IR 05000277/1979010
| ML19208B075 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 07/19/1979 |
| From: | Greenman E, Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19208B074 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-277-79-10, 50-278-79-11, NUDOCS 7909190023 | |
| Download: ML19208B075 (10) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I 50-277/79-10 Report No.
50-278/79-11 50-277 Docket No.
50-278 DPR-44 License No.
DPR-56 Priority
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Category C
Licensee:
Philadelphia Electric Company 2301 Market Street Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19101 Facility Name:
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Units 2 and 3 Inspection at: Delta, Pennsylvania Inspection conducted:
April 3-6, 23-27, May 7-8 and 10-26, 1979
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V 7-/f-77 Inspectors:
E. G. Greenman, Resident Inspector date signed date signed O. Javens, OIE, HQ (May 17, 21-23, 1979)
date si ned Approved bj.
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E. C. McCabe,'/Jr., Chief, Reactor Projects date signed Section No. 2, RO&NS Branch Insnection Summary:
Inspection on April 3-6, 23-27, May 7-8 and 10-26, 1979 (Combined Report Nos.
50-277/79-10 and 50-278/79-11)
Areas Inspected: Routine, onsite regular and backshift inspection by the resident inspector (73 hours8.449074e-4 days <br />0.0203 hours <br />1.207011e-4 weeks <br />2.77765e-5 months <br /> Unit 2; 73 hours8.449074e-4 days <br />0.0203 hours <br />1.207011e-4 weeks <br />2.77765e-5 months <br /> Unit 3).
Areas inspected included accessible portions of the Unit 2 and Unit 3 facilities, radiation protection, Environmental Technical Specifications, physical security, plant operations, plant operating records, facility tours, the control room, followup on previously identified items, review of periodic reports, bulletin followup, LER reviews, and site communication including tours of incident and alternate response centers.
Results: No items of noncompliance were identified.
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Region I Fom 12 (Rev. April 77)
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Principal Licensee Representatives C. E. Andersen, Operations Engineer
- R. S. Fleischmann, Assistant Station Superintendent N. Gazda, Health Physics S. Roberts, Results Engineer S. Tharpe, Security Supervisor
- W. T. Ullrich, Station Superintendent J. Winzenried, Technical Engineer Other licensee employees were contacted during the inspection.
These included engineering personnel, administrative personnel, reactor operators, shift cupervision, health physics personnel, and security personnel.
- denotes those present at exit interviews.
2.
Previous Inspection Item Update (Closed)
Inspector followup item 78-30-01 and 78 -33-01 - Disposition of corrections and/or improvements resulting from Radiation Emergency Mcdical Drill. The inspector reviewed results from the post drill critique to confirm that followup action had been initiated / completed.
The inspector had to further questions regarding this matter at this time.
3.
Logs ar.d Records The following logs and records for the periods indicated were reviewed pursuant to the licensee's administrative requirements.
Comments concerning specific areas are contained within this report.
Management review was evidenced by frequent log book initialing.
a.
Shift Supervision Log - April 1-May 15 b.
Night orders - Current entries 0.
Unit 2 Jumper Log - Current entries d.
Unit 3 Jumper Log - Current entries e. ' Reactor Operator's Log Book Unit 2 - April 1-May 15, 1979 f.
Reactor Operator's Log Book Unit 3 - April 1-May 15, 1979 g.
ACO Log Book - April 1-May 15, 1979 h.
Maintenance Request Forms Unit 2 and 3 - Sampling Audit April-May, 1979 No unacceptable conditions were identified.
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4.
Facility Tours Facility tours were conducted at both Unit 2 and Unit 3 during the course of this inspection and on a daily basis. Areas examined included the reactor building, turbine building, radwaste, control room, and exterior areas including access controls, lighting, and personnel, including package processing.
Inspections were conducted to determine the general state of cleanliness, housekeeping, adherence to fire protection guidelines and to observe plant conditions. Receipt inspections for spent fuel (high density)
storage racks were observed.
No significant fluid leakage or excessive piping vibrations were observed. The inspector checked equipment status and operability and verified by comparison of selected control room instrumentation that limiting conditions for operation were being satisfied.
The status of off normal alarms was discussed with various operating personnel.
Operators were knowledgeable of plant conditions.
Minimum staffing requirements were also verified based on control room manning.
Security systems were examined during normal and off-shift hours to confirm that the licensee's controls were in place and that security procedures were being adhered to.
Perimeter lighting was also observed. No unacceptable conditions were identified.
