IR 05000272/1992014
| ML18096B099 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem, Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 11/09/1992 |
| From: | Laughlin J, Lusher J, Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18096B098 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-92-14, 50-311-92-14, 50-354-92-14, NUDOCS 9211200223 | |
| Download: ML18096B099 (8) | |
Text
Docket/E.eport:
Licensee:
Facility Name: _
Inspection Dates:
Inspection At:
Inspectors: _
Approved:
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission-Region I 50-272/92-14 50-311/92-14 50-354/92-14-Public Service Electric and Gas Company P. 0. Box 236 Hancocks Bl:idge, New Jersey 08038-4800 Licenses: DPR-70 DPR-75 NPF-57 Artificial Island (Hope Creek and Salem Generating Stations)
October 27-29, 1992 Lower Alloways Creek Township and Salem, New Jersey J. _Lau lin, ergency Preparedness Section J. Lusher,* B!llergency Preparedness Section _
S. Barr, Resident Inspector.
A. Mohseni, PEPB, NRR J. Jamison, _NRC Consultant, Battelle PNL Date E. C. McCabe, Chief, Emergency Preparedness Section Date Areas Inspected _
The licensee's annual full-participation emergency preparedness exercise-conducted on October.-
28, 199 Resnlts Exercise performance demonstrated the ability to protect_ public health and safety. Strengths included command and control in all Emergency Response Facilities, strong TSC Engineering Assessment Team performance, OSC prioritization and management or repair tasks, and BOP dose assessment. _ One exercise weakness was identified: the issuance of an initial protective action recommendation (PAR) for sheltering rather than for evacuatio PDR ADOCK 05000272 G
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DETAILS 1.0 -PERSONS CONTACTED-The foll~wing licensee representatives attended the exit meeting. on October 29, 1992. _
C. Banner, Administrator, On-Site Emergency Preparedness R. Burricelli, General Manager, Information Systems and External Affairs M. Camp, Nuclear Communications Manager
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S. Catalana, Emergency Preparedness T. DiGuiseppi, Emergency Preparedness Manager P. Duca, Jr., Delmarva Power Salem Site Representative D. Fawcett, Emergency Preparedness Staff Engineer J. Johnson, Shift Supervisor S. Jones, Emergency. Preparedness Senior Staff Engineer E. Katzman, Principal Engineer, Radiation Protection/Chemistry Services R. Keyes, PSE&G Radiation Protection Supervisor S. La.Bruna, Vice President, Nuclear Operations L. Miller, General Manager, Nuclear Operations Support R. Oakes, Atlantic Electric Salem Site Representative P. O'Donnell, Operations Engineer
. A. Orticelle, Manager, Nuclear Training J. Pierson, Emergency Preparedness, Senior Nuclear Shift Supervisor V. Polizzi, Operations Manager L. Reiter, General *Manager, QA/Nuclear Safet)' Review D. Ruyter, PSE&G Senior Radiation Protection Supervisor-J. Schaffer, Emergency Preparedness Supervisor D. Scull, Emergency Preparedness Technical Specialist G. Thomson, Emergency Preparedness Technical Specialist J. Trejo, Manager, Radiation Protection/Chemistry Services C. Vondra, General Manager, Salem Operations W~ Weckstein, Emergency Preparedness Senior Staff Engineer During the inspection, other licensee personnel were intervl.ewed and, observed in the performance of emergency response dutie.0 Emergency Exercise The Artificial Island full-participation exercise was conducted on October 28, 1992, from 5:00 p.m. to 12:00 p.m. The States of Delaware and New Jersey participated fully in the exercis The Federal Emergency Management Agency observed off-site activitie.1 Scenario Planning Exercise objectives were submitted to NRC Region I on July 20, 1992 and the complete scenario package on August 27, 1992, for NRC review and evaluatio Region I representativ~s* *
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discussed scenario.improvements with the licensee's emergency preparedness staff on October 6, 1992. Minor revisions were made to the scenario. The final scenario adequately tested the major portions of the Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedure NRC exercise observers attended a licensee scenario briefing on October 28, 1992. The final scenario was discussed in depth. The licensee stated that certain emergency response activities would be simulated and that controllers would intercede in exercise activities to prevent deviations from the scenario and to ensure that normal plant operations were not disrupte.2 Exercise Scenario The exercise scenario included the following simulated events:
Initial conditions: Salem Unit 2 was operating at 100% power for the last 3 month *
Reactor coolant chemistry analysis indicated that several fuel pins were leaking. Various equipment out of service included Emergency Diesel Generator #2B, Containment Fan Coil Unit #22, Containment Spray Pump #22, and Coolant Charging Pump #2 Unit shutdown at 25% per hour and declaration of an Unusual Event due to primary leakage exceeding Technical Specification limits.
