IR 05000269/2015301

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Er 05000269/2015301, 05000270/2015301, and 05000287/2015301; June 8-11, 2015 & June 17, 2015; Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3; Operator License Examinations
ML15203A327
Person / Time
Site: Oconee  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 07/21/2015
From: Gerald Mccoy
Division of Reactor Safety II
To: Batson S
Duke Energy Corp
References
50-269/15-301, 50-270/15-301
Download: ML15203A327 (11)


Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION uly 21, 2015

SUBJECT:

OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION - NRC OPERATOR LICENSE EXAMINATION REPORT 05000269/2015301, 05000270/2015301, AND 05000287/2015301

Dear Mr. Batson:

During the period June 8 - 11, 2015, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) administered operating tests to employees of your company who had applied for licenses to operate the Oconee Nuclear Station. At the conclusion of the tests, the examiners discussed preliminary findings related to the operating tests and the written examination submittal with those members of your staff identified in the enclosed report. The written examination was administered by your staff on June 17, 2015.

All applicants passed both the operating test and written examination. There were three post-administration comments concerning the written examination. These comments, and the NRC resolution of these comments, are summarized in Enclosure 2. A Simulator Fidelity Report is included in this report as Enclosure 3.

The initial examination submittal was within the range of acceptability expected for a proposed examination. All examination changes agreed upon between the NRC and your staff were made according to NUREG-1021, Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors, Revision 9, Supplement 1.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm.adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). If you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact me at (404) 997-4551.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Gerald J. McCoy, Chief Operations Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos: 50-269, 50-270, 50-287 License Nos: DPR-38, NPF-47, DPR-55

Enclosures:

1. Report Details 2. Facility Comments and NRC Resolution 3. Simulator Fidelity Report

REGION II==

Docket No.: 50-269, 50-270, 50-287 License No.: DPR-38, DPR-47, DPR-55 Report No.: 05000269/2015301, 05000270/2015301, 05000287/2015301 Licensee: Duke Energy Carolinas LLC Facility: Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Location: Seneca, SC Dates: Operating Test - June 8 -11, 2015 Written Examination - June 17, 2015 Examiners: D. Lanyi, Chief Examiner, Senior Operations Engineer D. Bacon, Senior Operations Engineer M. Donithan, Operations Engineer Approved by: Gerald J. McCoy, Chief Operations Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure 1

SUMMARY

ER 05000269/2015301, 05000270/2015301, and 05000287/2015301; June 8-11, 2015 & June 17, 2015; Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3; Operator License Examinations Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) examiners conducted an initial examination in accordance with the guidelines in Revision 9, Supplement 1, of NUREG-1021, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors." This examination implemented the operator licensing requirements identified in 10 CFR §55.41, §55.43, and §55.45, as applicable.

Members of the Oconee Nuclear Station staff developed both the operating tests and the written examination. The initial operating test, written Reactor Operator (RO) examination, and written Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) examination submittals met the quality guidelines contained in NUREG-1021.

The NRC administered the operating tests during the period June 8 - 11, 2015. Members of the Oconee Nuclear Station training staff administered the written examination on June 17, 2015.

Three ROs and five SROs were administered the exam. All applicants passed both the operating test and written examination. All applicants were issued licenses commensurate with the level of examination administered.

There were three post-examination comments.

No findings were identified.

REPORT DETAILS

OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA5 Operator Licensing Examinations

a. Inspection Scope

The NRC evaluated the submitted operating test by combining the scenario events and JPMs in order to determine the percentage of submitted test items that required replacement or significant modification. The NRC also evaluated the submitted written examination questions (RO and SRO questions considered separately) in order to determine the percentage of submitted questions that required replacement or significant modification, or that clearly did not conform with the intent of the approved knowledge and ability (K/A) statement. Any questions that were deleted during the grading process, or for which the answer key had to be changed, were also included in the count of unacceptable questions. The percentage of submitted test items that were unacceptable was compared to the acceptance criteria of NUREG-1021, Operator Licensing Standards for Power Reactors.

