IR 05000275/1987033
| ML16341E469 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 12/03/1987 |
| From: | Brown G, Fish R, Good G, Narbut P, Prendergast K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16341E468 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-87-33, 50-323-87-33, NUDOCS 8712220007 | |
| Download: ML16341E469 (16) | |
Text
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report Nos.
50-275/87-33 and 50-323/87-33 Docket Nos.
50-275 and 50-323 License Nos.
Faci l ity:
Pacific Gas and Electric Company 77 Beale Street San Fr anci sco, Cal ifor ni a 94106 Diablo Canyon Units 1 and
Inspection at: Diablo Canyon Site, San Luis Obispo County, California Inspection Conducted:
September 21-25, 1987 Inspectors:
r K.
. Prendergast, mergenc. Preparedness Analyst Q~
G.
M. Go; mergency Preparedness Analyst h2 Dat Signed
'Pal.~
Date Signed
]~" I'7 G.
Brown, Emerge cy Preparedness Analyst P.
P. Narbut, Se ior Resident Inspector Team Member:
Jim Jamison, Pacific Northwest Laboratories Approved By:
R.
F. Fish, Chief Emergency Preparedness Section
~Summar:
Ins ection on Se tember 21-25 1987 Re ort Nos.
50-275/87-33 and
~/
Dat igned l~
>Z'ateS>gned I 38" Dat gned associated critique, and tollow-up on open items.
Inspection procedures 82301 and 92701 were covered.
Results:
No deficiencies or violations of NRC requirements were identified.
871222oo Gppoa7S 7ggQQ pgR ADQCK o pDR
DETAILS Persons Contacted T. Mack, Senior Nuclear Generation Engineer D. Shelley, Senior Nuclear Generation Engineer Y. Mendez, Corporate Health Physicist S. Wilde, Engineer H. Arnold, Power Production Engineer J.
Hays, Chemistry and Radiation Protection Foreman B. Giffin, Supervising Engineer E.
Waage, Senior Engineer Action on Previous Ins ection Findin s
(Closed)
Open Item IN-86-10, safety parameter display system (SPDS)
malfunctions.
A review of the licensee's file for the above stated information notice determined that the licensee had received the notice, distributed the notice to cognizant personnel, and assigned=a project manager to evaluate any action requested regarding the notice.
No further actions regarding this notice were required.
This item is considered closed.
(Closed)
Open Item 85-31-01, formal logkeeping.
The licensee has demonstrated satisfactory logkeeping capabilities during the last two exercises.
This item is considered closed.
Emer enc Pre aredness Exercise Plannin The licensee's corporate emergency preparedness staff has the overall responsibility for developing, conducting and evaluating the annual emergency preparedness exercise.
The corporate staff developed the scenario package with the assistance of persons possessing appropriate expertise (e. g., reactor operations, health physics, maintenance, etc. ).
To maintain security over the scenario, individuals who had been involved in the scenario preparation were not participants in the exercise.
The corporate staff and the offsite agencies established the exercise objectives.
NRC Region V and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Region IX, were given an opportunity to review and comment on the proposed objectives.
The exercise document included the objectives and guidelines, exercise scenario, messages used during the exercise, initial and subsequent plant parameters, meteorological and radiological data, controller and evaluator instructions and critique worksheets.
The licensee maintained strict control of the exercise document before the exercise, only giving advance copies of the exercise document to the NRC evaluators and other persons having a specific need.
The exercise was intended to meet the requirements of IV. F. 3 of Appendix E, 10 CFR Part 50.
Also, the date of the exercise was not announced.
Exercise Scenario The exercise scenario started with an event classified as an unusual event and ultimately escalated to a general emergency classification in the following manner:
~
'
Cl assi ficati on Event Unusual Event Aler t Fire within protected areas lasting more than 10 minutes.
Unplanned radiation levels greater than 1.5 R/hr within the controlled area.
Site Area Emergency Loss of coolant accident greater than make-up capacity.
,General Emergency 5.
Federal Evaluators Loss of coolant accident combined with loss of containment cooling capability.
Five NRC inspectors evaluated the licensee's response to the scenario.
Inspectors were stationed in the Control Room (simulator), Technical Support Center (TSC), Operational Support Center (OSC),
and in the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).
The NRC inspectors in the OSC also accompanied repair/monitoring teams to evaluate their performance in responding to the scenario.
FEMA, Region IX, evaluators evaluated those portions of the exercise that involved State and local agencies, including the interface occurring at the EOF.
