IR 05000272/1992002
| ML18096A618 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 03/26/1992 |
| From: | Eselgroth P, David Silk NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18096A617 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-92-02, 50-272-92-2, 50-311-92-02, 50-311-92-2, NUDOCS 9204090200 | |
| Download: ML18096A618 (7) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I INSPECTION REPORT FACILITY DOCKET NO and 50-311 INSPECTION REPORT NOS.*
50-272 and 50~311/92-02 FACILITY LICENSE NO DPR-70 and 75.*
LICENSEE:
Public Service Gas and Electric Company P.O. Box 236.
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038
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FACILITY: -..
Salem Units 1 and 2 INSPECTION DATES:*
February 18 - 21, 1992
. SUBMITTED'BY:
David Silk Senior Operations Engineer PWR *Section APPROVED BY:
~!t&=-.*.
aeter selgroth,
. f
- f' PWR Section, Operations Branch Division of Reactor _Safety INSPECTION SUMMARY:
Date AREAS INSPECTED: Routine, announced inspection of the corrective actions taken* to address deficiencies identified during the Emergency Operating Procedures (BOP) Team Inspection (Report 50-272 and 50-311/90-80) and three other inspections (90-09, 90-81, and
- 91-02) pe~ning to operation '
- RESULTS: Of the seven open items reviewed by the inspector, six were closed. No safety significant deficiencies were identified during this inspectio PDR. ADOCK 05000272 G
PDR Personnel Contacted Licensee:
- +*. M. Alclaugh
R. Aritonow
T. Cellmer
J. Fest
+
T. Floyd
R. Graybill
S. La.Bruna
M. Morroni
P. O'Donnell
B, O'Grady
J. Pantazes
V. Polizzi
B. Preston
W. Schultz
M. Shedlock
+*
J. Varga
+*
E. *vmar
C.. Vondra
+*
F. Wiltsee NRC:
D. Silk
S. Barr DETAILS Lead Engineer Licensing and Regulation Outage Manager Unit 1 Radiation Protection I Chemistry Manager General Manager - Staff.
Operations - BOP Coordinator Manager Procurement. and Material Control
- . Vice President Nuclear Operations
- Technical Department Manager Operations Enginee Outage Manager Unit 2 Procedure Upgrade Project Manager Operations Manager Manager - SGS Projects Manager - Station Quality Assurance Maintenance Manager Supervisor - Engineenng *
Licensing
.. General Manager Salem Operations Technical *Engineer *
Senior Operations Engineer
- Resident Inspector, Salem
- Denotes those present at' the Entrance Meeting on February 18, 1992
+ Denotes those contacted during the inspection
- *
- Denotes those present *at the Exit Meeting on February 21, 1992 * Scope The _inspection was conducted to determine the adequacy of the licensee's corrective actions taken to address several findings of Inspection Reports 90-80, 90-81, 90-09 and 90-02. To evaluate the licensee's actions, the inspector reviewed Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs), Abnormal Operating Procedures (AOPs), and othe procedures and documentation. In addition, a plant tour was conducted to check if the procedural steps could be performe *
. 3. 0 Findings.
OPEN (90-80-03): Identify and correct labeling deficiencie.
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The inspector, with the assistance of the* EOP coordinator, performed partial validations of several AOPs to v:erify that labeling deficiencies had been corrected~
Labeling was found to be accurate in the control room and the plant except for the 125 VDC breaker, 2CDC2AX26, used to fail shut th_e MSIVs (Control Room Evacuation, step 3.6.A.1). This breaker had the correct noun name but was missing a digit on the label. Except for this mislabeling, the licensee has improved its plant labeling since January. 199 *
Several. control room labeling problems were noted in Inspection *Report 90-80. *
These labeling. corrections have -not been 'included in an approved design change as of this inspection. These control room labeling deficiencies are being considered in *
conjunction with other proposed control room modifications; but, based. upon the status of the control.room labeling, this* item will remain ope CLOSED (90-80-04): Perfonii Verification and Validation (V.&V) walkdowns of AOPs and correct identified deficiencie In accordance with AD-44, (Emergency/Abnormal Operating Procedures Program),
Seetion 7.3, the-licensee performed V&Vs on all of the new AOPs. The inspector verified this by reviewing several AOP packages which documented the V &V
- process. Unit 2 AOPs received a full V&V. This consisted of an editorial -
verification and a technical verification which ensure4 compliance to the writer's guide and accurate technical-content. A technical validation, which addressed th*e operational usability and effeetiveness, was performed by using the simulator (which replicates Unit 2's control room) and in-plant walkdowns to confirm procedural. ~tep
- performance. Unit 1 AOPs received editorial. and technical verifications. *Technical*
validations for Unit 1 AOPs consisted of table top reviews and credit taken from the Unit 2 AOP simulator and walkdown validations (as was done for the Unit 2 and Unit.
