IR 05000269/1988028
| ML16279A110 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 09/27/1988 |
| From: | Peebles T, Skinner P, Wert L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16127A235 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-88-28, 50-270-88-28, 50-287-88-28, NUDOCS 8810120216 | |
| Download: ML16279A110 (27) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA ST., ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos: 50-269/88-28, 50-270/88-28 and 50-287/88-28 Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, N.C. 28242 Docket Nos.:
50-269, 50-270, 50-287 License No DPR-38, DPR-47, DPR-55 Facility Name:
Oconee Nuclear Station Inspection Conducted: August 16 -
September 16, 1988
~Z Inspectors: _
_
_
_
___
<7 P. HSkinner, Senio Resident Inspector 2batg'Signed L.D.Wert, Reside 11" Inspector eSigned Approved by:
T. A. Peebles, S&tion Chief Date Signed O
Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection involved resident inspection on-site in the areas of operations, surveillance testing, maintenance activities, safeguards and radiation protection, refueling outage, safety system functional inspection report followup, and inspection of open item Results:
Of the seven areas inspected, two violations were identifie Within the areas inspected, the following violations were-identified:
-
Failure to follow procedures, paragraph Failure to provide adequate procedures, paragraph Operation with degraded Reactor Building Cooling Units, paragraph 3 The licensee has committed to the following schedule for the determination of thermal performance and fouling factors of the Reactor Building Cooling Units (RBCUs):
8810120216 880928
PDR ADOCK 05000269 PNU
Unit 1:
('A' and 'C' coolers) by September 30, 1988 and at monthly intervals thereafte Unit 2:
('A'
and 'C' coolers)
by October 11, 198 Followup testing will be scheduled as indicated by the Unit 1 and Unit 2 result Unit 3:
All three coolers will be tested prior to startup and quarterly thereafter the 'A' and 'C' cooler (As discussed in this report, the testing intervals may be shifted as additional information is obtained.)
REPORT DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- M. Tuckman, Station Manager C. Boyd, Site Design Engineer Representative
- J. Davis, Technical Services Superintendent W. Foster, Maintenance Superintendent T. Glenn, Instrument and Electrical Support Engineer C. Harlin, Compliance Engineer D. Hubbard, Performance Engineer H. Lowery, Chairman, Oconee Safety Review Group T. Matthews, Production Specialist J. McIntosh, Administrative Services Superintendent
- F. Owens, Assistant Engineer, Compliance
- G. Rothenberger, Integrated Scheduling Superintendent
- R. Sweigart, Operations Superintendent Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and staff engineer NRC Resident Inspectors:
P. H. Skinner
- L. D. Wert
- Attended exit intervie.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (Closed)
Violation 269/84-33-02, 270/84-30-02, 287/84-34-02:
Unauthorized Disposal of Licensed Radioactive Materia During an inspection in November 1984, an inspector identified that slightly contaminated waste oil had been transferred to a fossil fuel plant to be burned in violation of 10 CFR 20.30 In correspondence dated February 22, 1985, the licensee denied the violation and provided the-ir justification for this positio The NRC reviewed the basis for the denial and in correspondence dated April 17, 1985, concluded that the violation did occur as reporte In correspondence dated June 7, 1985, the licensee again denied the violation and provided additional justification for their position. On August 17, 1988, the NRC responded to the April 1985 correspondence in which they stated further discussions had taken place between the NRC and DPC staff that identified that the licensee had ceased disposal of oil with low levels of radioactive contamination by transfer offsite to fossil
fuel burning plants and that no further response to the Notice of Violation was require The inspector confirmed with utility management that contaminated oil was not being transferred offsit Based on this action this item is close (Open) Unresolved Item 269, 270, 287/88-13-06: configuration control inadequacies in the ES and RPS cabinets. The licensee has completed a portion of the corrective actions necessary to determine the extent of the configuration control inadequacies in the statio Seven additional systems were examined and multiple discrepancies were identifie The inspectors verified the results of the panel examinations and determined that the licensee has aggressively identified existing discrepancies in those systems. The analysis and resolution for discrepancies identified has not been completed, therefore the safety impact of the discrepancies has not been determine This item will remain open pending the completion of.the analysis and resolution of the configuration control inadequacies and the determination that the inadequacies for the station have been thoroughly addresse.