The NRC reviewed the licensees examination security measures while preparing and administering the examinations in order to ensure compliance with 10 CFR §55.49, Integrity of examinations and tests.

The NRC administered the operating tests during the period June 8-11, 2015. The NRC examiners evaluated three Reactor Operator (RO) and five Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) applicants using the guidelines contained in NUREG-1021. Members of the Oconee Nuclear Station training staff administered the written examination on June 17, 2015. Evaluations of applicants and reviews of associated documentation were performed to determine if the applicants, who applied for licenses to operate the Oconee Nuclear Station, met the requirements specified in 10 CFR Part 55, Operators Licenses.

The NRC evaluated the performance or fidelity of the simulation facility during the preparation and conduct of the operating tests.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

The NRC developed the written examination sample plan outline. Members of the Oconee Nuclear Station training staff developed both the operating tests and the written examination. All examination material was developed in accordance with the guidelines contained in Revision 9, Supplement 1, of NUREG-1021. The NRC examination team reviewed the proposed examination. Examination changes agreed upon between the NRC and the licensee were made per NUREG-1021 and incorporated into the final version of the examination materials.

The NRC, using NUREG-1021, determined that the licensees initial examination submittal was within the range of acceptability expected for a proposed examination.

The NRC determined that the licensees initial operating test submittal was within the range of acceptability expected for a proposed examination.

All applicants passed both the operating test and written examination and were issued licenses.

Copies of all individual examination reports were sent to the facility Training Manager for evaluation of weaknesses and determination of appropriate remedial training.

The licensee submitted three post-examination comments concerning the written examination. A copy of the final written examination and answer key, with all changes incorporated, and the licensees post-examination comment may be accessed not earlier than June 17, 2017, in the ADAMS system (ADAMS Accession Numbers ML15174A242, ML15174A244 and ML15174A248).

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

Exit Meeting Summary

On June 11, 2015, the NRC examination team discussed generic issues associated with the operating test with Ms. Carrie Dunton, Site Support Director, and members of the Oconee Nuclear Station staff. The examiners asked the licensee if any of the examination material was proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Licensee personnel C. Dunton, Site Support Director J. R. Steely, Training Manager C. Rop, Operations Training Manager C. Hartsock, ILT Supervisor T. Lawson, Training F. Baldwin, Training S. Lark, Training S. Bowen, Training J. Smith, Licensing NRC personnel None

FACILITY POST-EXAMINATION COMMENTS AND NRC RESOLUTIONS

A complete text of the licensees post-examination comment can be found in ADAMS under

Accession Number ML15174A248.

Item

RO QUESTION #11:

Comment:

The licensee contends that answer B is correct instead of A.

The question asked how Tave was controlled during the initial stages of recovering from

Condensate Booster Pump (CBP) feed.

The licensee stated that the stem of the question established the initial Tave stable at 566 °F and

was being maintained by CBP feed. Steam Generator (SG) pressure was implicitly established

at approximately 500 psig (step 1 RNO of Rule 3). Step 2 directed the operator to control

feedwater flow to stabilize reactor coolant system pressure and temperature by throttling, as

necessary, the startup control valves and Turbine Bypass Valves (TBVs).

The stem of the question also informed the applicants that the turbine driven emergency

feedwater (EFDW) pump was running and that flow had been verified. Therefore the flow

control valves were closed.

With those conditions established, the first part of the question asked whether throttling EFDW

or TBV Flow would INITIALLY be used to control Tave. The original intent of the question was to

determine the applicants knowledge of how Tave should be controlled after EFDW flow is

established but prior to the time when SG level has been established. However, the question

specifically asked about INITIALLY controlling Tave during recovery from CBP feed. With TC

greater than 547 °F, Step 59 of the Loss of Heat Transfer (LOHT) tab directed actions to begin

the recovery. Specifically it directed the operator to set the Turbine Hydraulic Pressure (THP) at

approximately 885 psig and then place the TBVs in AUTO. This would cause the TBVs to

throttle closed raising Steam Generator pressure and in response Tave.