1 EOPs). Iqentified defiqiencies were documented during the V &V process and the
- procedure approval process stopped until resolutions were made to the deficiencie Based upon the revision to AD-44 that requires V &Vs be performed and the actual performance of the V&V process to the AOPs, this item was close *
CLOSED (90-80-06): Correct differences between EOP-TRIP-4, 5, and 6 and AD-44. Revise AOP writer's guide to require local versus control room action distinctio in AOPs.
Insi>ection 91-02 verified that-the licensee had corrected the specifically mentioned differences above by providing direction at the end of those procedures to go to another procedure in accordance with AD-4 The inspector reviewed AD-44, Section 15.2.5, and determined that AOPs are to be written such. that an operator will be aware that remote or local perforinance of a *
procedural step is required to accomplish the task. While reviewing selected AOPs, it
- was noted that local performance w~ specified by several methods. Directing an equipment operator to perform a task, stating the in-plant _location of equipment to be
- operated~ parenthetical phrases indicating location, or attachments to procedures specified for locfil operation were v~ous methods use Also, a related item from Inspection Report 90-80 was a concern* that the dual column format in use at that time could result in the operator missing information contained i one column within the procedure while the reader was in the other colum According to revised AD-44, Attachment 8 (AOP & AOP technical Bases Document.
Fonriat) AOPs are to be written in single column format with notes and cautions *
clearly boxed across the width of the page. The revised AOPs have *been* formatted to be user-friendly and alleviate the concern of hiding information within the AOP Based upon the revision_toAD-44 to specify that'AOPs distinguish between remote and local actions and a sampling of AOPs to ensure this was done, this item was dosed.*
CLOSED (90-80-08): Revise AD-_44 and AD-2 to require in-plant walkdowns of both..
EOPs and AOP AD-44 has been* revised to address the concerns of this item. AD-44, Sections and 10.5, explains the purpose and implementation of the V&V process for the EOPs
. and AOPs. lil-plant walkdowns are required for EOPs and AOPs as part of the V&V program. except for editorial procedural changes.- All other changes (Le., design change, step sequence change, change to a quantitative value, or a Technical Specification *change) require a plant walkdown and/or simulator or table top validation; Sampled AOP packages revealed that the licensee did validate the Unit 2 AOPs via walkdowns and validated the Unit 1 AOPs via table top reviews due to the similarity between the unit Based upon the guidance in AD-44 and documentation of AOP walkdown validations, this item was close *
CLOSED (90-09-01): Licensed operators' responsibilities were not effectively
_distributed during BOP implementatio In April of 1990, after observing three crews during simulator requalification examinations, the NRC expressed concern that the single control board operator was *
- overloaded with responsibilities during a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR)._ In
- this~ and any emergency condition, the control board operator was tasked_ with -
manipulating controls, verifying plant parameters, addressing and silencing annunciators, listening to the procedure reader, as well as providing feedback regarding plant status. The single control board operator became the critical path to a timely mitigation of a SGTR event. After that examination, the licensee reviewed control room practices and concluded that adjustments were required.. The'iicensee reviSecl AD-44 to specify operator resl>onsibilities when the EOPs are in effect. The desk operator, upori receipt of a reactor trip, will read the immediate actions of EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip/Safety Injection, while the. board operator performs those immediate actions. The NSS then relieves,the desk operator as the procedure reader after the immediate actions have been completed. *The desk operator can then monitor the continuous actions summaries until the STA (Shift Technical -Advisor) arrive When the STA arrives, the desk operator will perform tasks as directed by the NSS, which usually is to assume resp6nsibility for the controls on the left side of the'
. control room. The implementation of the dir~tions of AD~44 have been witnessed by the inspector on two operator licensing examinations since April 1990. Control room responsibilities have been better fulfilled while control room activity proceeded in a smoother and more timely manne In conclusion~ based upon the directions of AD-44 with regard to control room personnel respon.sibilities arid the observation of its effective implementation, this item*
was close CLOSED (90-81.;01): An BOP tool box inventory surveillance procedure was performed and had identified missing gaskets. No corrective action was taken t replace or identify the location of the missing gasket J
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The inspector reviewed the above mentioned surveillance procedure and examined the
