IR 05000272/1994023
| ML18101A350 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem, Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 11/21/1994 |
| From: | Keimig R, Laughlin J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18101A349 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-94-23, 50-311-94-23, 50-354-94-21, NUDOCS 9411300117 | |
| Download: ML18101A350 (11) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report/License No.:
50-354/94-21/NPF-57 50-272/94-23/DPR-70 50-311/94-23/DPR-75 Licensee:
Public Service Electric and Gas Company P. o. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038-4800 Facility Name:
Artificial Island (Hope Creek and Salem Generating Stations)
Inspection At:
Lower Alloways Creek Township and Salem, NJ Inspection Conducted:
October 24-26, 1994 Inspectors:
Approved by:
J. L ghl *, Emergency Preparedness Specialist J. Schop
, Resident Inspector, Artificial Island W. Schmidt, Senior Resident Inspector, Peach Bottom R. Lorson, Resident Inspector, Peach Bottom L. Eckert, Radiation Specialist Chief, Emergency Preparedness Section Areas Inspected: Announced emergency preparedness inspection and evaluation of the annual full-participation exercis Results: The onsite response to the accident scenario was goo There were no exercise strengths or weaknesses, but three areas for potential improvement were note No safety concerns or violations of regulatory requirements were observed.
9411300117 941121 PDR ADDCK 05000272 G
- DETAILS INDIVIDUALS CONTACTED PRINCIPAL LICENSEE EMPLOYEES The following licensee representatives attended the exit meeting on October 26, 199 C. Banner, Administrator, Onsite Emergency Preparedness D. Burgin, Emergency Preparedness R. Burricelli, General Manager, Information Systems/External Affairs M. Camp, Manager, Nuclear Communications G. Connor, General Manager, Nuclear Support and Services G. Daves, Operations Engineer T. DiGuiseppi, Emergency Preparedness Manager M. Dior, Nuclear Shift Supervisor J. Harris, Emergency Preparedness R. Hovey, General Manager, Hope Creek Operations K. Krueger, Senior Nuclear Shift Supervisor C. Lambert, Manager, Nuclear Engineering Design L. Mi 11 er, Di rector, Estuary Enhancement Program P. Opsal, Balance of Plant Technical Engineer, Hope Creek R. Reece, Emergency Preparedness J. Schaffer, Emergency Preparedness G. Thomson, Emergency Preparedness M. Trum, Manager, Maintenance W. Weckstein, Emergency Preparedness NRC EMPLOYEES The following NRC personnel attended the exit meeting:
C. Bajwa, Division of Reactor Projects, Section 3B L. Eckert, Radiation Specialist J. Laughlin, Emergency Preparedness Specialist R. Summers, Senior Resident Inspector, Hope Creek The inspectors also interviewed other licensee personne.0 PURPOSE OF INSPECTION Evaluation of the licensee's full-participation emergency preparedness exercise conducted on October 25, 199.0 EXERCISE PARTICIPATION The Artificial Island full-participation exercise was conducted on October 25, 1994, from 8:30 a.m. to 3:30 The state of Delaware participated fully and was evaluated by the Federal Emergency Management Agenc The state of New Jersey partially participated, but was not evaluate Personnel from NRC Region I and Headquarters participated in the exercise by fully implementing the agency's incident response plan, which included the dispatch of a Region I team to the sit *
A briefing was conducted by the licensee for NRC Region I exercise participants and personnel from the states of Delaware and New Jersey in the Region I offices on October 17, 199 The NRC also provided the states of Delaware and New Jersey with an overview of the NRC Incident Response Program, including a tour of the Region I Incident Response Center and demonstration of the available technical assessment tools used during an inciden.0 SCENARIO REVIEW Exercise objectives were submitted to NRC Region I on July 22, 199 The scenario was submitted on August 24, 1994, for NRC review and evaluatio Region I representatives discussed the scenario with the licensee's emergency preparedness staff on September 8, 199 The final scenario adequately tested the major portions of the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs), and also demonstrated licensee performance in areas previously identified for further revie The NRC exercise evaluators (inspectors) attended a licensee scenario briefing on October 24, 199 The final scenario was discussed in depth and licensee staff answered NRC question The licensee stated that certain emergency response activities would be simulated and that controllers would intercede in exercise activities to prevent deviations from the scenario and to ensure that normal plant operations were not disrupte ACTIVITIES OBSERVED The NRC team members observed the activation and augmentation of the Emergency Response Organization (ERO), activation of Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs), and actions of emergency response personne The following activities were observed: Detection, classification, and assessment of scenario event.
Direction and coordination of the emergency respons.
Notification of licensee personnel and offsite agencie.
Communications, information flow, and record keepin.
Assessment and projection of offsite radiological dose.
Protective Action Recommendations (PARs). Performance of technical support, repairs and corrective action.
Accountability of personne.
Accident analysis and mitigatio.
Provisions for communicating information to the publi.
Licensee post-exercise critiqu.0 CLASSIFICATION OF EXERCISE FINDINGS Exercise findings were classified as follows:
Exercise Strength: a strong positive indication of the licensee's ability to cope with abnormal plant conditions and implement the Emergency Pla *
Exercise Weakness: less than effective Emergency Plan implementation which did not, alone, constitute overall response inadequac Area for Potential Improvement: an aspect which did not significantly detract from the licensee's response, but which merits licensee evaluation for possible corrective actio.0 EXERCISE OBSERVATIONS Activation and utilization of the ERO and ERFs were generally consistent with the Emergency Plan and EPIP The presence of Mr. S. LaBruna, Vice President, Engineering and Plant Betterment, in the ERFs during the exercise demonstrated management attention to E The following observations were made in the ERF SIMULATOR CONTROL ROOM (SCR)
The operating shift promptly and accurately assessed and mitigated degrading plant condition The shift demonstrated good communications and procedure usage and in-depth plant knowledg The Unusual Event and Alert declarations by the Senior Nuclear Shift Supervisor/Emergency Coordinator (SNSS/EC) were accurate and timel Notifications of state and local officials were completed in the required tim The SNSS/EC and Nuclear Shift Supervisor (NSS) exercised very good command and control through facility briefings, establishment of work priorities, which were continuously re-evaluated, and effective use of personne The NSS maintained Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) flow charts up-to-date, carefully considered pressure/level control contingency plans, and effectively controlled equipment restoratio On two occasions, the SCR referee interjected contingency messages which preempted operator action However, this was done for scenario control, and had no negative effect on respons Overall, no exercise strengths, weaknesses, or areas for potential improvement were noted in the SC.0 TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC)
The TSC activation was good, and was completed in one hour and 14 minute Activation was unnecessarily delayed for about 15 minutes due to one SCR communicator being held on the Emergency Notification Syste (ENS) line by the NR This prevented a timely turnover to the TSC communicator. The NRC assessed this activation time as acceptable, but noted that the delay was preventable by informing the NRC phone-talker of the situatio All personnel knew their duties and retrieved their stored supplies (i.e., procedures, logs, instruments) quickl The Technical Support Supervisor (TSS) was the first TSC manager to arrive and gathered initial plant status informatio He provided a very good initial briefing to the Emergency Duty Officer (EDO) on his arriva The EDO demonstrated very good command and control over the TSC activitie He quickly established work priorities, and utilized his staff well in the accurate Site Area Emergency declaration and validation of EOP usage in the SC Operational Support Center (OSC)
priorities were updated by regular communications with the OS The EDO discussions with the Emergency Operations Facility concerning emergency classification upgrading and protective action recommendations were goo The TSC staff briefings were concise and factual. After the EDO briefed facility personnel on plant conditions, the team leaders briefed personnel on their areas of responsibility. A posted briefing check-off list for TSC team leaders was usefu Since there were no direct continuous communications with the SCR, the EDO and TSS sometimes had to call the SCR for information update Generally information flow into the TSC was good, but occasionally, NRC exercise participants, in communication with NRC personnel in the SCR, provided new information on changing plant conditions to the licensee's EDO for evaluatio An open (direct) communications link between the EDO and SCR could have improved this situatio Plant parameter and equipment status boards were updated every 15 minutes in accordance with procedure However, these boards were not changed as equipment became inoperable or as major plant parameters change This potentially could have resulted in TSC personnel relying on erroneous information between status board update Further, status boards did not specifically state why equipment was out of servic Status board updates and information content were noted as an area for potential improvement (IFI 50-354/94-21-01, 50-272/94-23-01, 50-311/94-23-01).
.
