the following'),non-routine events on site, at the corporate offices (LER 79-39/10 and in the NRC site office
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J for safety significance, circumstances, and relationship to Technical Specification protective limits. The licensee's PORC revicw, evaluation, and corrective action was also examined.
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LER Number Title 3-79-041/3L
"C" Core Spray Pump Discharge Pressure Switch was Above Required Value Pressure Switch PS 3-14-44C was found 9.0 psig above limits during a surveillance test. The Technical Specifications require a setpoint of 180 plus or minus 10 psig value.
The switch provides a pump running signal to ADS logic and was recalibrated and returned to service.
Redundant pressure sensors were within limits. The inspector had no further questions.
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'LER Number Title 3-79-39/IP Design Deficiency Concerning 16 3-79-39/1P(Update)
Supports Associated with Unit 3 3-79-39/1T 1-Inch CRD Insert and Withdrawal Piping The engineering review of the vendor design associated with IE Bulletin 79-02 disclosed that four seismic supports associated with Unit 3 one-inch control rod drive insert and withdrawal piping, was not seismically qualified due to over-stressing of certain structural members outside primary containment.
The inspector reviewed, at corporate offices, the licensee's data, vendor information, and General Electric evalu-ation which indicated that the failure of these hangers, as well as postulated failure of the supported one-inch piping, would not prevent the control rods from scraming.
The design reviews and safety reviews performed also indicated that no drive insert and/or withdrawal line would, in fact, break under a design basis earthquake. The licensee was required to complete corrective action within seven days in accordance with a letter from Region I to PECo, dated October 24, 1979.
Subsequent analysis by the AE of piping inside containment showed that one member on each of eight hangers inside containment was also over-stressed under a design basis earthquake. An additional four supports, just off the pedestal on each piping bundle, were also identified inside containment.
Based on this review, including P& ids, the inspector concluded that the CRD system was operable and that no drive insert and/or withdrawal line would fail in a design basis earthquake.
The licensee's proposed modification was reviewed in detail.
Unit 3 was placed in cold shutdown on December 7, 1979 and structural members were re-inforced, and additional members were installed to eliminate the over-stressed conditions.
2-79-52/IP Engineering Design Deficiency for Four Concrete Block Walls Located on Elevation 135 in the Unit 2 and 3 Reactor Buildings Analysis of seismic capabilities conducted pursuant to Information Notice No. 79-28, indicated that using current calculation models, four concrete block walls had concrete expansion bolt safety factors of greater than two but less than v-lues of four, as required. The licensee's engineering analysis, as discussed with NRC (0IE/HQ and NRR) on November 30, 1979, indicated that allowable values under the loading of a design basis earthquake, were within code allowable.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's re-design, which included the installation of 18-inch channels to existing construction.
Field work and installation was observed by the resident inspector at the north and south valve rooms on November 29 and December 4, 1979.
This area is unresolved pending review of completed installation work packages to assure that seismic integrity was not compromised during the modification (277/79-30-06 and 278/79-33-06).
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5.
Emergency Planning a.
Training and Familiarization On December 14, 1979, the inspector attended an emergency training
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and familiarization session conducted by the licensee for various off-site agencies. The Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA), the York County Emergency Operations Committee, the Lancaster County Emergency Management Agency, and the Chester County Department of Emergency Services were. represented. The PEMA representative commented that he would also relay notes from the session to a representative of the State of Maryland.
The licensee discussed emergency planning in general and also reviewed the scenario for an upcoming drill.
The attendees were not informed of the actual date planned for the drill. The licensee. stressed that the drill was being conducted to demonstrate
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ability to comply with existing emergency preparedness requirements and that regulations were expected to change during 1980. The
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attendees asked a variety of questions and conducted some dis-cussion among themselves, including a review of communications procedures and a cross-check of telephone lists.
The training session appeared to meet the perceived needs of the representa-tives of the various agencies.
b.
Emeroency Drill Participation i
The inspector participated as an observer in the licensee's annual site evacuation exercise, which was conducted Sunday, December 16, 1979. The drill was conducted pursuant to ST/EP-8, Class IV Emergency. The resident inspector also participated in the drill briefings conducted by licensee representatives. Areas-examined included control room response, health physics response, security response, off-site monitoring teams, and licensee notifi-cation; to various state and federal contacts.
The inspector's observations indicated that the objectives of the drill had been met.
Outstanding items from the drill, including Unit 1 public address system audibility, will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection (277/79-30-07and378/79-33-07).
6.
In-Office Review of Monthly Operating Reports The following licensee reports have been reviewed in office onsite.
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Monthly Operating Report for:
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November, 1979 dated December 10, 1979 This report was reviewed pursuant to Technical Specifications and verified to determine that operating statistics had been accurately reported and that narrative summaries of the month's operating -
i experience were. contained therein.
No unacceptable conditions were identified. The inspector noted the licensee's scheduled Unit 2
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refueling outage date of March 21, 1980. Region I letter to PECo dated October 24, 1979 addressing IE Bulletin 79-14, requires a shutdown to complete inaccessible Unit 2 piping checks by March 1, 1980 or to complete these checks during any outage of sufficient duration to provide access, which ever occurs first. A one week outage is also scheduled for year end,1979.
7.
Radiation Protection During the course of the month, the inspector observed work in progress by various licensee and contractor groups to assure that workers were adhering to requirements of Radiation Work Permits (RWPs).
Particular attention was directed at protective clothing, change areas, the use of " friskers", sign-in and sign-out require-ments, and taped openings. On December 21, 1979, while touring the Unit 2 RBCCW room, one worker was observed working in a painting area, (a contaminated area), with untaped open coveralls.
Taping requirements were specified in RWP 2-94-0628A dated November 10, 1979. The failure to follow RWP requirements was contrary to Health Physics Procedure HP0/C0-4, " Radiation Work Permits",
revision 14, dated September 14, 1979 and constitutes an infraction
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level item of noncompliance (277/79-30-08 and 278/79-33-08).
8.
Unres'olved Items Unresolved items are items about which more information is required to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations.
Unresolved items are discussed in Details 3 and 4.
9.
Presentation of Preliminary Inspection Findinas During the period of the inspection, licensee management was periodically notified of the preliminary findings by the resident inspector. A summary of the items of noncompliance was provided to site management prior to report issuance.
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