IR 05000272/1992019

Insp Repts 50-272/92-19,50-311/92-19 & 50-354/92-20 on 921229-930102.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Operations,Radiological Controls,Maint & Surveillance Testing,Emergency Preparedness & Security

ML18096B222
Person / Time
Site:	Salem, Hope Creek
Issue date:	01/20/1993
From:	Jason White NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML18096B221	List: IR 05000272/1992019 ML18096B220
References
50-272-92-19, 50-311-92-19, 50-354-92-20, NUDOCS 9302010024
Download: ML18096B222 (17)

Text

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U. S. NUCLEAR.REGULATORY COMMISSION *

• REGION I

• -

Report Nos. 50-272/92-19 50-311/92-19 -

50-~54/92-20 *.

License Nos. DPR-70 DPR-75

- NPF-57 Licensee:

• Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236

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Hahcocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Facilities: *

Salem Nuclear.Generating Station Hope Creek Nuclear Generating Station.

. Dates:

November 29, 1992 - January 2, 1993 Approved:

Inspection Summary: *

This inspection teport documents routine and reactive inspections to assure public health _and safety during day and backshift hours of station activities, including: operations, radiological control~, maintenance artd surveillance testing, emerg~ncy preparedness, security,

. engineering/technical support, and safety assessment/quality verification. An Executive*

Summary follows, which summarizes the inspection findings and related conclusion *

. 9302010024 930121 PDR ADOCK 0500027 G PDR

.EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Salem Inspection Reports 50-272/92-19; 50-311/92-19

. *Hope Creek Inspection R~port 50-354/92~20 November 29, 1992 - Janllal)' 2,. 1993.

OPERA TIO NS.. (Modules 71707, 93702)

Salem: The Salem units were operated in a sclfe manner. Plant personnel appropriately

• resp0nded to.*unit power reductions and a Unit 1 shutdown due to condenSer waterbo cleaning and chemistry excursions. A temporary loss of the Unit 2 overhead annunciator system on December 13, 1992 was*inspected by a NRC Augmented inspection Tea Hope Creek: The Hope Creek unit was operated in* a safe manner. A contractor inadvertently tripped a non-Safety related breaker in. the turbine building, causing a loss of both reactor recirculation pumps. This _res~lted in operators *initiating a manual reactor scram.* The licensee appropriately responded to this scram, including operator actions and *.

. root cause followu.

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• .. RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS (Modules 71707, 93702)

Salem: Periodic inspector observation of station workers and* Radiation* Proteetion personnel noted good implementation of radiological controls and protection program requirement The llcensee appropriately responded to a radiation monitoring alarm for the Unit 1

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containment. The. licensee met their.1992 goals for'radiation dose, personnel contamination events, and solid rad waste* volume.. *

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Hope Creek: Periodic inspector observation of station workers and Radiation Protectio personnel noted good implementation of radiologiCal controls and protection program requirements.. *Although the 1992 go3.ls for radiation dose and personnel contaminations were slightly exceeded, the licensee perforfued very well in keeping personnel exposure as low as

• reasonably achievabl MAINTENANCE/SURVEILLANCE (Modules 61726, 62703)

Salem: The rµaintenance and surveillance testing activities inspected*were effective with respect to meeting the program safety objective Hope Creek: *The maintenance and surveillance testing activities inspected were effective.*

• * with respeet to meeting the program safe_ty objective *

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. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (Modules 71707, 93702)

With the exception of the loss of tii.e Salem Unit 2 overhead annunciator alarm system on December* 13, 1992, events were reported as expected. An assembly and accountability drill was well-conducted and provided a good exercise for the station staff SECUlUTY (Modules 71707 ~ 93702)

Routine observation of protected area access and egress showed good control by the license A security* intrusion training dnll with local law enforcement agencies was well planned and well execute, ENGINEERING/TECHNICAL SUPPORT (Modules 71707)

Salem: System engineering personnel appropriately responded to* several radiation monitor *

failure *

Hope Creek: There were no noteworthy findings during the inspection perio SAFETY ASSESSl\\.fENT/QUALITY VERIFICATION (Modules 30702, 40500, 71707, 90712, 92701)

Common: Through meetings with PSE&G management, the inspectors determined that the licensee has an effective, critical self-assessment capabilit *--,

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SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS Salem Units 1 and 2 -

The Salem Unit 1 turbine was removed from service on December 24, 1992, due to a Ioss of circulators: Unit 1 was subsequently shutdown on December 26, 1992, due to condenser leakage. The leak was repaired and the unit was restarted.on December 27, 1992. The unit returned to service on Deceinber 2s; 1992. Salem Unit 2 operated atpower during the entire perio.

