IR 05000269/1988033
| ML16127A261 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 11/23/1988 |
| From: | Skinner P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16127A260 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-88-33, 50-270-88-33, 50-287-88-33, NUDOCS 8812050282 | |
| Download: ML16127A261 (14) | |
Text
p REG, UNITED STATES
.oNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-269/88-33, 50-270/88-33, and 50-287/88-33 Licensee:
Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Docket Nos.: 50-269, 50-270, License Nos.: DPR-38, DPR-47, ahd and 50-287 DPR-55 Facility Name:
Oconee 1, 2, and'3 Inspection Conducted: Odtober 15 - November 15,'1988 Inspectors:
,(
a. Skinn
, Senior sident Inspector Dae Sgned
- L. D. Wert, Residen Inspector Date 5 ned Approved by:
.
-
///-._
_
T. A. Peebles, Section Chief Date Signed Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope:.
This routine, unannounced inspection involved resident inspection on-site in the areas of operations, surveillance testing, maintenance activities, safeguards and radiation protection, and inspection of open item Results: A weakness was identified in the licensee's program to assure all sliding links were in their proper configuration, paragraph Within the areas inspected, the following unresolved items* were identified:
-
Lee Station 100 kv transmission system potential inadequate design, paragraph Potential inadequate configuration control of sliding links, paragraph *Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or deviation :2 8S1 12:3 PDR ADOCK 05000269
REPORT DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted Licensee Employeesl
- M. Tuckman, Station Manager
- C. Boyd, Site Design Engineer Representative J. Brackett, Senior QA Manager M. Carter, Site Design Engineer Representative
- J. Davis, Technical Services Superintendent
- W. Foster, Maintenance Superintendent T. Glenn, Instrument and Electrical Support Engineer
- D. Havice, Instrument & Electrical Engineer
- P. Guill, Nudlear Licensing Engineer C. Harlin, Compliance Engineer D. Hubbard, Performance Engineer H. Lowery, Chairman, Oconee Safety Review Group J. McIntosh, Administrative Services Superintendent
- F. Owens, Assistant Engineer, Compliance
- G. :Rothenberger, Integrated'Scheduling Superintendent
- R. Sweigart, Operations Superintendent Other licensee employees contacted 'included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and staff engineer NRC-Resident Inspectors
- P. H. Skinner
- L. D. Wert
- Attended exit interview 2. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)
a. (Closed) Violation 287/88-28-03:
Operation With Degraded Reactor Reactor Building Cooling Units (RBCUs).
This item was identified in report 88-28 as being under consideration for escalated enforcement actio An enforcement conference was held on October 6, 1988 and documented in correspondence dated November 4, 198 This corre spondence identified that this item will not be cited as a violation since it resulted from matters not within the control of the license Since no Notice of Violation was issued, no additional actions are required in response to this reported item. However, LER 287/88-03 also addresses this issue. The inspectors will continue to follow the licensees progress on this issu b. (Open)
Unresolved Item 269,270,287/88-13-06:
Configuration Control Inadequacies In The ES and RPS Cabinets Electrical wiring discrepancies were identified in Paragraph 4.e of NRC Report 50-269, 270,. 287/88-13 dated..August 3, 198 These items are associated with the Reactor Protection System and the Engineered Safeguards Logi As a result :of this inspection, the licensee performed a sample inspection-of approximately 3b,000 wires/
terminations which identified numerous minor discrepancies with the connection drawing The inspectors reviewed the extent of the licensee inspection and determined that.it had addressed all.systems required to be operational in an emergency situation.'
The program included the physical examination of the wires/terminations,'licensee evaluations of drawing and wiring concerns, configuration control of electrical connection drawings, elementary wiring diagrams and schematics, and vendor drawing In general, the discrepancies, the licensee's evaluation of the discrepancies, the configuration control inadequacies, and the necessary corrective action indicates no existi-ng safety concer One specific-problem was identified and is discussed in the following paragraphs. Different types of electrical drawings 'are relied upon during the various phases of the facilities existence. The connec tion drawings are used more during the construction phase to provide interconnection requirements between components and the panel The discrepancies identified were with the connection drawing Elementary wiring diagrams and schematic drawings are used more during operation and testing of the facilit During plant operation, the connection drawings are used as the basis for modification Therefore, the need still exists for accurate connection drawing The elementary wiring diagrams and schematics provide the necessary information for design, training, troubleshooting, functional understanding of the circuits, and testing during the plant operations phase. In no instance were the elementary wiring diagrams or the electrical schematic drawings found to be in error or the circuits to be electrically incorrec For all the discrepancies identified, the problems were with the connection drawings and in several instances with vendor drawings concerning internal panel wirin During the licensee's inspection of Unit 3, an overload bypass contact for Engineered Safeguard (ES)
Channel 6 was found not connected (missing jumper). In the motor control circuit for Reactor Building Cooling Unit Fan 3B, Relay 3CR-70, contact 4Fa, the bypass contact was not connected as required by the elementary wiring diagram and schematic N OEE-338-18, Low Pressure Service Water
System, - Reactor Building Cooling Unit Fan "38".
