IR 05000266/1990006
| ML20033G640 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 03/28/1990 |
| From: | Dan Barss, Foster J, Patterson J, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20033G638 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-266-90-06, 50-266-90-6, 50-301-90-06, 50-301-90-6, NUDOCS 9004100449 | |
| Download: ML20033G640 (36) | |
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V. $. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS$10N REGION !!!
Reports No. 50 266/90006(OR$$); $0-301/900d(DR$$)
Docket Nos. 50-266; $0 301 License No. OPR-24; DPR-27 Licensee: Wisconsin Electric Power Company 231 West Michigan Milwaukee, WI $3201 Facility Name:
Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
Point Beach Site, Two Creeks, Wisconsin Inspection Conducted: March 13-16, 1990 Y
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Inspectors:
), Foster 3/2fs# [O
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/ e r
Dge f'
. Patterson J/rtho Date
0. Barss 3 [27/10
We0 h%->W D*\\*
Accompanying Personnel:
H. Simons G. Martin J. Gadzala C. Vandernett W. $wenson UIkbh CM Approved By: William Snell, Chief 2da/n Radiological Controls and Date Emergency Preparedness Section Inspection Summary Inspection on March 13-16,1990 (Reports No. 50-266/90006(DR$$):
LO-301/90006(DR$$))
Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection of the Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant annual emergency preparedness exercise involving observations by eight NRC representatives of key functions and locations during the exercise (IP 82301), exercise objective / scenario review (IP 82302), and followup on previously identified items (IP 92701).
5004100449 900329 PDR ADOC.K 05000266 O
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Results: No Exercise Weaknesses, Violations, Deficiencies or Deviations were identified. The licensee demonstrated an effective response te a complex hypothetical scenario involving multiple equipment failures and a large radiological release through an unmonitored release path, Exercise performance was considerably improved as compared to the 1989 exercise,
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DETAILS 1.
NRC Observers and Areas Observed J. Foster, Control Room (CR). Technical Support Center (TSC). Operations Support Center (0$C), Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
D. Barss, TSC G. Martin, OSC, In plant Teams J. Patterson, Field Monitoring Teams W. $wenson, EOF C. Vandernett, CR J. Gadzala, OSC H. Simons, CR, OSC, T$C EOF 2.
Persons Contacted Wisconsin Electric Power Company C. Fay, Vice President. Nuclear Power
- J. Zach, Plant Manager D. Stevens, Regulatory Specialist, Regulatory Services
- H. Gleason, Emergency Planning Coordinator
- R. Chojnacki, Quality Specialist Emergency Planning
'R. Seizert, Acting Regulatory Engineer, Regulatory services
'T. Malanowski, Engineer, Licensing
- F. Flentje, Administrative Specialist, Regulatory Services
- T. Kochler, General Superintendent, Maintenance
' Denotes those attending the NRC exit interview held on March 16, 1990.
The inspectors also contacted other licensee personnel during the course of the inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items (IP 92701)
a.
(Closed) Open Item No. 266/8B007-01:
Licensee procedures did not assure annual Emergency Plan training for all personnel assigned duties in their Emergency Plan.
The licensee revised their Emergency Plan on January 19, 1989, adding a requirement (Section 8.3.1.lb)
for specialized training for key plant personnel and those individuals assigned specific duties associated with the Emergency Plan.
Methods for accomplishing this annual training have been determined (Emergency Plan Training Course. TRCR 8.0, Revision 7),
and training is being provided. As noted below, a cumputerized training tracking system is now in place to' monitor accomplishment of the training program. This item is closed, b.
(Closed) Open item No. 266/89008-02:
During the 1989 annual Exercise, licensee personnel did not recognize and aggressively pursue the existence of the (scenario) containment release path.
The licensee responded to this item, indicating that no corrective action could
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be identified or implemented.
This position was not accepted by the NRC, and an additional response was requested.
A subsequent response indicated that timely release path recognition and aggressive termination response would be specified as drill or exercise objectives.
During the 1990 annual exercise, as detailed in Section 6 of this report, plant staff were cognizant of plant status and pursued timely mitigation and termination of the release of radioactive material to the environment. This item is closed, c.
(Closed) Open Item No. 266/89008-03: Operational Support (OSC)
procedures should be modified to require activation of the OSC concurrently with the Technical Support Center (TSC), to provide augmented manpower to carry out any T!C directed initiatives.
Discussion indicated that Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP) 1.3 (Revision 7) would have the OSC activate, at the Alert classification, up to the point of assuming OSC responsibilities for plant equipment function and maintenance. This is so that the normal maintenance organization can continue to function if OSC support is not required by conditions of the Alert.
Activation of the OSC concurrently with the TSC worked out well during this exercise, providing OSC resources at an earlier timeframe than they would otherwise have been available. This item is closed, d.
(Closed) Open Item No. 266/89008-05: During the 1989 annual Exercise, sample handling techniques were poorly demonstrated by field monitoring teams.
Licensee personnel indicated that c review of the training program did not identify inadequacies in the Health Physics The major concerns developed from review of the previous NRC area.
exercise findings related to field monitoring teams were hand contamination and possible sample cross-contamination, as vehicle contamination was expected under the scenario conditions.
The training department was requested to complete a Training Needs Analysis for field monitoring teams. During the 1990 annual exercise, as detailed in Section 6.e of this report, sample handling techniques were adequately demonstrated.
This item is closed.
e.
(Closed) Open Item No. 266/89013-01: More emphasis should be placed on the accurate documentation of Emergency Preparedness Training.
Per discussion with licensee personnel, an Emergency Preparedness Training review team performed an overview of related training, and revised the Emergency Plan training program and related documentation requirements. A computer 1:ed listing of the training performed, and each individuals' status as to current position qualification was reviewed and found adequate.
This system provides, for each individual with assigned Emergency Response duties, the following information: position, name, initial training date, last training, continuing training due date, EP overview due date, "JPM satisfied",and a qualification (yes/no) listing. This item is closed, j
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(Closed) Open Item No. 266/89013-02:
The licensee should assure that the training program is easily auditable and that the records of training provided are maintained in one area in order to verify the requirements of the training program are being met.
As noted above, the Emergency Preparedness training program has been reviewed, revised, and a computerized system now tracks implementation of the program.
This item is closed.
4.
General An exercise of the Point Beach Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan was conducted at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant on March 14, 1990.
The exercise tested the licensee's and offsite agencies' emergency support organizations'
capabilities to respond to a simulated accident scenario resulting in a major release of radioactive effluent.
This was classified as a " partial participation" exercise for the State of Wisconsin, although State involvement was almost at the full participation level.
This was a " full participation" exercise for Manitowoc County and Kewaunee County.
Attachment I describes the scope and Objectives of the exercise and Attachment 2 describes the Exercise $cenario, b.
General Observations a.
Procedures This exercise was conducted in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix E requirements using the Point Beach Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures, b.
Coordination The licensee's response was coordinated, orderly and timely.
