IR 05000269/1988004
| ML16161A965 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 03/15/1988 |
| From: | Blake J, Economos N NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16161A964 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-88-04, 50-269-88-4, 50-270-88-04, 50-270-88-4, 50-287-88-04, 50-287-88-4, NUDOCS 8803250286 | |
| Download: ML16161A965 (11) | |
Text
k REG, UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-269/88-04, 50-270/88-04, and 50-287/88-04 Licensee:
Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Docket Nos.: 50-269, 50-270, License Nos.: DPR-38, DPR-47, and and 50-287 DPR-55 Facility Name:
Oconee 1, 2., and 3 Inspection Cond t'eflfebruary 16-19 and 22-25, 1988 Inspect r:
Apprg N
p mDate Signed
/4 Appr ed
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J
./AB!-ake, Section Chief Date Signed E gieering Branch
,oivision of Reactor Safety SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, unannounced inspection was in the areas of Inservice Inspection (ISI) of Oconee Unit-2, including Eddy Current Testing (ET)
of Once Through Steam Generator (OTSG)
tubes, Ultrasonic Examination (UT)
of reactor vessel flange to shell weld and safety-related piping; radiographic examination of other pipe welds; feedwater nozzle spray head replacement; OTSG nozzle dam retention ring installation; pipe/fitting erosion inspection; and valve maintenanc Results:
In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie SSO3250286:E S3'21 pi ADOCK 05000269
REPORT DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- J. R. Brackett, Station QA Manager C. B. Cheezem, QA Engineer, ISI E. T. Few, Technical Inoport Engineers, Maintenance C. L. Harlin, Compliance Specialist
- M. A. Hipps, Technical Support Engineer, OTSG Maintenance Project Manager W. R. Hunt, QA Engineer - Technical Support, ISI D. R. Jones, Valve Repair Coordinator F. B. Owens, Compliance Specialist
- M. S. Tuckman, Station Manager J. R. VanSurdam, Technical Support Engineer, Valve Maintenance Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personne Other Organizations Babcock and Wilcox (B&W), Special Products Integrated Filed Services (SPIFS)
H. W. Stoppelmann, ISI Coordinator/Level II UT Examiner J. C. Walden, Level II, UT Examiner E. L. Evering, Principal Engineer B. Stallings, OTSG Coordinator Welding Services In T. Wiggins, Welding Engineer/Project Manager NRC Resident Inspectors P. Skinner, Senior Resident Inspector L. Wert, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 25, 1988, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 abov The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection finding No dissenting comments were received from the license.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters This subject was not addressed in the inspectio. Observation of Work and Work Activities Unit 3 (73753) Examiner Qualification The inspector reviewed the qualification documentation for the below listed examiners in the following areas:
employer's name; person certified; activity qualified to perform; effective period -of certification; signature of employer's designated representatives; basis used for certification; and annual visual acuity, color vision examination and periodic recertificatio Method-Level Company Examiner UT EC RI Duke Power I Company G. II A (DPC)
C. II A G. II B&W J. II A T-707 II M-242 I W. II A W. II b. Ultrasonic (UT) Examination The inspector observed the ultrasonic examination indicated belo The observations were compared with the applicable procedures and the Code ASME Section XI (80W80),
in the following areas:
availability of and compliance with approved Nondestructive Examination (NDE)
procedure; use of knowledgeable NDE personnel; use of NDE.personnel qualified to the proper level; type of apparatus used; extent of coverage of weldment; calibration requirements; search units; beam angles; DAC curves; reference level for monitoring discontinuities; method of demonstrating penetration; limits of evaluating and recording indications; recording significant indications; and acceptance limit Item N Description Identification E04.001.001 Al Discharge 2PDAl-47 Makeup Nozzle, HPI Safe End
Item N Description Identification (cont'd)
B01. 030.001A 0-180 from Flange 2RPV-WR19 Surface B01.030.001B 180-0 from Flange 2RPV-WR19 Surface The following listed ultrasonic equipment and materials certification records were reviewe Ultrasonic Instruments Manufacturer/Model S/N Tanametrics, Epoch 2002 Flaw Detector DB-12089 Ultrasonic Transducer(s)
40246, 40054,121105 K05229, B22275, E01705 E07636, B12182 Ultrasonic Calibration block(s)