Plant Operations (71707)
a. The inspectors reviewed plant operations throughout the reporting period to verify conformance with regulatory requirements, technical specifications -(TS), and administrative controls. Control room logs, shift turnover records, and equipment removal and restoration records were reviewed routinel Discussions were conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics, instrument and electrical (I&E), and performance personne Activities within the control rooms were monitored on an almost daily basis. Inspections were conducted on day and on night shifts, during week days and on weekends. Some inspections were made during shift change in order to evaluate shift turnover performanc Actions observed were conducted as required by the Licensees Administrative Procedure The complement of licensed personnel on each shift inspected met or exceeded the requirements of T Operators were responsive to plant annunciator alarms and were cognizant of plant condition Plant tours were taken throughout the reporting period on a routine basi The areas toured included the following:
Turbine Building Auxiliary Building Units 1, 2, and 3 Electrical Equipment Rooms Units 1, 2, and 3 Cable Spreading Rooms
Station Yard Zone within the Protected Area Standby Shutdown Facility Units 1, 3 Penetration Rooms Unit 3 Containment Condenser Circulating Water Intake Structure Unit 3 Condenser Circulating Water Discharge Piping During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, security, equipment status, and radiation control practices were observe Unit 1 -
Unit 1 operated at 100 percent power until August 26 when power was reduced to 70 percent to allow the 1B2 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP)
to be secured due to a low level alarm on the upper oil po Subsequently on August 30, the unit was shutdown and repairs to a loose oil line flange on th RCP were completed. The unit was returned to 100 percent power on September 1 and continued to operate at that level for the remainder of the report perio Unit 2 -
Unit 2 operated at 100 percent power until August 26 when the unit tripped due to a false high moisture separator reheater level signa The false high level caused a turbine trip which tripped the unit. The unit was returned to 100 percent power on August 27 and operated at that level for the rest of the report perio Unit 3 -
Unit 3 remained in a scheduled refueling outage during the report perio b. On August 12, 1988, during the cooldown of Unit 3 at the beginning of the end-of-cycle 10 refueling outage, the licensee identified that the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) had been cooled below 325 degrees F for a period of 8 minutes without having any of the specified means of low pressure overpressure protection in service as required by Technical Specification 3.1. The licensee investigated this event and provided the following information to the inspector On August 11, OP/3/A/1102/10 Enclosure 4.2, Hot Shutdown Conditions to 250 Degrees/350 PSI Conditions, was in progres Step 2.8 required
"closing or verify closed" 3HP-27, RC Loop "B" Injection valve (in addition to several other valves). The step also included directions to open the applicable valve circuit breakers and post tags *on the breakers and also post tags on the manual handwheels of these power operated valves. At 12:17 a.m., valve 3HP-27 was signed off as being closed and a second operator had signed the procedure verifying that the valve was closed. At 2:00 a.m., the unit was cooled to less than 325 degrees which caused a violation of TS 3.1. At 2:08 a.m.,
the Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV)
was selected to the low pressure mode which satisfied the requirements of TS 3.1.2.9.- The PORV is a second method that is acceptable by TS to provide low
pressure overpressure protectio On August 12, an Assistant Operating Engineer noted 3HP-27 was open and identified this to the control room operators. The valve was placed in its required position and an investigation conducte The investigation identi fied that 3HP-27 had not been closed as required but the step had been signed off as being accomplished and the independent verifica tion had also been signed as having been performed. In addition, the licensee checked to determine if the low temperature overpressure protection sensing device had been isolated or if plant conditions were such that the TS was not met for any duration that exceeded the limiting conditions for operation (LCO)
and found that the LCO had not been exceede The licensee took disciplinary action for all operations personnel involved. The inspectors also investigated this occurrence and agreed with the conclusions reached by the license This event is identified as a violation (287/88-28-01):