This constitutes a failure to meet the requirements in 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawing Criteria V states, in part, activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by drawings and shall.-be accomplished in accordance with these drawing This apparent violation was discussed with the resident inspectors, and Regional personnel and since all the requirements specified in 10 CFR Part 2, appendix C,Section V, were satisfied, this violation is not cite.
The licensee replaced the missing jumper and performed an.Operability Evaluation, per Problem Investigation-Report 3-088-0197, dated'
September 2, 198 The Operability Evaluation stated that the worst case scenario has ES Channel 5 out of service during an accident conditio.Channel 5 'controls fan A&B and Channel 6 controls fans B& Fan A would stop running and would have to be started manually in accordance with emergency procedure EP/3/A/1800.1,*Section ES 505, in low spee Fan C would run in low speed with the overloads bypassed. Fan B would fail if an overload condition occurre The inspector discussed and reviewed the corrective action already cbmpleted or planned to be *taken by the license The licensee stated that the wiring/termination 'discrepancies would be corrected by either. changing the wiring/terminations in the panels to agree with the drawings or by revising the drawings to agree with the as-built configuration. Either method would be acceptabl. Plant Operations (7.1707)
a. The inspectors reviewed plant operations throughout the reporting period to verify conformance with regulatory requirements, technical specifications (TS), and administrative controls. Control room logs, shift turnover records, and equipment removal and restoration record were reviewed routinel Discussions were conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics, instrument &
electrical (I&E), and performance personne Activities within the control rooms were monitored on an almost daily basis. Inspections were conducted on day and on night shifts, during week days and on weekends. Some inspections were made during shift change in order to evaluate shift turnover performanc Actions observed were conducted as required by the licensee's Administrative Procedure The complement of licensed personnel on each shift inspected met or exceeded the requirements of Technical Specifica tions (TS).
Operators were responsive to plant annunciator alarms and were cognizant of plant condition Plant tours were taken throughout the reporting period on a routine basis. The areas toured included the following:
- Turbine Building Auxiliary Building Units 1, 2, and 3 Electrical Equipment Rooms Units 1, 2, and 3 Cable Spreading Rooms Station Yard Zone within the Protected Area Standby Shutdown Facility Units 1/2 Spent Fuel Pool Room During the plant tours, ongoing-activities, housekeeping, security, equipment status, and radiation control practices were observe All three Oconee units operated.at 100% power for the entire report-period with the exception of.Unit 3. which tripped twice on November 14, 1988 due-to turbine trips (See paragraph 3.b).
Unit 3*
was returned to operation on November 15, 198 On November 2, 1988, Senator Ernest Hollings toured the Oconee sit The Senator spent about one and a half hours onsite and met briefly with the resident inspector during the course of the tour:
b. Reactor Trips - Unit Three On November 14, 1988, at 7:27. a.m., Unit 3 reactor tripped from 100%
power. The trip was caused by "an anticipatory reactor trip on main turbine trip. The operators reduced secondary side pressure to about 950 psig to cau*se one of the main steam relief valves to fully sea No other problems occurred. An investigation could nof determine the cause of the turbines trip and the unit-was returned to-criticality at 11:54 and power escalation commence At 5:37 p.m. the power level had been increased to 39% when the main turbine tripped agai This caused a reactor runback but the reactor tripped on high reactor coolant system pressure although this transient should not have caused a reactor tri The trip of the main turbine was caused by a circuit identified as the Main Turbine Customer Tri Several independent signals feed this trip and the problem was isolated to a partial ground on a high *steam generator level circuit for the 2A once thru steam generato The faulty sensing module was replaced and the circuit tested sati'sfactoril As discussed above, the units should be capable of the loss of a main turbine from this power level without sustaining a reactor tri A review of the plant parameters and data associated with the trip indicate that the trip may have been caused by a combination of high xenon levels in the core which caused the rod insertion to decrease reactor power at a slower than expected rate in conjunction with rapidly decreasing feedwater flo The integrated-control system (ICS) cross limit circuits should have more closely matched reactor power and feedwater flow decreases to reduce the rate of change which would have reduced the pressure surge allowing the plant to sustain the turbine trip without a reactor trip. The licensee is continuing
- the investigation of the ICS to determine if the system performed as expecte The reactor was returned to criticality at 3:25 a.m. on November 15, 198 The inspectors are continuing to follow the licensee's action c. Inadequate Voltage Levels on Standby Bus When Powered From Lee
.