The engineering organization functioned well in assessing plant technical informatio They developed plans for reactor building entries, emergency diesel generator repair work, and core damage/reactivity monitorin This organization also utilized a white board to list the times of major events and equipment/plant problem Although the board was effective, it was not formally proceduralized and was not centrally located for optimum us The Radiological Assessment Coordinator (RAC) presented good detailed briefings during the initial steam release to the reactor buildin Discussions between the RAC and EDO concerning special exposure limits for reactor building entries to isolate the release path were goo There were no strengths or weaknesses noted in the TS.0 OPERATIONAL SUPPORT CENTER COSC)
The OSC was activated in accordance with licensee procedures within 30 minutes of the Alert declaratio It provided good support to the SCR and the TS The OSC task priority status board was well maintained and consistent with the one located in the TS Damage Control Teams (DCTs)
were thoroughly briefed, effectively tracked, team members were
- knowledgeable concerning their assigned operational and repair activities, and most repairs were well executed in a few minute However, the OSC Coordinator (OSCC) did not always exhibit effective command and control as shown by:
The OCT assigned to repair the "0" low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) isolation valve returned to the OSC for accountability and remained there for 40 minutes, when this repair item was the highest priority. This occurred without the knowledge of the OSCC, who erroneously informed another member of the ERO that the job was in progress. This OCT was quickly dispatched when it was discovered in the OS The inspector noted, however, that the team tracking status board correctly showed that the team had returne *
TSC/OSC staff did not effectively investigate contingency repair options to repair the drywell atmospheric gaseous radioactivity monitoring inboard isolation valve (SKHV-5018) for release path isolation. A team was dispatched to shut this valve locally, by overriding breaker control contacts, which subsequently failed, and no alternate repair plan was devised in the interi The inspector noted that there were trained OSC personnel available who could have developed an alternate repair pla *
The noise level in the OSC was frequently high such that several site public address (PA) announcements were not hear Some of these announcements required action by the OSC, which subsequently had to be prompted to complete the actio *
Key plant information was not always recorded on the OSC plant information status boar For example, the recirculation li~e break and loss of coolant accident were not indicate For these reasons, OSC command and control was noted as an area for potential improvement (IFI 50-354/94-21-02, 50-272/94-23-02, 50-311/94-23-02).
No exercise strengths or weaknesses were note.0 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY CEOF)
The Emergency Response Manager (ERM), in preparation for EOF activation, asked his managers if they were prepared to activat Licensee procedures require EOF staffing at the Alert level and activation at the Site Area Emergency (SAE).
The Radiological Support Manager (RSM)
stated that his group would be ready for activation when the field team coordinator was read This held up activation but was well before the SAE declaration. After the EOF dose assessment group was ready to take responsibility from the TSC, the ERM called the EOO to determine whether or not facility activation was desire The EOO stated that he would discuss the matter with his staff and then reply. Subsequently, referee intervention delayed EDF activation so that the TSC could demonstrate event classification at the SAE leve The inspector noted that the
- *
referee could have interjected after the EDO had called the ERM, to allow for more free pla The SAE was declared at 114 At 1209, after a thorough briefing from the EDO and concurrence from his staff, the ERM activated the EOF and assumed the position of Emergency Coordinator (EC).
The ERM demonstrated good command and contro The EOF management meetings were frequent and comprehensive, and EOF staff was kept apprised of plant status through frequent PA announcement State representatives were informed of key events by attending EOF management meeting Noise levels in the EOF were, at times, excessive and the ERM often requested that players remain quie The General Emergency (GE) declaration was correct and timel Licensee EOF dose assessment personnel performed wel Protective action recommendation (PAR) formulation was good and completed in accordance with licensee procedure The licensee also appropriately revised the PAR for the anticipated wind shift. Control of licensee field monitoring teams was good~
With the exception of the dose assessment status boards, status boards were not well maintaine However, this did not negatively affect respons When informed of the protective actions implemented by the State of New Jersey, which differed from the licensee's PAR, licensee EOF Management did not appear to ensure that the basis for the GE declaration and concurrent PAR was understood by the New Jersey Bureau of Nuclear Engineering representatives at the EO This was assessed as an area for potential improvement (IFI 50-354/94-21-03, 50-272/94-23-03, 50-311/94-23-03).
No exercise strengths or weaknesses were observed in the EO.0 LICENSEE ACTION ON PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED ITEMS 1 (CLOSED) IFI 50-354/93-08-02, 50-272,311/93-12-02 The quality and consistency of team briefings had been previously identified as 'an area for potential improvemen During this inspection, the inspector noted that team briefings were thorough and in accordance with the posted briefing checklist. This item is close.2 (CLOSED) IFI 50-354/93-08-03, 50-272,311/93-12-03 Tracking of field team assignments was identified as an area for potential improvemen During this exercise, the inspector noted that the OSC team tracking board was well maintained and provided clear information regarding team assignment This item is close *
13.0 REVIEW OF EMERGENCY PLAN AND IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE CHANGES An inspector reviewed recent changes made to the Emergency Plan and EPIPs for both Hope Creek and Sale He reviewed these changes in the NRC Region I office prior to the exercise to determine if they resulted in a decrease of effectiveness of the Emergency Plan or EPIP A list of the reviewed changes is included in Attachment 1 to this repor The inspector had questions about two of the changes mad One change that seemed to decrease the effectiveness of the plan was a change made to the section of the Emergency Plan that described communication capability. This change seemed to reduce the number of telephone voice lines in some of the ERFs from the number listed in the previous revision of the Emergency Pla The inspector discussed this with an emergency planner on the licensee's staff who said that no decrease had occurred in the number of phone lines in the facilitie The planner determined there was an error in the current revision which understated the number of lines at the ERFs and an error which understated the number of lines going to the Delaware Emergency Management Agenc The planner stated that no reduction of communications capability had occurre The inspector concluded that the errors did not constitute a decrease in emergency response capabilit He concluded, however, that the licensee should take greater care to ensure the accuracy of the Emergency Plan, since it is a regulatory commitment by which the adequacy of the emergency response capability is measure The discrepancy will be corrected in a subsequent revision of the pla The inspector also questioned the licensee about the deletton of the procedure for manually calculating dose assessment in the event of computer unavailability (EPIP 311H and EPIP 3115).