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1.2.. Hope Creek The Hope Creek *Unit was manually scrammed.on December 3, 1992, after both reactor recirculation pumps automatically tripped. The unit was restarted on December 5, 1992, and remained at power for the remainder,of the period.

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OPERATIONS Inspection Activities The inspectors verifiect that the facilities.were oJ)erated*safely and in.conformance with regulatory requirements. *Public Service Electric.and Gas (PSE&G) Company management control was evaluated. by direct observation of activities, tours* of the* facilities, interviews and discussions with personnel, independent verification of safety system status and Technical Specification. complianee, and review of facility records. The inspectors performed normal

• and back-shift inspections, including deep back-shift (20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />) inspection.2 Inspection Findings and Significant Plant Even~

• 2.2.1 Salem Unit 2 Control Room Overhead Annunciator System Failure

• At 9:26 p.m. on December 13, * 1992, a control room operator at Salem Unit 2 noticed an alarm being printed out on the auxiliary alarm typewriter in the Unit 2 control room. This typewriter records alarms. associated with off-normal plant conditions. The typewriter..

interfa~s with the control room alarm annunciation system, which activates the overhead annunciator (ORA) indicators to alert operators of off-normal. operating and equipment parameters. The operator noted that the rela~ed OHA did not illuminated when the auxiliary

.. ~arm typewriter was printing. Upon investigation, the operators determined tpat the central

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proeessing unit (CPU) for the OHAs had ~pparently fciiled to-perform sinee 7:45 p.m.,

. according to the time clock associated with the CPU; The operators performed a manuai

_ reset of the affected CPU, and. the *system was immediately returned to normal operation:.

• The resident inspector was informed of the event on the morning of December 14, 1992. *

NRC management determined that the condition warranted review and evaluation by a Augmented Inspection Team (AIT). The puqx)se of the AIT was to conduct a timely inspection of the ~vent and the licensee's response, with the emphasis on fact-finding, and to assess the safety significance of the event. The. details of the event and the results of the _

AIT "investigation are documented in-NRC Inspection 50-272&311/92-8 * _ Unit Power Reductions and Subsequent Unit 1 Shutd~wns

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. During ~e week of December 21, 1992, both Salem units operated at less than full power at various times in order to accommodate the cleaning of the units' condenser waterboxes. 'The Salem units use the Delaware River as circulating water for the main oondenser cooling*

medium. The units operate with a limit of a maximum 27.5 degrees Fahrenheit temperature rise across the condensers~ Due to fouling of the. condenser waterboxes, this temperature limit was beirig approached, and the licensee reduCed power levels to accommodate isolation of sections of the condensers to accomplish waterbox cleaning. During the course of the week, Unit 2 reduced power to 77%, and performed waterbox cleaning. The licensee returned the unit to full power on-December 26, 199 Licensee operators also reduced power at Unit.1 on December 23, 1992, to perform similar waterbox cleaning. However, on D_ecembe~ 24, a severe debris problem on the Unit 1 -

circulating water travelling screens caused a loss of the screens and the circulating water pumps. The loss of the pumps necessita~ed removing the turbine from service and reducing reactor power to 1 % (Mode 2). Following clean-up of the circulating water system, operators commenced a unit start-up on December 26. During the start-up, co~densate cation activity and steam generator sodium levels increased beyond secondary chemistry specifications. Consequently, the operators removed the turbine from ser-Vice and shut down

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_The 'licensee identified the cause of the Unit 1_ secondary chemistry transient to be failed condenser tubes in No. 12A waterbox. Licensee personnel repaired the tubes and cleaned up the steam generatm:s on December 26 arid 27. Upon completion of repairs, operators

- initiated unit start-up; on th~ evening of December 27. After the turbine was placed back on

. line and power ascension was underway on Decemb~r 28, dissolved oxygen levels in N * 13B waterbox began to rise and condenser vacuum began to decrease. Subsequently, the licensee removed the turbine from service and lowered reactor power level. The cause of the problem was* ruptured tubes in the No. 13B-waterbox. The Jicensee completed repairs on December 28, and r~-commenced the plant start-up that night. The unit was placed-back on

• * line on December 29, and full power was attained on December 3 The iieenSee kept the inspector informed of both units'- status throughout the long weekend, __ -

and the inspector monito!ed plarit start-up performance duririg the week of Deeember 2 The-inspector subsequently discussed and reviewed the start-up *activ~ties and the problems

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- enoountered with -Operations, Maintenance and Chemistry Department management and staff..