5.
In-Office Review of Monthly operating Reports The following licensee reports have been reviewed in office.
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Monthly Operating Reports for:
a.
April, 1979 dated May 11, 1979 b.
May, 1979 dated June 11, 1979 These reports were reviewed pursuant to Technical Specifications and verified to determine that operating statistics included shutdowns and that narrative summaries of the month's operating experience were contained therein. No unacceptable conditions were identified.
6.
IE Bulletin Followun IE Bulletin No. 79-08 dated April 14, 1979
" EVENTS RELEVANT TO BOILING WATER POWER REACTORS IDENTIFIED DURING THREE MILE ISLAND INCIDENT".
The licensee's response to Bulletin 79-08 was reviewed.
Inspection confirmed that licensee management hnd forwarded copies of the bulletin response to appropriate management representatives, that the Plant Operations Review Committee had reviewed this matter and that the response was submitted to the NRC within the required ten day time frame following receipt.
The NRC resident inspector was provided a copy of the licensee response on 4/25 and confirmed that Region I had received this response.
Inspection confirmed that responsibilities had been assigned to complete required actions.
PORC Minutes BWR 79-35 dated April 14, 1979 documented the licensee's initial review pending formal response to the NRC and completion of review requirements.
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Further reviews were conducted by the PORC on April 25.
Minutes of this meeting were not available for inspector review and will be examined during a subsequent inspection (79-10-01 and 79-11-01).
Bulletin 79-08 required that the licensee address and take action in the following topic areas:
a.
A review of the description of circumstances described in Enclosure I of IE Bulletin 79-05 and the preliminary chronology of the TMI-2 3/28/79 incident as included in Enclosure I to IE Bulletin 79-05A.
NRC review and inspection of this area is contained in IE Combined Inspection Report 50-277/79-11 and 50-278/79-12.
Final review of the licensee's training attendance as documented in the referenced report remains outstanding and the inspector had no further questions regarding this item and the licensee's response at this time.
The licensee's response was forwarded to NRC Headquarters for review.
The inspector also reviewed a letter to all licensed personnel dated April 24, 1979 which addressesBulletin 79-08, Item I.
b.
Review of the containment isolation initiation design and preparation and implementation of all changes necessary to initiate containment isolation, whether manual or automatic of all lines whose isolation does not degrade needed safety features or cooling capability upon automatic initiation of safety injection.
The licensee's review of containment isolation initiation design and procedures was completed.
Three 3/4 inch lines in each unit which are triple valve isolated with the valves closed by the ILRT were confirmed by direct inspector observation to have one valve in each line blocked closed.
Revision of the Isolation Procedure for four small conductivity sample lines from the outlet of RHR Heat Exchangers to assure manual isolation during a Group I isolation was incomplete.
This item is considered to be unresolved pending engineering review and disposition of automatic versus manual isolation capability (79-10-02 and 79-11-02).
The inspector subsequently reviewed the revised isolation procedure which requires manual isolation of these valves following a Group I (containment) isolation.
c.
Description of actions, both automatic and manual, necessary for proper functioning of the auxiliary heat removal systems (e.g.,
RCIC) that are used when the feedwater system is not operable.
The licensee's response was reviewed.
The inspector had no further questions at this time with respect to HPCI, RCIC, Core Spray, LPCI, and long term shutdown cooling.
Procedural topics were addressed in IE Combined Inspection Report 50-277/79-11 and 50-278/79-12 and inspection confirmed that operating procedures require rc at e of the turbine trip throttle valve.
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d.
Description of all uses and types of vessel level indication for both automatic and manual initiation of safety systems.
Description of other redundant instrumentation which the operator might have to give the same information regarding plant status.
Instruction to operators to utilize other available information to initiate safety systems.
The licensee's response was reviewed. A letter to all operating personnel re-emphasizing that redundant and confirmatory instrumentation available be used when making operating decisions dated April 24, 1979 was reviewed by the inspector.
As a re-enforcement of normal operating procedures, further instructions were provided which assure that Engineered Safeguards Systems (HPCI, RCIC, ADS, LPCI, or Core Spray) are not overridden unless:
(1) Redundant and confirmatory instrumentation indicates the system is not required.
(2)
System initiation is spurious and the cause of the initiation is known.
(3) Continued operation would cause an unsafe plant condition.
The inspector also reconfirmed that operators were instructed to consult redundant instrumentation when making operational decisions to start, stop, or change the operation of an Engineered Safeguards System.
