IR 05000272/1994022
| ML18101A604 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 03/22/1995 |
| From: | Drysdale P, Eugene Kelly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18101A603 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-94-22, 50-311-94-22, NUDOCS 9503290170 | |
| Download: ML18101A604 (34) | |
Text
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DOCKET/REPORT NOS.
LICENSEE:
FACILITY:
DATES:
INSPECTORS:
APPROVED BY:
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
50-272/94-22 50-311/94-22 Public Service Electric and Gas Company Salem Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey September 8 - October 18, 1994 and January 26, 1995 P. Drysdale, Sr. Reactor Engineer, DRS S. Malur, Sr. Mechanical Engineer, NRR/RSIB D. ~' Reactor Engineer, DRS 1a:-a pw--
Peter rys a e, r. Reactor ngineer Systems Sectio Divisi n of Reactor Safety Su11111ary:
The inspectors observed the Salem service water system operational performance inspection (SWSOPI) self-assessment and concluded that all elements of Temporary Instruction (Tl) 2515/118, Rev. 1, were satisfactorily accomplished.
The SWSOPI and response teams were fully staffed, their members were technically competent, and were committed full-time to the self-assessment.
The SWSOPI team was appropriately focused, and maintained objectivity and independence throughout the assessment.
The final SWSOPI team findings were substantive and developed in depth.
PSE&G's response team and line organizations responded thoroughly and effectively to the SWSOPI team's findings, and operability/reportability concerns were promptly addressed.
PSE&G's Nuclear Mechanical Engineering Department Manager and the Vice President of Nuclear Engineering were kept fully apprised of the SWSOPI team's progress, and provided ongoing support and oversight of the self-assessment.
9503290170 950322 PDR ADOCK 05000272 G
DETAILS 1.0 INTRODUCTION On March 15, 1994, the NRC informed Public Service Electric and Gas Company (PSE&G) that their self-assessment plan was conditionally acceptable to perform a Service Water Operational Performance Inspection (SWSOPI) in accordance with TI 2515/118, Rev. 1, "Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection."
PSE&G performed a significant amount of advance preparation prior to the assessment that included thoroughly developed team assignments, an orientation meeting with participants, and an onsite briefing with site management.
The self-assessment effort was organized and led by a contracted engineering services company (Ogden Environmental and Energy Services Co.).
The SWSOPI team and a dedicated PSE&G response team began their assessment with an entrance meeting on September 8, 1994. This was followed by five full weeks of assessment effort, three of which were at the Salem Station.
As an alternative to an extensive NRC team inspection, inspectors from Region I and NRR monitored and evaluated PSE&G's onsite assessment effort. The inspectors noted that the self-assessment included a process for operability determinations, PSE&G's approach to corrective actions, and an evaluation of the service water system for inclusion in the final SWSOPI report. The team conducted an exit meeting with PSE&G management on October 18, 1994.
2.0 SCOPE AND DEPTH The scope and depth of the assessment were clearly defined prior to the assessment.
The SWSOPI team prepared a comprehensive assessment plan with detailed instructions on how to conduct the assessment, and with detailed task assignments for each team member.
Each review task corresponded directly to an assessment area of TI 2515/118 and was assigned to a responsible team member. The assessment plan also included a "Critical Attributes Matrix" that provided references to service water system issues at other nuclear facilities during previous SWSOPI inspections and assessments.
The SWSOPI team addressed all the required areas of TI 2515/118 in detail (design, operations, maintenance, testing, and quality assurance}, and completed a thorough assessment in each area to determine PSE&G's compliance with NRC Generic Letter 89-13.
The inspectors attended the daily team meetings (both the SWSOPI team and the response team), and reviewed the findings and follow-up responses. The inspectors concluded that the SWSOPI team conducted the assessment fully in accordance with TI 2515/118.
Throughout the entire assessment process, the team initiated 88 formal questions with requests for detailed information they needed to review the service water system design bases and implementing site procedures.
The response team screened questions for system operability concerns and overall safety significance. Together with interviews of Salem site personnel, the SWSOPI team reviewed PSE&G's responses and initiated 23 "observations" of weaknesses that varied from minor concerns, such as procedure inaccuracies and missing component labels, to more significant findings such as improper control settings for the service water intake structure ventilation system, and untimely and incomplete resolution of potential safety injection pump room cooler single failure issues.