The inspector noted-good Chemistry Department response and a conservative approach by station management relative to-the chemistry transient which occurred ori December 26. The inspector also obseved that the Unit 1 operators responded well to the unexpected loss of vacuum during the start-up* of December 2.2.2 Hope Creek _Manual Reactor Scram Following Trip of Both Reactor Recirculation Motor-Generator (MG) Sets -__

On December 3, -1992, with the unit operating at 100% power, control room operators noted indications that both reactor recirculation MG set cooling fans had tripped. Shortly afterivards, both recirculati_on MG sets tripped as designed. In accordance With abnormal operating procedures~ the senior nuclear-shift supervisor ordered the reactor shutdow Operators manually scrammed the unit at 9:37 a.m. by placing the reactor mode selector switch in the shutdown position. _ All control rods fully inserted and 9perators stabilized reactor water ievel and pressure. An investigation revealed that a non-vital 480V AC motor control center (MCC) power supply br~er had tripped open, -resulting in the loss of the _

MG set cooling fans and a number of other non-safety related load '

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Operators experienced difficulties in *removing some steam loads froin service, p~cularly the "B... _main steam jet air.ejector, due to the loss of valve control power from-the MCC. _

This, coupled with the necessity to maintain reactor water level with "cold" feedwater and_ -

very little decay heat from the reactor core, resulted in a rapid cooldowri of the reactor- -

which-exceeded the transient Technical Specification (TS) maximum rate of 100°F in one hour. The highest rate noted was 135°F per hour between* io:OO and 11:00 a.m. Licensee personnel noted no abnormalities wi~ the tripped MCC and re-clos&l the breaker. The unit * -

then proceeded to cold shutdow The plant general manager convened a Significant.Event _Response Team (SERT) -to review the event. The SERT completed their review on December 10, 1992, and concluded that the root cause of the loss of the recirculation MG set fans was personnel error. Specifically, the SERT determined* that a contractor, working in the area around the MCC, *inadvertently _

caused the breaker to open when a material -handling cart he was operating bumped into the breaker control switch. -

The inspeetors responded to the control room after a page announcement alerting plant personnel of the manual scram, and obserV'ed the licensee's activities dealing with plant shutdown and cooidow..

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Actions. taken by licensed operafors were generally appropriate, and due considerati~n was given to timely removal of equipment from service in order to limit the reactor cooldow During the post-trip review, operations management recognized that an ex_cessive cooldown rate had* existed during the shutdown. As required by Technical Specification (fS) -3.4.6, the licensee, in conjunction with the reactor vendor, General Electric _(GE), evaluated the effect of t:Iie excessive cooldown on the. reactor vessel.. The licensee concluded that the reactor vesrel had not been adversely affected and that the unit could.be returned to power operations; The inspector reviewed GE's analysis and concluded that it adequately supporte the licensee's conclusions and restart determination. The inspector concluded that the.

licensee's response to the scrain was appropriat,

Following the. forced shutdown, the licensee reported -the event to the NRC operations duty offiGer as an actuation of an engineered safety feature which was not preplanned*

[10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii)]. This was in accordance with Section 18.L of the licensee-'s event*

, classification guide (ECG). The licensee subsequently_ retracted the report on December 21, 1992.. Upon further review, the licensee had' concluded that the event was not-reportable because the manual scram was required by an abnormal operating procedure and therefore was considered preplanned. The licensee _stated that a licensee event report (LER) would be voluntarily submitted due to the unusual nature of the events leading up to the shutdown. *

The licensee discussed this interpretation with the NRC resident, region and headquarters staff. After reviewing _the licensee's position, the staff disagreed with their interpretatio The licensee consequently withdrew their retraction on December 30, 1992. LER 50-354/92-

.. 13 was ~ubmitted to the NRC on December 31, 1992. The inspector reviewed the LER and

. determined that it adequately discu~sed the event, its root cause and correetive actions. The NRC staff was continuing its revi_ew of the issues raised by the licensee's initi~ position on-reportability when the inspection period ende.

RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS 3.1.. Inspection Activities PSE&G' s conformance with the radiological. protection program was verified ori a periodic basi.2

. Inspection Findings 3.2~1 Salem

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. Radiation Monitor lRllA Containnient Ventilation Isolation (CVI)

A Unit ~ CVI occurred at 2:52 p.m. on December 30, 1992, when the containment particµlate monitor (lRl lA) alarmed at its setpoint of 60,000 counts per minute (CPM). The licensee confirmed the CVI signal, made the required ENS call, notified the inspector, and L

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samplecI the containment. This sample confirmed measurable rubidium-88 activity of 23 %

of the value (1 * E-6 u Ci/m/) expressed iri 10 CFR 20 Appendix B. * The licensee attributed this activity to power level changes during _power ascension due to a small body-to~bonnet leak on pressurizer spray valve lPS 1, and to a higher than normal fission* product activity in the reactor coolant due to a minor fuel leak (See NRC Inspection 50-272/92-13). The licensee further confumed that the reactor coolant system umdentified leak rate was norma (0.2 gpm, which was less than the 1.0 gpm limit). Subsequent lRllA readings decreased to 15,00Cf CPM, and additional containment samples did _not detect any activit The inspector-confirmed licensee actions, monitored lRl IA readings, reviewed chemistry sample results, and discussed this item with appropriate licensee personnel.' The inspector concluded that licenSee actions were appropriate~

. Radiological Goals ~

• The lic_en*see reported the following relative to the status of their 1992 radiological goal's-_

Personnel Dose (Persqn-Re~)

Personnel Contaminations (#)

Solid Radwaste (Cubic Meters)

GOAL

. <45 <225

.<170 ACTUAL 416 1.80

. 138 The inspector reviewed these goals and the results. The inspector noted that the licensee.

• • reviewed performance relative to these goals at least weekly guring the facility's management meeting. the inspector noted that the goals were also successfully met during the 1991 calendar year.. The licensee's performance relative to the 1992 goals is noteworthy because o( the two back-to-bac.k extended refueling outages that PSE&G conducted during this perio.

• 3.2.2 Hope Creek* Radiological Parameters Performance Goals The licensee established goals for station radiation exposure and personnel contaminations for calendar year 1992. The goals and a comparison with* 1991 are shown belo Personnel Dose (Person-Rem) *

Personnel Contaminations (#)

Major Outages 199 GOAL ACTUAL

. <-37. <160 366.918 159 half of the third refueli~g 1992_

GOAL ACTUAL

<405 437.148

< 140

. 150 entire fourth refueli~g

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. The inspector noted that these goals were aggressive considering the inclusion of the entir~

. scope of a refueling outage. 1he most dose intensive portion of the refueling was early in the outage wheri the reactor vessel.was disassembled and fuel *off-loaded. While the goals for both parameters were exceeded slightly, the total number. of perS<>nnel contaminations dropped in 19_92. Several design changes and increased snubber testing, that were not under consideration when the goals were set, contributed to most of the additional radiation exposure. The inspector concluded that the licensee had performed very well in keeping.

personnel exposure as low as reasonably achievable and that the lessons learned.from. pie third refueling outage contributed noticeably to the radfological successes in.the fourth refueling outage.

. MAINTENANCE/SURVEILLANCE TESTING

• . *Maintenance Inspection Activity The inspectors observed selected maintenance activities on safety-related equipment to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures,

. Technical Specifications, and app_ropriate industrial codes* and standards.

Portions of the following a~tivities were observed by the inspector:

Salem 2 Salem 1 Hope Creek Work Order(WO) or Design Change Package (PCP)

Description WO 921214098 *

Various Various Annunciator system troubleshooting..

. lA emergency diesel generator Process computer and reactor recirculation motor generator set repairs. -

. Surveillance Testing Inspection Activity The inspeetors peiformed detailed technical procedure reviews, witnessed in-progres sµrveillance testing, and reviewed completed surveillance packages. The inspectors verified

• • that.the surveillance tests were performed in accordance with Technical Specifications, approved procedures, and* NRC regulation The following surveillance tests were reviewed, with portions witnessed by the inspector:

Procedure No.

Salem 1 Sl.OP-ST.TRR-OOOl(Q).

Main Turbine Valve Testing

Salem 1 Sl.IC-ST.SSP-:0004(Q)

Salem 1 S l.IC-PM.*RM-0002(Q)

-Salem l

• lIC-18.1.010 Hope.Creek OP-IS.BH-OOl(Q)

• *Hope Creek OP-ST.KJ-002(Q)

. lnspectio!l Findings 4.3.1 Salem

-Solid State Protection System

• Testing Radiation Monitoring System

• Testing

• *. Reactor Trip Breaker Testing..

