IR 05000272/1994030
| ML18101A367 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 11/30/1994 |
| From: | Bores R, Noggle J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18101A366 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-94-30, 50-311-94-30, NUDOCS 9412060195 | |
| Download: ML18101A367 (7) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
-Report Nos.:
50-272/94-30; 50-311/94-30 Docket Nos.:
50-272, 50-311 License Nos.: DPR-70, DPR-75 Licensee:
Public Service Electric and Gas Company P. O. Box 236
-
Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 Facility Name:
Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
Hancocks-eridge, New Jersey Inspection Conducted:
October 24 - November 2, 1994 Inspector:
Approved by:
J.
ief, Facilities rotection Section
- Areas Inspected:
The inspection was an announced review of the radiation controls safety program as implemented during the Salem Unit 2 refueling and maintenance outag The areas inspected included HP work control, additional HP staffing and qualifications, ALARA planning and results, and radiological occurrence report resolutio Results:
The licensee provided effective HP coverage and provided very good ALARA controls during the Salem Unit 2 outag Two ALARA initiatives that -
were noteworthy included the field testing of a prototype robotic arm for steam generator platform support activities and the implementation of an eddy current cable cleaner to enhance contamination controls during eddy current inspection activities. The ALARA tracking program was effective, but could be improved if exposures were also tracked with respect to work completion as is tracked during outage status meeting Also, the ALARA shielding efforts were extensive, but were generally based on dose rate reduction and not on an
area's collective dose basi The use of remote HP work stations has resulted in a reduced HP presence in the work area and, in some instances, a workforce -
that was not always observed maximizing the ALARA potential in the work area The radiological occurrence reports for 1994 were few in number and generally of low safety significanc No safety concerns or violations of regulatory -
requirements were observed.
9412060195 941130 PDR ADOCK 05000272 Q
DETAILS INIDIVIDUALS CONTACTED PRINCIPAL LICENSEE EMPLOYEES
- T. -ce 11 mer, Radiation Protection and Chemistry Manager, Sa 1 em
- R. Gary, Senior Radiation Protection Supervisor, Hope Creek
- W. Grau, Licensing Engineer, Salem
- J. Hagan, Vice President-Nuclear Operations and General Manager Salem Operations
- E. Katzman, Radiation Protection Engineer, Salem
- D. Ruyter, Senior Radiation Protection Supervisor, Salem
- S. Skabicki, Senior Quality Assurance Supervisor
- J. Wray, Radiation Protection Services Engineer
- Denotes those present at the exit meeting on November 2, 1994.
The inspector also interviewed other licensee and contractor personne.0 PURPOSE OF INSPECTION The inspection was an inspection of the licensee's radiation controls program implementation during the Sale~ Unit 2 refueling and maintenance outag The inspection also reviewed portions of the tadiation controls program as applicable to Unit 1. ORGANIZATION To meet the demands of the Unit 2 refueling and maintenance outage, the licensee increased the size of the radiation protection staff with the addition of 90 contractor health physics (HP) technicians and with the addition of 3 HP supervisors borrowed from Hope Creek Station and the Nuclear Training Departmen Reporting to the Radiation Protection Engineer were a Radiation Protection (RP) Operations Coordinator, a Senior Supervisor ALARA and an Rad Assesso The ALARA group consisted of 2 ALARA supervisors and 10 ALARA technicians to provide for shielding *
requirements, work-in-progress reviews, as well as ensuring successful implementation*of special exposure reduction project The RP Operations group included HP supervision of containment, auxiliary building, ALARA, radioactive material control, Unit 1 fuel pool rerack proj~ct, and Westinghouse con~ractor liaiso To provide further HP support within containment, several satellite HP work stations were provided with specific containment area responsibilit These include the 130-foot elevation HP work station, which*provided coverage for all refueling floor and reactor cavity wor A separate HP staff was dedicated to the coverage of all pressurizer-associated work and all work within containment located outside of the bioshield wal Three other HP work stations were located in the containment basemen One was located inside the bioshield wall and tasked with coverage of all work in this area except steam generator-associated activitie Two other HP work stations were located on 78-foot elevation outside the bioshield wall and were established for the Nos. 21 and 23 steam