An operating basis earthquake resulting in an Alert declaration.
Trip of the 500 KV Breaker 1- *
Trip of Turbine Auxiliary Cooling Pump #2 *
Alarm indicating loose parts in the reactor pressure vesse *
Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) #24 seal failure causing a 300 gpm loss of coolant accident (LOCA).
Reactor trip and Safety Injectio *
Site Area Emergency due to a LOCA greater than makeup capacit *
Trip of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump #2 *
Failure of RHR Pump #21 to restart after completion of cold leg recirculation alignment shift, causing loss of emergency recirculatio *
Restart of RHR Pump #2,
- General *Emergency declaration due to severe ioss of cladding an:d loss of primary.. *
coolan *
Trip of Safety Injection (SI) Pump #2 *
Earthquake aftershock*causing failure of weakened cladding and failure of a containment vent valve in the intermediate position~
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Release of radioactive material through the containment ven *
Return to service of Containment Fan Coil Unit #22.*
Containment pressure reduced to zero, stopping the release, and exercise terminatio * Activities Observed NRC team members made observations of the activation and augmentation of the Emergency Response Organization (ERO), activation of Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs), and actions of emergency response personnel. The following activities were observed: Detection, classification, and assessment of scenario event.
Direction and coordination of the emergency respons.
Notification of licensee, Delaware and New Jersey State goverriment personnel, and offsite agencie. Communications, information flow, and rec;orci keepin.
Assessment and projection of offsite radiological dose, consideration of protective*
actions, and recommendation of protective actions to State official.
Maintenance of site security and access control. * Performance of technical support, repairs* and corrective action.
Accountability of personne * Accident analysis and *mitigatio.
Provisions for communicating information to the publi.
Licensee post-exercise critiqu.0 Classification Of Exercise Findings *
Emergency preparedness exercise findings were classified as follows:
Exercise Strength: a strong positive indication of the licensee's ability to cope with abnormal plant conditions and implement the Emergency Pla..
Exercise Weakn~s: less than effective implementation of the Emergency Plan which did not of itself indicate overall response inadequac *
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Area for Improvement: an aspect which did not significantly detract from the licensee's response, but which merits licensee evaluation for corrective actio * * Exercise Observations Activation and utilization of the Emergency Response Organi7.ation (ERO) and Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) were generally consistent with the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plail Implementing Procedures (EPIPs)~ The presence of Mr. S. LaBruna, Vice President,
- Nuclear Operations, in the ERFs during the exercise demonstrated management attention to BP;*
The following observations were made in the ERF.1 Simulator Control Room (SCR)
The shift crew demonstrated good teamworkin responding to the simulated casualty condition They quickly recognized. abnormal plant conditions, such as the Reactor Coolant System (RCS)
leak from rising containment temperature and the abnormal 2VC6 (containment vent) valve position. Operators also displayed effieient communications, performed correct emergency response *actions, and made appropriate recommendations for mitigatio Crew response included proper implementation Of procedure The Senior Nuclear Shift Supervisor (SNSS) and the Nuclear Shift. Supervisor (NSS) exercised.*
good command and control. The SNSS correctly classified the Unusual Event and Alert and notifications were completed in the required time. The NSS conducted regular briefings to keep the crew informed of event status. Supervisors made good use of the Shift Technical Assistant (STA) in analyzing and responding to plant events. There was good communication between the SNSS and the 0perations Support Center (OSC) 'regarding plant status and proposed.
corrective action Uniformly good communication was not maintained with the Technical Support Center (TSC)
or the Emergency Operations. Facility (EOF). Those facilities received no information on the alarm,indicating loose parts in the reactor vessel. That prevented the Engineering Assessment Team from assessing this condition in relation to the resulting core damage. Also, the SNSS.
did not provide recommendations to the TSC on event classificatio The following exercise strengths were observed:
SCR command and contro *
Excellent plant awareness by SCR operators providing early recognition of abnormal*
plant conditions and effectiv~ recommendations.
No exercise weaknesses were observe The following area for improvement was identified:.
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- SCR supervisors keeping the tsc and EOE informed of plant statu. Technical Support Center (TSC)
The TSC was activated in about.an hour. The Engineering Duty Officer (EDO) exercised good command and control. He conducted regular status briefings and worked with his key staff and SCR crew to establish and review priorities. He requested and received technical data from his staff to clarify plant status and anticipate event classification changes. EDO classification of the
- Site Area Emergency (SAE) was correct and notifications were timel *
The. Engineering Assessment Team was well-organized a:nd d,emonstrated excellent plant knowledge. They quickly recognized and diagnosed major status changes, proposed effective corrective actions, and tracked Emergency Operating Procedure progress aggressivel Communications between the EDO and the Emergency Response Manager (ERM) in the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) were generally good. However, the EDO did not discuss the proteetive action recommendation (PAR) when.discussing classification upgrade to a General Emergency. By the time the*EDO discussed PARs with the ERM~ the PAR had been issue The RadiOlogical Assessment Coordinator (RAC) checklist required that the Administration Building ventilation be isolated.. The RAC did not know how to accomplish thi The following exercise strengths were observed: *
EDO command and contro * *
Engineering Assessment Team technical support to the ED No exercise we3.knesses were identifie The following areas for improvement were noted:.
No discussion of the PAR in the recommendation to upgrade to a G *
Knowledge of Administration *Building ventilation system isolatio.3 Operational Support Center (OSC)
The OSC was activated in 33 minute The OSC Coordinator (OSCC) showed effective command and control. He gave thorough and frequent briefings to his staff and OSC personnel to keep them informed of plant status, radiological conditions, *and repair priorities. However, the OSCC did not inform facility personnel of the SAE declaration due to his involvement in repair task management. This. was complicated by the fact that 'plant announcements were hard to hea,l..
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OSC staff exhibited good teamwork in keepirig the OSCC iriformed of maintenance activities and brahistorming to find* effective repair options. Team briefings and debriefings were good and included information on requirf'.d repairs, work precautions, radiological controls, and* other.
safety instruction The Radiation Protection Coordinator was proa~tive in maintaining ALARA standards.* for damage control activities. He also conducted thorough radiological briefings with volunteers on use of thyroid blocking agent (KI) and effects of radiation, in preparation for the Containment ventilation valve repair~
The following exercise strengths were iden_tified:
OSCC command and contro *
Excellent prioritization and direction of mitigation effort No exercise weaknesses were observe The following area for improvem~nt was noted:
OSC internal communication (e.g. emergency declarations.) Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
EOF activation was completed in 39 minutes. The Emergency Response Manager (ERM)
assumed the position of Emergency Coordinator after a thorough turnover from the EDO. The ERM demonstrated good command and control. He frequently briefed EOF staff on event status, ensured staff completed requested action items, kept State representatives informed ofkey decisions, and maintained a professional atmosphere in the facility. His classification of the GE was prompt and c~rrect, and _all notifieations were timel The Protective action recommendation (PAR) was not consistent with the GE declaratfon. This PAR called for sheltering the two mile radius and five miles downwind. It was based on the EOF staffs conclusion that no fuel cladding damage had occurred. Yet the technical staff had correctly recommended the GE based on a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) and severe loss of cladding (200 R/hr in containment)~ This was complicated by the fact that the core remained covered, maximum core exit thermocoJ.Iple (CET) average temperature was 320 degrees F., and there was no evidence of hydrogen* in containment.. The EOF staff did not receive information
. from the SCR on the Loose Parts Alarm and were puzzled by the lack of evidence of core damage. About 15 minutes later, when containment radiation monitors indicated 900 R/hr and containment hydrogen was 1 %, the PAR was upgraded to an evacuation of the two mile radius and out to five miles for downwind sectors. Further, after the radioactive release, the PAR was correctly upgraded to evacuation of the five mile radius and teri miles downwin.8 The Radiological Assessment Staff performed very wel They showed an in:-depth understanding of the key elements of dose projection.. Field monitoring teams were coordinated with State and County teams, as was the co<>rdination of data with State representatives in the
- EOF. The staff perlormed... what-if' calculations before the release, provided accurate dose calculations after the release, and correctly tracked plume movement. This information was also clearly communicated to the EOF staff during ERM conferenee The following exercise strength was observed:
Radiological Assessment Staff performanc The following exercise weakness was identified:
Incorrect initial PA No areas for improvement were identifie.0 Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items Based upon NRC observations during the exercise, discussions with licensee representatives, and examination of procedures and records, all areas for improvement identified in the previous annual exercise were acceptably demonstrated and not repeated. The weakness identified in the..
previous exercise concerned difficulty in using Section 4 of the Event Classification Guide, Loss of Decay Heat Remova The licensee revised this procedure, but it was not used in the eiercise. In this case, item closure is to be based on inspector review of the revised procedur.0
- Licensee Critique and Exit Meeting On October 29, 1992 the NRC team attended the licensee's exercise critique. The Emergency Preparedness Manager and lead facility controllers summarized the licensee's observations. The critique was thorough and identified all NRC finding Further, the findings were well-characterized for management assessment. The NRC evaluated the critique as excellen Following the critique, the NRC team met with the licensee personnel denoted in Section to discuss the inspection findings. The team leader discussed the potential exercise. weakness and the areas for improvement. The licensee_ was informed that. their exercise performance *
demonstrated the_ ability to implement the Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures to protect public health and safet Licensee management acknowledged NRC findings and indicated that they would evaluate them for appropriate corrective actions.