-"A" Standby Liquid Control Purrip 92-Day Inservice Test

"B" Emergency Diesel* Generator Monthly Surveillance Test * *

.. _ The maintenance and surveillance testing activities inspected were effective with respect to meeting the program *safety objective.

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4.3.2 Hope Creek The maintenance _and surveillance testing activities inspected were effective with respect to.

meeting.the pr~grani safety objectives:

-. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 5.1 * Inspection Activity The inspector reviewed PSE&G' s conformance with 10CFR50.4 7 regarding implementation of the. emergency plan and procedures. In addition,_ licensee event notifications and reporting requirements per 10CFR50.72 and 73 were reviewe.2

'Inspection Findings * Event N otificatiOns

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With the exception of the Salem Unit 2 annunciator failure (See NRC Inspeetion 50-272/92-81), Hope Creek and Salem event notifications were appropriately made an_d were consistent with the" required time_ constraints. Rep6rtability issues associated with the Hope Creek

. manual scram on December 3, 1992, are discussed In Section 2.2.2.A of this repor B..

Artificial ISiand Assembly and Accountability Drill.,.

• On December 17, 1992, the PSE&G Emergency Preparedness (EP) groµp conducted an

_assembly and accountability drill in the Artificial Island protected area (PA). The drill

• required participation by all personnel inside the PA fence, except those who had specificaily been identified as exempt by the station general managers. The drill scenario involved an ammonia Jtydroxide spill on the Hope Creek side of the site, a response by the PSE&G Site Protection Department, and a subsequent requirement. for site personnel accountability. *

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The inspector monitored the performance of the drill from the site secondary alarm stati_on

. (SAS), where island-wide activities were observable by means of the site security camera monitors. The inspector observed the collection and inventory of the acc0untability badges for all personnel who had. remained within the PA. The licensee Security staff accounted for all but eight personnel in approximately 40 minutes and accounted for those in an additional *

10 minutes. This amount of time exceeded the EP goal of complete accountability within 30 minutes of drill initiatio The inspector was informed by the licensee that PSE&G -has initiated a project to install a *.

system which will track personnel accountability throl:Jgh the magnetic identification cards.

used for access into the PA and other site vital areas. The new system is expected to reduce.

the time* required to account for all site personnel. The inspector will monitor PSE&G's progress with the project. Despite not m~ting the goal for ~ccountability time, the inspector.

determined that the drill, *overall, was a good exercise for *the station staff, site security and site protection personnel, and that the exercise was well run by the PSE&G EP grou *. *

SECURITY Inspection Activity PSE&G's conformance *with the security program was verified on a periodic basis, including the adequacy of staffing, entry control, 3.larm stations, and physical boundaries; Inspection Findings Protected Area Intrusion Security Drill.

• Fo,r cerutin emergency condition scenarios, the Artifi~ial Island Site Security Department has plans for eliciting the cooperation of local and. state law enforcement agencies to assist in -

• dealing with the situation. In order to practice and test the licensee's contingency-plans and to familiarize these law enforcement agencies with site layout, PSE&G conducted a security drill*on December 18, 1992, in which a hostile intrusion into the site protected area was

simulated. The drill involved site security personnel p<>rtraying intruders who had overtaken:

the Salem service water structure by gaining access from the Delaware River. As the drill

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. progressed, site 'security personnel contained the intruders at the service water structure while awaitirig assistance from the New Jersey State Police and the local Lower Alloways Creek Township _police department to arrive at the site. Once on site; these forces worked in*

conjunction with the site force to neutralize the simulated threa. -

The inspector discussed the drill scenario and the planned use of off-site law enforcement personnel with the PSE&G Site Security Manager and observed the drill from a nearby structure with the same manager. - Prior to the commencement of the drill, the inspector verified that Salem Operations personnel had.been properly informed of the drill and that it

- would not aff~t normal plant operations. The inspector noted that the drill was well pianned and executed arid also determined that the effort undertaken by PSE&G to accomplish the

. drill's goals was worthwhil.

ENGINEERING/TECHNICAL SUPPORT Salem Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) Special Reports Unit 2 Special Reports 92-8 and 92~9 addressed RM_S channels 2R45B, C and 2R46C inoperability for greater than 1 days. _These rei}orts were required by Teehnical Speeification-3.3.3.1, Table 3.3-6. _The 2R45B and C channels monitor the plant vent noble gas. The licensee determined that equipment failure was caused by a grounded wire connector. The -

licensee repaired the channels and returned them to.serviee. _Similar Unit 1 channels will be checked. The 2R46C channel monitors main steam line radioactivity (1 of 4 steam lines).

The lic_ens~ determined that-- equipment failure occurred due to a failed _solenoid valve. The

_ licensee* continues to pursue root cause and repair activities. _

The inspector verified that special reports addressed the appropriate issues and that the

• _Technical Specification Action Statements_ were followed. The inspector noted that redundant channels, as well as grab samples, were available to monitor these process streams for radioactivity.. The inspector_ concluded Uiat system engineering personnel appropriately responded to these RMS failure *

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Hope Creek No noteworthy findings w:ere observe *

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SAFETY ASSESSMENT/QUALITY VERIFICATION

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Public Service Electric and Gas. Seif-Assessment* Capabill.ty *

During the inspection i)eriod, the inspectors met with licensee management ~rsonnel to review and assess their self-assessm,ent capability; This review occurred approximately mid-way through the current SALP period. The licensee discussed their actions taken to address previous SALP weaknesses and their assessment of performance to date (through the curren SALP period). The.inspectors met with the following licensee organi:zational groups:

Salem Operations (operations, maintenance, technic3.l, and radiation

• protection/chemistry)

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Hope Creek Operations (operations, maintenance, technical,. and radiation protection/ chemistry)

Quality Assurance (QA) and Nuclear Safety Review (Station QA, Offsite and Qnsite.

Safety _Review, QA Audit and QA engineering/procurement)

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• Site Services (emergency planning, site prot~tion, radiation and chemistry services, training, site maintenance)

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. Nuclear Engineering The inspector noted that the_ licensee demonstrated a good and sound capability to perform self-assessment. The licensee performed a critical review of their performance, including actions taken or pfanned to ensure continued improvements. Based on this, the inspector concluded that the licensee (Salem, Hope Creek and common groups) has an effeetive self-assessment capability. *

• LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS. (LER), PERIODIC AND SPECIAL REPORTS 9.1 Spedal and Periodk ReportS PSE&G submitted the following licensee event reports~ and special and periodic reports, which were reviewed for accuracy and evaluation adequacy. *

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Salem and Hope Creek Monthly Operating Reports for November 1992.

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Salem Unit 1 Special Report 92-9 regarding fire barrier penetration seals dated December 18, 199 *

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• Salem Unif2 Special Reports 92-8 and 9 (See Section 7.1.A.)

-These reports were determined to be appropriat.2 LERs _

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Salem LERs Unit l

-LER 92-24 concerned a Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 entry on November 23, 1-992, due to a loss of both safety injection pumps. The,event was reviewed during _

NRC Inspection 50-272/92-17. The inspeetor concluded that this LER was well

-, written and it appropriately described the event, corrective actions and root caus *

-LER 92-25 concerned a TS 3.0.3 entry on December 6, 1992, due to out of Unit 2 specification control rbd position indications. -The licensee adjusted the position signals, exited the TS, and made an*_ENS call. Longer term corrective actions included reviewing system design and evaluating the possibility of a modfficatio The inspector concluded that this LER was well written and it appropriately described the event, corrective actions and root caus *

LER 92-16 concerned a TS 3.0.3-entry on November 14, 1992, due-' to qut of specification control rod p0sition indications. The event was reviewed in NRC Inspeetion_ 50-272/92-17. The inspector concluded th~t this LER was* well written and -

appropriately described the event, root cause and corrective action *Hope Creek

LER 92-,13 (See Section 2.2.2.A)

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1,EXIT INTERVIEWS/MEETINGS 1 Resident Exit Meeting The inspectors met with Mr. -C: Vondra and Mr. -J. Hagan and other PSE&G personnel periodically and at the end of the inspection report period to summarize the scope and -

findings of their insp~tion activities.

Based on NRC Regior:i I review and _discussions with PSE&G, it" was determih~ that this report does not contain information subject to 10 CFR 2 restrictions *.....

1 Specialist Entrance and Exit Meetings

. Inspection Reporting Date(s)

Subject Report N Inspector 12/7-11/92 Radiological 50-272,311&354/92-2 Nimitz Controls

. 12/13-23/92 Augmented 50-272&311 /92-81 Ruland*

Inspection Team 1/4-8/93 Service Water and 50-272,311&354/93.:.03 Kaplan Chemistry -.