Failure to follow procedure OP/3/A/1102/10 resulting in a violation of TS 3.1. c. Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) Incore Thermocouples On August 5, 1988, the station was informed by their design engineering group that some of the instrumentation wiring for the SSF were incorrectly routed for fire protection vulnerabilit Upon investigation of this, the licensee identified that the cables for the SSF thermocouples were routed through the east penetration room instead of the west penetration roo These penetration rooms are the dividing lines between an all encompassing fire for each uni The proposed TS associated with instrumentation for the SSF has requirements for the incore thermocouples but does not address the hot leg detectors except that a surveillance is specified in section 4. According to the licensee the omission of the hot leg detectors was in error and they should have been included in section The wiring for the hot leg detectors was confirmed to be through the west penetration room.which would make them available for use during an all encompassing fire. An operability evaluation was performed by the licensee on August 11, which found that the incore thermocouples were enhancements to the SSF system rather than a necessity for operation and that the hot leg detectors were required and were availabl A letter was submitted to NRC dated August 12 that proposed changes in the SSF TS to add operability requirements for hot leg temperature detectors and delete the requirements for the thermocouples. The inspector has reviewed the actions taken by the licensee and considers this action to be acceptable pending final review and approval of the TS proposed amendmen d. Complete Loss of All Power On Unit 3 On September 11, 1988, at 3:17 a.m., a complete loss of all AC power occurre The licensee was conducting procedure PT 3/A/610/01H, Emergency Power Switching Logic Standby Breaker Closure Channel A &
B. The purpose of this procedure is to test proper operation of the circuits involved in the transfer of the main feeder bus to the standby bus and the retransfer back to the startup bus. The test had established main feeder bus one (MFB-1)
energized from the startup power transformer (CT-3)
through startup circuit breaker one (E-1).
E-I had its control power fuses removed to prevent this breaker from opening and causing a complete loss of all AC powe The remaining main feeder bus (MFB-2)
was not connected to a power source other than through crossties between the MFB Startup breaker (E-2)
and emergency breaker (S-2)
were in the racked to "test" position with control power fuses installed and S-2 breaker close The S-1 breaker was also in the "test" position with its control power fuses installed and the breaker close PT/3/A/610/01H did not provide sufficiently detailed instructions to the operators as to the method to be used to assure the breakers and control power remained in the required configuration for the tes As a result operations personnel used the normal operating procedure, OP/0/A/1102/06, Enclosure 3.3, (Procedure for Removing From or Returning to Service 6900/4160/600 Volt Breakers), to operate these breaker One senior reactor operator (SRO)
(designated the control room SRO)
and one nuclear equipment operator (NEO)
were assisting the performance personnel in conducting this test. During the testing the NEO was replaced by a second NEO who was not as familiar with the process as was the first individua The second NED had previously racked in breaker E-1 using OP/0/A/1102/0 He went to the control room and during the review of the OP saw that the fuses had not been installed (the test procedure required the fuses to be removed but not tagged).
He returned to the breaker and called the control roo He asked a different SRO (designated the Unit Supervisor) if it was okay to re-install the control power fuses. The SRO thought that the testing had been completed, told the NEO to install the fuse Upon installation the breaker immediately tripped open, since the logic circuit completed by installation of the fuse indicated (due to a low voltage simulated by a testing variac) that power was not available from the startup bL' Also, the closure of the E breaker was prevented by the S-1 and S-2 breakers being shu This caused a complete loss of all AC power. Breakers E-2, S-1, and S-2 could not be closed since they were in a "test" position, an attempt to close E-1 was made by opening S-1 and S-2 (they will open from the control room even though in the "test" position) and attempting to close E-E-1 would not close since the test device installed as part of the PT was providing a zero voltage signal on the startup bus (since power to the variac was lost).
The SRO familiar with the test took corrective actions to re-energize the MFB in 15 minutes (at 3:32 a.m.).