If the scenario events had been real, the actions taken by the licensee would have been sufficient to permit State and local authorities to take appropriate actions to protect the public's health and safety, c.
Observers The licensee's observers monitored and critiqued this exercise along with eight NRC observers, d.
Exercise Critique A critique (Exit Interview) was held with the licensee and NRC representatives on March 16, 1990.
The NRC discussed the observed strengths and weaknesses during the exit interview. A public critique, where representatives of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the NRC presented their preliminary findings, was also conducted on March 16, 1990.
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6.
Specific Observations (IP 82301)
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Control Room (CR)
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As in previous years, a simulated Control Room was staged in a room l
above the real Control Room.
Terminals running in drill mode and
personal computers displaying plant alarms added realism to data i
presentation.
Discussion with licensee personnel indicated that a i
plant-specific simulator is in the process of development, and this
will significantly inprove the degree of Control Room exercise
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realism.
The current schedule for iniplementation of the simulator
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does not provide for readiness of the simulator in time for the
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1991 annual exercise.
Response of Control Room personnel to conditions displayed by the
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scenario was excellent.
Use of and knowledge of Abnormal Operating
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Procedures was apparent.
Proper procedural precautions were taken
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when severe weather was predicted.
On several occasions, Control
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Room personnel took anticipatory actions which, had events been
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real, would have significantly mitigated the effects of the
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accident.
Loss of the Instrument Air system was quickly identified, i
as were the symptoms of a steam generator tube rupture event.
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(EAls) pertaining to severe weather and high winds. A proper Alert classification was made upon reports of a tornado striking the
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plant.
Subsequent notifical. ions were properly made, per procedure.
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Plant announcements of emerg ency classifications-were timely, complete, and included the reason for the classification.
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During one portion of the exercise, Control Room Operators devised a creative way of cooling the reactor, even given the extensive
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scenario list of failed equipment.
This action was blocked by a
Controller to preserve the scenario timeline.
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On occasion, communication from the Technical Support Center (TSC)
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to the Control Room was not comprehensive.
For example, the TSC did (
not advise the Control Room of the status of the purge exhaust boot repair team for some time.
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At 1400 hours0.0162 days <br />0.389 hours <br />0.00231 weeks <br />5.327e-4 months <br /> the shift supervisor's logs were reviewed and it was i
noted that the last entry was at 1010 hours0.0117 days <br />0.281 hours <br />0.00167 weeks <br />3.84305e-4 months <br />.
Even though this was i
an exercise and not a real event, the logs should be better l
maintained to aid in the subsequent reconstruction of an accident and actions taken.
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Based upon the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable.
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b.
_ Technical support _ Center (TSC)
Activation of the TSC was quickly initiated following the Alert declaration.
Early arriving personnel placed the Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) system into the emergency mode of operation. A Duty Technical Assistant was assigned to start the "dinty diesel" and restore power to the TSC. The facility was declared functional at OBS3 hours.
The need for additional personnel qualified as communicators was promptly identified.
The TSC Manager directed that a general plant announcement be made directing personnel whose last nan,y began with A through K and qualified as communicators report to the 18 and 1/2 foot elevation Assembly Area.
From this pool of personnel necessary communicator assignments were made.
The Security Supervisor provided reports to the TSC Manager regarding visible damage identified by security surveillance cameras. The Security Supervisor also quickly determined that nonessential plant personnel should be sent to their homes.
Surveys of the plant aren were directed, because of the concern over the integrity of the Unit 2 containment.
Status boards were very well maintained throughout the exercise.
Significant parameter changes were brought to the attention of management personnel.
Emergency Action Levels and Protective Action Recomaendations (PARS) were continuously reviewed.
It was noted that the individual utilizing the Plant Process Computer System (PPC$) terminal had to consult several display screens to locate the information required for status board updates (this was also true in the Emergency Operations Facility).
This effort could be mace more efficient by providing for one or two display screens which mimic the format of the status board. A printout from such a screen can then be given to the status board writer, making the display terminal available for other use.
At 1002 hours0.0116 days <br />0.278 hours <br />0.00166 weeks <br />3.81261e-4 months <br />, conditions warranting classification of a General Emergency were identified, and the classification was properly made.
Initial notifications were made per the notification procedure.
When all notification callbacks were not received, the communicator followed up with additional notification contacts.
Record keeping, in various forms, appeared adequate.
Staff meetings were well conducted, without being overly lengthy. The use of a stenographer during staff meetings aided in recording issues discussed and decisions made at those meetings.
Accountability was completed at approximately 1024 hours0.0119 days <br />0.284 hours <br />0.00169 weeks <br />3.89632e-4 months <br /> (approximately 24 minutes elapsed time), without significant problems. This was considered excellent.
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TSC personnel were aware of overall plant status throughout the exercise. At one point, concern was expressed over the unrealistic plent " water balance" which had resulted from a minor scenario flaw (containment sump level should have been inuch higher).
TSC personnel gave consideration to taking a Post Accident $ ample System sample.
However, it was decided that obtaining such a sample should have lower priority than several ongoing activities, and a sample was not obtained.
Given the status of the scenario at that point, and the anticipated benefit of such a sample, this decision was prudent.
Maintaining radiation doses As-Low-As-Reasonably-Achieveable (ALARA)
considerations were evident.
Sending a crew to the switchyard to place a procedurally required tag was discussed at a staff meeting, and a proper decision was made not to send the team based on ALARA considerations. Health Physics personnel requested that TSC personnel periodically read their dosimeters.
Near the end of the exercise, shift staffing was evaluated and arrangements made for relief personnel.
While selected TSC personnel were advised of activation of the EOF and OSC, a public address announcement was not made.
Prioritization of T$C concerns was not evident.
For example, the Plant Operations Manager indicated that restoring function to the Instrument Air system should be a priorny, but no indication was given that this should be a higher priority than several other ongoing evolutions.
The licensee was very slow in obtaining results from offsite air samples to determine or confirm existence of an offsite release.
Field monitoring teams were available by 0900 hours0.0104 days <br />0.25 hours <br />0.00149 weeks <br />3.4245e-4 months <br /> to obtain air samples.
A known release was detected by alarming portal monitors at the South Gate house at 1007 hours0.0117 days <br />0.28 hours <br />0.00167 weeks <br />3.831635e-4 months <br />.
By 1047 hours0.0121 days <br />0.291 hours <br />0.00173 weeks <br />3.983835e-4 months <br />, on site readings of 80 mR/hr were identified confirming the release.
One field team had completed an air sample by 1102 hours0.0128 days <br />0.306 hours <br />0.00182 weeks <br />4.19311e-4 months <br />, yet, as late as 1231 hours0.0142 days <br />0.342 hours <br />0.00204 weeks <br />4.683955e-4 months <br />, the results of the analysis were still not available for use in performing dose calculations.
This delay of more than 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> to get results from an air sample is unacceptable, particularly when field teams were already dispatched and available to obtain samples.
Demonstration of the ability to obtain more timely results from air samples is considered an Open Item (No. 266/90006-01).