Station Gas.Turbines
.
On October 17, 1988, Design Engineering (DE)
completed preliminary calculations of the Oconee Standby Bus Voltage profile when the bus is being fed by a Lee gas turbin The.results of the calculation indicated that'a less than adequate voltage level could exist at the standby.bus if all three units transfer to the standby bus simulta neously in the event of a complete loss of offsite power (LOOP) or if the loss of coolant accident (LOCA) loads of one unit transfer to the standby bus followed by the transfer of LOOP loads.of two units in the event of a LOCA/LOOP. This calculation was generated in response to a finding identified in a Safety System Functional Inspection (SSFI)
conducted at Oonee Nuclear Station in Juhe 19 The
.
licensee responded to the NRC in correspondence dated October 1, 1986, which stated that calculations had been performed less formally for mod.ifications that occurred six or seven years prior to the SSFI and that these design"basis documents were being completed and file The' response. also ircluded a, commitment that if significant calculations were found to be not retrievable, then system capability would be verified by regenerating the analysis, testihg, operating experience, or documented design review In Duke Power Company internal correspondence dated August 11, 1986, the Lee Combustion Turbine Feed system to the ONS transformer CT5, was identified (as followup to the SSFI) as requiring design analysis 'to be performe Subsequent to the notification to operations personnel by Design Engineering (DE),
the Station 100 kv system was declared inoperabl A review was conducted to determine if the station has previously operated outside of TS requirements..The results of this review indicated that both Keowee units are removed from service 1) once per year for approximately 30 minutes to perform a flow test, 2) once every three years for less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for turbine inspections, and 3) have been removed twice since 1979 for re-wedge of the generators which requires less than 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> As a result of the finding that the Lee Station 100 kv system would not perform its design function for all postulated accidents, the licensee reported as required by 50.72 (b)(2)(iii)(D) and 50.73 (a)(2)(v)(D). The inadequacy of the Lee Station to perform its design function is identified as an Unresolved Item 269,270,287/88-33-01:
Lee Station 100 KV Transmis sion System Inadequate Design, pending additional review by NRC managemen d. SRO In The Control Room Exited Assigned Area On October 28, 1988, with both Units 1 and 2 operating at 100 percent full power, the Senior Reactor Operator (SRO)
who was designated as the "SRO in the Control.Room" on Units 1 and 2 mistakenly left that control room for a period of about 3 minute This was a violation of Oconee Nuclear Station Operations Management Procedure (OMP). 2-1
"Duties and Responsibilities of Reactor Operators, non licensed operators and the SRO in the Control Room" which requires the "SRO in the Control Room" to be within the boundaries of that control room (inside the CAD key doors) any time the unit is above cold shutdow Additionally it requires that the *SRO shall ensUre he is properly relieved prtor to crossing the boundary. - Technical Specification (.TS) 6.1.1.3 requires that an SRO shall be in 'the control room from which 'a unit is operated whenever the unit i above cold shutdow This TS was not violated since throughout the period that the "SRO in the Control Room" was not in the control room, the Shift Supervisor (an. active SRO)
and the Shift Technical Advisor (STA)
were both within the boundaries of the control"roo Narmally -with both Units 1 and 2 operating at, power there are at least three SROs assigned to the Unit 1/2 control room (in addition to the Shift Supervisor 'and STA) for each shift. Two of the SROs are designated "Unit Supervisors" and the other SRO is designated "the SRO in the Control Room". Unit supervisors are not restricted to the control room boundaries and frequently leave the control room in the course of their duties. The above incident occurred because one of the Unit Supervisors had relieved*"the SRO in the Control Room" and then. forgot that he was serving in that role and left the control room. He proceeded to the Unit 3 control room area, quickly realized his error and returned to the Unit 1/2 control roo (The other SROs assigned to the Unit 1/2 control room had left the control room previously except the Shift Supervisor and STA).
