IR 05000266/1980015
| ML19343A744 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 10/15/1980 |
| From: | Guldemond W, Hague R, Warnick R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19343A742 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-266-80-15, 50-301-80-15, NUDOCS 8011210149 | |
| Download: ML19343A744 (7) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Reports No. 50-266/80-15; 50-301/80-15 Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301 Licenses No. DPR-24; DPR-27 Licensee: Wisconsin Electric Power Company 231 West Michigan Milwaukee, WI 53203 Facility Name: Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2 Inspection At: Point Beach Site, Two Creeks, WI Inspection Conducted: September 2-30, 1980 R FU) Fw-Inspectors:
W. G. Guldemond
/o-/f-Fo R.Fu) Fw-R. L. Hague
/ o- /f-80 RFLO U Approved By:
R. F. Warnick, Chief
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Projects Section 3 Inspection Su. mary Inspection on September 2-5, 8-12, 15-19, 22-26, 29-30, 1980 (Report No.
50-266/80-15; 50-301/80-15)
Areas Inspected: Routine resident inspection of operational safety veri-fication, monthly maintenance observation, monthly surveillance observation, followup on licensee event reports, IE Bulletin and IE Circular followup, review of plant operacions, followup on items of noncompliance, receipt of new fuel (Unit 1 only), and plant trips (Unit 2 only). The inspection involved a total of 197 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors in-cluding 50 inspector-hours during 'ffshifts.
Results: No items of noncompliance were identified.
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DETAILS
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Persons Contacted
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- G. A. Reed, Manager, Nuclear Operations
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E. Link, Assistant to the Manager T. J. Koehler, Operations Superintendent J. C. Reisenbuechler, I&C Engineer R. R. Weedon, Health Physicist J. J. Zach, Superintendent Technical Services T. F. Deddens, Superintendent Maintenance and Construction R. Krukowski, Security Supervisor
- F. A. Zeman, Office Supervisor The inspectors also talked with and interviewed members of the opera-tions, maintenance, health physics and instrument and control aections.
- Denotes cersonnel attending exit interviews.
2.
Operational Safety Verification The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the month of September. The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components.. Tours of both auxiliary buildings-
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and turbine buildings ~were conducted to observe plant equipment condi-tions, including potential fire hazards, fiufd leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The inspector by observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plaa was being implemented in accordance with the station security p7an.
The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. During the month of September, the inspector walked down the accessible portions of the safety injection, containment spray, and auxiliary feed systems to verify operability.
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under technical specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.
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No items of noncompli;nce were identified.
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Monthly Maintenance Observation Station maintenance activities of safety celated systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted-in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory gui6 s and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.
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The following items were considered during this review: the limiting
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conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; and, fire prevention controls were implemented.
Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.
The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:
Re-routing of Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Lines.
Following completion of maintenance on the emergency diesel generator fuel lines, the inspector verified that these systems had been returned to service properly.
During the inspection on September 29, 1980, of activities associated with re-routing the underground fuel supply line for the emergency diesel generators the inspector noted a temporary fuel supply line from a tank truck running through the doors between the diesel gener-ator roons. This is contrary to the fire barrier requirements pro-mulgated in the " Point Beach Nuclear-Plant Fire Protection Review" dated Jure, 1977. Section 4.8.10.1 of.this document, based ont APCSB9.5 1 Appendix A, Guideline Statement, states in part " Diesel generatorc should be separated from each other and other areas of the plant by fr e barriers having a minimum three hour fire resistance rating." Tht commitment to this standard is made in section 4.8.10.3, compliance, whlch states in part, "The diesel generator room walls will be upgradet' to 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rating, except the east wall which contains the outdoor relitf dampers." The situation was promptly rectified when brought to th attention of plant supervisory personnel.
No items of noncompliince were identified.
4.
Monthly Surveillance Observation The inspector observed technical specifications required surveillance testing on the reactor protection,. safety injection, and analog systems for Unit 1 (I&E 2.1, 2.3, 2.5) and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instru-mentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were e
set, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individua? directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
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The inspector also witnessed portions of the following test activities:
I&E 2.7 - Nuclear Instrument Surveillance Testing, and Monthly Technical
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Specification In-Core Flux Mapping.
On September 25, 1980, the licensee, as a resu)' ~' their followup the pump and valve investigation of a NRC identified noncompliar - related-to Technical inservice testing program, identified two it s.
Specification surveillance testing of the containment spray system.
The first item was failure to test spray additive valves in the manner and frequency prescribed in Technical Specification 15.4.5.II.B.2 This requirement states that, "The spray additive valves shall be With the pumps shut down and the refueling water tested as follows.
storage tank outlet valves closed, each valve will be opened and The spray additive valves were, closed by operator action monthly."
in fact, being tested only during cold shutdown periods and in accord-ance with a procedure which left the refueling water storage tank (RWST)
Leaving the RWST outlet valves open precludes making
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outlet valves open.
This fre-both trains of containment spray simultaneously inoperable.
quency and manner of testing was in accordance with the licensee's yet to be approved valve and pump testing program required by 10 CFR 50.55a which was submitted in 1977.
On September 26, after consultation with Region III and the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, the licensee received approval to test the spray additive valves in accordance with a more conservative procedure Using this procedure the
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which leaves the RWST outlet valves open.
valve test was completed on September 26, 1980. Furthermore,. the.