Based upon the above findings, with the exception of the Open Item, this portion of the licensee's prograin was acceptable.
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c.
Qperational Support Center (0$C]
Activation of the OSC concurrent with the T$C is now provided by procedure, This resulted in 05C assistance being more rapidly available.
Provisions of the exercise scenario and the efforts of OSC personnel resulted in a minimization of exercise simulation.
The OSC Director exerted himself to maintain an overview of OSC activities and coordinate efforts.
The OSC Director was continuously aware of the overall situation regarding the plant itself and in-plant team status.
The radio communications log was well maintained and communication repeat-backs were often utilized. /, newly installed public address system in the TSC/OSC area aided communications.
The physical separation between the OSC operations Director, HP Supervisor, Maintenance Supervisor and Chemistry Supervisor lead to problems with OSC activation, team briefings / debriefings, and OSC information flow.
It was also not clear how the security force activities were integrated with those uf the OSC.
The scope of the duties and responsibilities assigned to the OSC Operations Director should be reexamined and limited to allow greater attention to high priority tasks and to increase efficiency.
The OSC Operations Director was observed performing all of the following tasks; answering phones, filling out team dispatch paper work, interacting with OSC Supervisors, interacting with TSC staff, attending TSC staff meetings, gathering information, and conducting team briefings / debriefings.
This was considered an Open Item (No. 266/90006-02).
Poor prioritization and preplanning activities led to a less than timely response by the team formed to repair the instrument air line, it did not appear that the TSC formally assigned any priority to the request for this repair activity.
No effort was made to expedite the instrument air repair team preparation over those of any other team (e.g., dressing team out while tools and materials were gathered by others).
Late in the preparation process it was decided that two additional team members were needed, further delaying team dispatch.
When the team finally reached the repair point (a mockup was pre positioned), the hose line selected for the repair effort did not fit.
Failure of the hose fitting to fit could have been avoided by te:; ting in the shop, or taking along two sizes of hose.
Even though there was not enough information to guarantee that fixing the instrument air line would stop the release, there appeared to be no contingency planning in the event the attempt failed.
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The foiledng problems were noted concerning the decontamination activities attempted in the men's restroom in the 0$C/TSC area;
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There was a lack of supplies such as towels or decontamination soap.
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The sho m was inoperative due to lack of fixtures.
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The drains on the shower and sinks go directly to the sewer system.
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There was a risk of contaminating and losing access to the only men's room in the vicinity of the TSC/0$C.
Inplant radiological information received from teams was not consistently maintained on the wall mounted floor plan status board as specified in EPIP 4.2, OSC activation and operation, Section 3.13.
The following problems were observed relating to the in plant team preparation and tracking process:
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Copies of the Team $tatus form (gold and pink) were not 1egible.
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Practices for assigning team designations could lead to i
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confusion and communication problems (e.g., a team returns and is dispatched on a new job but retains the same name and number). At one time there were two teams in the field
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designated as " Maintenance Team #2".
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The amount of paperwork necessary for team dispatch and tracking is cumbersome and could be consolidated, l
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configuration of the facility should be re-examined. ' Discussions
were also held with licensee personnel relative to possible improvements in OSC status boards.
i Based upon the above findings, with the exception of the Open Item, I
this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable; however, the following item should be considered for improvement:
i The overall organization and configuration of the OSC should be reconsidered, d.
Emeroency Operations Facility (EOF)
EOF was set up and staffed quickly.
Except for the Emergency Support Manager (ESM) and Radeon/ Waste Manager (RCWM), the EOF appeared ready for operation by 1000 hours0.0116 days <br />0.278 hours <br />0.00165 weeks <br />3.805e-4 months <br />. The Offsite health
physics office was set up quickly and efficiently.
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Plant status and meteorology boards were updated regularly and the time of update was noted on the board. An updated meteorological
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forecast was obtained.
Good control of outgoing information was demonstrated.
The ESM approved outgoing communications and draft press releases.
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turnover.
Communicators were urged to use only the ESM approved
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materials and information distributed to them, not to disseminate i
information directly from the status boards.
Although the ESM and the RCWM arrived from the corporate offices at 1045 ho"es, the EOF did not pick up its duties from the TSC and i
become. Aly operational until 1150 hours0.0133 days <br />0.319 hours <br />0.0019 weeks <br />4.37575e-4 months <br />. Considering the fact that the EOF was set up and fully staf fed with their arrival, this
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delay in turnover was excessive.
Consideration should be given to
sequential assumption of EOF responsibilities as sufficient
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personnel are present to perform the required function.
Although the Meteorological and Dose Assessment system (MAD) was available in the EOF as early as 0930 hours0.0108 days <br />0.258 hours <br />0.00154 weeks <br />3.53865e-4 months <br /> the first dose l
assessments were not run until after the RCWM had arrived from the corporate office.
The NRC communicator sent out ti.e first event nctification update without obtaining approval from the ESM.
As a result, two conflicting reports were put out within minutes of each other. At 1124 hours0.013 days <br />0.312 hours <br />0.00186 weeks <br />4.27682e-4 months <br />, a press release was issued stating that no personnel contamination or overexposures had occurred. At 1130 hours0.0131 days <br />0.314 hours <br />0.00187 weeks <br />4.29965e-4 months <br />, the NRC event notification update indicated that personnel contamination and/or overexposures had occurred.
Unlike other EPIP forms used in the EOF, the event notification form does not include a block for the ESM's approval.
Inclusion of such an update approval block could help prevent such conflicting notifications.
At about 1354 hours0.0157 days <br />0.376 hours <br />0.00224 weeks <br />5.15197e-4 months <br />, to assure that Site Boundary Control Center ($BCC) building (housing the EOF) had not been subject to any radiciodine from the plume, the SBCC Iodine Detector was checked with its check source to determine whether it was operable.
Plant status briefings for the EOF should have been held more of ten.
EOF team members were not 'always current on changes to plant status or progress on restoration activities.
Although the information was generally available within the EOF, it was not communicated well to all team members.
The dose assessment program utilizes an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> release time as a default, and this is considered as conservative.
However, discussion bstween the dose assessment group and the engineering group, to obtain a more valid evaluation of the release duration was not observed.
Near the end of the exercise, as containment pressure
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was trending down, the 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> release duration estimate appeared to be overly conservative (as contaitsent pressure approacnes zero, a containment release stops).
Dose projection data was not updated on the status board during the af ternoon as updated projections had not been developed.
The RCWM was waiting for additional air sample data, but the boards could have been updated using other field data.
The dose projection provided to the State was not updated between 1202 hours0.0139 days <br />0.334 hours <br />0.00199 weeks <br />4.57361e-4 months <br /> and the termination of the exercise at 1529 hours0.0177 days <br />0.425 hours <br />0.00253 weeks <br />5.817845e-4 months <br />. While dose projections would have been trending downward, the State should receive more frequent dose projection updates to aid in overall decisionmaking.
This was consi6ered an Open Item (No. 266/90006-03).
Based on the above findings, with the exception of the Open Item, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable, e.