The SWSOPI team noted significant strengths in
PSE&G's service water programs such as the hydraulic and heat exchanger analytic models, the ongoing service water pump and piping revitalization efforts, and the extensive evaluations of potential grass intrusion concerns in the service water systems.
During the self-assessment period, the inspectors observed PSE&G's response team pursue resolution of the SWSOPI team's questions and observations. Three of the team's observations resulted in incident reports; however, none of these required prompt corrective actions or notification to the NRC.
Six of the observations were resolved before the final presentation meeting on January 26, 1995.
The remaining 17 items were entered into PSE&G's internal commitment tracking system and planned corrective actions were initiated, but not yet fully implemented.
PSE&G currently plans to have all remaining issues completed by the end of 1995. All ongoing issues require additional evaluations or other follow-up actions in order to properly resolve.
At the January 26, 1995, presentation, the licensee confirmed that the 17 concerns were properly identified in scope and potential impact on system operation.
PSE&G assigned specific actions to cognizant PSE&G personnel to accomplish resolution of all identified concerns in a timely manner.
3.0 OBJECTIVITY AND INDEPENDENCE The inspectors observed the SWSOPI team members to evaluate their objectivity and independence in dealing with the PSE&G line organizations. The following paragraphs delineate the results of the observations.
- Objectivity The SWSOPI team partly consisted of five contracted engineering specialists (Ogden Environmental and Energy Services Co.)
that were assigned to specific assessment areas, i.e., design, operations, testing, maintenance, and quality assurance.
Five dedicated PSE&G specialists were assigned with each of these individuals to participate in the assessment and to help facilitate the assessment process in each specific area.
Individual findings were reviewed by the entire SWSOPI team during a meeting in the afternoon of each working day.
The findings were examined and developed in detail, then documented in the teams records and formally presented to the response team by the team leader. The SWSOPI and response teams formally tracked PSE&G's responses to all questions and findings to assure they were pursued in a timely manner.
In all cases observed by the inspector, the SWSOPI team members maintained a high level of objectivity toward their assessment reviews and their findings. Although five members of the team were permanent PSE&G employees, it was evident that they were an integral part of the team and contributed to its findings while maintaining an objective and independent view point.
- Independence PSE&G's plan for the SWSOPI effort was designed to assure the independence of all team members.
The SWSOPI team was organized and sponsored by PSE&G's onsite Nuclear Safety Review group, who reports directly to the Vice President of Nuclear Engineering, independent from of all PSE&G line organizations.
The SWSOPI team leader ensured that PSE&G team personnel were divorced from ties to their normal (permanent)
assignments; this included the five team members from PSE&G line organizations. The inspectors observed a degree of professionalism and independence toward the assessment process equivalent to an NRC team inspection.
The response team was fully staffed with dedicated PSE&G personnel who were separated from their normal duty assignments.
A senior engineering manager coordinated and directed the efforts of the response team.
The inspector concluded that the team maintained a high degree of objectivity and independence throughout the observed period.
The dedication of PSE&G personnel to the assessment effort, and the effectiveness of the response team in facilitating the self-assessment were also notable.
The response team and PSE&G line organizations also gained the insights of the assessment process for potential benefit in future self-assessments.
4.0 OPERABILITY/REPORTABILITY Each of the formal questions and observations identified by the team required an assessment for operability and reportability.
Each issue was documented on an information request that also contained the response team's analysis and justification for operability. The safety significance and potential reportability of each item was also formally documented.
The inspector sampled several of these issues and concluded that the associated operability and reportability considerations were appropriate and prompt, and were in accordance with established PSE&G procedures.
5.0 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS The inspector observed prompt initiation of corrective actions from the response team and the PSE&G line organizations in addressing concerns raised by the SWSOPI team.
Of the total 23 observations identified, all had been addressed and thoroughly reviewed prior to the exit meeting on October 18, 1994.
The inspector reviewed all planned corrective actions and found their root cause determinations and planned resolutions to be acceptable.
PSE&G tasked all corrective actions for implementation prior to issuing the final report on December 5, 1994.
The inspector concluded that the additional time needed to complete engineering analysis and other activities was appropriate for their resolution.
6.0 FINAL SWSOPI REPORT The inspector reviewed the SWSOPI team's final report that was issued on December 5, 1994.
The report contents closely matched previous observations made during the assessment period at the Salem site. The report was comprehensive and complete, and contained detailed descriptions of the team's more significant findings.