- BOP tool boxes and lockers. The procedure had been revised so that the inventory list specifically_ stated the location of the gaskets to be in the tool locker beneath the tool box. Each unit has a tool box which sits on a tool locker. The tools are in the tool box and the gaskets (due to their larger size) are in the locker. When the inspector checked the inventory list against the contents of the tool boxes and lockers, all equipment was present, and the gaskets were found, as specifie. '
During the inventory of the Unit 2 tool box and locker, the inspector found the tool box unlocked with the lock mechanism broken. All tools were present as stated above. The licensee replaced the tool. t>ox the next day and locked it: There was n * safety significance to ~s finding because Unit 2 has been shutdown since November
- 1991 and was in a refueling outage at the time of this inspection. Also, a* review of the last tool box surveillance (January 1992) indicates that there was no lock problem at that time; therefore, the tool box has been unlocked only recently and only while the unit was shutdow *
Based upon the licensee's revision to the BOP tool box surveillance procedure and the establishment of a suita,ble storage location for the gaskets,* this item was closed. *
.CLOSED (91-02-01):. The licensee was not performing comprehensive corrective actions regarding instances of NRC identified weaknesse *
To ensure that the licensee incorporates BOP changes on a plant-wide scale, the licensee revised AD-44, Section 10.4.3, to state that the BOP coordinator shall review
. other EOPs for which a change may be applicable. Attachment 2 of AD-44
_ (Emergency Operating Procedure Approval Cover Page) has the BOP coordinator document that other* BOPs were checked for the change.. The inspector verified. that
- .*the licensee was using this method for pr~ure changes..
The inspector ~eviewed.two specifi~ types of deficiencies *that were identified. in*
Inspection 90-80 but were also found to exist in other :aoPs, as documented in Inspection 91-02. These deficiencies were checking subcooling during natural circulation conditions and guidance at the end of a procedure to direct the operators to another procedure. The licensee did correct those deficiencies in the BOPs and has revisited Attachment 2 of Inspection Report 90-80 (Deficiencies Identified) to determine if any specific NRC identified deficiencies were common to other BOP *Several items were identified, and BOP corrections will be incorporated in a future revisio.
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Based upon the licensee's revision of AD-44 to direct the BOP coordinator to review other EOPs for applicable changes, this item was close.0 Annunciator Response Procedures (ARPs)
During-this inspection, the inspector briefly reviewed several new ARPs for the Unit
. 2 control room~ The ARPs have been upgraded and include various features to enhance usability and operator performance. At the top of each ARP is a reduced. *
mimic of the annunciator window which contains the individual alarm and
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shows the relative position of the individual alarm with. respeet to the other alarms.
within the window. Also at* the* top of the ARP are the words as they exactly appear on the individual alarm.. These two mentioned feattires assist the operator iri referencing the correct ARP. The ARPs state the alarm setpoinf and list the input sources to the alarm as well as Ca.uses, automatic actions, and operator actions..
- Several supplemental features to the ARPs have been installed. There is a computer.
that records up to six pages of alarms to. allow the operators the opportunity to review * *
plant alarm history, if needed. The individual alarms have been grouped together by.
systems with the groups having labels denoting the appropriate* system. The alarms have been arranged so that they correspond better to the controls on the bo~d beneath them. The alarm horns have. differing pitches and frequency depending on whether
. the alarm is coming in or is clearing. Annunciator*wind0ws now have speeifi acknowledge pushbuttons which focuses the operator to address speeific alarms. *A master silence pushbutton was installed to control the noise level in the control room during excessive alarm activation condition The licensee's approach to the ARPs was an improvement from the previous ARP The usability of the ARPs and the supplemental features and modifications, in conjunction with enhanced control room lighting and anti--glare features in the Unit 2
. control room, is an improvement when compared to what previously existe.0 Conclusions Unresolved Items 90-80-04, 06, and 08; 90-81-01; 90-09--01; and 91"'."02-01 were closed during this inspection based upon a review of licensee procedures and record Item 90-80-03 (control room labeling) will remain open until a design change has been approved that incorporates corrective action pertaining to the identified label The licenSee's efforts to upgrade procedures and conditions in the control room were.
evident.. The AOPs and the ARPs have been improved to enhance clarity and operator. implementatio.0 Exit Meeting At the conclusion of the site inspeetion, on February.21, 1992, an exit meeting was held with the licensee's representatives (noted in Paragraph 1.0) to discuss the scope *
. and findings as detailed in the repor *