Field Monitori n Teams The monitoring equipment, dosimetry and other gear needed for the field teams were satisfactorily checked for operational capability at the Site Boundary Control Center ($BCC) prior to dispatching the two teams.
The initial briefing for the teams, given by the Assistant Health Physics Director (AHPD), was thorough and definitive in scope.
Team No.
2 was first dispatched at 0842 hours0.00975 days <br />0.234 hours <br />0.00139 weeks <br />3.20381e-4 months <br /> following the Alert declaration.
The Team Dispatcher, whose official title was Recorder, did a very good job in a stressful position.
Radio communications, as demonstrated by Team No. 2, were well disciplined, concise and with very few exceptions included "this is a drill" before and after messages.
Plant status updates, including meteorology information were frequently provided by the Team Dispatcher. As the event proceeded and radiation levels increased, the teams occasionally requested and received updated information.
These frequent updates on plant status and meteorology information were an improvement from that demonstrated in the 1989 annual exerci,e. At 0955 hours0.0111 days <br />0.265 hours <br />0.00158 weeks <br />3.633775e-4 months <br /> the teams received information that the facade sa the East side of the reactor building was damaged.
Radiation readings of 760 R/hr, plus 35 psig pressure in containment indicated a breach in the reactor coolant system boundary.
Also, the team was informed that a radioactive release could follow. The teams continued field monitoring as directed by the Team Dispatcher.
At approximately 1020 hours0.0118 days <br />0.283 hours <br />0.00169 weeks <br />3.8811e-4 months <br />, Team No. 2 donned Self Contained Breathing Apparatus ($CBA) when ambient radiation levels reached 45 mR/hr. They took air samples and a gaseous sample. Their sample handling techniques were generally very satisfactory; however, one error was observed.
The air sampler was placed on the hood of the vehicle in heavy rain and fog.
This was contrary to Procedure
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EPIP 7.3.1, Airborne Sampling and Direct Dose Rate $vrvey Guidelines,
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Section 4.2.2 The procedure stated that during inclement weather, such as rain and snow, the air sampler should be placed inside an open vehicle (near the rear floor area) or shielded in some other fashion.
Later in the exercise, this air sampling procedure was j
correctly performed, per procedure, in similer weather conditions, i
For both of these sampling assignments, the use of SCBAs with the earplug speaker / microphone units attached was very well demonstrated by both of the team member $.
Hcwever, at times, it was difficult to get good reception from the Team Dispatcher when both individuals j
had these units attached, i
$ ample contamination or examples of cross contamination were not identified during the exercise.
Plume tracking and ground i
deposition surveys were well conducted. Team No. 2 properly recorded I
all airborne sample data on the designated form. EPIP 7.31a, i
Emergency Plan Airborne Radiation Survey Record.
Requests for readings of team Self Reading Pocket Dosimeters ($RDs)
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This was
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particularly true when field radiation levels rapidly increased
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to 90 mR/hr (beta shield open).
Only one request for the teams to
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read their $RDs was received from approximately 1010 to 1040 hours0.012 days <br />0.289 hours <br />0.00172 weeks <br />3.9572e-4 months <br />.
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Although plant status updates were more frequent than in the 1989 exercise, there were a few occasions when the teams asked for updates and were told that conditions had not changed. Actual (
relevant plant conditions should have been repeated, then followed l
with a statemer.t that these conditions were the same as the last report.
The teams should not be expected to recall this information i
each time.
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i The Team Dispatcher, on advice from the Assistant HPD, correctly
directed the shuttle vehicle to deliver the field team samples by
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way of the North Gate entrance to the plant to avoid passing through the projected plume path.
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Between approximately 1120 hours0.013 days <br />0.311 hours <br />0.00185 weeks <br />4.2616e-4 months <br /> until 1250 hours0.0145 days <br />0.347 hours <br />0.00207 weeks <br />4.75625e-4 months <br /> there was no assignment given to Team No. 2.
With more direction from the EOF the j
team could have made some contributions in plume tracking or other
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assi nraents. At approximately 1440, the team took three soil
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samp es, four smear samples, one gaseous sample and an atmospheric f
iodine sample.
These samples were properly taken, packaged and labeled.
They should have asked the Team Dispatcher for the status of the release at approximately 1500 hours0.0174 days <br />0.417 hours <br />0.00248 weeks <br />5.7075e-4 months <br /> when such information was
not forthcoming.
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Overall, the field teams met their objectives and demonstrated capabilities which indicated they had been well trained, i
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i Based upon the above findings, this portion of the licensee's
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trogram was acceptable, f.
Joint Public Information Center (JPIC)
Operation of the JPIC was not directly observed. A review of press
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releases made during the exercise indicate that additional improvement is needed.
For example, a press release made at 1224 hours0.0142 days <br />0.34 hours <br />0.00202 weeks <br />4.65732e-4 months <br /> indicated that " emergency systems continue to operate l
normally. While this is essentially a true statement, no mention is made of the failed Instrument Air system, or the steam generator
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tube rupture.
Based upon the above findings, this portion of the licensee's
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program was acceptable.
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7.
Exercise Objective and Scenario Review (IP 82302)
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The licensee submitted the draft annual exercise scope and objectives l
within the timeframe goals established by NRC Region III.
A single copy l
of the scenario package was submitted for review, also within the
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established goals.
Scenario review did not indicate'any significant
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problem areas.
The licensee's scenario was considered complex and challenging, including: multiple equipment failures, loss of power, an unmonitored I
release path, and assembly / accountability, The degree of challenge in an exercise scenario is considered when assessing observed exercise
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weaknesses.
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By minimizing the use of simulation, additional opportunities for
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training were gained.
The use of the instrument air line mockup was
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highly innovative and greatly enhanced the reulism of that portion of the exercise.
During the initial phase of the simulated loss of offsite
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i power, power for the normal lighting systems in the TSC and OSC was
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actually interrupted.
Based upon the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was
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acceptable.
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f 8.
Exercise Control Overall, exercise control was considered very good.
No occurrences of l
controller prompting were observed.
t A problem with the simulation of annunciators ic the drill control roon
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was identified during the exercise. A personal computer was gtO m o to j
display annunciators actuated by the events in the planned scenario. The computer had an alarm beeper which sounded whenever a simulated annunciator was activated.
The beeper however, was too faint to be heard
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easily over the background noise in the room. As an example, this
resulted in the annunciator for containment high radiation being missed
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by the operator because he was not able hear the alarm beeper. By the time the beeper caught his attention, two nuisance alarms had been activated and the containment high radiation alarm was no longer on the display screen. The high radiation in containment was recognized by the operator a few moments later when a high steam line radiativ pipm was activated.
Consideration should be given to increase the volume of the computer alarm for easier recognition and a possible scrolling of annunciators to make the simulation more realistic.
The Control Room operators were not all aware of the simulated strip charts provided in the drill control room.
This indicated that a better pre-exercise tour of the drill control room should be given to ensure operators are aware of all available information sources at their disposal.