Unit conditions at the time this incident commenced were:
primary temperature 95 degrees F and level in the reactor vessel at 14";
the reactor vessel head was installed with control rod drive mechanism vents open; the steam generators were closed; and the equipment loading hatch was ope When power was restored temperature in the primary system had increased to 106 degrees F. All other parameters remained the same. If necessary, water could have been injected into the vessel via the borated water storage tank through the gravity fill method. Upon re-energizing the MFB, a low pressure injection pump and a low pressure service water pump were restarted and stable conditions were re-establishe An "Alert" was declared at 3:55 a.m. due to loss of functions needed to maintain plant cold shutdow The "Alert" was terminated at 4:10.4.1 requires the station to be operated and maintained in accordance with approved procedures. Implicit in this requirement is that the procedure contains adequate guidance to accomplished the purpose of the procedure. PT/3/A/610/01H did not contain guidance to assure that control power fuses would be adequately controlled i.e.,
removed and tagged, and that actions to correct specific and foreseen malfunctions were provided. As a result of this lack of guidance and the communication problems discussed above all AC power was lost resulting in a violation of TS 3.8.3 which requires at least one low pressure injection pump and cooler to be operable during refueling operations. In addition, actions were not taken to assure that, for this complicated test, an adequate evaluation of initial conditions was performed, a review of all interface requirements were met, and that potential malfunctions that could occur and corrective actions for the malfunction were not discusse This failure to provide an adequate procedure in conjunction with the breakdown in communications between operations and performance personnel is identified as a violation (287/88-28-02):
Inadequate testing procedure resulting in a violation of TS 3. Degraded Performance of Reactor Building Cooling Units (RBCUs)
On August 19, 1988, the licensee reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 that testing indicated Unit 3 RBCUs cooler performance had significantly degraded over the most recent operating cycle (EOC-10).
Unit 3 was in a scheduled end of cycle refueling outag The data obtained indicated that the thermal performance of the coolers had degraded (due to. service induced fouling of the heat transfer surfaces) to a point where they would remove less containment building residual heat than is required for the worst case analyzed LOCA conditio On September 2, Duke Nuclear Safety Analysis completed an operability evaluation (the performance of the RBCUs was
combined with the performance level of the Low Pressure Injection (LPI) Coolers at existing lakewater temperatures to determine overall system heat removal capability) which concluded that Unit 3 should have been operating at a maximum power level of 91 percent of full power at the end of the cycle. This 91 percent limit was a result of analysis of the Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA)
requirements of the the RBCU and LPI system (Combined heat removal capability of the RBCU's and LPI coolers is sufficient to remove heat at the 30 minute time frame after injection phase of LOCA is completed.)
Additionally, the operability evaluation concluded that the power level of Unit 3 should have been limited to 93 percent of full power to assure the combined heat removal capability of the RBCU's and LPI coolers was sufficient to maintain the containment temperature profile within the environmental qualification requirements after a LOCA. The normal plant operation requirements of the RBCU's and LPI coolers were capable of being satisfied by the existing RBCU and LPI cooler capacity at the end of the cycl Technical Specification 3.3.5 requires that with the reactor critical all three RBCU's and associated ESF valves shall be operabl The above operability evaluation indicates that these technical specification requirements were violated during operating cycle - 1 The inspectors have been closely following the licensee actions as this situation developed, including close examination of the involved calculations and testing methodolog A meeting was held on September 8, 1988, at ONS between NRR and Region II representatives and the licensee to discuss the problem. Attached to this inspection report is the outline provided at this meetin The outline sets forth the history behind the discovery of the problem, the current status of the units and corrective action (Inspection reports 269,270,287/87-13, 87-17, 87-29, and 88-08 contain additional details relating to this issue.)