The report included the Critical Attributes Matrix
and detailed writeups of all 23 observations made by the SWSOPI team.
The report also contained extensive entries from each team member's assessment notebook that identified all documents reviewed, all PES&G personnel interviewed, and the results of these reviews. All sections of the final report contained a detailed assessment of the areas reviewed with conclusions on the results of the assessment.
7.0 MANAGEMENT MEETINGS The inspectors met continuously with PSE&G management throughout the self-assessment process to provide feedback on the quality of the assessment effort and the potential significance of the team's findings.
The NRC Region I Chief for DRS Systems Section attended the SWSOPI exit held onsite on October 18, 1994. A management meeting was subsequently held at Artificial Island on January 26, 1995, to discuss the final SWSOPI report and the corrective actions underway.
The slides from the licensee's presentation are attached to this report. The following personnel attended the final presentation meeting:
Public Service Electric and Gas Company J. Barnes, Service Water System Engineer H. Berrick, Principal Engineer, Nuclear Mechanical Engineering L. Catalfamo, Operations Manager K. Dziubela, Engineer, Licensing & Regulation B. Hall, Manager, Nuclear Safety Review S. LaBruna, Vice President, Nuclear Engineering K. Moore, Safety Review Engineer, Nuclear Safety Review J. Morrison, Technical Manager, Salem Operations J. Ranalli, Nuclear Mechanical Engineering Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. Drysdale, Sr. Reactor Engineer, DRS T. Fish, Salem Resident Inspector, DRP E. Kelly, Chief, Systems Section, DRS J. Wiggins, Director, Division of Reactor Safety State of New Jersey T. Kolesnik, Department of Environmental Protection D. Vann, Department of Environmental Protection
ATT/l.CHMENT 2 PS~G Public Service Electric and Gas Company SERVICE WATER SYSTEM OPERATIONAL PERFORl\\JIANCE INSPECTION
{SWSOPI)
SELF ASSESSMENT JANUARY 26, 1995 SALEM GENERATING STATION
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SALEM GENERATING STATION SWSOPI SELF-ASSESSMENT AGENDA I.
Introduction S. LaBruna II.
Self-Assessment Overview K. Moore Ill. Self-Assessment Results K. Moore IV. Corrective Action Status H. Berrick V. Summary and Conclusion S. LaBruna 95MM1-2
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SALEM GENERATING STATION SWSOPI SELF-ASSESSMENT INTRODUCTION PURPOSE OF MEETING 95MM1-3
- To share the results of our agreed upon self-assessment
- Demonstrate the Salem Service Water Systems' capability to perform its intended safety function on demand
- Confirm Salem's compliance with the
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requirements of NRC Generic Letter (GL) 89-13
- Demonstrate the comprehensiveness of the NRC approved Salem SWSOPI self-assessment
- Provide SWSOPI corrective action status
SALEM GENERATING STATION SWSOPI SELF-ASSESSMENT SELF-ASSESSMENT OVERVIEW OBJECTIVE - VERIFY THE SALEM SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS' OPERATIONAL READINESS 95MM1-4
- Assess compliance with GL 89-13 requirements
- Verify thermal and hydraulic performance requirements are met
- Verify system operation is consistent with design bases
- Ensure the system is operated and maintained to perform safety-related functions
95MM1-5 SALEM GENERATING STATION SWSOPI SELF-ASSESSMENT SELF-ASSESSMENT OVERVIEW METHODOLOGY - BASED ON SALEM SWSOPI PLAN, INCLUDING
- NRC Inspection Manual Temporary Instruction (Tl) 2515/118
- Inspection Notebook
- Tool to ensure Tl 2515/118 coverage
- Critical Attributes Matrix
- Identified industry-wide SWSOPI issues to Assessment Team members
SALEM GENERATING STATION SWSOPI SELF-ASSESSMENT SELF-ASSESSMENT OVERVIEW Tl 2515/118 AREAS INSPECTED
- Design and Configuration Control
- Operations
- Maintenance
- Surveillance and Testing
- Quality Assurance and Corrective Action 95MM1-19
SALEM GENERATING STATION SWSOPI SELF-ASSESSMENT SELF-ASSESSMENT OVERVIEW DESIGN AND CONFIGURATION CONTROL
- Design Bases Documents
- Component functional requirements
- Hydraulic analyses
- Single active component failure vulnerabilities
- Potential common mode failures
- Flow balance verification
- Seismic qualification
- System modifications
- Setpoints 95MM1-15.
