IR 05000277/1979015
| ML19254E424 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 08/22/1979 |
| From: | Greenman E, Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19254E415 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-277-79-15, 50-278-79-17, NUDOCS 7911010077 | |
| Download: ML19254E424 (8) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I 50-277/79-15 Report No.
50-278/79-17 50-277 Docket No.
50-278 DPR-44 C
License No.
DPR-56 Priority Category C
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Licensee:
Philadelphia Electric Company
_p301 Market Street Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19101'
Facility Name: Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Units 2 and 3 Inspection at:
Delta, Pennsylvania Inspection conducted: May 27 - June 30, 1979
- c4D / f U Inspectors
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J E. G. Greenman, Resident Reactor Inspector date signed date signed date signed Approved by:
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' % d M,li73 E, C. McCabe, Jr., Chief, Reactor Projects date signed'
Section No. 2, RO&NS Branch Inspection Summary:
Inspection on May 27 - June 30, 1979 (Combined Report Nos. 50-277/79-15 and 50-278/79-17)
Areas Inspected: Routine, onsite regular and backshift inspection by the resident inspector (63 hours7.291667e-4 days <br />0.0175 hours <br />1.041667e-4 weeks <br />2.39715e-5 months <br /> Unit 2; 63 hours7.291667e-4 days <br />0.0175 hours <br />1.041667e-4 weeks <br />2.39715e-5 months <br /> Unit 3).
Areas inspected included accessible portions of the Unit 2 and Unit 3 facilities, radiation protection, including respiratory protection and training records, physical security, plant operations, facility tours, control room inspections, followup on previously identified items, review of periodic reports, IE Bulletin followup, and LER reviews.
Results: No items of noncoupliance were identified in eight areas and one item of noncompliance was identified in one area related to improper certification of respiratory protection training on security badges for one individual (Infraction, Detail 5).
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Region I Fom 12 7 911010 CO2 (Rev. April 77)
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted C. E. Andersen, Operations Engineer J. Austin, Engineer - Maintenance Division W. Barley, Health Physics
- R. S. Fleischmann, Assistant Station Superintendent N. Gazda, Health Physics C. Lauletta, Training E. Marcinkevich, Mechanical Engineering S. Roberts, Results Engineer M. Sullivan, Health Physics S. Tharpe, Security Supervisor
- W. T. Ullrich, Station Superintendent J. Winzenried, Technical Engineer Other licensee employees were contacted during the inspection.
These included engineering personnel, administrative personnel, reactor operators, shift supervision, maintenance personnel, health physics personnel, and security personnel.
- denotes those present at exit interviews.
2.
Previous Inspection Item Update (Closed)
Unresolved Item (78-35-01) - Use of ultrasonic examination frequency not specified by ASME code. The licensee provided the following as justification for the use of a 1.5 MHz examination frequency for the ultrasonic examination of austenitic stainless steel piping welds:
- Report prepared by Southwest Research Institute (SWRI) for the Electric Power Research Institute entitled " Detailed Analysis of the Fundamental Ultrasonic Response Data From Stainless Steel' Stress Corrosion Crack Specimens" and SWRI letter to PECo regarding use of 1.5 MHg search units for the examination of austenitic piping dated 12/8/78.
The inspector reviewed the above listed material and has no further questions concerning this matter at this time.
This item is considered resolved.
(Closed)
Unresolved Items (79-10-06 and 79-11-06) - Issuance of a prompt reporting procedure for NRC notification within one hour of the time the reactor is not in a controlled or expected condition of operation.
The inspector reviewed Procedure A-31, Revision 0, dated May 25, 1979 and confirmed that the licensee had met the commitment provided in IE Bulletin 79-08 response dated April 25, 1979. Procedure A-31 requires an open line of communication to the NRC and incorporates requirements for a one hour time frame regarding NRC notification.
The inspector had no further questions concerning this matter at this time. This item is considered resolved.
Additional interim guidance as provided to the licensee by the resident inspector is contained in Detail 8.
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(Closed)
Unresolved Items (79-10-08 and 79-11-08) - Licensee proposals for changes as required, to those Technical Specifications which must be modified as a result of implementing and addressing requirements of IE Bulletin 79-08.
The licensee's supplemental response to IE Bulletin 79-08 dated May 14, 1979 was reviewed. To date, in the licensee's on-going review, no Technical Specification changes had been identified as a result of the licensee's Bulletin review.
The inspector also confirmed that the supplemental response was submi+ 9ed within the required 30 day time frame and had no further q sstions regarding this matter at this time.
3.
Logs and Records The following logs and records for the periods indicated were reviewed pursuant to the licensee's administrative requirements.
Comments concerning specific areas are contained within this report. Management review was evidenced by frequent log book initialing.
a.
Shift Supervision Log - May 16-June 30, 1979 b.
Unit 2 Jumper Log - current entries c.
Unit 3 Jumper Log - current entries d.
Reactor Operators Log Book Unit 2 - May 16-June 30, 1979 e.