The inspector had no further questions at this time and noted that ESF capabilities are predicated upon adherence to Technical Specifications and formally approved procedures.
e.
Review of actions directed by operating procedures and training instructions to ensure that operators do not override automatic actions of engineered safety features unless continued operation of engineered safety features will result in unsafe plant conditions (e.g., vessel integrity) and that operators are provided additional information and instructions to not rely upon vessel level indication alone for manual actions, but to also examine other plant parameter indications in evaluating plant conditions.
The '.icensee's review is in progress and status was confirmed by the inspector. Completion of these reviews and revision to administrative procedures governing shift operations is considered unresolved (79-10-03 and 79-11-03).
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f.
Review all safety-related valve positions, positioning requirements, and positive controls to assure that valves remain positioned (open or closed) in a manner to ensure the proper operation of engineered safety features. Also review related procedures, such as those for maintenance, testing, plant and system startup, and supervisory periodic (e.g., daily / shift checks), surveillance to ensure that such valves are returned to their correct positions following necessary manipulations and are maiatained in their proper positions during all operational modes.
NRC verification of,,fety-related valve positions, positioning requirements, and positive controls was completed during IE Combined Inspection 50-277/79-11 and 50-278/79-12. The inspector verified that an independent reverification of safety-related valve position outside of primary containment was completed by the licensee and that instrument rack valve check-off lists on safety-related instruments was also completed.
The licensee is completing an independent review of safety-related system process valve positioning requirements by comparing check-off lists and P& ids and is also reviewing control mechanisms in addition to confirming adequacy of existing positive controls to assure that valve positioning remains as required.
The results of this review will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection (79-10-04 and 79-11-04).
g.
Review your operating modes and procedures for all systems designed to transfer potentially radioactive gases and liquids out of the primary containment to assure that undesired pumping, venting, or other release of radioactive liquids and gases will not occur inadvertently.
In particular, ensure that such an occurrence would not be caused by the resetting of engineered safety features instrumentation.
List all such systems and indicate:
(1) Whether interlocks exist to prevent transfer when high radiation indication exists, and (2) Whether such systems are isolated by the containment isolation signal.
(3) The basis on which continued operability of the above features is assured.
The licensee's response was reviewed. With the exception of RHR sample valves previously addressed and documentation concerning changes contained in IE Combined Inspection Report 50-277/79-11 and 50-278/79-12, the inspector hed no further questions regarding this item at this time.
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Review and modify as necessary your maintenance and test procedures to ensure that they require:
(1) Verification, by test or inspection, of the operability of redundant safet.v-related systems prior to the removal of any safety-related system from service.
(2) Verification of the operability of all safety-related systems when they are returned to service following maintenance or testing.
(3) Explicit notification of involved reactor operational personnel whenever a safety-related system is removed from and returned to service.
Action taken was verified as described in the licensee's response.
Further revisions to administrative procedures addressing verification of system operability and review of all safety-related surveillance and routine test procedures will be examined during a subsequent inspection (79-10-05 and 79-11-05),
i. Review prompt reporting procedures for NRC notification to assure that NRC is notified within one hour of the time the reactor is not in a controlled or expected condition of operation.
Further, at that time an open continuous communication channel shall be established and maintained with NRC.
The inspector confirmed that written instructions dated April 25, 1979 were issued to plant management, Shift Superintendents, and Shift Supervision providing guidelines for prompt notification of NRC following significant operational events.
The inspector verified that these guidelines satisfied the requirements for a one hour time frame for NRC notification and open continuous communication.
The licensee was provided telephone number contacts for the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> NRC duty officer located at Region I.
Issuance of an Administrative Procedure governing this suoject by May 31, 1979 is considered unresolved (79-10-06 and 79-11-06).
j. Review operating mods and procedures to deal with significant amounts of hydrogen gar that may be generated during a transient or other accident that would either remain inside the primary system or be released to the containment.
The licensee's response was reviewed in detail with respect to plant procedure related to LOCAs and CAD system operation.
The licensee is revising existing procedures to include a discussion of venting these gases from the reactor pressure vessel to containment. These revisions will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection (79-10-07 and 79-11-07).
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Proposal ;or changes as required to those Technical Specifications which must be modified as a result of implementing the items above.
The lice 1see has committed to respond as necessary within the 30 day time period specified in IE Bulletin 79-08.
This item is unresolved pending review of any response (79-10-08 and 79-11-08).