The scenario included an unrealistic plant " water balance" which resulted from a minor scenario flaw (containment sump level should have been much higher).
Based upon the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable, 9.
Licensee Criticues Immediately following the exercise, the licensee held facility critiques, a Controller exercise critique, and a critique where the Controller /
Evaluators and key players discussed their observations.
NRC personnel attended these critiques, and determined that significant NRC identified exercise deficiencies had also been identified by licensee personnel.
Based upon the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable.
10.
Oyen Items Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee which will be reviewed further by the inspector and which involves some actions on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. Open Items disclosed during this inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 6.b, 6.c, and 6.d of this report.
11.
Exit Interview (IP 30703)
The insoectors held an exit interview two days after the exercise on March 16, 1990, with the representatives denoted in Section 2.
The NRC Team Leader discussed the scope and findings of the inspection.
The Team Leader indicated that the licensee demonstrated an effective response to a complex hypothetical scenario involving multiple equipment failures and a large radiological release through an unmonitored release path.
The overall conclusion of the NRC evaluation team was that exercise performance was considerably improved as compared to the 1989 exercise.
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t The licensee was also asked if any of.the information discussed'during
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the exit interview was proprietary.
The licensee responded that none of
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the information was proprietary.
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Attachments:
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1.
Point Beach 1990 Annual
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. Exercise $ cope and Objectives.
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2.
Point Beach 1990 Annual f
Exercise $cenario Outline.
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EP EXERCISE 1990 l
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Section 4
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4.0 EMERGENCY ExtRCISE SC0FE i
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4.1 overview l
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4.1.1 The 1990 Point Beach Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan exercise
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i scenario will require activation of the Wisconsin Electric
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l TSC, OSC, EOF, JPIC and various corporate support facilities.
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i 4.1.2 The State of Wisconsin, Manitowoc and Kewaunee counties will
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participate.
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4.1.3 Scenario events will provide opportunities to identify,
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l classify and mitigate emergency events.
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l 4.1.4 Scenario events will escalate to the General Emergency level.
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4.1.5 Scenario events lead to an environmental release of radio-
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activity of sufficient magnitude to be tracked by field teams.
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4.1.6 Protective action recommendations will be required due to l
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plant conditions and a release of radionuclides to the
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environment.
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4.2 Sequence of Events
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4.2.1 The scenario begins with PBNP Unit 1 in cold shutdown with the 50 primary manways open, containment hatch locks
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defeated, and the generator and turbine are being readied to open for inspection. Unit 2 is operating at 100% power.
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Unit 2 is 29 hours3.356481e-4 days <br />0.00806 hours <br />4.794974e-5 weeks <br />1.10345e-5 months <br /> into a 48-hour LCO which was due to
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failure of a pressure test on the purge exhaust boot.
4.2.2 Severe weather warnings have been issued for the Northeast l
part of the state.
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4.2.3 Early in the scenario (0750) a tornado strikes the site, damaging the switchyard and the Unit 2 facade. The tornado
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strike warrants an ALERT classification.
This will result in the notification of offsite authorities and the activation of
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In view of the damage, it is
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possible that an evacuation and accountability will be conducted.
It is also possible that a Site Emergency could
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be declared if the players feel that structural damage to t
containment has occurred from the high winds (category 9).
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4.2.4 Switchyard Bus section 5 is severely damaged, resulting in a loss of BS-4 and BS-5 and a loss of AC to both units.
This challenges the operators to assess and plan for restoration of offsite power.
Both emergency diesels start. Unit 2 O
tripped as a result of the power loss.
There is NO automatic l
Safety Injection (SI) on Unit 2.
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l 4.2.5 Considerable damage has been done to the Unit 2 facade, I
d including the rupture of the 2 inch instrument air (IA)
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j header, which removes the capability to operate the MSIVs,
50 atmospheric reliefs, the SG blowdown valves, and air to
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f, the purge valves.
This damage results in a loss of cooldown (
capability. Assessment of the facade damage and development i
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of repair plans will challenge the TSC personnel. The i
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ruptured air header is expected to be isolated early in the l
process.
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j 4.2.6 Other tornado damage includes the loss of the backup (North)
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meteorological tower.
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I 4.2.7 With power loss precluding SG cooldown using the steam
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dumps, and both the physical damage and loss of air to i
atmospheries preventing their use, the SG safety valves cycle I
I to control pressure. The repeated cycling of these valves
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imparts a series of hydrostatic shocks to the system.
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4.2.8 Approximately two hours after the tornado strike, several j
events occur in rapid sequence which lead to an escalation
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j to a GENERAL EMERGENCY classification.
First, the main feedwater line to SG "B" breaks $n containment, allowing I
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the SG to blow down to containment and uncovering the SG tube i
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(EPIP 1.2+1, Category 3)
I 4.2.9 The added stress on SG "B" tube U-bends is postulated to i
cause the rupture of two tubes, initially creating a l
1200 gallon per minute leak into "B" SG and then into r
containment via the ruptured main feedline.
Coincident
with the SG tube breaks, fuel rods fail, significantly
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raising the amount of iodine and Noble gas being transferred i
into containment.
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4.2.10 With a purge valve boot leak already present (see Initial Conditions) and the loss of outer boot pressure due to IA
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system damage and accumulator bleed down, when the
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containment pressure rises, a leak develops through the purge exhaust boots and out through the severed purge exhaust
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piping, creating an unmonitored release to the environment.
Recognition of the failure of all three fission product barriers (fuel, RCS, and containment) will warrant a GENERAL i
EMERGENCY declaration and the issuance of protective action
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recommendations (PARS) for sheltering all sectors within the
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two mile radius and downwind sectors G, H, J, K, and L out to
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Escalated PARS will be based on dose projections by
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EP EXERCISC 1990 l
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Section 4 i
l 4.2.11 This unmonitored telease, when assessed using field values f
and an assumed 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> estimated release duration, warrants t
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evacuation FARs out to 5 miles downwind.
Precautionary t
evacuation of Two Rivers school children is anticipated.
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4.2.12 Effective damage assessment and maintenance activities are
i required to terminate the release.
Repairs must be made in
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in order to restore air to the purge valve outer boot.
This
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work will require emergency repair planning and demonstration
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of repair methods under challenging conditions of airborne i
radiation and high radiation levels.
The release vill f
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terminate when the appropriate actions are taken.
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4.2.13 When the release is terminated, conditions may be examined
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i in preparation for event recoven'.
It is expected that time
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recovery process.
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4.2.14 The exercise will be terminated at the discretion of the
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Lead Exercise controller, in coordination with Lead Facility i
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i EMERGENCY PUW OBJECTIVES - MARCH EXERCISE I
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3.0 OBJECTIVES l
l 3.1 Wisconsin Electric Power Company l
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i 3.1.1 Control Room
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I a.
Demonstrate the ability of control room staff to l
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correctly classify an emergency event using the EPIPs.
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b.
Demonstrate the ability to notify on site personnel of f
emergency classifications using the plant Gai tronics
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system, i
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Demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilise and i
l activate personnel for both facility and field based
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emergency functions based upon specified emergency action
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(This objective may be demonstrated from the
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d.