Reactor Operators Log Book Unit 3 - May 16-June 30, 1979 f.
ACO Log Book - May 16-June 30, 1979 g.
Round Sheets - Sampling Audit h.
Night Orders Book - all current entries i. Maintenance Request Forms Unit 2 and 3 - Sampling Audit May-June, 1979 The inspector also reviewed logs to confirm that night orders and instructions did not conflict with Technical Specification requirements. No unacceptable conditions were identified.
4.
Facility Tours Facility tours were conducted at both Unit 2 and Unit 3 during the course of this inspection and on a daily basis.
Areas examined included the reactor building, turbine building, diesels, radwaste, control room, exterior areas including access controls, security fencing, vehicle control, lighting and personnel access / processing, and package processing into the controlled area.
Inspections were conducted to determine the general state of housekeeping, cleanliness, adherence to fire protection guidelines, checks of fire extinguishers, observations regarding LSA shipments, control of high radiation areas, and to observe plant conditions.
No significant fluid leakage or excessive piping vibrations were observed. The inspector checked equipment status and operability and verified that limiting conditions for operation were being satisfied. The status of off-normal alarms was discussed with various operating personnel. Operators and shift supervision were knowledgeable of plant conditions. Minimum staffing requirements were also vrrified based on control room manning.
Security systems were examined during normal and off shift intervals to confirm that 1282
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Perimeter lighting and compensatory measures with respect to the licensee's commitments were examined. No unacceptable conditions were identified.
5.
Respiratory Protection' Program and' Equipment Qualification The inspector reviewed the licensee's qualification records for respiratory and General Employee Training with respect to two individuals in order to determine the mechanism by which individuals are initially trained and then retrained in general respiratory protection. The licensee's Health Physics procedures are non-specific with respect to the periodicity of retraining in this area. Additionally, NUREG 0041 does not specify a maximum time frame for such retraining. The inspector reviewed a licensee memorandum dated April 27, 1979 initiated by Health Physics, recommending that a retraining frequency of 12 months plus an additional two month grace period be established to ensure that potential respiratory equipment users maintain proficiency in the necessary equipment. During the week of June 11-15, 1979, the inspector reviewed training records for two individuals and held discussions with the Training Department, Health Physics, and with security personnel.
Files were examined to determine record status, certification, and respiratory equipment qualification label issuance and controls. Health Physics procedures implementing this aspect of the licensee's program require that a qualification label on the reverse of security badges shall be used as a means of verifying each individual's qualification.
These procedures also require the instructor, after completion of training and fitting, to complete a respiratory label reflecting the individual's qualifications.
Such labels are then maintained by the security personnel and affixed to employee badges. At the time of this inspection, the labels were not laminated and the inspector's survey of several additional employees indicated that in some cases the label was difficult to read due to badge use and normal wear.
General Employee Training (GET) and Respiratory Protection Training records for Employee A and Employee B were reviewed. Employee A received GET training on May 25, 1978 and Employee B had received GET training on February 1, 1979. Both individuals had been certified for respiratory protection equipment in March, 1978 and the inspector detemined from file records that qualification labels carrying a March,1979 expiration date had been authorized and issued. At the time of this inspection, Employee B's security badge showed the respiratory qualification had expired March, 1979.
No retraining had been conducted. The qualification label affixed to Employee A's badge was validated through 1980 with no monthly expiration date provided. This label had been re-issued without benefit of retraining and certification. This improper processing r.nd issuance of a new respiratory qualification. label is contrary to 10CFR20.103, Regulatory Guide 8.15 and the licensee's procedures as required by Technical Specifications and constitutes an infraction level item of noncompliance (79-15-01 and 79-17-01).
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The inspector also reviewed HPA-77, " Determination of MPC Hours",
Revision 5, dated November 30, 1978 which requires work sheet completion if all of the following apply:
a.
Air activities are greater than 1.0 N9 uCi/cc (Gross Beta or I131),
b.
Stay time for 2 MPC hours is less than 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
c.
Someone worked more hours than the allowed stay time for 2 MPC hours.
This procedure requires a technician to then check the respiratory record for each individual to determine if the person is qualified to receive a protection factor for the equipment worn.
The inspector noted that there appeared to be no relationship between this determination and any utilization of respiratory protection labels as a mechanism for verifying an individual's qualification. This area is considered unresolved (79-15-02 and 79-17-02).
The inspector confirmed by review of licensee records (e.g., current respiratory qualification listing) that neither individual appeared on this listing as qualified.
Further, review of RWPs and supporting information indicated that no MPC hours had been recorded for either individual during the quarter or week, thus no exposure was involved or resulted which was equated to the. absence of current respiratory protection qualifications.
6.
Non-Routine Event Review The inspector reviewed the following non-routine event onsite and in-office for safety significance, circumstances, and relationship to Technical Specifications protective limits.
The licensee's PORC review, evaluation, and corrective action was also verified.