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SALEM GENERATING STATION SWSOPI SELF-ASSESSMENT SELF-ASSESSMENT OVERVIEW OPERATIONS
- Walkdown
- Normal, Abnormal, and Emergency Operating Procedures
- Flow instrumentation/operator logs
- Operator training
- System alignments
- Adherence to technical specifications
- Operational controls 95MM1-14
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SALEM GENERATING STATION SWSOPI SELF-ASSESSMENT SELF-ASSESSMENT OVERVIEW MAINTENANCE
- Walkdown
- Work control process
- Vendor Manual review
- Procedure review
- Corrosion/Erosion Program
- Maintenance history
- Training
- Routine inspection and maintenance program 95MM1-13 I
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SALEM GENERATING STATION SWSOPI SELF-ASSESSMENT SELF-ASSESSMENT OVERVIEW SURVEILLANCE AND TESTING
- Pump and valve surveillance procedures
- Performance trending
- Acceptance criteria 95MM1-12
- lnservice Service lnspection/lnservice Testing Program
- Instrument error/calibration
- Post maintenance testing
- Heat exchanger testing
SALEM GENERATING STATION SWSOPI SELF-ASSESSMENT SELF-ASSESSMENT OVERVIEW QUALITY ASSURANCE AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
- Operational history review
- Root cause analysis
- Deficiency management
- Past findings
- Industry operating experience 95MM1-16
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SALEM GENERATING STATION SWSOPI SELF-ASSESSMENT SELF-ASSESSMENT OVERVIEW PREPARATION OF TEAMS -
MUL TIDISCIPLINED ASSESSMENT AND RESPONSE TEAM 95MM1-7
- 10 member Assessment Team
- 65 + member Response Team
- Up-front training of Assessment & Response Team
- Operability training on GL 91-18
- Roles and responsibilities clarified
- Existing corrective action processes reviewed
- Response Team provided system familiarization vva! kdowns for the Assessment Team
- Presentation of technical issues/initiatives by response team
- Single active component failure (SACF)
- Net positive suction head
- Flow model
- Mode Ops calculation
- Marsh grass
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ASSESSMENT TEAM ORGANIZATION DESIGN STEVE FOGELSON
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MANAGER - NUCLEAR SAFETY REVIEW BRUCE HALL PSE&G PROJECT TEAM LEADER KEN MOORE TECHNICAL LEAD
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OPERATIONS DAVE SAVAGE
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RESPONSE TEAM LEAD INTERFACE QA/CORRECTIVE CRAIG BERSAK
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SALEM GENERATING STATION SWSOPI SELF-ASSESSMENT SELF-ASSESSMENT OVERVIEW SWSOPI PROTOCOL - ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED DURING THE SELF -
ASSESSMENT
- Daily morning meeting with lead interfaces
- Daily morning station conference call
- Daily Nuclear Engineering morning meeting
- Up-front documented operability reviews
- Resolution process per corrective action program
- Commitment tracking system 95MM1-23
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SALEM GENERATING STATION SWSOPI SELF-ASSESSMENT SELF-ASSESSMENT RESULTS SWSOPI QUESTIONS - GENERATED BY ASSESSMENT TEAM MEMBERS DURING THE SWSOPI 95MM1-25
- 88 Formal questions issued by Assessment T
Team
- All had upfront documented operability screening
- No operability concerns noted
- Prompt responses to Assessment Team questions were given prior to exit meeting
- Any response requiring long term resolution entered into our commitment tracking system
- Closure will be completed by end of 1995
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SALEM GENERATING STATION SWSOPI SELF-ASSESSMENT SELF-ASSESSMENT RESULTS SWSOPI OBSERVATIONS - WEAKNESSES IDENTIFIED BY SELF-ASSESSMENT TEAM CATALOGED BY Tl 2515/118 AREAS 95MM1-26
- 23 Observations issued
- All received upfront operability reviews with continuous operability evaluations performed as more information became available
- Observations have been entered into our commitment tracking system
- 6 Observations are closed
- 1 7 Observations are open
- All observations will be closed by the end of 1995
- 3 Observations resulted in Incident Reports
- None required prompt notification
- None required immediate compensatory actions
- Incident reports have been entered into our commitment tracking system
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SALEM GENERATING STATION SWSOPI SELF-ASSESSMENT SELF-ASSESSMENT RESULTS ANALYSIS OF OBSERVATIONS - GENERAL AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT 95MM1-28