Demonstrate the ability to notify the State DEO and both lI counties of event classification within 15 minutes using EPIP 2.1.
(This objective may be demonstrated from the
TSC:)
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Demonstrate the ability to notify the NRC within one I
hour of event classification using EPIP 2.2.
(This objsetive may be demonstrated from the TSC.)
f.
Demonstrate the ability to coordinate and control the
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flow of event related information from the control room
to offsite authorities.
I g.
Demonstrate the ability to notify on-site personnel of an evacuation using the plant Gai-tronics and alarm system.
(This objective may, in part, be demonstrated from the TSC.)
h.
Demonstrate the ability to perform:
1.
An evacuation of plant personnel to predesignated
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on-site assembly areas.
(This objective may be demonstrated from the TSC.)
2.
An evacuation of contractor personnel to the SBCC.
(This objective may be demonstrated from the TSC.)
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EP EXERCISE 1990 l
Section 3
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Personnel accountability within about 30 minutes of (
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(This objective
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may be demonstrated from the TSC.)
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i NOTE: TOLLOWING COMPLETION OF PERSONNEL i
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j ACCOUNTABILITY, CONTRACTORS AND PLhWT
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EMPLOYEES NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE I
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EXERCISE WILL RETURN TO THEIR WORK STATIONS l
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AND WILL BE CONSIDERED INVISIBLE TO THE j
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RENh!NDER OF THE EXERCISE.
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Demonstrate the ability of control room staff to provide l
data in a timely fashion to the TSC.
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j. Demonstrate the ability to brief staff personnel on the i
status of other emergency response facilities including l
l the assumption of responsibilities.
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I EP EXERCISE 03-SO Section 6
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1120 Possible release of non-essential plant and contractor personnel from site.
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During the period until release termination, messages / cues will be provided to support:
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SG tube rupture response /cooldown
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Restoration of IA/ release termination
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Restoration of offsite AC power.
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(1030 to 1600) Release is terminated by participant actions.
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Onsite RECOVERY actions may begin if release terminated by participants.
1600 Release terminated by containment reaching atmospheric pressure.
(1700)
Termination of exercise by Lead Exercise Controller; critiques.
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EP EXERCISE 1990 Section 3
3.1.2 Technical Support Center a.
Demonstrate the ability to activate the TSC using the EPIPs.
b.
Demonstrate the ability to announce the activation of the TSC and the assumption of TSC responsibilities to appropriate personnel, c.
Demonstrate the ability of TSC staff to correctly classify an emergency event using the EPIPs.
d.
Demonstrate the ability to notify on-site personnel of emergency classification using the plant Gai-tronics system.
e.
Demonstrate the ability to conduct a plant evac.3ation to on-site assembly areas.
(This objective may be i
demonstrated from the control room.)
f.
Demonstrate the ability to develop appropriate offsite
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protective action recommendations using the EPIPs.
(This
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objective may be demonstrated from the EOF.)
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g.
Demonstrate the ability to notify the State DEG and both counties of event classification within 15 minutes.
l h.
Demonstrate the ability to notify the NRC within one hour of event classification using EPIP 2.2.
(This
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objective may be demonstrated from the EOF.)
1.
Demonstrate the ability of the TSC staff to identify the source of a radiological release in a timely manner, j.
Demonstrate the ability of the TSC staff to agressively pursue actions to terminate the release following its
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identification.
k.
Demonstrate the ability to analyze a radiological sample having elevated iodine levels and to report the results
to appropriate personnel.
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Demonstrate the ability to promptly obtain a reactor containment atmosphere sample (PASS) and complete an analysis of the sample within three hours of the decision to obtain a sample.
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EP EXERCISE 1990
'l Section 3
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Demonstrate the ability to maintain meteorological, plant j
and fission product barrier status boards with current data (e.g., not more than 30 minutes old).
I n.
Demonstrate the ability to provide regular (e.g., hourly)
status reports to appropriate state and county agencies.
(This objective may be demonstrated from the EOF.)
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Demonstrate the ability to provide regular (e.g., hourly
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status reports to the NRC.
(This objective may be
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demonstrated from the EOF.)
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Demonstrate the ability to assure contamination control l
in the TSC.
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Demonstrate the ability of TSC personnel to maintain an emergency reentry team status board.
r.
Demonstrate the ability of TSC personnel to maintain the personnel status board up-to-date, s.
Demonstrate the ability of TSC staff to provide accurate l
and timely information regarding plant and emergency
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event status to the EOF.
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Demonstrate the ability to monitor and control exposure
of all persons assigned to the TSC.
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Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, displays and other materials to support emergency
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operations.
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Demonstrate the ability to brief staff personnel on the status of other emergency response facilities including the assumption of responsibilities, v.
Demonstrate the ability to make appropriate protective action recommendations during an unmonitored release.
(May be demonstrated from the EOF.)
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i 3.1.3 Operations Support Center I
a.
Demonstrate the ability to activate the OSC using EPIPs.
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b.
Demonstrate the ability to announce the activation of the i
OSC and the assumption of the OSC responsibilities to l
appropriate personnel.
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Demonstrate the ability to brief staff personnel on the status of other emergency response facilities including
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EP EXERCISE 1990 Section 3 d.
Demonstrate the ability to dispatch and control in-plant reentry teams following the assumption of responsibilities by the OSC.
e.
Demonstrate the ability to assure contamination control in the OSC.
f.
Demonstrate the ability to organize, dispatch, and manage a damage assessment or repair team in accordance with the EPIPs.
g.
Demonstrate the ability of OSC personnel to maintain an emergency reentry team status board.
h.
Demonstrate the ability to monitor and control exposure of all persons assigned to the OSC.
1.
Demonstrate the ability of personnel using radios to communicate effectively.
j. Demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to properly outfit reentry teams with protective clothing based upon anticipated environmental conditions.
k.
Demonstrate the ability of OSC staff to keep dispatched teams informed of changes in plant status.
1.
Demonstrate the ability of the Health Physics director to direct on-site radiological monitoring teams.
)
m.
Demonstrate the use of respiratory protection equipment and associated communications equipment to support emergency response efforts, n.
Demonstrate the ability of supervisory staff (HP &
Chemistry) to keep.the OED informed of significant findings and/or events.
3.1.4 Emergency Operations Facility j
a.
Demonstrate the ability to activate the EOF using the
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Demonstrate the ability to adequately staff the EOF to support emergt:ncy operations.
c.
Demonstrate the ability to announce the activation of the EOF and the assumption of EOF responsibilities to appropriate personnel.
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EP EXERCISE 1990 Section 3 d.
Demonstrate the ability to brief staff personnel on the status of other emergency response facilities including the assumption of responsibilities, e.
Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities and displays to i-support emergency operations, f.
Demonstrate the ability to provide regular (e.g., hourly)
status reports to state and county offices of emergency government, g.
Demonstrate the ability to provide regular (e.g.,
hourly) status reports to the NRC.
h.
