IR 05000266/1980003

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IE Insp Repts 50-266/80-03 & 50-301/80-02 on 800225-26.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Ie Bulletin 79-14 Matters,Work Procedure Review & Piping Analysis Review
ML19309G197
Person / Time
Site: Point Beach  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 03/12/1980
From: Danielson D, Yin I
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML19309G195 List:
References
50-266-80-03, 50-266-80-3, 50-301-80-02, 50-301-80-2, IEB-79-14, NUDOCS 8005050120
Download: ML19309G197 (6)


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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECT' ION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION III

e Report No. 50-266/80-03; 50-301/80-02

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Docket No. 50-266; 50-301 License No. DPR-24; DPR-27 Licensee: Wisconsin Electric Company 231 West Michigan Milwaukee, WI 53201 Facility Name:

Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:

Bechtel Power Corporation, San Francisco, CA Inspection Conducted: February 25-26, 1980

!! fe Inspector:

I. T. Ya.n h

Q at Approved By:

'. H. Daniels ief,

$//2/JO Engineering Support Section 2

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Inspection Summary Inspection on February 25-26, 1980 (Report No. 50-266/80-03 and No. 50-301/30-02)

Areas Inspected: Licensee actions relative to IE Bulletin No. 79-14, including general discussion on NRC requirements, work procedure review, and review of analysis and calculations. The inspection involved 16 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspector.

Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

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DETAILS

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Persons Contacted Wisconsin Electric Power Company (WEP)

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0. L. Dill, Project Engineer Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel)

E. Y. Wong, Project QA Engineer D. H. Clark, Project Engineer C. B. Hogg, Group Supervisor J. L. Carton, Project Manager S. 1. Heisler, Division Manager of QA H. B. Norris, QA Supervisor J. D. Laurie, Project QA Engineer S. Chitnis, Stress Engineer M. Z. Khafallah, Stress Staff L. E. Shipley, Stress Staff L. Spensko, Project Quality Engineer D. B. Hardic, Supervisor, QE A. C. Ancheta, Plant Design F. S. Competente, Plant Design L. B. Mangoba, Pipe Support E. Hadelrae, Pipe Stress B. F. Dow, Startup and Operating Services Supervisor Functional or Program Areas Inspected This special inspection was conducted at the Bechtel office to evaluate the licensee's implementation of IEB 79-14, including verification and evaluations performed by their engineering consultant. The unresolved areas identified during the inspection will be reviewed during subsequent inspections.

1.

Procedure Review The inspector reviewed the following WEP and Bechtel procedures:

WEP. inspection procedure WMTP 12.6, " Piping Inspection Procedure

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for NRC IE Bulletin No. 79-14", Revision 0, dated August 16, 1979.

Bechtel Procedure, "USNRC IEB 79-14 Program for the Verifica-

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tion of the Seismic Analyses for the Safety Related Piping Systems for Point Beach Nuclear Plant", Revision 0, dated October 23, 1979.

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Bechtel Procedure, "USNRC,IEB 79-14 Phase 2 Piping Stress

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Analysis Guidelines for Point Beach Nuclear Plant", Revision 1, dated February 14, 1980.

After the review, the inspector commented:

a.

The WEP procedure does not require removal of pipe insulation

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to inspect the pipe seismic restraints and is in deviation with the IEB 79-14 requirement.

In discussion with the licensee, it was stated that where there is pipe restraint, pipe insulation was either not provided in the original installation or pipe saddles were put in between the pipe and the contact surfaces.

The inspector stated that he will verify the installations dur-ing a future site inspection.

b.

The WEP procedure does not provide indirect measurement con-trols such as the use of telescopes for inspecting the con-tainment spray ring headers and the use of plumb bobs in difficult to reach areas.

2.

Field Inspection Requirements In review of the licensee responses to RIII and in discussion with the licensee representative, it was stated that some system modifi-cations received better QA/QC inspection and had more complete documentation and so should be exempted from the IEB 79-14 require-ments. The inspector stated that all safety related seismic Cate-gory I piping systems should be inspected and evaluated in accordance with the Bulletin requirements unless substantiated by records, the licensee was requested to include the applicable radioactive waste and spent fuel pool cooling systems including the modified portions of the system into the scope of the IEB 79-14 implementation work.