LER Number 3-79-19/1P and 3-79-19/1T - RCIC Piping Anchor found with two improperly installed bolts.
On June 21, 1979, one support anchor associated with the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC) was found to have two bolts which could not be properly torqued. Additionally, with six bolts in this anchor, properly in place, two bolts had a safety factor of 1.8, two bolts had a safety factor of 3.6, and the remaining two bolts had a safety factor in excess of 5 (based on manufacturer's loading).
The licensee stated in his report filed with the NRC that safety significance was minimal due to the low probability of a seismic event and engineering analysis leview indicated that the faulty installation of two of the six anchors resulted in the anchor being incapable of withstanding a combination af operating and seismic loads without overstressing the anchor bolts. With the anchor overstressed, failure could have resulted. However, it has not been determined that the stressing would have caused the anchor to fail.
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An alternate system IIPCI was available, thus the safety feature involved would not have been invalidated by a Design Basis seismic event. Had the RCIC system been degraded, continued operation is permissible wi?h HPCI operability confirmed. The inspector confirmed that the two anchor bolts which could not be properly torqued were removed and replaced with new anchors subsequent to a reactor trip and prior to startup, which restored this support to its original capability. HPCI operability was verified by surveillance testing.
The supporting structure has been redesigned and a brace installed to increase the anchor bolt safety factor to at least 5.
Based upon completion of these actions, the inspector concluded that the safety hazard from anchor bolt failure was minimal after repairs were completed.
7.
Identification, Inspection, and Testing of' Concrete Expansion Bolts for Pipe Support Base Plates Using Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts Discussions were held with responsible licensee representatives to determine the licensee's schedule for testing and evaluation and to assure that the licensee was initiating a testing and inspection program.
The licensee was apprised that although licensees are not required to shutdown, testing of inaccessible hangers should be conducted during any shutdown intervals within the time frame specified by IE Bulletin 79-02.
The licensee was in the process of implementing an inspection and test program in early June, 1979.
The inspector reviewed both onsite and with the Regional Office the licensee's procedure number 7902-1, Revision 1, dated June 7, 1979, " Procedure for Identification, Inspection, and Testing of Concrete Expansion Bolts for Pipe Supports as Required by uRC IEE Bulletin 79-02", dated March 8, 1979. Discussions were held with the licensee which included the following:
a.
Base plate flexibility - The inspector noted that the procedure as written did not provide for measurements. The licensee stated that analytical work was being conducted in this area.
b.
Correlation of torque to tension with respect to design loading and safety factors.
c.
Specifics regarding failures encountered at other facilities.
d.
UT testing of bolts for length and utilization of similar bolts for calibration in conjunction with qualification of personnel.
e.
Testing priorities.
The inspector's procedcre review determined that:
a.
Scope includes Seismic Category I Systems as described in the FSAR.
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As recommended in IEB 79-02, one bolt on each plate is tested and if the required torque value is not achieved for any given concrete expansion bolt (CEB) in a support, then the specified torque is applied to all remaining CEB's in the base plate.
c.
All expansion anchors are identified as to type (wedge and shell).
d.
Bolt length, type, and diameter is specified.
e.
The repair program requires that if the first CEB in a plate fails, it shall be replaced prior to testing remaining CEBs in the plate and does not allow more than one CEB to be removed during testing and/or replacement. The repair program includes requirements that for wedge type anchors, if the failure occurs due to concrete breakout, wedge type anchors of the same diameter are to be installed provided that the required embedment length is provided beyond the breakout depth.
If the failure occurs by pullout or the anchor turning in the aole, it is to be removed and replaced.
If required torque is not developed, the hole is to be redrilled and the next larger diameter wedge anchor installed at the same location if concrete integrity has not been disturbed.
Shell type concrete expansion bolts are to be replaced with wedge type anchors at the same location.
8.
Prompt Reporting to NRC Additional guidance was provided to the licensee with respect to IE Bulletin 79-08.
Specifically, the licensee was requested and committed to on June 5, 1979 to report within one hour of detection any plant condition which results in one or more of the following:
a.
Exceeding or potential excess of a safety limit, b.
Exceeding or reaching a limiting safety system setting without the specified safety action being accomplished, c.
Exceeding a Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) without the specified action being taken.
d.
Exceeding an LCO during shutdown if the coility to cool the core is jeopardized.
Inspection confirmed that the licensee issued instructions to operating personnel which addressed the above topical areas. The inspector also reviewed revisions to Procedure A-31 which have been forwarded to Philadelphia Electric Company corporate offices for review and signature incorporating the above and addressing the NRC phone line installation at Peach Bottom.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
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Unresolved Item Unresolved items are items about which more information is required to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations. An unresolved item is discussed in Detail 5.
10.
Exit Interviews During the period of the inspection, licensee management, as identified in Detail 1, was periodically notified of the preliminary findings by the resident inspector (as documented elsewhere within this report). A summary was also provided at the conclusion of the report period. The licensee acknowledged inspection findings.
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