The results of FEMA's evaluation of State and local participation will be described in a separate report issued by FEMA.
6.
Control Room/Simulator The following aspects of Control Room (CR) operations were observed during the exercise:
detection and classification of emergency events, notification, use of emergency procedures, and innovative attempts to mitigate the accident.
The following NRC observations of the CR activities, as appropriate, are intended to be suggestions for improving the program.
a.
The CR staff operated efficiently while responding to the conditions in the scenario.
They promptly and appropriately classified the accident using their emergency procedures, performed timely notifications to state, local and federal agencies, identified subtle trends in plant conditions, and developed innovative responses to mitigate the accident.
b.
The Shift Foreman exercised good judgement in limiting plant activities that might lead to other plant problems; however, the lead controller prevented these actions to keep, the exercise on track and within the bounds of the scenario.
C.
The transfer of the responsibilities from the CR to the TSC was smoot d.
The display for the critical safety function status tree could be improved in that it is out of date.
This forced the Senior Technical Advisor to use the manual procedure.
7.
Technical Su ort Center The following aspects of TSC operations were observed:
activation, accident assessment/classification, dose assessment, notification, and support to the CR.
The following are NRC observations of the TSC activities.
An exercise weakness is a finding identified as needing corrective action in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F.5.
The open item is of sufficient importance to warrant NRC examination during a future inspection.
The other observations, as appropriate, are intended to be suggestions for improving the program.
a 0 The TSC staff operated well as a team.
Individuals for the various functional areas kept the Site Emergency Coordinator (SEC) well informed on the status in their respective areas.
The players demonstrated a positive, aggressive attitude toward their duties.
b.
Checklists and logs were completed and well maintained.
c.
The staff held excellent discussions regarding recovery.
d.
The TSC did not meet exercise objective ¹11, regarding the formulation and communication of protective action recommendations (PARs) to local authorities.
There were no PARs communicated to local agencies from the TSC at the general emergency classification.
Emergency Plan implementing procedure G-3 (Notification of Offsite Organizations)
requires prompt notification, including PARs, within 15 minutes.
The general emergency was declared at ll:35 a.m.
and no PARs were communicated to the county within the 15 minute time frame.
The numerous and cumbersome volumes of implementing procedures required by the SEC to fulfillhis responsibilities may have contributed to the problem with the PARs.
The failure to make a
PAR based upon plant conditions at the general emergency classification is considered to be an exercise weakness and will be tracked as open item 50-275/87-33-01.
e.
The licensee should consider a signature block on the official notification form to insure that the information is complete and correct.
f.
The TSC ventilation system was set to recirculate and the airlock simulated closed; however, health physics habitability precautions were neither discussed nor taken.
Health physics precautions to insure the habitability of the TSC should have been addressed.
g.
Seismic hazards in the TSC Ventilation Room should be examined.
Ladders and radiation monitors on wheels in the TSC ventilation room were not secured.
This has the potential to cause damage to the ventilation system or controls during a seismic event.
This matter will be tracked as open item 50-275/87-33-0.
0 erational Su ort Center The following aspects of OSC operations were observed:
activation of the facility, functional capabilities and-the disposition of various in-plant/monitoring teams.
The following NRC observations of the OSC activities, as appropriate, are intended to be suggestions for improving the program.
a.
The OSC supervisors and team members showed a good understanding of the ALARA principles, choosing methods and routes to minimize time spent in high radiation zones.
b.
The post accident sampling team was proficient in conducting the sampling operations.
They worked rapidly, minimizing their exposures to radiation.
C.
The OSC post-exercise critique was excellent.
All controllers and most players participated.
Discussion and self criticism was candid, detailed, and highly productive in identifying areas for improvement.
d.
The OSC functioned well, providing a place to assemble, organize, and dispense teams into to the plant.
However, an examination of the layout, coordination, and/or management of the the OSC may indicate changes which could give a smoother and more efficient operation.
e.
The transfer of operations from the OSC to the alternate OSC (AOSC)
could be improved.
For example:
(1)
There did not appear to be an accountability performed prior to or after evacuat'ion of the OSC.
(2)
There were no surveys of the alternate OSC prior to its occupancy.
According to the licensee, these surveys were simulated during the exercise.
However, this area should be examined to preclude a relocation to a contaminated area.
(3)
After the relocation to the cold machine shop, contamination control appeared uncer tain.
This apparently was due to the lack of frisking stations and well defined ingress/egress routes.
f.
Specific instructions regarding the use of Potassium Iodide (KI)
should be provided for team members who may be in airborne contamination areas and wearing protective clothing and respirators.
9.
Emer enc 0 erations Facilit The following EOF operations were observed:
activation of the facility, functional capabilities, accident assessment, notifications, support by the Corporate Incident Response Center, and the interface with offsite officials.
An exercise weakness is a finding identified as needing
corrective action in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F.5.
The other observations, as appropriate, are intended to be suggestions for improving the program.
a.
The operations group did a good job keeping the Recovery Manager and EOF staff informed of plant conditions and determining ways to mitigate the accident.
b.
Status Boards were well maintained and the EOF staff was well briefed on plant conditions throughout the exercise.
c.
The transition from the interim EOF staff to the long-term EOF staff was smooth.
d.
The Recovery Manager approved and disseminated news releases from the utility to the public in a timely manner.
e.
There was generally good communication flow between the EOF and the San Luis Obispo County Emergency Operations Center, however, it appeared that the significance of the plant status situation, which existed at approximately 12:30 p.m.,
was not clearly conveyed to offsite officials.
At about this time, plant personnel had indications of significant fuel damage fr'om the high radiation levels in containment.
Conversations between the Recovery Manager in the EOF and the Site Emergency Coordinator in the TSC resulted in the utility's decision to recommend evacuation of Protective Action Zones 6 and 7.
This recommendation was based on the severity of plant conditions and did not involve any actual release of radiation.
However, because of the decision to process the utility's recommendation through the Unified Dose Assessment Center, rather than directly to the County Administrator, the recommendation to evacuate zones 6 and 7 was delayed for approximately 30 minutes and not made until 1: 15 p.m.
Between the period of 12:30 to 2:00 p.m., there was no evidence to suggest the situation would improve and, in fact, actually worsened when a leak in containment developed at approximately 1: 10 p.m.
The licensee's failure to authorize and issue a prompt and timely protective action recommendation to appropriate offsite officials based upon plant conditions is considered to be an exercise weakness and will be tracked as open item 50-275/87-33-03.
FEMA held a briefing on Friday, September 25, 1987, to present a general summary of their findings regarding offsite participation during the exercise.
The NRC team leader also attended this meeting.
ll.
Exit Interview An exit interview to discuss the preliminary NRC findings was held on September 25, 1987.
The attachment to this report identifies some of the personnel who were present at this meeting.
The NRC was represented by the five evaluator team members which included Mr.
P. Narbut, Senior
0'
Resident Inspector.
The licensee was informed that no violations of NRC requirements were identified during the inspection.
Other items discussed during this meeting are described in Sections 2 through 10 of this repor ~
'
ATTACHMENT Exit Interview Attendees Name J.
M. Gisclon T.
P.
Mack J.
D. Townsend D.
H. Johnson C.
E.
Johnson K.
C.
Doss R.
L. Johnson L.
F.
Womack J.
M.
Rappa J.
E.
Molden R. J.
Glaza G.
C. Sarkisian J.
P.
Hubble J.
M. Boots P.
P.
Powers J.
A.
Hays D.
D. Malone M.
W. Stephen P.
M. Nanninga B.
P.
Black M.
L. Smith M.
G. Smith T.
W. Pellisero D.
W. Shelley J.
B. Neale N.
J
~ Aiken D.
H. Oatley W.
B.
McLane W. J.
Keyworth Title PG&E, Assistant Plant Manager DCPP NOS, Senior Engineer, Emergency Planning PG8E, Acting Plant Manager PG8E, Telecommunication (Acting) Superintendent-DCPP Fire Marshall Senior Nuclear Generation Engineer -
OSRG Chemistry General Foreman Operations Manager Electrical Maintenance, PG8E Operations Training Supervisor Operations Training Instructor Senior News Representative, Corporate Communications Security Supervisor, PG8E, Security Liaison Chemistry and Radiation Protection Manager Senior Chemistry and Radiation Engineer Radiation Protection General Foreman Senior I8C Engineer General Foreman Senior Mechanical Maintenance Engineer Mechanical Maintenance Advisor Electrical Maintenance Advisor Nuclear Generation Engineer Power Production Engineer Senior Nuclear Generation Engineer Nuclear Generation Engineer Shift Foreman Supervisory Nuclear Generation Engineer Assistant Plant Manager Senior Power Production Engineer