50304, 40343 Ultrasonic Conplant; Ultragel No. 2 8551 With regard to Item E04.001.001, the inspector noted that the above UT examination included the entire length of the short pipe, safe end to nozzle well and pipe to reducer wel Also, the thermal sleeve welds were examined to verify integrit The flange to shell weld was examined from the flange surface manually with a 0 one inch diameter 2.25MHz transduce This examination identified a small indication located approximately 33 inches from the flange surface which placed it in the weld joint between closure Stud Holes #10 and #1 A follow-up examination with four other transducers, varying in size, frequency, angle beam and wave disclosed that indication was less than 20% DAC and, therefore, of minor significanc This evaluation was only preliminar A final determination will be made by the B&W Level III examiner in Lynchburg, Virgini Eddy Current (EC) Examination of Steam Generator (SG) Tubes, Unit 2 ISI activities during this outage included the Eddy Current Examina tion of tubes in "A" and "B" OTSG(s). Data acquisition and analysis were being performed by B& The approved B&W procedure ISI-418, Rev. 3 and related references are the governing document Examination was being performed with a multi-frequency technique and utilized the computerized MIZ-18 EC Examination System to analyze
tube integrity. Discussions with the licensee disclosed that as of February 25, 1988, the status of the examination was as follows:
OTSG "A" OTSG "B" Tubes Inspected 5705 8232 Tubes Analyzed 5113 7968 Tubes with 40%
through wall degradation
3 On February 19, 1988, the inspector observed by remote TV camera, the ongoing EC examination of tubes in OTSG "B".
During this time, the following tubes were examined:
Row Tube N, 2 and 3
6 and 7
9 and 10
12 and 13
15, 16 and 17 This work effort was performed to verify:
use of approved procedure and equipment; use of knowledgeable examination personnel with proper qualifications; proper recording of examination data; proper examina tion frequencies; calibration standard adequacy; and performance of calibration at proper interval On February 23, 1988, the inspector observed equipment calibration performed at three different times in OTSG "B".
This was documented in Tapes 80 and 81. Calibration and/or quality records were reviewed for the following items to verify completeness, accuracy and compliance to applicable specification MIZ-18 Computers S/N 2314AO7406 Model# HP9836 2314AO6077 Model# HP9836 2440810016 Model# HP9836 2440810018 Model# HP9836 Data Cartridge Recorder S/N 007 Model HCD 752 079 Model HCD 752 EC Probes MTBM -
1380 MTBM -
1361 EC Calibration Standard S/N 49155 Within the areas inspected, no violations are deviations were identifie Radiographic Examination, Units 1 and 2 The below listed radiographic film was reviewed to determine if radiographic quality was in accordance with the applicable procedure NDE-12 Rev. 5, Code requirements, and to specifically verify the following:
penetrameter type, size, and placement; penetrameter sensitivity; film density and density variation; film identification; film quality; and weld coverag Item N Weld N Size Comments C05.021.206 2-03A-67-14 6" x.562" No rejectable Indications (NRI)
C05.021.202 2-03A-10-61 6" x.562" NRI C05.021. 053 2-03-18.2-35 14" x.750" NRI E04.001.001A 2PDAl-47 3.5" x.750" Augmented ISI to monitor HPI thermal sleeve position and weld integrit C05.021.023 1-O1A-02-13B 26" x 8.75" NRI C05.021.025 1-01A-1.3- " x 1.164" NRI C05.021.028 1-01A-02-43B 8" x 9.06" NRI C05.021.031 1-01A-1.3-01 36" x 1.1164" NRI C05.021.035 1-01A-MS21A-A 24" x.969" NRI C05.021.036 1-01A-MS21A-D 24" x.969" NRI C05.021.037 1-01A-MS21A-F 24" x.969" NRI C05.021.042 1-01A-MS24B-A 24" x.969" NRI C05.021.043 1-01A-MNS24B-C 24" x.969" NRI C05.021.047 1-O1A-1.1-29E 12" x.562" NRI C05.021.049 1-01A-1.1-19 36" x 1.164" NRI CS.021.053 1-01A-mS4B-C 26" x.875" NRI
The inspectors reviewed the examination records for the above listed welds to determine compliance with procedure requirements for examination records and to determine if disposition of the welds radiographed was in compliance with applicable Code and specification requirement Within these areas, the inspector noted that the quality level, i.e.,
radiographic sensitivity in some instances, was such that the image of the specified hole of the penetrameter was not plainly visibl In other words, a qualified/trained individual using his knowledge and/or experience, could identify the location of the specified hole; but in these cases, it was not the image of the specified hole that was being observed, but rather a slightly darker granule of emulsion at the location of the hole, on the penetramete In reference to this subject, the applicable ASME/ASTM Standard SE-94 states that the quality level designation refers to the penetrameter thickness expressed as a percentage of specimen thickness and to the diameter of the penetrameter hole that must be reveale Paragraph T-261 of ASME Section V states that radiography shall be performed with a technique of sufficient sensitivity to display the penetrameter image and the specified hole..... the inspector discussed this observation/concern with site management and technical personnel who agreed to look further into this are The inspector will continue to review radiographs in future inspections and monitor this conditio In addition, the inspector witnessed QA's review and evaluation of radiographs from six, 3" pipe welds in the radwaste system. These welds were fabricated and inspected in accordance with USAS B31.1 requirements. The inspector noted that even though QC had accepted the radiographs, QA requested five out of the six welds be reshot because of questionable technique (backscatter) and apparent fabrication related defects. In reference to this observation, the inspector indicated to management that although the program appeared to be working, radiographers and QC inspectors should be informed and corrective actions taken to improve their sensitivity to quality in this are Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie e. Once Through Steam Generator (OTSG) Main Feedwater Spray Nozzle Head Replacement, Unit 2 (37700)
Replacement of the main feedwater spray head nozzle was underwa The replacement was been prompted because erosion/corrosion degraded the perforated carbon steel nozzle spray heads to the extent that the desired spray pattern is no longer ther Discussion with cognizant licensee and contractor, Babcock and Wilcox (B&W)
personnel, disclosed that the replacement nozzle heads were made of inconel-600 material. B&W was in charge of the modification;
however, welding was being done in accordance with DPC qualified welding procedures. The licensee is in charge of QA/QC activitie The modification will be done in accordance with Oconee maintenance Procedure MP/O/A/1130/3 USAS B31.1 was listed as the applicable Code, and therefore, the governing document for welding and inspection requirement The following completed and in-process nozzle header welds were checked for compliance with applicable Code requirement Nozzle N Weld Status 2B26 Completed 2B14 Completed 2B20 Completed 2B24 In-process 2B32 In-process In addition, the inspector reviewed the applicable field weld data sheet, L-296, Rev. 0, for compliance with ASME Section IX require ments, reviewed performance qualification records for DPC welders JDS-379 and KJK-339, and quality records for filler metal wire NX46750HA, under QA #5414 Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie f. OTSG Nozzle Dam Retention Ring Installation At the time of this inspection, installation of the nozzle dam hold-down rings was in progress. This work effort was being done in order to facilitate the installation of nozzle dams in both cold legs of each OTSG in this unit, and thereby permit the isolation of the primary side of the OTSGs from the rest of the Reactor Coolant System (RCs) during a refueling shutdown. With the nozzle dams in place, the RCS and the refueling canal can be flooded to allow fuel movement while the primary side of the OTSGs remain dry, allowing access through the manway for such activities as tube sleeving. The ability to perform OTSG maintenance, repair and testing concurrent with refueling operations can significantly reduce the length of the outage. Similar nozzle dams have been used successfully at both McGuire and Catawb The subject rings were supplied by Nuclear Energy Services through Reno Machine Company, Inc.,
and are made from Inconel-600 per ASTM B564 materia The rings were being TIG (Tungstem Inert Gas) welded
in place by a remote automatic process and are considered as permanent fixtures within the OTSG(s). B&W, under contract from DPC, had overall project responsibility and as such, was designated as the repair organization under provisions of ASME Section X Welding of the rings to the OTSG was being performed by Welding Services, In of Atlanta Georig The rings were designed and fabricated as appurtenances in accordance with ASME Code Section III, 1983. By engineering analysis, the ring attachments and the welds were shown to have met the intent of the structural requirements of subsection N/G of Section III 1980 Edition, Winter 1980 Addend The inspector reviewed applicable controlling documents, welding procedures, welder performance qualifications, and related quality records. These documents included the following:
Work Request (WR)
-
52230G "Install Nozzle Dam Hold Down Rings Unreviewed Safety
-
Problem No. OSC-2591/7/31/87 Question Review of OTSG Nozzle Dams Weld Wire,
-
QA #54342, ERNICR-3.035"o Ht
/x4677D Inconel-82 Hold Down Rings
-
QA #54342, Dwg # 83D3888 Rev. 2 Welding Process
-
M 43135 Rev. 0 Specification Supporting PQR-A-43256-1 Rev. 0
-
A 43140 Rev. 0 Supporting -PQR-A 43256-2 Re M43136 Rev. A Supporting PQR A43256 Re Welder Performance
-
JMC, CAP, RU, LAW, LBL Qualification Records Remote Visual
"
tNDE-60A (R)
Exami nati on Procedure Because of. the relatively high radiation field inside the OSTG bowl, all entries were kept to a minimum. Accordingly, all welding and inspection was performed with the aid of remote control equipment and camera The inspector observed welds in progress in both OTSG Subsequent, visual inspection showed the surface appearance of the completed welds to be exceptionally goo Discussion with cognizant personnel and a review of inspection reports showed the welds in this unit were fabricated with little or no difficult Within the areas inspected, no deviations or violations were qualifie Pipe/fitting Erosion Inspection, Unit 2 Discussion with the engineer in charge of inspection and replacement of steam eroded balance of plant piping/fittings disclosed the followin The licensee's design groups selected ten locations for ultrasonic thickness measurements during this outag These locations were in the feedwater and condensate systems and in a part of the heater drain system downstream of the heater drain pump Items scheduled for or being inspected included reducers, elbows tees and certain valve bodies. The selection was based in part on EPRI's
"CHEC" analysis component model, developed under the NUMARC progra The licensee representative indicated that approximately 110 individual items had been inspected during this outag Of these, seven out of approximately 80, thus far evaluated, were found at or below a designated minimum wall thickness and would require replacement. The cognizant engineers stated that fittings made of stainless steel material were being used as replacement when available. Other material being used as replacement was ASTM-672 with Cr, Ni and C The latter was GE's Specification B50A242E discussed in Techncial Information Letter (TIL) 1009-Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie h. Valve Maintenance and Repair, Units 1, 2 and 3 The inspector met with the valve repair coordinator to help in selecting a repair on a safety-related valve that could be observed during the alloted tim The valve selected was a 6" crane gate Valve No. 2MS-84, located in the main steam line running through the turbine building. During the last refueling outage, this valve required some weld repairs on the bonnet and body. The weld repair on the valve body failed to pass NOE which required rewelding and remachinin The valve was repaired, reassembled and leak tested (VT-2) successfully. After the unit had returned to power, it was discovered that no NDE had been performed on the valve body following the second repai The licensee generated a Problem Investigation Report (PIR) which required the valve to be disassembled and the body re-examined on the following refueling outage. The work was scheduled to the performed under Work Request N W/R 5187S The inspector reviewed the
maintenance procedure, subject work request, and a portion of the testing (bluing of gate surfaces)
performed in preparation for assembly. The work crew discontinued the work effort; however, when the quality control inspection disclosed several small indentations on the blued gate seating surfac Following completion of this inspection effort, the inspector learned that the indications in question had been machined, inspected and the valve reassembled satisfactoril Discussions with the cognizant engineer provided an overview of the valve maintenance program. During the discussion, the inspector was provided with an internal document showing that repeat work rate on valves immediately following repair work had been reduced drasticall Apparently such problems as placing adjustments and operator oil leaks were causing significant scheduling and. manpower problem According to the report, the repeat rate for the Unit 1 outage was, down to 1.58% and down to §1.0% for the Mechanical Maintenance Services and Construction Maintenance Department Within the areas inspected, no deviations or violations were identified.