- Operations/engineering interface
- Instances where procedures and/or plant practices did not adequately reflect design basis
- Attention to detail
- Component labeling
- Understanding of plant deficiencies impact on equipment Control of HV AC equipment settings Validation of Equipment Malfunction Identification System tags
- Follow-up of corrective action
- Previous ineffective actions* to resolve self-identified deficiencies
- Material condition of SW bays
- Transient materials
- Housekeeping
- Corrective Maintenance
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SALEM GENERATING STATION SWSOPI SELF-ASSESSMENT SELF-ASSESSMENT RESULTS ACTIONS IN RESPONSE TO TASK I - V OF GL 89-13 WERE ADEQUATE, HOWEVER AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT WERE IDENTIFIED
- Biofouling inspection criteria of service water intake structure 95MM1-41
- Single active failure review comprehensive, however one example identified to not be fully addressed
- Administrative limits for chlorination system out-of-service time
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SALEM GENERATING STATION SWSOPI SELF-ASSESSMENT SELF-ASSESSMENT RESULTS STRENGTHS
- Upgrading of Service Water piping and pump replacement
- Knowledge and competency of Licensed Operators
- Critical setpoint review and Procedure Upgrade Program(s)
- Evaluation on potential for Service Water detritus challenges
- Service Water pump Net Positive Suction Head evaluation
- Operator training
- Document Management System
- Managed Maintenance Information System -
Critical component classification and basis
- Implementation and use of analytical tools 95MM1-22
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SALEM GENERATING STATION SWSOPI SELF-ASSESSMENT CORRECTIVE ACTION STATUS A service water alternate discharge path (i.e., a 24 inch tee connection) was not incorporated into procedures and operators were not familar *with location 95MM1-10
- Engineering memo to operations department describing Service Water design feature
- Service Water tees field located based on drawings
- Equipment required for excavation identified
- I PEEE preliminary analysis indicates Service Water discharge path would be maintained
- Independent review of Service Water system tees including potential need for their use
- Demonstrated Circulating Water discharge line seismic capability by analysis
- Update UFSAR to incorporate findings
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SALEM GENERATING STATION SWSOPI SELF-ASSESSMENT CORRECTIVE ACTION STATUS The evaluation of single failure concerns associated with the Safty Injection (SI) pump room cooler found to be incomplete (worst case ambient room temperature not considered) and not timely 95MM1-24
- Performed and issued engineering evaluation to determine the maximum temperature of SI Pump room. Cases evaluated:
( 1) 1 SI Pump running w/o cooler fan motor operating (2) 2 SI pumps running w/ cooler fan motor operating
- Resultant room temperature, after 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, was Case ( 1 ) < 1 21 ° F Case (2) < 142 °F
- Identified all equipment in SI pump room, including pump motor, cabling, instrumentation and valves
- EQ analysis of equipment indicates that all would be functional for at least 30 days at 146 ° F
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SALEM GENERATING STATION SWSOPI SELF-ASSESSMENT CORRECTIVE ACTION STATUS Safety Injection Pump Room Cooler - Single active component failure (continued)
- En1ergency Plan Implementing Procedure revision for Technical Support Center (TSC}
and/or Emergency Off-site Facility (EOF}
A Room temperature monitoring by operators every 1 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />
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SALEM GENERATING STATION SWSOPI SELF-ASSESSMENT CORRECTIVE ACTION STATUS Open Service Water Intake Structure (SW/SJ control room boundary doors resulted in an arrangement that shared ventilation systems and components between units. Also, control of settings for HVAC SWIS control room dampers and fans was inconsistent 95MM1-9
- Signs to ensure ventilation boundary door
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are posted
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- Procedure revision request issued to verify ventilation boundary door closure each shift by operations
- Thermostats for heaters and alarms in Bays 1, 2, and 3, have have been replaced with.
tamper proof feature. Bay 4 is in process of being worked.