generators and the Nos. 22 and 24 steam generator maintenance activities, respectivel With respect to the outage work scope, the inspector determined that adequate radiation safety personnel resources were available for the outage and they were effectively utilized. The inspector sampled selected senior HP technicfans' resumes and determined that they met the requirements of ANSI NlB.1-197 The licensee also provided one week of training for the temporary contract HP technicians and two additional days of training for the steam generator coverage HP technician No discrepancies were noted with respect to training and qualifications of the radiation protection staf.0 HP WORK CONTROL Health physics work control interfaces were focused at various HP work stations that* provided specific functions related to radiation safet The radiological controlled area (RCA) access point was well staffed and provided radiation work permits (RWPs), RWP briefings, and egress contamination monitoring controls for equipment ~nd personne The RCA access point also served as the center for dispatching HP technicians for work coverage of all areas of the RCA except the Unit 2 containmen Based on the inspector's observations, the RCA access point performed well during peak outage traffic period Within the Unit 2 containment, the licensee-provided four satellite ~P work stations that were responsible for monitoring work activities and radiological conditions for specific areas of containmen The licensee provided two steam generator HP work stations that provided radiological coverage for all work activities associated with the steam generator Appropriate radiological-assessments were made with respect to primary steam generator maintenance areas, appropriate multiple dosimetry monitoring was provided and good conservative staytime bases were develope Inside the containment bioshield was another HP work station, which was dedicated to provide radiological coverage for reactor coolant pump maintenance activities and other non-steam generator-related work activities within the containment bioshield wal These three HP work stations were provided with remote closed-circuit video and audio systems established to support increased monitoring of these radiologically sigriificant work locations. The refuel floor of containment was supported by another HP work station that had two areas of responsibilit The refuel floor and reactor cavity areas were supported by one HP technician cre The second HP technician crew was-responsible for the pressurizer enclosure and the areas, of containment outside of the bioshield wal Workers interfaced with the HP technicians at the HP work stations during each RCA entry and work status and radiological status information were exchange The inspector observed HP technicians providing good prejob briefings of radiological conditions and exhibited good working knowledge of work progressing in the plan The RCA was well supplied with locking doors and gates to restrict access to high
'
- radiation areas and HP technicians demonstrated good control of entries into locked high radiation areas during this inspectio Work area postings were within regulatory requirements and the licensee provided additional ALARA dose rate zone postings, however the dose rate ranges were broad (e.g., 10-50 mR/hr) and workers did not always demonstrate complete knowledge of the work area dose rates. Hands-off HP coverage from remot~ monitoring HP work stations combined with limited non-specific work area dcise rate postings resulted in a less than conscientious workforce that was not always found to be working in available lower*dose rate areas. This effect was more pronounced in the inside-bioshield HP work station due to the large areas and range of dose rates covered by this work station. For example, the No. 23 reactor coolant pump seal replacement work group was briefed on all of the dose rates encountered on the path to and including the work site and there was one ALARA dose rate zone posting of 10-50 mR/hr at the work sit When the workers were asked about the dose rates in the area, they did not know beyond the general range of dose rates suggested.
by the.posting and were not optimizing doses by working in the lower dose rate areas away from the pressurizer and safety injection pipin The licensee acknowledged the concern and agreed to evaluate this issue for future improvement In general, the licensee provided effective HP work control coverage during the outage with effective use of closed-circuit video and audio communications systems for increased monitoring capability. A side affect of remote monitoring usage has been less of an HP presence in the work areas and a workforce that was not always observed maximizing the ALARA potential in the work area ALARA PROGRAM The 1994 Salem Station collective exposure goal was 250 person-rem, which included a 210 person-rem goal for the Unit 2 refueling outag As of the end of October 1994, the licensee reported a total of 9 person-rem for the year with 52.75 person-rem attributable to the first 18 days of this 73-day outag The licensee's ALARA targets were based on historical station performance, current outage scheduling and a percentage challenge. At the time of this inspection, the Unit 2 outage and annual Salem Station exposure targets were being me The ALARA tracking program provided a weekly ALARA report for station-wide distribution and the ALARA staff produced various ad hoc reports based on specific need Actual exposures and RCA*entry times were compared to the ALARA estimates to determine if specific jobs were performing as expecte The inspector noted that exposures and times could be tracking well when compared with one another, while* actual job progress may have deviated from the schedul The ALARA tracking program could be improved if exposures were also tracked with respect.to work completion as is tracked during outage status meeting The licensee agreed to review and evaluate this area for improvemen The inspector noted the extensive use of temporary shielding inside
...