Demonstrate the ability to perform computer offsite dose and dose rate calculations.
1.
Demonstrate the ability to monicur and control exposure of all persons assigned to the EOF.
j. Demonstrate the ability to provide accurate and timely information to the JPIC.
k.
Demonstrate the ability to evaluate radiological survey information and recommend appropriate protective actions based on PAGs and plant conditions.
1.
Demonstrate the ability of supervisory staff (e.g., RCWM)
to keep the ESM informed of changes in plant / event status.
3.1.5 Offsite Health Physics Facility (OSNPF)
a.
Activate the OSHPF using the EPIPs.
i b.
Demonstrate the ability to mobilize and deploy field monitoring teams in a timely fashion.
Demonstrate the ability to maintain meteorological status c.
boards with recent data (e.g., not more than 30 minutes old).
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d.
Demonstrate the ability of personnel using radios to i
communicate effectively, Demonstrate the ability to routinely inform offsite e.
survey teams of changes in plant conditions and/or emergency classifications.
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EP EXERCISE 1990 i
Section 3 s
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C.
Demonstrate the ability of monitoring teams to perform
radiological surveys and report results.
g.
Demonstrate the ability of the offsite Health Physics director to coordinate mobile survey teams to perform radiological surveys.
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h.
Demonstrate the ability of the offsite Health Physics director to coordinate mobile survey teams to report l
survey results to appropriate emergency response facilities.
1.
Demonstrate the ability of the offsite Health Physics
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director to coordinate mobile survey teams to collect ambient air samples, j. Demonstrate the ability of the offsite Health Physics director to coordinate mobile survey teams to transport
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k.
Demonstrate the ability of the offsite Health Physics director to coordinate mobile survey teams to locate and track the plume.
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1.
Demonstrate appropriate equipmer.t and procedures for measurement of airborne radioiodine concentrations as low as E-07 pCi/cc in the presence of noble gases.
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Demonstrate the ability of monitoring teams to properly handle potentially contaminated samples to minimize the potential for cross-contamination and/or contamination spread.
n.
Demonstrate the ability to adequately staff the OSHPF to support emergency operations.
3.1.6 Security a.
Demonstrate the ability to accomplish personnel accountability within 30 minutes of a plant or limited plant evacuation, b.
Demonstrate the ability to control access to the plant site.
c.
Demonstrate the implementation of appropriate emergency response procedures.
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EP EXERCISE 1990 Section 3
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d.
Demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinete and control emergency activities, e.
Demonstrate the ability to connunicate with appropriate emergency response facilities.
3.1.7 Joint Public Information Center (JPIC)
Demonstrate the ability to staff the Corporate Emergency a.
Response-Public Information Center (CERPIC).
b.
Demonstrate the ability to mobilite JPIC staff and activate facilities promptly, c.
Demonstrate the ability to adequately staff the JPIC.
d.
Demonstrate the ability to provide accurate and timely information to the public.
e.
Demonstrate the ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate, and timely manner.
f.
Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate a utility rumor control program at the JPIC.
g.
Demonstrate the ability to provide advance coordination with offsite agencies of information released to the public, h.
Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities and displays i
to support emergency operations.
i. Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate company locations and offsite orgenizations.
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EP EXERCISE 1990 Section 3 i ;
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3.2 State of Wisconsin
3.2.1 Demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand and use
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emergency claswification levels (ECL) through the appropriate implementation of emergency functions and activities corresponding to ECLs as required by the scenario. The four ECLS are: Notification of unusual event, alert, site area emergency and general emergency.
(FEM #1)
3.2.2 Demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize and activate personnel for both facility and field-based emergency functions.
(FEM #2)
3.2.3 Demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate and control
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emergency activities.
(FER #3)
3.2.4 Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel.
(FER #4)
3.2.5 Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, displays
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and other materials to support emergency operations.
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(FEM #5)
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3.2.6 Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.
(FEM #6)
3.2.7 Demonstrate the appropriate equipment and procedures for determining field radiation measurements.
(FE M #7)
3.2.8 Demonstrate the appropriate equipment and procedures for the l
measurement of airborne radiciodine concentrations as low as 10~7
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microcurie per cc in the presence of noble gases.
(FEM #8)
3.2.9 Demonstrate the ability to obtain samples of particulate j
activity in the airborne plume and promptly perform laboratory analyses.
(FEM #9)
3.2.10 Demonstrate the ability, within the plume exposure pathway, to project dosage to the public via plume exposure, based on plant and field data.
(FEM #10)
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EP EXERCISE 199^
Section 3
3.2.11 Demonstrate the ability to make appropriate protective action decisions, based on projected or actual dosage, EPA PAGs, availability of adequate shelter, evacuation time estimates and other relevant factors.
(FEMA #11)
3.2.12 Demonstrate the ability to coordinate the formulation and dissemination of accurate information and instructions to the public in a timely fashion after the initial alert and notification has occurred.
(FEMA #13)
3.2.13 Demonstrate the ability to brief the media in an accurate, coordinated and timely manner.
(FEMA #14)
3.2.14 Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated and timely fashion.
(FEMA #15)
3.2.15 Demonstrate the ability to make the decision to recommend the use of KI to emergency workers and institutionalized persons, based on predetermined criteria, as well as to distribute and adninister it once the decision is made, if necessitated by radioiodine releases.
(FEMA #16)
3.2.16 Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures, facilities, equipment and personnel for the registration, radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuees.
(FEMA #21)
3.2.17 Demonstrate the adequacy of medical facilities equipment, procedures and personnel for handling contaminated, injured or exposed individuals.
(FEMA #24)
3.2.18 Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, supplies, i
procedures and personnel for decontamination of emergency
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workers, equipment and vehicles and for waste disposal.
(FEMA #25)
j 3.2.19 Demonstrate the ability to identify the need for and call upon federal and other outside support agencies'
assistance.
(FEMA #26)
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Section 3 3.3 Kewaunee County 3.3.1 Demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand and use emergency classification levels (ECL) through the appropriate implementation of emergency functions and activities corresponding to ECLS as required by the scenario. The four ECLS are: Notification of unusual event, alert, site area emergency and general emergency.
(FEMA #1)
3.3.2 Demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize and activate personnel for both facility and field-based emergency functions.
(FEMA #2)
3.3.3 Demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate and control emergency activities.- (FEMA #3)
3.3.4 Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel.
(FEMA #4)
3.3.5 Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, displays and other materials to support emergency operations. (FEMA #5)
3.3.6 Demanstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control l
emergency worker exposure.
(FEMA #6)
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3.3.7 Demonstrate the ability to initially alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and begin dissemination of an instructional message within 15 minutes'of a decision by appropriate state and/or local official (s).
(FEMA #12)
l 3.3.8 Demonstrate the ability to coordinate the formulation and dissemination of accurate information and instructions to i
the public in a timely fashion after the initial alert and notification has occurred.
(FEMA #13)
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3.3.9 Demonstrate the ability to brief the media in an accurate,
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coordinated and timely manner.