The licensee contended that the procedure caused the TBVs to close thus causing Tave to rise

prior to placing EFDW flow in service. This was done in order to ensure that EFDW feed would

not be established too quickly in order to prevent an overcooling event. Therefore, with the

particular conditions provided in the stem of the question, throttling TBVs to control Tave was the

correct answer to the question.

NRC Discussion:

The licensees recommendation was rejected.

The question stem set the conditions as stated by the licensee. The comment is directed at

what the word INITIALLY meant. The entire first part of the question was Which one of the

following describes how Tave and SG levels will be controlled INITIALLY during recovery from

CBP feed?. As stated, the LOHT Tab is the applicable procedure. The RNO for step 59

verified the THP setpoint at approximately 885 psig and then to directed the operator to go to

step 62. Step 62 directed placing the TBVs in AUTO. Step 63 then directed Initiating feed per

Rule 7. Step 62 would cause the TBVs to automatically close. This would affect Tave, but in no

way could this be considered controlling Tave. In practice, as the TBVs close, the operators

throttle the EFDW control valves open to maintain core heat removal and thus control Tave.

No changes to the answer sheet shall be made.

RO QUESTION #48:

Comment:

The licensee contended that all of the answers were correct and the question should be deleted.

This question asked for the response of the 1X and 2X switchgear following a loss of all 4160 V

switchgear.

Upon further review after the examination was administered, the licensee recognized that the

1X and 2X switchgear would behave similarly and therefore both buses would be restored 15

seconds later.

The licensee further contended that there was a subset issue associated with the new answers.

Distractors B and D were identical to A and C except that the time to re-energization was

seconds instead of 15 seconds. The licensee believed that since the buses would be

energized at the 36 second point, B and D would also be correct.

NRC Discussion:

The licensees recommendation was partially accepted.

The NRC agrees that A and C were correct answers. The NRC disagrees that B and D

could be considered correct.

The distractors stated that the switchgear de-energizes and then is restored 36 seconds

later. The language indicates two events, not states. If the distractors had stated that they

were energized 36 seconds later, it would be indicative of a state instead of an event.

Therefore, the time stated is when the re-energization occurred, and the correct time delay is 15

seconds.

In accordance with NUREG-1021 section ES-403 D.1.c., because both answer choices A and

C are correct and do not contain conflicting information, both are accepted as correct.

The answer key will be changed to accept both A and C as correct answers.

RO QUESTION #62:

Comment:

The licensee contends that both A and C are correct answers.

The stem of the question stated that a gaseous waste release at 1/3 station limit was being

performed. The first part of the question asked which radiation monitor (1RIA-38 or 45) had

their Alert and High setpoints based upon this limit.

The question and answers were developed using information provided in PT/0/A/0230/001,

Radiation Monitor Check. The references in that procedure indicated that RIA-45 limits were

based upon the 1/3 station limit, while RIA-38 limits were adjustable.

Upon further review after the examination was administered, the licensee recognized that both

radiation monitors were described in the Selected Licensee Commitments bases to ensure that

the site does not exceed the SLC 16.11-2 (i.e., 1/3 station limit) dose rate limits for unrestricted

areas.

NRC Discussion:

The licensees recommendation was accepted.

The NRC agrees with the licensees contention that both RIA-38 and 45 correctly answer the

first part of the question.

In accordance with NUREG-1021 section ES-403 D.1.c., because both answer choices A and

C are correct and do not contain conflicting information, both are accepted as correct.

The answer key will be changed to accept both A and C as correct answers.

SIMULATOR FIDELITY REPORT

Facility Licensee: Oconee Nuclear Station

Facility Docket No.: 05000269, 05000270, 05000287

Operating Test Administered: June 8 -11, 2015

This form is to be used only to report observations. These observations do not constitute audit

or inspection findings and, without further verification and review in accordance with Inspection

Procedure 71111.11 are not indicative of noncompliance with 10 CFR 55.46. No licensee

action is required in response to these observations.

No simulator fidelity or configuration issues were identified.

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