containment~ * Thrciugh independent radiation surveys of containment, the inspector determined that most maintenance areas. inside containment had been shielded. These included all four steam generator shot peen areas, all four reactor coolant pump platforms, the accessible portions of the
- reactor coolant system loops, the valve and piping systems located outside the bioshield in the containment basement area, the reactor head and many other individual areas within the RC The one exception that was identified by the inspector that was not shielded was a staged work area located below the 140-foot elevation of the pressurizer enclosur The licensee indicated that this area would be evaluated and shielded as necessar In general, the licensee had reduced large dose rate gradient fields in the areas mentioned abov The shielding efforts were effective and were based on reducing dose rates in major work area The inspector determined, however, that low dose rate, high occupancy areas were, in general, not fully evaluate The ALARA shielding efforts were generally based on an area dose rate reduction and not on. an area's expected collective dose basis. The licensee agreed to review and evaluate this area for improvement The inspector noted that extensive steam generator and shot peen equipment mockup training were utilized.for this outag The licensee had well developed mockup scenarios that involved multi-discipline work groups to familiarize the work "team" with various aspects of the maintenance task One refinement derived from repetitive steam generator mockup practice has been the establishment of a minimum acceptable time value for installing and removing steam generator nozzle dam Team selection was based on meeting this performance criterio The inspector noted the absence of a headset communication system at the steam generator mockup facilit The licensee indicated that the addition of a communication system would be evaluated for future outage An area of original development included the field testing of a prototype robotic arm, that was developed jointly between the l.icensee and Westinghouse for primary steam generator maintenance support activities, to reduce the steam generator platform occupancy and dos The robot, named ROMMRS (Remotely Operated Managed Maintenance Robotic System), has been under development for two years. This outage marks the first field test of the entire syste The robot was ~uccessfully installed on a steam generator platform and was successfully used to survey the platform area with a conventional HP survey instrument, perform smear surveys, exchange air samples, vacuum the platform, and clean the platform with a sticky roller attachment. All of these activities were performed without any personnel located 1n this high radiation are Another area of original innovation by the ALARA group was the development and implementation of an eddy current cable cleaner and contamination containment shroud for the eddy current probe pusher rollers in order to enhanc~ contamination controls during steam generator tube eddy current inspection activities. This innovation was initiated this outage and has significantly reduced the amount of steam
..
generator platform contamination that has traditionally resulted from eddy current inspection of steam generator tube The identification and contra 1 of the source of contamination generation have resulted in a *
significant reduction of the airborne radiological hazards associated with steam generator tube inspection activities, allowing relaxation of respiratory protection requirement In summary, the Salem Station ALARA program was comprehensive, achieved very good results and has included several original exposure reduction development.0 RADIOLOGICAL OCCURRENCE REPORT (ROR) PROGRAM The licensee maintains an ROR program for reporting, investigating, and correcting radiological occurrences at the station. The inspector evaluated the licensee's use of this program for adequacy of problem resolution and safety perspective, to review the use of problem reports as radiation control program performance feedback, and the breadth of the use of problems for program enhancement opportunitie The licensee classifies RORs into three categories, with Level Three as the most severe and Level One as least significan The inspector reviewed the numbers and types of RORs generated during the first ten months of 199 Only one ROR was designated as a Level Three report, and that involved an equipment contamination monitor operating procedure weaknes Thi~ item was thoroughly resolved by the licensee and was discussed in a previous NRC inspection report
- There were approximately twelve Level Two RORs and approximately 61 Level One RORs recorded over the same time period. The Level One RORs consisted of almost exclusively personnel and clothing contaminations of low safety significanc The inspector reviewed the Level Two RORs for 199 The types of Level Two radiological occurrences included four reports of contamination spread into clean areas of the RCA, one of which resulted in the development of a hose marking and segregation program to ensure contaminated hoses are not used in clean area Two RORs involved contaminated clothing that required some investigation to establish caus Two RORs involved administrative approval processes for radiation worker exposure authorization The other RORs included a hot particle exposure, the disposal of an unlicensed exempt quantity source, and two minor instances of departure from accepted RCA behavior practices. The inspector determined that the licensee had relatively few safety significant RORs during 1994 and had taken appropriate corrective actions while maintaining a good safety perspectiv Although of low safety significance, many of the reports were several months old and had not been closed. Since the outage began, an additional HP supervisor had been dedicated to dispositioning the outage related radiological occurrence report The outage related
1Inspection Nos. 50-272/94-20; 50-311/94-20; 50-354/94-20 conducted on August 29 - September 2, 1994.
radiological problems have been well handled and closed in a timely fashio The additional management attention to the ROR program during the outage has provided a good level of attention and allows radiological issues to more quickly become elevated to management's attentio During non-outage periods, additional attention to this program area may be warrante No violations of regulatory requirements were identifie.0 EXIT MEETING The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Section 1.0)
on November 2, 199 The inspector summarized the purpose, scope and findings of the inspectio The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings.