IR 05000275/1987040
| ML16341E481 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 12/11/1987 |
| From: | Burdion J, Mendonca M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16341E480 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-87-40, 50-323-87-41, NUDOCS 8712310197 | |
| Download: ML16341E481 (12) | |
Text
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U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report Nos.
50-275/87-40, 50-323/87-41 Docket Nos.
50-275; 50-323 License Nos.
Pacific Gas and Electric Company 77 Beale Street Room 1451 San Francisco, California 94106 Facility Name:
Diablo Canyon Units 1 and
Inspection at:
Diablo Canyon Site, San Luis Obispo County, California Inspection Condu e
.
ov mber 12 an 16-20, 1987 Inspector:
Approved by:
~Summar F.
tor nspector
.
Mendonca, C ref actor Project Section
/2
~< g7 Date Signed IZ ri D te igned Ins ection Durin Period of November 12-20 1987 (Re ort Nos.
50-275/87-40 and 50-323/87-41 vital areas and equipment in the plant, and followup of enforcement and open items.
Inspection Procedures Nos.
30703, 36100, 71707, 90712 and 92701 were used as guidance for the inspection.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
87123iOi97 87i2ii PDR ADOGK 05000275
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DETAILS Individuals Contacted Pacific Gas and Electric Com an PG&E
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Townsend, Acting Plant Manager Miklush, Maintenance Manager-Angus, Work Planning Manager Ski'dmore, Manager, guality Assurance Young, Director, guality Projects Osness, Senior Engineer, Nuclear Program Management Grebel, Regulatory Compliance Supervisor Stephens, General Foreman, Instrumentation Wilson, Regulatory Compliance Engineer Fridley, Senior Operating Supervisor Smith, Power Production Engineer Malone, Sr.,
I8C Engineer Weber, Power Production Engineer Various other engineering and gC personnel.
In addition, NRC Resident Inspectors attended the exit meeting.
- Denotes attendees at exit meeting on November 20, 1987.
""Denotes attendees at meeting in San Francisco on November 12, 1987.
Area Ins ection An independent inspection was conducted in Units 1 and 2 Turbine and Auxiliary Buildings.
The inspection examined areas and equipment for debris, potential hazards, oil and water leakage, and equipment condition, e.g., oil level, valve position, and electrical connection configuration and cleanliness.
The equipment and areas inspected included:
A.
Five Emergency Diesel Generator Rooms B.
Six 4160 Volt Switchgear Rooms C.
Combined Two-unit Control Room D.
Four,.Containment Spray Pumps.
E.
Six Charging Pumps F.
Four Safety Injection Pumps G.
Four RHR Pumps H.
Six Component Cooling Water Pumps I.
Six Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps J.
Six Emergency Battery Rooms K.
Six 480 Volt Vital Bus Rooms L.
Two Cable Spreading Rooms M.
Two Hot Shutdown Panel N.
Two 480 Volt Load Center Areas
0.
Turbine Building at Elevations 85'.
GW/GE Penetration Areas Units 1 and 2 at Elevation 115'ousekeeping and equipment status appeared to be acceptable.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Followu of NRC Information Notices Closed 50-275/50-323 NRC Notice 87-35 Reactor Tri Breaker Westin house Model DS-416 Failed to 0 en on Manual Initiation from the Control Room This notice alerted the licensee of a potentially significant problem associated with Westinghouse type DS-416 Reactor Trip Breakers (RTB).
At McGuire Unit 2, while performing control rod drop tests during a
refueling outage, B train RTB failed to open when a manual trip was initiated from the control room.
Investigation revealed that the.shunt trip coil had burned and shorted while trying to open the breaker.
The coil is designed for intermittent duty to carry current only during the relatively short period required for the circuit breaker to open; and when the breaker failed to open, prolonged and damaging current flowed in the shunt trip coil.
Failure of the breaker to open is attributed to abnormal wear and a broken weld on the main drive link between the center pole lever and the pole shaft.
The inspector reviewed the notice with the licensee and examined the conclusions of the licensee's nuclear operations support group.
This group determined that Westinghouse type DS-416 circuit breakers are not used at Diablo Canyon in the reactor trip switchgear or on 480V, 4KV or 12KV systems.
Westinghouse type DB-50 circuit breakers are employed in the reactor trip switchgear at Diablo Canyon.
This notice is closed for Units 1 and 2.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Licensee Event Re ort Follow-U A.
The following LER was reviewed for event description, root cause, corrective actions taken, generic applicability and timeliness of reporting.
Unit 2 LER 85-28-LO.
On May 4, 1987, with the unit in Mode 6 (Refueling), Instrumentation and Control (I&C) technicians were calibrating steam generator steam pressure transmitter PT-536 (JE)(PT).
When the cover for PT-536 was removed, the, I&C technicians noticed that only one of two 0-ring seal had been installed.
It was determined that the cover was last closed by a contract technician on March 30, 1985, at which time one 0-ring seal was not installed.
Both the 0-ring seals were properly installed following calibration of PT53 ~
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An investigation was initiated to determine which other transmitters had been accessed during that same time frame (1985).
This -list of transmitters was then reviewed to determine which of these had been accessed by the same person.
The result was a list of twelve transmitters including 2PT-536.
The remaining eleven were then reviewed to determine if they had been accessed since the 1985 access.
It was found that all except-2PT-536 had been more recently accessed and found with properly installed seals.
Based on the results of the foregoing investigation this incident was considered by the licensee to be an isolated incident.
The'inspector reviewed with the licensee the following aspect of the LER; root cause, resolution corrective action, safety significance, etc.
The inspector examined the installation of pressure transmitter (PT), 2PT-536 in the penetration (GW) area of Unit 2 at elevation 115; and also reviewed the environmental qualifications for the PT.
Although 2PT-536 is located outside containment in a high energy line break effected area; the PT is qualified (when both 0-rings are installed) for operation in the more severe environment of a LOCA inside containment where the maximum pressure and temperature could be 47 psig and 325 F, respectively.
The actual pressure and temperature for which the PT is qualified (with both 0-rings) is 77.5 PSIG and 485 F, accompanied by lOOX humidity steam, chemical'pray and radiation background.
The licensee's calculated environmental conditions which would develop following a steam line break in the penetration area where 2PT-536 is located was a maximum pressure of approximately 21.14 PSIA at 20 milliseconds, rapidly dissipating to 14.5 PSIA in 8 to 9 seconds; and a maximum temperature of 325 F.
The licensee concluded that the operation of the PT with only one 0-ring seal in place would not be effected by a pressure increase of seven pounds calculated for the area (outside containment)
where 2PT-536 is located.
It is concluded that the report processing, conclusion arrived at and corrective actions taken by the licensee in response to this LER are acceptable.
The environmental qualification records for 2PT-536 appeared to be in order.
This LER is closed.
B.
Based on an in-office review, the following LERs were reviewed, for event description, root cause, corrective actions taken, generic applicability and timeliness of reporting.
Unit 1 86-10-Ll and 86-17-Ll These LERs are closed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Followu of 0 en Items A.
Closed Item 50-275/21-72-01 Continuation of Examination of the Licensee's Res onse to Findin s
b PAC and or EOS
Allegation Concern 72 is characterized as; inadequate PG8E Quality Assurance (QA) program since license suspension (November 1981).
NUREG 675 Supplement 21, dated December 1983, addressed allegation concern 72 and directed the Region V staff to continue to examine the licensee's response to findings by Project Assistance Corporation (PAC) and EDS Nuclear, Inc.
(EDS).
The staff's assessment (NUREG 675 Supplement 21), of findings in the PAC and EDS reviews, did not identify significant evidence that the licensee's QA program was inadequate or that the PAC or EDS reviews themselves disclosed any significant deficiencies in plant construction or operational capability.
r The following traces the licensee's responses to findings by PAC and EDS.
Back round The licensee engaged PAC early in June 1982 to review their QA manual (originally issued February 1981) to assure commitments in the FSAR, various applicable Regulatory Guides, and ANSI standards were adequately addressed.
During this same period (July 1982), the licensee engaged EDS to review for adequacy the QA implementating procedures as prepared by the various departments associated with the construction and operation of Diablo Canyon Power Plant, i.e.
engineering, general construction, planning and research, materials, nuclear power generation, etc.
Following the licensee's
'review of PAC and EDS findings, the licensee decided to prepare and issue a
completely new QA manual, and to revise a number of QA procedures to implement the revised section 17 of the FSAR.
Ins ector's Findin s
The inspector reviewed various documents which outlined the programs for preparing a new QA manual and revising forty three QA procedures.
Other documentation reviewed showed periodic progress of these programs to fully implement FSAR section 17.
The new quality assurance manual for Diablo Canyon was issued April 16, 1986, and the program for completing the revisions to QA procedures was accomplished in March 1987 with the issuing of the final revised QA Procedure QAP-3. F (associated with computer systems).
The licensee's new QA manual was examined in conjunction with FSAR Section 17. It is concluded'hat implementation of FSAR Section
is acceptable.
This item is closed.
(Closed Item 50-275/323/87-01-06 Resolution of Backlo of Action Re uests AR and Work Orders W.O.
The computerized Action Request (AR) and Work Order (WO) system was implemented in August 1986.
Shortly thereafter, management became aware that improvements were desired.
In November 1986, after a
review of the system performance following its initial,trial period, a task force was created to review the system.
An action plan was
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developed to provide direction to the task force, including a schedule for completion of the work.
The action plan included:
(1) a review of the AR and WO forms to make them more user-friendly; (2) establishment of a more effective prioritization system to ensure that plant problems are brought to the appropriate level of management attention; and (3) an evaluation of the processing system to ensure that ARs and WOs are processed in an effective and timely manner.
The inspector reviewed the status of resolving the backlog of action requests and work orders with the work planning manager.
The review of the AR and WO forms has been completed, and changes have been made to the form to make them more user-friendly.
The prioritization system has been developed and reviewed, and is scheduled to go to the Plant Safety Review Committee (PSRC) for approval in December.
The evaluation of the AR and WO processing system has been completed.
The development of an accurate system for tracking the backlog of ARs and WOs was scheduled for completion by December 1st.
The inspector also reviewed allocation of manpower to the Work Planning Center (WPC) with the W. P.
Manager.
During Unit 2 refueling, additional contract people were assigned to the WPC to process the large increase in WO's.
The last of these people left the site at the end of August.
Close monitoring of the WO backlog has determined seven additional planners will be required to stay abreast of WO load.
The authorization for hiring these new planners has been approved, and it is expected as many as three or four of the new people will be "onboard" by January 1st.
The backlog of WO's is not expected to be reduced appreciably unti 1 some of the new WPC staff members are in place and effective in their new assignments.
It is concluded that resolution of the backlog of action requests and work orders is in the process of being achieved.
Since this area is monitored during the routine inspection program and discussed at quarterly management meetings held with the licensee.
This item is being closed, based on the licensee s actions taken to date.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Meetin The inspector conducted an exit meeting on November 20, 1987, with the members of the plant staff as indicated in paragraph 1.
During this meeting, the inspector summarized the scope of the inspection activities and reviewed the inspection findings as described in this report.
The licensee acknowledged the concerns identified in the repor ~
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