Dose assessment is normally calculated on the computer-based MIDAS system to determine if certain emergency classifications or protective action recommendations need to be mad The inspector questioned another licensee emergency planner about why this procedure was delete The planner informed him that the main-frame computer resident MIDAS program for dose assessment was replaced with a personal computer (PC) based program that resides on several PCs at various facilities. Since redundancy of computer generated dose assessment capability exists at facilities that have backup power supplies, a manual backup method was no longer neede The inspector concluded that this arrangement was acceptable and that the deletion of the manual dose assessment procedure did not reduce the effectiveness of the on-site emergency response capabilit The inspector concluded that these two changes and the other changes made did not reduce the effectiveness of the plan or the procedure.0 LICENSEE CRITIQUE The NRC team attended the licensee's exercise critique on October 26, 199 Lead facility referees summarized the licensee's observation *
The critique was thorough, self-critical, and identified most items noted by the NR It was assessed as very good by the NRC tea.0 EXIT MEETING Following the licensee's critique, the NRC team met with the licensee personnel denoted in Detail 1.0 to discuss the inspection finding The licensee was informed of the following: Overall, the onsite response to this exercise scenario was goo.
There were no exercise strengths or weaknesses, and three areas for potential improvemen The licensee personnel in attendance acknowledged the findings and indicated that they would evaluate them for appropriate corrective action..
Attachment 1 List of the Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures Reviewed Procedure Procedure title Revision(s)/Change(s)
Number Reviewed AIEP Emergency Plan Section 1 Rev. 2 AIEP Emergency Pl an Section 2 Rev. 3 AIEP Emergency Pl an Section 3 Rev. 6 AIEP Emergency Pl an Section 5 Rev. 2 AIEP Emergency Plan Section 7 Rev. 3 AIEP Emergency Plan Section 8 Rev. 3 AIEP Emergency Plan Section 10 Rev. 3 HECG Att 9 Non-Emergency Notification Rev. 17 HECG Att 3 Site Area Emergency Rev. 8 HECG Att 4 General Emergency Rev. 7 HECG Sect 1 Reactor Coolant Leak/LOCA Rev. 6 HECG Sect 6 Boundary Failure Rev. 5 HECG Sect 17 Public Interest Rev. 6 SECG Att 9 Non-Emergency Notification Rev. 17 SECG Sect 1 Primary Leakage Rev. 6 SECG Sect 2 Secondary Leakage Rev. 1 SECG Sect 5 Fuel Damage Rev. 2 SECG Sect 6 Fission Product Boundary Failure Rev. 2 SECG Sect 17 Public Interest Rev. 7 EPIP 105H Upgrading PARs Rev. 6 EPIP 202H OSC Activation and Operations Rev. 13 EPIP 204H Callout Procedures Rev. 26 EPIP 205H Post-Accident Core Damage Rev. 0 Assessment EPIP 304H osc - Radiation Protection Rev. 10 Response
Attachment 1 (continued)
List of the Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures Reviewed Procedure Procedure title Revision(s)/Change(s)
Number Reviewed EPIP 306H Emergency Grab Air Sampling and Rev. 9 Analysis EPIP 309H Dose Assessment Rev. 6 EPIP 311H Manual Dose Assessment Rev. 3 (Deleted)
EPIP 313H Control Point Chemistry Response Rev. 3 EPIP 314H Chemistry Supervisor - TSC Rev. 3 Response EPIP 105S Upgrading PARs Rev. 6 EPIP 202S OSC Activation and Operations Rev. 13 EPIP 204S Callout Procedures Rev. 26 EPIP 301S Radiation Protection Technician -
Rev. 15 Onshift Response EPIP 304S OSC - Radiation Protection Rev. 9 Response EPIP 306S Emergency Air Grab Sample and Rev. 8 Analysis EPIP 309S Dose Assessment Rev. 7 EPIP 311S Manual Dose Assessment Rev. 3 (Deleted)
EPIP 404 PA Rs Rev. 7 EPIP 901 Onsite Security Response Rev. 12 EPIP 902 Accountability/Evacuation Rev. 12 EPIP 903 Opening of EOF/ENC Rev. 8 EPIP 904 Emergency Vehicle Support Rev. 3 EPIP 1013 Phone List Rev. 28