Licensee responses to IE Bulletin 79-08 have been forwarded to NRC management (OIE HQ and NRR)..?.ceptability of the licensee's response is considered to be unresotved (79-10-09 and 79-11-09).
7.
Nonroutine Event Review The inspector reviewed the following nonroutine events both in-cffice and onsite for safety significance, circumstances, and relationship to Technical Specifications protective limits.
The licensee's PORC review, evaluation, and corrective action was also verified.
LER Number 2-79-5/3L-0 - One pressure switch for alarm indication for core spray pipe break was found outside specification
during surveillance.
2-7 9-9/3 L-0
- Fire Alarm System inoperable for 3.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.
2-79-15/3L
- MSIV limit switch (90 percent) was found inoperable during surveillance.
3-79-7/3L-0 - ADS timer was found outside of required value during surveillance.
3-79-10/3L-0 - RCIC inboard isolation valve failure to close.
The drywell and torus ventilation valve inflatable 3-79-11/1P
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discs were found depressurized.
8.
Environmental Technical Specifications Technical Specification (ETS) 2.3 and 3.3 were reviewed to confirm that noise from plant operation had been monitored in accordance with ETS requirements and that noise levels monitored were within required ranges. Additionally, the inspector visually verified the location and presence of a permanently marked location in the North Substation arer.
Additionally, the following noise level measurements were reviewed:
ST 7.8.1 da'.*d July 25, 1974 (Unit 2).
All three cooling towers
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ST 7.8.1 dated October 29, 1974 (Units 2 and 3)
All three
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cooling towers in service.
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ST 7.8.1 dated February 24, 1975. Two cooling towers in service.
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ST 7.8.1 dated April 30, 1975.
Three cooling towers in service.
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ST 7.8.1 dated July 22, 1975. Three cooling towers in service.
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- ST 7.8.1 dated October 27, 1975.
One cooling tower in service.
ST 7.8.1 dated February 2, 1976.
Two cooling towers in service.
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The inspector also reviewed PORC deletion of this requirement effective May 3, 1976.
Inspection indicated that based on a Unit 3 commercial operation date of December 28, 1974 and testing overlap that test frequency requirements had been satisfied. Measurements made indicated that noise levels at the southeast landsite boundary did not exceed 45 d B(A) and noise level measurements at the North Substation did not exceed 60 d B(A), the specified Technical Specification required values.
Surveillance test review disclosed that over a period of one year, four tests had been completed with all cooling towers in service and data was available for two tests involving two unit operation. The inspector also noted instances where the unit (s) were not operating at full power listed as a prerequisite in procedural requirements.
In as much as this test was deleted in May, 1976 and in that reactor power level was not directly related to cooling tower operation required by Technical Specifications (ETS), the inspector had no further questions in this area.
Subsequent to this testing, additional cooling tower's were added to the site.
Representativeness of original noise level measurements to existing plant conditions is considered unresolved pending further NRC review (79-10-10 and 79-11-10).
9.
Seismic Recording Equipment Inspection indicated that the licensee uses peak recording accelerometers and a strong motion recording and playback system to sense and record seismic activity caused by local seismic disturbance, construction, and/or mechanical vibrations from plant equipment.
A record is provided of maximum disturbance on a special magnetic tape.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's RT procedures which provide a suggested test frequency only of once per year. The inspector noted that there are no requirements imposed to ensure that such systems are maintained operable. During the conduct of this inspection, the licensee ordered additional tapes to ensure recording system capability.
Portions of the system remain inoperable.
The subject of seismic monitoring requirements is considered unresolved pending review by NRC management (79-10-11 and 79-11-11).
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Miscellaneous The inspector accompanied by a licensee representative toured various response centers on and off site as well as certain onsite areas to determine locations for subsequent NRC telephonic communication equipment.
Specific areas examined included the control room, Operations Engineer's office, emergency shutdown boards, Primary Response Center (PUB), Alternate Response Center (North Substation), Alternate Response Center (Delta Service
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Building) and various Health Physics locations on site. Tour results indicated that space available for incident response is considerably restricted in some areas involving response centers.
This item has been forwarded to NRC management for further review (79-10-12 and 79-11-12).
11.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are items about which more information is required to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance or deviations.
Unresolved items are discussed in Details 6, 8, and 9.
12.
Exit Interviews At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management identified in Detail 1 to discuss inspection scope and findings.
Items as described in report details were discussed.
The licensee acknowledged inspection findings.
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