3.

Personnel Qualification The evaluation of field inspection data was handled by:

Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel)

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Westinghouse Nuclear Service Division and Nuclear Technical

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Division (W)

URS/ John A. Blume and Associates, Engineers (JB)

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Engineering Decision Analysis Company (EDAC)

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In review of Bechtel procedures, the personnel qualification require-ment was not established for all work personnel.

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In review of Bechtel audit reports:

(1) WE-1, audit of W on October 25-26, 1979, and (2) ED'-1, audit of EDAC on November 13, 1979, personnel qualification was not included in the audit checklist.

In review of a JB letter to Bechtel, " Record of Conversation on Point Beach and JB on January 7, 1980", dated January 10, 1980,

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problems relative to the inadequate personnel understanding of pipe stress analysis that had caused excessive distance modelled between mass points and decoupling problems ai system junctions and etc. were discussed.

In conclusion, the inspector stated that Bechtel should establish personnel qualification, certification, indoctrination, and train-ing requirements for the IEB 79-14 task force.

Implementation by all subcontractors should be verified by Bechtel or the licensee.

4.

Field Inspection of Motor Operated Valves (MOV)

Some deficiencies on field inspection of MOV's, such as valve oper-ator orientations and locations were not marked on the isometric drawings, were identified during the course of the inspection. A discussion was held between the inspector, the licensee, and the Bechtel representatives. The inspector accepted the licensee reasoning based on the following:

a.

Original piping analysis done in 1968-1969 did not model essentric mass came from MGV operators.

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Valve body locations had been marked on the drawings.

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A valve list including weight and dimension information pro-vided by the valve manufacturers was prepared for the IEB 79-14 evaluation.

The inspector stated that he had no further question in this area.

5.

Review of Piping Analyses A number of piping analyses were reviewed by the inspector. Due to the various deficiencies identified, the inspector stated that further review of this area will be conducted during a subsequent followup inspection at Bechtel.

Bechtel Work Not yet reviewed by the inspector.

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Westinghouse Work

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The inspector reviewed W calculation No. WEAN-1020-8-P201 for the SI-301R system. The calculation was accepted by Bechtel on-February 8, 1980. The inspector stated that based on the limited information provided by W, he could not determine whether or not

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the work was considered acceptable.

It is also true for other W calculations selected for review.

The Bechtel engineers stated that they were in the process of obtaining more ;etails f rom the W.

JB Work Bechtel No. 14-1 (JB No. 7924-06-001, Revision 0) and Bechtel No. 14-2 (JB No. 7924-06-003, Revision 0) for the 4" AC-152N-4 system were selected for review.

Two deficiencies relative to computer system coordinates were identified, i.e.

(1) pipe offset at containment penetration not correctly modelled, and (2) one section of pipe at offset was calculated to be 8.82 feet as shown on isometric drawing but modelled 9.56 feet in the computer. The inspector stated that Bechtel should verify all computer output coordinates.

EDAC Work Bechtel No. 1-2 (EDAC Calculation No. 249-051.03), contained in Package 108, accepted by Bechtel on February 11, 1980 involving the 30" EB-1-9 Main Steam Line from Steam Generator No. 2 to the Containment Penetration, was reviewed by the inspector. A number of apparent deficiencies were identified:

Computer anchor point was modelled in the middle of the con-

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tainment wall instead of at the fluid head connection.

One section of the pipe dimension:

(1) field measured to be

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11 feet, (2) calculated to be 13.96 feet based on piping fabrication drawings, and (3) input into the computer by EDAC to be approximately 22 feet based on an incorrect Bechtel provided isometric drawing.

The pair of large bore hydraulic snubbers installed near the

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steam generator nozzle were not modelled into the computer.

Additional weight of the flow element was not modelled into

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the computer.

The section of pipe bends near the steam generator nozzle is

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31" 0.D. by 1.5" wall thickness.

It was modelled 30" 0.D. by 0.908" wall thickness in the computer instead.

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Exit Interview

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.i The inspector met with licensee representatives at the conclusion of

the inspection on February 26, 1980. The inspector sununarized the scope and findings of the inspection. The licensee acknowledged the

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findings reported herein.

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