ML19353A330
| ML19353A330 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 11/26/1980 |
| From: | Parker W DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19353A327 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8101080148 | |
| Download: ML19353A330 (3) | |
Text
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DUKE PowEn COMPANY _
Powra Butt.ntwo 422 SocTa Cutruen Srazzr, CnAut.oriz. N. C. asa4a 3
i i pq-4 WWAM O. PAR K E R. J R.
November 26, 1980 WCE PetssDENT 7ELEP=ONC AREA 7C4 373-4C83 STEa= P*ocuCwo=
Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission Region II 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Re: RII:FJ 50-269/80-32 50-270/80-28 50-287/80-25
Dear Sir:
With regard to R. C. Lewis' letter of November 3, 1980 which transmitted the subject inspection report, Duke Power Company does not consider the informa-tion contained therein to be proprietary.
Please find attach responses to the cited items of noncompliance.
V truly yours, j[I
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William O. Parker, Jr.
FTP:ses Attachment 81010801.48
DUKE POWER COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION Responses to IE Inspection Report 50-269/80-32, -270/80-28, -287/80-25 Ites A.
Technical Specification 3.7 prescribes the operability conditions for off-site and on-site electrical power sources for operation of station auxiliaries during reactor operation.
Contrary to the above, on July 10 and 11, 1980, Unit 3 was operated in a mode with only control grade automatic transfer capability between normal power source and startup power source.
The safety grade automatic transfer capability was out-of-service during these periods. Manual transfer capability was available at all times.
This is an infraction and applies to Unit 3.
Response
As described in Reportable Occurrence Report R0-287/80-9, Revision 2, personnel error resulted in the operation of Unit 3 for a period of time withcut a safety-grade method for transferring from the normal source to the startup source, although non-safety-grade means existed for performing this transfer and were proven operable by a reactor trip on July 11, 1980. Duke Power Company recognizes the seriousness of the actions resulting from this incident and is taking the following corrective actions to preclude a reoccurrence of this nature:
- 1) A Technical Specification revision is being drafted to make operability of the EPSL explicit with respect to allowed unit operation.
It is anticipated that this revision will be submitted to NRC January 1, 1981.
2)
Personnel training will be reviewed, evaluated, and modified as necessary to provide a better understanding of safety-related systems, their inter-dependencies, and the consequences of their inoperability. This specific incident will be reviewed with Operations personnel and additional training will be performed to assure a better understanding of the function and purpose of the Emergency Power Switchic3 Logic.
It is anticipated that this training will be completed by December 31, 1980.
- 3) A letter has been issued from the Oconee Station Manager to plant personnel which stresses the need for an adequate review to be performed prior to taking any actions for situations not specifically addressed in the Technical Specifications or the Final Safety Analysis Report.
This letter has been reviewed by Operations personnel.
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- 4) An interpretation of the Technical Specification definition of " Operable" has been prepared to clarify the applicability of this term with respect to associated systems and/or components. This interpretation was issued September 15, 1980.
- 5) Procedure changes have been prepared for the pre-heatup checklists on all Units' startup procedures which will verify operability of the Emergency Power Switching Logic prior to heating the Reactor above 200 F.
This will be implemented prior to December 31, 1980.
The corrective steps taken thus far have prevented similar occurrences of non-compliance.
.: is anticipated that implementation of the above corrective steps will produce re9ults which will avoid further non-compliance.
Full compliance of the corrective steps is anticipated to be achieved by January 1, 1981.
Item B.
As required by Technical Specification 6.1.2, procedure changes issued for temporary use must be approved by two members of the station staff, at least one of whom holds a Senior Reactor Operator's license on the unit.
These changes must also be reviewed by members of the station supervisory staff.
Contrary to the above, Change 12 to Instrument Procedure IP/0/A/3000/12, 1.32, did not conform in that:
(1) the safety evaluation was performed by an I&E Technician who did not recognize that the change would permit nonccaformance with Technical Specification 3.7; and, (2) temporary approval did not receive two signatures by station supervisory staff. Only one approval, by a senior Reactor Operator, was obtained.
This is an infraction and applies to Unit 3.
Response
This item resulted from personnel error, in that the personral involved did not follow the established procedures for processing of procedure revisions.
All I&E supervisory personnel have been reminded of the proper procedure revisions process.
In addition, safety analyses for procedure revisions are now performed only by supervisory personnel in the I&E section.
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