Although the licensee has not yet determined the mechanism of the fouling or the rate of fouling accumulation, a schedule of target dates to obtain data on Unit 1 and Unit 2 RBCU's (requires Reactor Building entry at power) has been set to ensure the fouling will not cause a loss of heat removal capability below that required:
Uni-t 1 -
On August 18, 1988, data was obtained and
. determination of the. thermal performance and fouling factor was made in response to the Unit 3 situatio By September 30, 1988, an additional set o.f data (the third data poi.nt) will be taken and utilized to more closely determine an approximate rate of foulin Although at this time the licensee anticipates obtaining more data at monthly intervals,this periodicity may shift based on the projected fouling rate as refined by subsequent data point Unit 2 -
Although no degradation has yet been identified (by differential temperature trends)
on Unit 2, the licensee will make a Reactor Building entry and obtain data to determine RBCU performance by October 11, 198 These coolers were recently cleaned and *the unit has been operating for a relatively short time since the cleanin This date may also shift based on the results of the Unit 1 dat On Units 1 and 2 these measurements will be taken on the 'A' and 'C'
RBCU coolers only as the 'B'
RBCU is not normally running and Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) is normally isolated to the coole Unit 3 -
Prior to startup from the current outage, (scheduled for September 23, 1988) the licensee will measure the thermal performance of all three RBCU' Again this data and the Unit 1 data will be utilized to determine future testing intervals, but currently data is scheduled to be obtained quarterl During their review of the testing results the inspectors noted that the data utilized to calculate the performance of the Unit 3 RBCU's may have contained some inaccuracies due to questionable positions of several dampers on the discharge of the RBCU's. (While these dampers may have affected the quality of the measurements utilized to determine operability of the RBCU's they would have no effect on actual RBCU air flow during an Engineered Safeguards actuation since a different RBCU discharge flowpath would be utilized in that case, Inspection Report 269,270,287/88-08 contains details on this function). While previous testing has indicated that the 'B'
RBCU cooler does not foul as rapidly as the other RBCU's, the Unit 3 data indicated that the '3B'
RBCU had degraded much worse than the '3A'
and '3C' coolers. Since the worst two RBCUs and worst LPI cooler are utilized to determine the operability of the system, the apparent large degradation of the 'B'
cooler significantly affected the operability evaluatio Additionally it has not yet been resolved if the loss of thermal performance was caused primarily by water side (.inside of tube containing LPSW) or air side (boron and dust deposits on air fins and outside of tubes) fouling. While the water side fouling factor will probably be relatively easy to project once more data is obtained, air side fouling (principally boron precipitation on the cooler surfaces) will be more difficult to project and would have many.more variables involve The inspectors will continue to closely monitor the licensee's actions on this matter including improvements in techniques employed to monitor and determine performance capabilit The operation of Unit 3 with coolers degraded beyond required capacity is a violation of TS 3.3.5 and will be the subject of subsequent NRC revie This is identified as Violation 287/88-28-03: Operation with Degraded Reactor Building Cooling Unit. Surveillance Testing (61726)
Surveillance tests were reviewed by the inspectors to verify procedural and performance adequacy. The completed tests reviewed were examined for necessary test prerequisites, instructions, acceptance criteria, technical content, authorization to begin work, data collection, independent verifi cation where required, handling of deficiencies noted, and review of completed work. The tests witnessed, in whole or in part, were inspected to determine that approved procedures were available, test equipment was calibrated, prerequisites were met, tests were conducted according to procedure, test results were acceptable and systems restoration was complete Surveillances reviewed and/or witnessed in whole or in part:
PT/2/A/0150/22 Valve Functional Test (LPSW)
PT/2/A/600/01 Periodic Instrument Surveillance OP/3/A/1502/07 Refueling Procedure IP/0/B/275/005H Calibration of Low Pressure Service Water Flow Meter 2FT156 No violations or deviations were identifie. Maintenance Activities (62703)
Maintenance activities were observed and/or reviewed during the reporting period to verify that work was performed by qualified personnel and that approved procedures in use adequately described work that was not within the skill of the trade. Activities, procedures and work requests were examined to verify proper authorization to begin work, provisions for fire, cleanliness, and exposure control, proper return of equipment to service, and that limiting conditions for operation were me Maintenance reviewed and/or witnessed in whole or in part:
WR 92700C Troubleshooting and Repairs to Correct 2B Motor Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump Low Cooling Water Flow WR 92691C Troubleshooting and Repairs to Correct Unit 1 and 2
'C' Low Pressure Service Water Failure to Operate Under Some Load Shed Conditions
Other maintenance observed included many activities associated with the Unit 3 outage. (See paragraph 7)
No violations or deviations were identifie. Safeguards and Radiological Controls Activities (71709)
In the course of the monthly activities, the Resident Inspectors included review of portions of the licensee's physical security activities. *The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities which included; protected and vital areas access controls, searching of personnel, packages and vehicles, badge issuance and retrieval, escorting of visitors, patrols and compensatory posts. The inspectors observed protected area lighting and protected and vital areas barrier integrity, and verified interfaces between the security organization and operations or maintenahc In addition, the inspectors toured the new Radwaste Facility during this inspection perio No violations or deviations were identifie. Unit 3 End Of Cycle 10 Refueling Outage Unit 3 performed a normal reduction in power and took the generator off the line at about 8:00 on August 1 Cooldown was continued to establish plant conditions for the beginning of the overhaul. Higher than expected contamination levels were encountered in the reactor building and also upon entry into the high pressure turbine and various other secondary components. This has been attributed to the minor fuel leakage combined with the small steam generator tube leaks discovered during the latter part of cycle 10. Major work items to be accomplished during this outage are: the inspection and repair of the high pressure turbine, installation of nozzle dams in each steam generator, tube sleeving in each steam generator, and several nuclear station modifications. Removal of all fuel from the vessel commenced on August 24 and was completed on August 27 with no significant delays or problem The duration of the outage is scheduled for forty-four day Included in the surveillance of the refueling activities was a detailed review of OP/3/A/1502/07, Refueling Procedure dated 6/27/88. Several comments were discussed and resolved with the license.
