IR 05000277/1979023
| ML19291C418 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 11/09/1979 |
| From: | Greenman E, Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19291C400 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-277-79-23, 50-278-79-25, NUDOCS 8001240375 | |
| Download: ML19291C418 (12) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I 50-277/79-23 Report No.
50-278/79-25 50-277 Docket No.
50-278 DPR-44 C
License No. DPR-56 Priority
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Category C
Licensee:
Philadelphia Electric Company 2301 Market Street Philadelphia, Pennsylvania ~'19101 Facility Name:
Peach Bottom Atomic Power' Station Units'2 and 3 Inspection at:
Delta, Pennsylvania Inspection conducted:
September 1 - September 30, 1979
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//- 4-7 7 Inspectors:
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E. G. Greenman, Resident Reactor Inspector date signed date signed date signed Approved by:
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E. C. McCabe, Jr., Chief, Reactor Projects date signed Section No. 2, RO&NS Branch Inspection Summary:
Inspection on September 1 - September 30, 1979 (Combined Inspection Report Nos.
50-277/79-23 and 50-278/79-25)
Areas Insoected: Routine, onsite regular and backshift inspections by the resident inspector (59 hours6.828704e-4 days <br />0.0164 hours <br />9.755291e-5 weeks <br />2.24495e-5 months <br /> Unit 2; 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br /> Unit 3).
Areas inspected included refueling activities, accessible portions of the Unit 2 and Unit 3 facilities, maintenance activities, physical security, radiation protection for operations / refueling, plant operations, facility tours, control room inspection, LER review onsite, followup on previously identified unresolved items, review of periodic and special reports, and IE Bulletin / Circular followup.
Results: Noncompliances - None in 11 areas, one in one area (Infraction - failure to adhere to Radiation Work Permit (RWP) requirements - three examples, Detail 7).
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00124o 375 Region I Form 12 (R-v. April 77)
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DETAILS 1.
Persons' Contacted C. E. Andersen, Operations Engineer J. Austin, Engineer - Maintenance Division W. Barley, Health Physics
- R. S. Fleischmann, Assiscant Station Superintendent N. Gazda, Health Physics S. Roberts, Results Engineer S. Tharpe, Security Supervisor J. Valinski, Health Physics and Chemistry
- W. T. Ullrich, Station Superintendent Other licensee employees were contacted during the inspection.
These included engineering personnel, administrative personnel, reactor operators, shift supervision, maintenance personnel, contracd. ors, health physics personnel, and security personnel.
- denotes those present at exit interviews.
2.
Previous Inspection Item Update (Closed)
Unresolved Item (78-29-01 and 78-32-02) - Incorporation of engineering reviews and new acceptance criteria relating to snubber locking velocity relationship to temperature.
The inspector verified that hydraulic snubber operability criteria for locking velocity and bleed rate had been incorporated.
Supporting documen-tation included Procedure M-18.8 dated February 10, 1979.
Data was consistent with results reported in IE Combined Inspection Report 50-277/78-29 and 50-278/78-32 dated November 27, 1978.
The inspector had no further questions on this item.
(Closed)
Unresolved Item (78-29-02) - Review of testing results for hydraulic snubbers to assure that snubbers are fully operable during the operating cycle.
During a Unit 2 outage starting February 9, 1979, g erability checks were performed on ten hydraulic snubbers.
One of the ten snubbers removed from its location showed zero bleed and tension.
As a result, an additional ten snubbers were removed and tested. All snubbers in the second group had locking velocities and bleed rates within required ranges.
Examination of oil from the one of twenty snubbers evidencing signs of failure disclosed flakes of gasket material and damage of the seal ring of the threaded adjustment screw indicating possible improper assembly.
Inspection results have been confirmed by the inspector.
The inspector had no further questions on this item including the licensee's commitment to complete this testing.
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3.
Plant' Operations Review a.
Logs and Records 1) Documents Reviewed A sampling review of logs and records was made to:
identify significant changes and trends; assure that required entries were being made; verify that operating and night orders conform to Technical Specification requirements; check correctness of communications concerning equipment operating and lockout status; verify jumper log conformance to require-ments and to verify conformance to limiting conditions for operation. Logs and records reviewed were:
a.
shift Supervision Log - September 1 - September 30, 1979 b.
Unit 2 Jumper Log - Current entries c.
Unit 3 Jumper Log - Current entries d.
Reactor Operators Log Book Unit 2 - September 1 -
September 30, 1979 e.
Reactor Operators Log Book Unit 3 - September 1 -
September 30, 1979 f.
ACO Log Book - September 1 - September 30, 1979 g.