While no TS violation had occurred and the entire episode was corrected within about three minutes, the licensee realized the significance of this matter, promptly informed the resident inspec tors, 'and expeditiously initiated corrective actions to prevent any reoccurrenc The licensee has enacted an informal program which requires the "SRO in the Control Room" to install a clear plastic sleeve over his CAD key car The "SRO in the Control Room" would not be able to key out of the control room doors without removing this sleeve. Since there are no other documented similar instances at Oconee in the many years of operation, the inspectors consider this episode to be an isolated case and judge the licensee's corrective action to* be sufficient to prevent any reoccurrences in the futur *l7 e. Temporary Removal of a Senior Reactor Operator From Licensed Duties On October 27, 1988, an Oconee Senior Reactor Operator (SRO)
was removed from licensed duties by Operations management. The operator was suspected of being under the influence of alcohol when reporting to work. The SRO was tested for blood alcohol levels by a Duke.Power company physician. -Results were obtained on October 31, 1988, which indicated positiv The operator received disciplinary action in accordance with Duke policy and has been enrolled in the company's Employee Assistance Program (an extensive rehabilitation program).
f. Reduction in Facility Personnel On November 9, 1988, as part of a reduction in Duke Power Company personnel, a total of 42 personnel were terminated from various operating departments in the Nuclear Power Production Department. The process used was to have each individual that was terminated escorted by a supervisor throughout the termination proces This was
-
initiated since the individuals access to controlled areas was removed upon notificatio In addition to the NPD personnel terminated at Oconee, approximately 90 persons working for 'the Construction Maintenance Division at the site were also terminate No adverse operating effects have been observed as a result of this V-reduction in personnel at this tim 'No violations or deviations were identifie. Surveillance Testing (61726)
Surveillance tests were 'reviewed by the inspectors to'verify proceduraT and performance adequacy. The completed tests reviewed were examined for necessary test prerequisites, instructions, acceptance criteria, technical content, authorization to begin work,. data collection, independent verification where required, handling of deficiencies noted, and review of completed work. The tests witnessed, in whole or in part, were inspected to determine that approved procedures were available, test equipment was calibrated, prerequisites were met, tests were conducted according to procedure, test results were acceptable and systems restoration was complete Surveillances reviewed and witnessed in whole or in part:
IP 3A/0305/3A RPS Channel A On-line Test PT O/A/0400/06 SSF HVAC Service Water Pump Service Water Test PT/O/A/0600/15 Control Rod Movement Test (Unit 1)
No violations or deviations were identifie. Maintenance Activities (62703)
a. Maintenance activities were observed and/or reviewed during the reporting period to verify that work was performed by qualified personnel and that approved procedures i use adequately described work that was not within the skill of the trad Activities, procedures andwork requests were examined to verify proper authori zation to begin work, provisions for fire, cleanliness,, and exposure
control, proper return of equipment to service, and that,limitin conditions for operation were me Maintenance reviewed and witness'ed in whole or in part:
WR 051202H Repair Oil Leak'on Hydra-motor on Valve SSF-CCW 277 WR 17710C Repair Inlet Flange to IMS 93 MP/O/A/2000/4 Doble Testing (Safe Shutdown Facility Breakers)
b. Configuration C6ntrol Inadequacies Associated With Sliding Links On November 1, 1988, the Tesident inspector was 'informed by station compliance personnel that Oconee had written a Problem Investigation Rep"ort (PIR) to initiate an investigation by the -Safety Review Group into sliding links discovered inadvertently open (as the result of an inspection of links being conducted in response to a Catawba PIR on
'
sliding links).
The inspector immediately met with the Instrument and Electrical (I&E) personnel tasked with the link inspection. At that time all of the control room boards, the Safe Shutdown Facility boards and most of the cable room boards had been inspected'on Unit 3 and the same inspections were in progress on Units 1 and 2 in conjunction with the wiring discrepancy inspections that were being completed (See paragraph 2.b). At this time, while no safety related equipment had been affected by open sliding links, approximately 35 links had been discovered open that should have been shu Approximately one third of these open links were on shield cables to computer points (these links do not significantly affect the functioning of the computer indications) and many others were located in circuitry to the event recorders. A total of three annunciators were rendered inoperable (inappropriately)
by open sliding link A link had also been found open in the circuity associated with the Unit 1 'A' High Pressure Injection (HPI)
pum The open link defeated a feature which would automatically restart the 'A'
HPI pump and.a component cooling pump on a restoration of power following an undervoltage condition on the Main Feeder Busse *This circuit is a portion of a Reactor Coolant Pump seal protection feature. The link did not affect the Engineered Safeguards circuitry associated with the pump and also did not affect the manual operation of the pump. The inspector expressed concern that open sliding links were a significant problem and the scope of the proposed inspection
9 was far too narrow (at that time the inspection was limited to the control room and cable room panels and cabinets being inspected as a result of the wiring discrepancy issue scheduled to be complete by July 1989)
to ensure that no safety function were rendered.
inoperable by open links.. During a subsequent conference call with the resident inspector, other Region II personnel; and NRR, a
commitment was made.-by the licensee to inspect virtually all safety Yelated and importapt to safety links by November,7, 1988:
On November 7, fhat inspection was completed and as of November 10, 1988, the results were being evaluated on several. sliding. links discovered ope A total of 25 to 30 links were discovered open (out of about 60,000 links inspected),which should have been shut (excluding approximately 25 computer point cab*1e shields and links whose positions were simply not documented properly).
No safety related function had been affected by these link Another control room annunciator and several computer indicators have been found inoperable due to open link Several other application areas of sliding links were still being inspected and/or evaluated including the Keowee Hydrostation, the 230 kv Switchyard and panels in the Turbine Buildin This issue is identffied as Unresolved Item (269,270,287/88-33-02):
Potentfal Inadequate Configuration Control Associated With Sliding Links, pending completion of inspection for sliding links and evaluation of all open links. -The inspectors will closely follow licensee progress and corrective action o0 this issu Preliminary indications appear that some of the open links may be the result of-improper control during Nuclear.Station Modification wor During followup discussions with the licensee on this matter the resident' inspectors were informed that a partial -inspectiqn of control room panels on Unit 3 conducted on August 22, 1988, (initial response to the Catawba finding) had discovered eight open links which should have been shut. The I&E personnel involved with this inspection did not feel at that time that this indicated a signifi cant loss of control of sliding links. As.late as November 1, 1988, the licensee's intentions were still to inspect only links in panels in the control rooms and cable rooms although a PIR had been initiated to investigate the issue. The NRC inspectors consider that although no safety related functions have been discovered 'to be adversely affected by open links, inappropriately open sliding links, whether safety related or not, is a significant issu The licensee's actions to determine the scope of this issue and resolve it were not carried out in the typical vigorous and expeditious fashion the inspectors would have expecte This concern is considered a weakness and should be reviewed by licensee managemen No violations or deviations were identified
6. Safeguards and Radiological Controls Activities (71707)
In the course of the monthly activities, the Resident Inspectors included review of portions of the licensee's physical security activitie Th performance of various shifts of the security. force was observed in. the conduct of daily activities which included; protected and vital -areas, access controls, searching-of personnel, packages and vehicles, badge issuance and retrieval, escorting of. visitors, patrols and compensatory post The inspectors observed protectedarea lighting, and protected and. vital areas barrier integrity, and verified interfaces between the security organization and operations or maintenanc No violations or deviations were identifie. Licensed Operator Activities (71707 & 41701)
a. During the weeks of October 3 and October 17, 1988, regional inspectors conducted a modified version of Inspection Module 41701,
"Licensed Operator Training",
as well as Inspection Requirement 02.05 of Inspection Module 71707, "Operational Safety Verification".