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licensee agreed-to submit a formal;TechnicainSpecification change-no:
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later than October 1,1980, to allow continued use of this procedure -
for the required monthly testing.
The second item relates to testing of containment spray pump discharge While the Technical Specifications do not explicitly call for valves.
testing of these valves, the basis for Technical Specification 15.4.5 states, "During reactor operation, the instrumentation which is depended on to initiate safety injection and containment spray is generally checked weekly and the initiating circuits are tested monthly (in accordance with Specification 15.4.1).
In addition, the active components (pumps and valves) are to be tested monthly to check operation of the starting cir-cuits.and to verify that the pumps are in satisfactory running order."
As the containment spray pump discharge valves are active components in the containment spray system the licensee had adopted a monthly test of these valves. The test precedure required that.both containment spray pump suction valver, from the 3WST be simultaneously shut to perform this This testing procedure was consistent with Technical Specification test.
4.5.II.B.2 which requires both RWST valves to be closed while the spray
additive tank valves are cycled. Using the testing procedure of Technical i
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Specificatica 4.5.II.B.2 created a condition whereby both containment spray pumps were out of service simultaneously during the few minutes required to stroke the pump suction valves.
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The licensee commi ted to make temporary changes to the procedure for
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testing the containment spray pump discharge valves prior to the next required test to require that only one RWST outlet valve at a time be closed. The temporary changes are then to be incorporated as permanent
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changes.
Because of the unusual wording of the Technical Specification require-ments, these matters were not identified as items of noncompliance.
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Licensee Event Reports Followup
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Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to deter-mine that reportability requirements wert fulfilled, immediate correc-tive action was accomplished, and correcrive action to prevent recurr-ence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specifications.
50-301 LER 80-08 Failure of MSIV B to Shut 50-266 LER 80-10 Improper Maintenance on Containment Spray System Valves 6.
IE Bulletin Followup For the IE Bulletins listed below the inspector verified that the written response was within the time period stated in the bulletin, that the written response in':1uded the information required to be reported, that the written response included adequate corrective action commitments based on information presented in the bulletin and the licensee's response, that licensee management forwarded copies
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of the written response to the appropriate onsite management represent--
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atives, that information discussed in the licensee's written response was accurat., and that corrective action taken by the licensee was as
described La the written response.
IEB 80-18 Maintewance of Adequate Charging Pump Miaimum Flow IEB 80-19 Failure of Mercury Wetted Matrix Relays 7.
IE Circular Followup For the IE Circular listed below, the inspector verified that the Circular was received by the licensee management, that a review for applicability was performed, and that if the circular were applicable to the facility, appropriate corrective actions were taken or were scheduled to be taken.
IEC 80-18 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluations for Changes to Radioactive Waste Treatment Systeins
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8.
Review of Plant Operations a
During the month of September the inspector reviewed the following activity:
Licensee Action Concerning Identified Problems The inspector reviewed corrective actions taken by the licensee for resolution of identified discrepencies involving safety-related com-All discrepancies were expeditiously corrected or entered ponents.
into a formal follovup system with appropriate priority assignments.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
9.
Plant Trips (Unit 2)
Following the Unit 2 reactor trip and safety injection at approximately 1700 September 12, 1980, the inspector ascertained the status of the reactor and safety systems by observation of control room indicators and discussions with licensee personnel concerning plant parameters, emergency system status and reactor coolant chemistry. The inspector verified the establishment of proper communications and reviewed the corrective actions taken by the licensee.
All systems responded as expected, and the plant was taken critical at 0144 September 13, 1980 and synchronized with the grid at 0306 September 13, 1980.
The reactor trip and safety injection were both initiated by low pressurizer pressure signals. The low pressure condition was a result of dropping of Group A shutdown rods while operating at 100% power.
The rod drops were believed to be associated with the failure of a This could 100 VDC power supply to the rod control logic cabinet.
not be positively verified. However, after replacing the power supply, the system was tested for several hours with no further problems and a reactor startup was performed.
Although the safety injection signal was received due to low pressur-izer pressure (1735 psig), there was no injection of water since the pump discharge pressure (1600 psig) was less than the system pressure.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
10.
Receipt of New Fuel (Unit 1)
The inspector verified prior to receipt of new fuel that technically adequate, approved procedures were available covering the receipt,
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inspection, and storage of new fuel; observed storage of new fuel elements and verified these activities were performed in accordance
with the licensee's procedures.
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The inspector observed the receipt of two separate new fuel shipments,
one of 8 assemblies and one of 6 assemblies. The receipt inspections l
by the licensee showed no deficiencies.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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Followup on Items of Noncompliance Licensee response to the inspection reports noted below was reviewed to ascertain that corrective actions for items of noncompliance were complete and in conformance with regulatory requirements.
50-266/80-10:
(Closed) Uncontrolled Vital Area Access.
Personnel retrainiag is complete.
50-301/80-10:
(closed) Residual Heat Removal Pumps' Operability Impaired.
Increased formal management attention has been required for safeguards equipment maintenance
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and testing. Licensed personnel have received rein-forcing instruction on awareness of the status of safety related equipment.
(Open) Emergency Safeguard Feature Buses Cross connected.
Operations refueling test procedure No. 3 has yet to be modified to include verification of the proper breaker lineup.
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Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection period and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities.
The licensee acknowledged these findings.
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