Fire System Status Sheets (sampling) - September, 1979 h.
Plant Round Sheets, Sampling Audit i. Maintenance Request Forms Units 2 and 3 - Sampling Audit, September, 1979 j.
Radiation Work Permits - various in both Unit 2 and Unit 3 during September, 1979 k.
Night orders - Current entries 1.
Operations Work and Information Data - September, 1979 m.
Surveillance Test Results - (sampling)
2) Facility Tours During the course of this inspection which also included backshifts, the inspector conducted tours and made obser-vations of:
Control Room - (daily)
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Turbine Building - (all levels)
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Reactor Building (accessible areas)
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-- Diesel Generator Building
-- Yard area and perimeter exterior to the power block Security Building including CAS, SAS, Aux SAS, and
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control points including the power block Maintenance Shop (hot area)
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Security Fencing
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Lighting
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Vehicular Control
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-- Badging and Escorting Portal Monitoring
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Control of Radiation and liigh Radiation Areas
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Personnel
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The following determinations were made by the inspector.
- Monitoring Instrumentation.
The inspector frequently confirmed that selected instruments were operational and indicated values were within Technical Specification.
limits.
On a daily basis when the inspector was on site, ECCS switch position and valve lineups, based upon control room indicators, were verified.
In plant instru-mentation was also frequently examined.
Examples of instrumentation observed included flow setpoints, breaker positions, PCIS status, drywell temperatures, and nuclear instrumentation. No unacceptable conditions or status unfamiliar and not reviewed by the inspector (breakers)
were identified.
- Valve Positioning. The inspector independently verified that selected valves in safety related systems were maintained locked as required and were properly positioned.
System status of Standby Liquid Control, Emergency Service Water, Core Spray, and RHR were checkad.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
Plant Housekeeping and Fire Protection.
The inspector
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observed housekeeping conditions, fire hose station and equipment status, and observed the licensee's fire pro-tection procedures and practices as well as the usage of firewatches.
The licensee's adherence to "no smoking" areas was also examined.
The Unit 3 refueling outage currently in progress was impacting negatively on house-keeping. No specific unacceptable conditions were identified.
Fluid Leaks. No significant fluid leaks were observed
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which had not been identified by the licensee nor for which necessary corrective action had not been initiated.
The inspector also observed sump status, pump out rates, and held discussions with licensed personnel.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
Piping Vibration. No significant piping vibration or
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unusual conditions were observed.
- Breaker Positioning.
Beginning September 19, 1979, the licensee identified certain brenkers in Units 2 and 3 which had been inadvertently or otherwise mispositioned.
Unit 3 was off line on September 14, 1979 for a refueling outage.
The licensee's investigation was monitored on a daily basis. No impact was identified with respect to safety-related systems which were required to be operable.
This area is unresolved pending the licensee's disposition and an NRC investigation (79-23-01 and 79-25-01).
The licensee's measures to counter this problem were examined in detail by the resident inspector.
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Anchor plates, bolts, and seismic restraints were
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observed. No unusual or unreported conditions were observed.
Off Normal Alarms.
Selected annunciators were discussed
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with control room operators to verify that operators and shift supervision were knowledgeable of plant conditions and that corrective action, if required, was being taken.
Control Room Manning. On frequent occasions during this
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inspection, the inspector confirmed that requirements of 10CFR50.54(k) and Technical Specifications for minimum staffing requirements were satisfied.
On one occasion, the inspector also examined that requirements of 10CFR55.9(b) were satisfied with respect to training under the direction and in the presence of a licensed individual. No unacceptable conditions were idhntified.
3) Reactor Water Chemistry a.
Primary Coolant Sampling and Chemical Analysis The following surveillance tests for the periods as indicated were reviewed by the inspector to assure that Technical Specification limits were being satisfied.
b.
Conductivity and Chloride Ion Content in Primary Coolant During Normal Operation Surveillance Test 7.2.3.A and Peach Bottom Daily BWR Chemistry Analysis - September 10-23, 1979.
Inspection at Unit 2 confirmed that conductivity was being maintained
within a range of 0.22 to 0.45 micromhos/cm at 25 C.
Technical Specification 3.6.B.2a requires conductivity to be maintained within a 5.0 micromhos/cm limit.
Inspection at Unit 3 confirmed that conductivity was being maintained within a range of 0.25 - 0.47 micromhos/cm for the interval - September 10-15, 1979. Unit 3 was shutdown September 15 for refueling.
Chlorides parts per billion (ppb) for the time frames as referenced were verified less than 20 ppb at both Units 2 and 3.
Technical Specification limits are 0.2 parts per million.
c.