The focus of the inspection was to obtain a "snapshot" view of licensed operator training, review -the >facility's process for integrating licensee events into the training program, inspect their program for tracking active and inactive licenses -as described in 10 CFR 55.53(e) and (f) and inspect,their program for tracking and evaluating the medical status of the licensed personnel as described in 1Q CFR 55
-
Subpart C, "Medical Requirements" and ANSI/ANS-3.4-1983, "Medical Certification and Monitoring of Persofinel Requiring Operator Licenses for Nuclear Power Plants".
b. No violations or inspector follow-up items were identifie Pertinent comments are as follows:
(1) Licensed operator simulator training was observed and found to be of meaningful content and well structured. Constructive and insightful feedback was provided by the evaluators and effective use was made of video replays in reviewing the simulator activitie There was significant operations department involvement via the presence of the Operations Superintendent and/or his primary assistant as evaluator (2) The facility's procedure for NRC license-maintenance, OMP 1-12, did not provide an adequate mechanism for tracking the 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> of parallel watchstanding required to return -an inactive licensee to active statu Additionally, the OMP referenced the wrong sections of 10 CFR 55 that define the requirements for license maintenanc The facility committed to resolving
these administrative problem (3)
The medical records of six personnel, including several individuals that have medical conditions on their license, were reviewed for compliance with ANS/ANSI-3.4. They were found to meet the applicable requirement The facility appeared to have an effective tracking system for scheduling biennial medical examinati6ns required by 10 CFR 55.2. Inspection of Open Items (92700)
The following open items are being closed based on review-of licensee reports,.inspection, record review, and discussions' with licensee-personnel, as appropriate:
(Open)
LER 287/88-03: Potential Degraded Performance of Reactor Building Cooling Units Due to Service Induced Fouling. During this report period the licensee has continued to periodically measure the thermal performance of the RBCUs as discussed in Inspection Reports 269,270,287/88-28 and 88-32 and during an enforcement conference on this matter on -October 6, 198 The frequency of the testing has been set to ensure that fouling will not.cause a loss of heat removal capability below that require While the licensee has made improvements in the accuracy of-measured parameters and overall testing methods, the mechanism of fouling and an accurate rate of fouling accumulation remain unresolve The licensee has not yet been able to confirm that calculations of the thermal.performance of the coolers have been yielding values significantly lower than actual thermal performances due to conservative errors id the heat transfer modeling portion of the calculatio The licensee's Nuclear Safety Analysis Section continued to utilize 'very conservative criteria (discusied in Inspection' Report 269,270,287/88-28) to determine overall system heat removal capability in the operability evalua tions. The current status of the RBCU testing is as follows:
Unit 1:
Latest testing conducted on November 8,'1988, indicate that the RBCUs can support 100 percent full power operation for a period well in excess of the end of cycle scheduled refueling outag (January 27, 1989).
This testing has provided more indications that the.25 percent per day fouling rate utilized in the operability determinations for all three units is conservative and the actual fouling rate seems to be much lower. The licensee has continued to apply the
.25 percent per day fouling rate to all operability evaluation Unit 2:
Most recent test was conducted on October 4, 1988 and indicated that the RBCUs can support full power operation through at least January 3, 198 More testing is scheduled well in advance of this dat Unit 3:.Latest test conducted on November 1, 1988, indicated that the RBCUs can support full power operation for at least 28 calendar days as of November 1, 1.98 Additional testing will be conducted well in advance of this date to ensure both operability and gather additional data to resolve this i5su The inspectors have continued to closely follow *the licensee',s actions on this matter., Very conservative assumptions including a lakewater temperature of 80 degrees F and a fouling rate of.25 percent per day continue to be applied to al.1 operability evalua tion The licerfsee't commitment to resolving this-.issue has resulted in testing at intervals set by these conservative evalua tions instead of lengthening testing intervals by utilizing more realistic but less conservative assumptions. Mbre testing along with the continued seasonal decrease in lakewater temperature should help resolve suspected conservative errors-in the heat transfer modeling
.
portion of the thermal performance c~alculations. The,inspectors will
- continue to monitor the licensee's actions on this matter.,
9. Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on November 15, 1988, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The following items were discussed in detail:
Item Number Status Description/Reference Paragraph 287/88-28-03 Closed Operation With Degraded Reactor Building Cooling Units, paragraph,270,287/88-13-06 Open Configuration Control Inadequacies in the ES -and RPS Cabinets, paragraph,270,287/88-33-01 Open Lee Station 100 KV Transmission System Inadequate Design, paragraph,270,287/88-33-02 Open Potential Inadequate Configuration Control Associated With Sliding Links, paragraph Item Number Status Description/Reference Paragraph (cont'd)
LER 287/88-03 Open Potential Degraded Performance of Reactor Building Cooling Units Due to Service Induced Fouling, paragraph 7 The licensee representatives present offered no dissenting comments, nor-did they identify as proprietary any of the information reviewed by the-inspectors during the course of their inspection.