Safety System Functional Inspection Report Followup There was one item left remaining on this inspection report (50-269, 270,287/86-16). This item was an item of concern and was not.given an identification numbe This item was addressed in sections 2.1.4 and 3.4.10 and addressed extensive operator reliance on instrumentation and control equipment that was not safety related and a related finding that the licensee had conducted no analysis to assure that sufficient time
existed for the operator to recognize and compensate for malfunctioning or degraded performance of control grade instrumentation in the emergency feedwater (EFW)
syste The licensee formed a task force of design engineering and nuclear production personnel to evaluate the EFW system control grade equipment and operator responses to determine if changes were needed and assess the system operational capability. This review was performed in the latter part of 1986 and in early 1987 and the conclusions of the task force findings detailed in a report issued April 17, 198 Although the task force made several recommendations for system modifications to enhance system reliability, the task force concluded that the existing EFW system was fully operational and reliable. The inspector reviewed this report and reviewed the station modifications listing to determine that the recommendations were being pursue With this item a review of report 86-16 was conducted and all items addressed in the report have been reviewed and discussed in various Region II inspection report.
Inspection of Open Items (92701)
The following open items are being closed based on review of licensee reports, inspection, record review, and discussions with licensee personnel, as appropriat a. (Closed)
LER 269/88-09:.Reactor Trip Due to Personnel Error and Equipment Failur This LER was submitted to the NRC in corre spondence dated August 4, 198 The inspectors have reviewed the incident and corrective actions addressed in the LER and consider this item close (Closed) Unresolved Item 287/88-08-06:
Runback during Control Rod Drive (CRD)
System Maintenanc The inspectors reviewed the licensee's investigation and concur with the root cause identified as inadequate communication (between the Instrument and Electrical (I&E)
technician and the control room operator).
Contributing factors included a failure to follow procedure on the part the I&E technicia While the subject of adequate communications remains a potential problem area overall and several recent issues have been attributed to some type of communication weakness, the inspectors reviewed the corrective actions taken addressing this incident and found them to be sufficient. Based on this review, this item is close.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on September 16, 1988, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 abov The following items were discussed in detail:
Item Number Status Description/Reference Paragraph 269/84-33-02, Closed Unauthorized Disposal of Licensed 270/84-30-02, Radioactive Material 287/84-34-02 LER 269/88-09 Closed Reactor Trip Due to Personnel Error and Equipment Failure 287/88-08-06 Closed Runback During Control Rod Drive System Maintenance 269,270,287/88-13-06 Open Configuration Control Inadequacies in the ES and RPS Cabinets 287/88-28-01 Open Failure to Follow Procedure Resulting in Violation of TS 3.1. /88-28-02 Open Inadequate Testing Procedure Resulting in a Violation of TS 3. /88-28-03 Open Operation with Degraded Reactor Building Cooling Units The licensee representatives present offered no dissenting comments, nor did they identify as proprietary any of the information reviewed by the inspectors during the course of their inspectio Attachment:
Agenda
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