Determination of Dose Equivalent Microcuries/ Gram I-131 in the Primary Coolant The licensee analyzes the following nuclides:
I-131, I-132, I-133, I-134, and I-135.
Test data reviewed dated Sentamher 18. 1979 for Unit 2 indicated a total
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micracuries/ml I-131 equivalence of 3.37 x 10-3 Test data reviewed dated September 18, 1979 for Unit 3 indicated a total microcuries/ml I-131 equivalence of 6.16 x 10-3 The Technical Specification limit is 2.0 microcuries per gram.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
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d.
Analysis of the Time Reactor Water Chloride and Conductivity are Above Specified Limits Inspection of Peach Bottom daily BWR chemistry analysis for Units 2 and 3 indicated that there were no hours that the reactor water conductivity exceeded one or five micromhos for the interval September 10-23, 1979.
Unit 3 was shutdown for the week September 17-23, 1979. No unacceptable conditions were identified.
4.
IE' Bulletin / Circular /Information Notice Followup a.
IE Bulletins Inspection was perforned for the following IE Bulletin to verify that the Bulletin was received by licensee management, review and evaluation was performed, that the' licensee's response was submitted to the NRC within the required time frame, and that documentation supporting evaluations and review was contained in PORC Minutes. Findings were as follows:
IE Bulletin 79-10, "Requalification Training Program Statistics" The licensee's response to the NRC Region I dated May 23, 1979 was reviewed.
Inspection determined that the response was submitted in the required 14 day time frame and that the licensee had submitted required data for Items 1-5 and.in the format as designated by the NRC.
The inspector had no further qu'stions regarding the licensee's response to Bulletin 79-10.
b.
IE Circulars Which Require No' Response Inspection was performed for the following IE Circulars to verify whether the Circular was received by licensee management, review for applicability was performed, corrective action (if any)
was initiated and/or evaluated and supporting documentation evidencing licensee review was contained in PORC minutes.
Findings were as follows:
IE Circular 78-06, "Potentiel Common Mode Flooding of ECCS Equipment Rooms at ENR Facilities" PORC review was verified completed.
The licensee has reviewed site design and procedures including conduct of a physical inspection.
The ECCS corner room floor drains have each room piped separately to the floor drain sump.
The equipment drains share a common header which services all four core spray pump rooms. A common header also services all four RHR pump rooms an well as the HPCI and RCIC rooms.
During construction and to preclude the possibility of common mode flooding, the problem was corrected by capping equipment drain funnels and providing only a % inch vent hole.
Additionally, floor drains in the HPCI and RCIC rooms are serviced by a common header.
Floor drains 1795 273-
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have been plugged with plumber's plugs to preclude a common mode flooding condition. The inspector also reviewed Surveillance Test ST 2.25.9, " Calibration of LT-2919, LS-2920 A-D, LS-2921, LS-2922 A-D, LS-2923, LS-2924, and LS-4155", Revision 1, dated August 16, 1979.
This test provides periodic testing once per operating cycle of the flooding detectors in the ECCS roons.
Inspection verified that ESW bays, torus, RCIC, RHR, HPCI, Core Spray, and torus room detectors had been incorporated into the testing program.
The inspector had no further questions.
IE Circular 79-08, " Attempted Extortion - Low Enriched Uranium" PORC review was completed and verified by the inspector and circular review was conducted by appropriate PORC membership.
The inspector had no further questions.
c.
IE Information Notices Which Require No Response Inspection was performed for the following IE laformation Notices to verify whether the notice was received by licensee management, review for applicability was performed, corrective action, if any, was initiated or evaluated, and supporting documentation evidencing licensee review was contained in PORC minutes.
Findings were as follows:
IE Information Notice 79-01, "Bergen Patterson Hydraulic Shock and Sway Arrestors (HSSA)"
This notice was related to abusive handling of snubbers during compression and installation subject to testing. Plant Operations Review Committee review was conducted February 15, 1979. Licensee utilizes a different type snubber, however, installation and testing program applies. The inspector had no further questions.
IE Information Notice 79-02, " Attempted Extortion - Low Enriched Uranium" Notice was forwarded to all fuel facilities - reference IE Circular 79-08 issued to all fuel facilities and licensed reactors for licensee's review.
The inspector had no further questions.
IE Information Notice 79-03, "Limitorque Valve Gear Limit Switch Lubricant" This notice was related to failures as a result of lubrication hardening at high temperatures.
Initial Plant Operations Review Committee review was conducted February 15, 1979.
Limitorque recommended usage of Mobil 28 grease as a replacement for Beacon 325 to provide a superior temperature rating. The licensee utilizes Beacon 325.
Inspection determined that the maintenance department had initiated changes to incorporate use of Mobil 28.
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Procedure M-9.1, effective May 14, 1979 reflected this change.
Nominally, twenty (20) valves per unit will require this
lubricant located in a temperature envir;nment of 140 -150 Fahrenheit. Change out of lubrication is still in progress.
No failures have been encountered to date, however, the licensee's inspection indicated that the lubricant previously used in high temperature environments evidenced drying out and hardening with an attendant loss of effectiveness.
Final documentation regarding lubrication change over and PORC disposition is incomplete at this time.
IE Information Notice 79-04, " Degradation of Engineered Safety Features" This notice was related to a sequence of events at Arkansas Nuclear One Units One and Two, which identified safety concerns in the electrical distribution system operation and design (reference IE Circular 79-02). The static invertor and static switch at Peach Bottom are not SCI Inc.
They are provided by Exide Power Systems Division.
The Peach Bottom units have no time delay for transfer from preferred (invertor) source to the alternate source. The licensee's review indicates that a loss of the uninterruptable power supply panel would not impact RPS, ECCS, or PCIS systems.
This subject and degraded voltage conditions are currently under NRC review (NRR) (79-23-02 and 73 25-02) and is considered unresolved.
5.
Non-Routine Event Review The inspector reviewed the following non-routine events onsite and in the NRC site office for safety significance, circumstances, and relationship to Technical Specification protective limits.
The licensee's PORC review, evaluation, and corrective action was also verified.
LER Number Title 2-79-2/1P and 2-79-2/1T Cable Spreading Room Cardox System Out of Service for 5% Hours Without a Fire Watch The licensee had instructed personnel in communications between shift personnel and the working group. A similar event occurred on January 30, 1979, involving the recirculation MG set room fire protection system. As a result of these events, an administrative procedure and status board was developed and implemented.
Fire watches and use of the status board were periodically monitored during the month and no unacceptable conditions were identified.
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LER' Number
' Title 2-79-3/03-L-0 2A Off Gas Monitor Failed Downscale During Surveillance Failure occurred due to dirt on the contacts of the trip test /zero calibration switch. The contacts were cleaned. Redundant channel was operable and the 2A monitor was restored following completion of surveillance testing.
The inspector discussed preventive maintenance with the ICC Department and noted that the LER did not address any cleaning of contacts on the redundant monitor. A licensee representative acknowledged the inspector's concerns in this area.
2-79-04/3L One Cable Spreading Room Smoke Detector Could Not Be Reset During Surveillance Testing Failure occurred due to an improper reset.
Licensee has revised the test procedure to prevent recurrence.
3-79-3/3L An Instrument Shutoff valve to Pressure Switch PS-3-2-3-52D was Found Closed The affected switch is one of four switches providing permissives to open core spray and low pressure admission valves during accident conditions.
Unit 3 was shutdown for maintenance at the time of this event. Redundant instrumentation was operable.
This problem was caused by personnel error.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's disciplinary action which consisted of holding discussions with the involved technicians which stressed safety-related aspects and the importance of the error involved and a written reprimand to the foreman and technicians involved.
6.
In-Office Review of Monthly Operating' Reports The following licensee reports have been reviewed in office onsite.
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Monthly Operating Report for:
August, 1979 dated September 12, 1979 This report was reviewed pursuant to Technical Specifications and verified to determine that operating statistics had been accurately reported and that narrative summaries of the month's operating experience were contained therein. Additionally, Peach Bottom Unit 3 refueling information was reviewed in detail. No unacceptable conditions were identified.
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7.
Radiation Protection The inspector reviewed work in progress on the turbine deck related to Health Physics controls, badging, usage of protective clothing, Health Physics adherence to RWP requirements, surveys, trash removal, and handling of potentially contaminated equipment and materials.
During the course of the month, observations were made of usage of friskers and portal monitors on exiting various RWP areas, the power block, and the licensee's final exit point.
Fifty-two people were observed during the month.
The inspector also examined the licensee's control over radiation areas and high radiation doors.
Key control was also reviewed.
No high radiation area doors required to be locked were found unsecured.
During this inspection, particular inspection emphasis was given to RWPs and licensee controls.
The inspector reviewed Health Physics Procedure HP0/CO-4, Revision 13, dated March 20, 1979, to assess the methods by which Radiation Work Permits are obtained, used, and terminated and the licensee's adherence to procedures. Work in progress during the refueling outage at Unit 3 and ongoing work at the operating Unit 2 were audited by the inspector. Work and various RWPs were also audited during the month and during daily tours of the facility.
Findings were as follows:
a.
Turbine Building Unit 2 116' elevation, Chemical Decontamination Area (RWP No. 2-94-0555, dated September 14, 1979).
During facility tours conducted on September 17, 1979, two individuals were observed working in the area, a contaminated area, with untaped open coveralls and untaped gloves.
The inspector verified that the individuals involved had signed in on the RWP and that the RWP required openings to be taped.
This matter was called to the attention of Health Physics and prompt corrective action was taken.
This example of failure to follow RWP require-ments when examined collectively with other examples as listed below constitutes an infraction level item of noncompliance.
b.
RWP No. 3-94-0423, Unit 3 refuel floor, dated August 2, 1979 and RWP No. 3-01-0492, Unit 3 MSIV room, dated September 15, 1979.
Review of RWP 3-94-0423 indicated that on September 20, seven individuals who had signed in on the RWP between September 18 and 20, 1979, failed to provide required information including time out, dosimeter readings, and differential dosimeter readings.
Also, review of RWP 3-01-0492 disclosed four individuals who were signed in on the RWP that failed to provide the required informa-tion on leaving.
This example of failure to follow RWP require-ments when examined collectively with other examples as listed constitutes an infraction levt1 item of noncompliance.
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c.
Reactor Building Unit 2195 foot elevation, Hot Tool Repair area (RWP No. 2-64-056B dated September 18, 1979). During facility tours conducted September 24-25, 1979, two individuals who were working in the area were observed not signed in on the RWP.
Additionally, one individual had left the area without signing out and providing required information.
This failure to follow RWP requirements when exa. mined collectively with the two other examples cited constitutes on infraction level item of noncompliance (79-23-03 and 79-25-03).
Additionally, the inspector observed a Health Physics technician present in the area who was not alert and therefore, did not detect this problem.
This problem was brought to the attention of licensee management. Resident inspector followup indicated that meetings were held with this individual and a written reprimand was provided. The inspector had no further questions on this item.
8.
Refueling Activities Inspections were conducted to verify that all surveillance testing required by the Technical Specifications and licensee procedures related to fuel handling were completed prior to handling of fuel in the core.
The following surveillance tests were reviewed:
Verification of Control Rod " Full In" Inputs to Refueling a.
Interlocks (ST 12.1A, Revision 1, dated February 24, 1977)
completed September 17, 1979.
b.
Refueling Interlock Functional Test (ST 12.1, Revision 5, dated August 14, 1979) completed September 20, 1979.
c.
SRM Functional and Calibration Check (ST 3.1.3, dated November 2, 1978) completed September 19, 1979.
d.
IRM Functional and Calibration Check (ST 3.2.3, Revision 5, dated November 2, 1978) completed September 19, 1979.
e.
SRM Core Monitoring Test (ST 3.1.2, dated August 14, 1979)
completed September 20, 1979.
Inspections conducted during control room tours also confirmed that SRM minimum counts as established by Technical Specifications 3.10.B.2 were satisfied.
Control room inspections by the resident inspector verified that in excess of 100 cps were indicated on SRM channels at Unit 3.
The inspector also confirmed that required testing was completed prior to the time that fuel movement commenced on September 20, 1979.
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9.
Maintenance Activities The inspector observed maintenance activities in progress during the refueling outage at Unit 3 and during routine operations at Unit 2.
Inspections were conducted to confirm that:
a.
Required administrativ.t approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work.
b.
That maintenance activities were being accomplished utilizing approved procedures.
c.
That maintenance activities included functional testing / calibration prior to returning equipment to service.
d.
No reportable occurrences resulted or were not reported pursuant to Technical Specifications.
Limiting conditions for operation were being satisfied.
e.
Systems inspected / examined included anchor bolt inspections on safety-related equipment conducted during the month; turbine work in progress at Unit 3 during the month; resolution of conductivity recorder spiking at Unit 2, September 20, 1979; 3B CRD pump maintenance, September 7, 1979; and Unit 3 HPSW pump work, September 17, 1979.
Additionally, the inspector verified that radiological controls were established for worker protection including minimizing exposures to personnel. No unacceptable conditions other than those denoted in Detail 7 were identified.
Implementation of controls such as fire watches, posting, and communication were also reviewed.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
10.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are items about which more information is required to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations.
Unresolved items are discussed in Details 3 and 4.
11.
Exit Interviews During the period of the inspection, licensee management, as identified in Detail 1, was periodically notified of the preliminary findings by the resident inspector (as documented elsewhere within this report). A summary was also provided at the conclusion of the report period.
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