- Safety Related SWIS HV AC thermostatic fan controller replacement and calibration in progress
- Engineering direction provided to operations for monitoring temperatures during maintenance of exhaust fans
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95MM1-11 SALEM GENERATING STATION SWSOPI SELF-ASSESSMENT CORRECTIVE ACTION STATUS Watertight doors were not described in the procedure which requires all watertight doors be closed on high river water level
- Operations apprised of procedure deficiency
- Procedure revision request issued to revise severe weather procedure
- Operations instructed on closure of doors during high river water level conditions
SALEM GENERATING STATION SWSOPI SELF-ASSESSMENT CORRECTIVE ACTION STATUS The material condition in the Service Water Bays was not consistent with that obsenied in other areas of the plant Short Term
"Work It Now" team to address minor material condition issues
- System engineer conducting biweekly material condition walkdowns Long Term
- Replace large bore piping in bays
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- Material Condition Upgrade of SW Bays and Control Rooms by end of 1995 95MM1-20
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SALEM GENERATING STATION SWSOPI SELF-ASSESSMENT CORRECTIVE ACTION STATUS Incomplete or untimely action taken in resolving self-identified deficiencies 95MM1-21 Short term
- Regular selective review of completed engineering discrepancy packages to determine effectiveness/lessons learned
- Engineering Assessment Group augmented with system engineers to improve operations/engineering interface and add systems/operations perspective Long term
- Backlog reduction is incorporated into management performance goals
- Salem onsite safety review to assess effectiveness of most significant corrective actions
- Salem onsite safety review tracking SWSOPI items to closure
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- SALEM GENERATING STATION SWSOPI SELF-ASSESSMENT CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY
- Our self-assessment has been consistent with our agreed upon inspection plan
- The Salem Service Water Systems' capability-'*_
to perform it's intended safety function on
demand has been demonstrated
- Salem complies with the requirements and intentions of NRC GL 89-13
- The Salem SWSOPI self-assessment was comprehensive and has yeilded areas for improvement
- SWSOPI corrective actions are being tracked and implemented in a timely manner 95MM1-30
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Christine Todd Whitman Governor ATTACHMENT 3
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Department of Environmental Protection Division of Environmental Safety, Health and Analytical Programs Radiation Protection Programs Bureau of Nuclear Engineering CN 415 Trenton, New Jersey 08625-0415 Tel (609) 987-2032 Fax {609) 987-2032 February 28, 1995 Mr. James T. Wiggins, Director Division of Reactor Safety U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406
Dear Mr. Wiggins:
Robert C. Shinn, Jr.
Commissioner Subject:
Salem Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection In accordance with the provisions of the July 1987 Memorandum of Understanding between the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
and the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (DEP),
the DEP is providing feedback regarding the Salem Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection (SWSOPI).
As you know, the New Jersey DEP's Bureau of Nuclear Engineering (BNE) observed part of the NRC's inspection of the SWSOPI performed by PSE&G and Ogden Environmental & Energy Services Company.
In keeping with the spirit of the agreement between the DEP and the NRC, the DEP will not disclose.its in:::;pection observations to the public until the NRC releases its final report.
Unlike most NRC inspection modules, which require the NRC inspector ( s)
to perform the inspection, NRC Inspection Manual Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/118 was particularly useful to the BNE representative by providing a different perspective to meeting NRC requirements, while maintaining the mechanisms in place to effectively assess the operational performance of the service water system.
The BNE r2presentative was impressed with the organizational techniques employed to ensure that all areas of the TI were assessed, specifically a color coded chart depicting the levels of followup attention.
Open and candid communication between assessment and response team members allowed for enhanced
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information flow.
The NRC inspectors and PSE&G's SWSOPI team were extremely cooperative and open. to the BNE representative's questions and concerns.
The BNE concurs with the SWSOPI observation regarding the disparity of mate~ial condition between the Salem Service Water Intake Structure and service water system components located in other plant areas, such as the Auxiliary Building.
The BNE anticipates that corrective actions implemented by PSE&G will resolve this and other deficiencies identified during the self*
assessment process. This information has been communicated to DEP management.
If you have any questions, please contact me at (609) 987-2031.
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Dave Chawaga, SLO, NRC Jill Lipoti, DEP Dennis Zannoni, DEP Sinc7rely,...--------
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Kent Tosch Manager Bureau of Nuclear Engineering