(FEMA #14)
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EP EXERCISE 1990 Section 3
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3.3.10 Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated and timely fashion.
(FEMA #15)
3.3.11 Demonstrate the ability to make the decision to recommend the use of KI to emergency workers and institutionalized persons, based on predetermined criteria, as well as to distribute and a& sinister it once the decision is made, if necessitated by radioiodine releases. -(FEMA #16)
3.3.12 Demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate protective actions for the impacted permanent and transient plume EPZ populations (including transit-dependent persons, special needs populations, handicapped persons and institutionalized persons).
(FEMA #18)
3.3.13 Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control evacuation traffic flow and to control access to evacuated and sheltered areas.
(FEMA #20)
3.3.14 Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures, facilities, equipment and personnel for the registration, radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuees.
(FEMA #21)
3.3.15 Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment and personnel for congregate care of evacuees.
(FEMA #22)
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3.3.16 Demonstrate the adequacy of vehicles, equipment, procedures and personnel for transporting contaminated, injured or exposed individuals.
(FEMA #23)
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EP EXERCISE 1990 Section 3 3.4 Manitowoe county 3.4.1 Demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand and use emergency classification levels (ECL) through the appropriate implementation of emergency functions and activities corresponding to ECLs as required by the scenario. The four ECLs are: Notification of unusual event, alert, site area emergency and general emergency.' (FEMA #1)
t 3.4.2 Demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize and activate personnel for both facility and field-based emergency functions.
(FEMA #2)
3.4.3 Demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate and control emergency activities.
(FEMA #3)
3.4.4 Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel.
(FEMA #4)
3.4.5 Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, displays and other materials to support emergency operations.
(FEMA #5)
3.4.6 Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.
(FEMA #6)
3.4.7 Deh,%% rate the ability to initially alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and begin dissemination of an instructional message within 15 minutes of a decision by appropriate state and/or local official (s).
(FEMA #12)
3.4.8 Demonstrate the ability to coordinate the formulation and dissemination of accurate information and instructions to the public in a timely fashion after the initial alert and notification has occurred.
(FEMA #13)
i 3.4.9 Demonstrate the ability to brief the media in an accurate, coordinated and timely manner.
(FEMA #14)
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3.4.10 Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated and timely fashion.
(FEMA #15)
3.4.11 Demonstrate the ability to make the decision to recommend the use of KI to emergency workers and institutionalized persons, based on predetermined criteria, as well as to distribute and administer it once the decision is made, if necessitated by radioiodine releases.
(FEMA #16)
3.4.12 Demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate protective actions for the impacted permanent and I
transient plume EPZ populations (including transit-dependent
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persons, special needs populations, handicapped persons and institutionalized persons).
(FEMA #18)
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3.4.13 Demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate protective actions for school children within the plume EPZ.
(FEMA #19)
3.4.14 Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control evacuation traffic flow and to control access to evacuated and sheltered areas.
(FEMA #20)
3.4.15 Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures, facilities, equipment and personnel for the registration, radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuees.
(FEMA #21)
3.4.16 Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment and personnel for congregate care of evacuees.
(FEMA #22)
3.4.17 Demonstrate the adequacy of vehicles, equipment, procedures and personnel for transporting contaminated, injured or exposed individuals.
(FEMA #23)
3.5 Evaluation The exercise is evaluated through observation by assigned controllers l
and evaluators. Each emergency facility will have the assigned lead
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facility controller who is responsible for the documentation of the i
performance of each facility objective. The following rating
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criteria is used to document performance.
Rating Criteria 1.
Satisfactory j
2.
Satisfactory with a few problems that may be subject to follow up.
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3.
Deficiency is noted. This deficiency, however would not
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j seriously affect our ability to protect the health and
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safety of the public and/or plant personnel.
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Deficiency is noted. This deficiency would affect our I
ability to protect the health and safety of the public i
and/or plant personnel.
j N/A Not applicable (e.g., you did not observe any activities i
related to this objective).
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The acceptance of performance for objectives is discussed at
controller meetings / training sessions. Most objective performance i
standards are based upon compliance with procedures and timely (
completion where appropriate.
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EP EXERCISE 03-90 Section 6 6.0 TIME SCHEDULE OF REAL AND SIMULATED SCENARIO EVENTS 0630 Exercise is initiated with shift turnover.
(0720)*
Operators go to AOP-13C, " Severe Weather Conditions," based on severe weather warnings from the PBNP System Control Center.
0735 Winds accelerate to 45-50 mph. AOP-13C initiated if not already done.
0748 Tornado sighted by guard and reported.
0750 Tornado strikes site Loss of offsite AC to both units.
I Unit 2 trips, No SI.
0750+**
Both emergency diesel generators start.
0750+
Instrument air lost due to Unit 2 facade damage - So atmospheric (s) lost; MSIV operation lost; purge supply / exhaust air lost; SG blowdown lost.
Operators initiate AOP-5B, " Loss of Instrument Air."
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0800 Steam generator safety valves cycling due to loss of normal cooldown function.
(0805)
ALERT declared based on EPIP 1.2, Category 9.
TSC activation initiated.
Possible evacuation / accountability based on initial tornado damage reports.
0810 First damage reports from facade and switchyard to control room.
South IA header recovered as per AOP-5B.
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(0815)
OSC activation initiated.
(0820)
Offsite agencies notified of the ALERT classification.
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- Parenthesis indicate approximate times which are dependent upon player actions.
- "+" indicated occurrence immediately following indicated time.
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EP EXERCISE 03-90 Section 6 (0835)
The technical support center is manned.
(0835)
CONTINGENCY: Declare ALERT.
0830 to 0950 More damage reports from facade area; SFP description; Met tower destruction may be reported; repair time estimates from switchyard.
(0850)
Ruptured IA North header isolated.
(0855)
Optional manning of the EOF begins.
(0905)
Technical support center is operational.
0930 Possible release of contractors and non-essential personnel.
0950 Main feedwater line break in containment.
0952 Steam generator tube rupture in "B" SG - initially at 1200 gpm.
q Massive fuel clad failure.
l 0957 Release from containment begins through purge exhaust boots.
(1010)
TSC declares GENERAL EMERGENCY and sets PARS for sheltering
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all sectors within 2 miles and downwind sectors to 5 miles.
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(1020)
Evacuation of plant personnel to assembly areas is conducted if not already accomplished.
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1020 Restoration of offsite AC proceeds with backfeed from Unit I complete, or (see 1100 entry).
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(1025)
Offsite agencies notified of GENERAL EMERGENCY and release.
(1032)
Radiation survey reports from facade /IA repair area.
l (1045)
Repair begins in IA damage area.
(Scenario does not allow repair completion until after 1030.)
1100 CORTINGENCY: Declare GENERAL EMERGENCY 1100 Restoration of offsite AC continues with backfeed Ur.it 2 complete.
(1115)
Based upon field readings offsite, escalated PARS should be set for evacuation in the keyhole out to 5 miles.
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