IR 05000261/2006009

IR 05000261-06-009; Carolina Power & Light (Cp&L); 10/2-6/2006 - 10/16-20-2006; H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2

ML063210465
Person / Time
Site:	Robinson
Issue date:	11/17/2006
From:	Randy Musser NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB4
To:	Walt T Carolina Power & Light Co
References
IR-06-009
Download: ML063210465 (25)

Text

November 17, 2006

SUBJECT:

H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT 2 - NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT NO. 05000261/2006009

Dear Mr. Walt:

On October 20, 2006, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your H.B. Robinson reactor facility. The enclosed inspection report documents the findings, which were discussed on October 20, with Mr. Noll and other members of your staff.

This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to the identification and resolution of problems, and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and the conditions of your operating license. Within these areas, the inspection involved examination of selected procedures and representative records, observations of plant activities, and interviews with personnel.

On the basis of the samples selected for review, there were no findings of significance identified during this inspection. The team concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, and resolved within the problem identification and resolution (PI&R) programs.

However, during the inspection, several examples of minor problems were identified, including minor deficiencies associated with cause determinations, isolated problems with the implementation of corrective actions, instances of non-compliance with procedural requirements to enter issues identified by the OE program into the CAP, the failure to identify a trend, and corrective actions that were ineffectively tracked or had not occurred.

CP&L

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web-site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Randall A. Musser Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No.: 50-261 License No.: DPR-23 cc w/encl: (See page 3)

ML063210465 OFFICE RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRS RII:DRP SIGNATURE RPC GJW DAJ by fax SON NAME RCarrion:rcm GWilson DJones SNinh DATE 11/17/2006 11/16/2006 11/17/2006 11/17/2006 11/ /2006 11/ /2006 11/ /2006 E-MAIL COPY?

YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO

CP&L

cc w/encl:

William G. Noll Director, Site Operations Carolina Power & Light Company H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Electronic Mail Distribution Ernest J. Kapopoulos, Jr.

Plant General Manager Carolina Power & Light Company H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Electronic Mail Distribution Chris L. Burton, Manager Performance Evaluation and Regulatory Affairs CPB 9 Electronic Mail Distribution C. T. Baucom, Supervisor Licensing/Regulatory Programs Carolina Power & Light Company H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Electronic Mail Distribution J. F. Lucas, Manager Support Services - Nuclear Carolina Power & Light Company H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Electronic Mail Distribution Henry J. Porter, Director Div. of Radioactive Waste Mgmt.

Dept. of Health and Environmental Control Electronic Mail Distribution R. Mike Gandy Division of Radioactive Waste Mgmt.

S. C. Department of Health and Environmental Control Electronic Mail Distribution Beverly Hall, Chief Radiation Protection Section N. C. Department of Environment, Health and Natural Resources Electronic Mail Distribution David T. Conley Associate General Counsel - Legal Dept.

Progress Energy Service Company, LLC Electronic Mail Distribution John H. O'Neill, Jr.

Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 2300 N. Street, NW Washington, DC 20037-1128 Chairman of the North Carolina Utilities Commission c/o Sam Watson, Staff Attorney Electronic Mail Distribution Robert P. Gruber Executive Director Public Staff - NCUC 4326 Mail Service Center Raleigh, NC 27699-4326 Public Service Commission State of South Carolina P. O. Box 11649 Columbia, SC 29211 Distribution w/encl: (See page 4)

CP&L

Report to Tom Walt from Randall A. Musser dated November 17, 2006.

SUBJECT:

H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT 2 - NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT NO. 05000261/2006009 Distribution w/encl:

C. Patel, NRR C. Evans (Part 72 Only)

L. Slack, RII EICS OE Mail (email address if applicable)

RIDSNRRDIRS PUBLIC

Enclosure U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket No:

50-261 License No:

DPR-23 Report No:

05000261/2006009 Licensee:

Carolina Power & Light (CP&L)

Facility:

H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2 Location:

3581 West Entrance Road Hartsville, SC 29550 Dates:

October 2 - 6, 2006 (Week 1)

October 16 - 20, 2006 (Week 2)

Inspectors:

R. Carrion, Reactor Inspector (Lead Inspector)

D. Jones, Resident Inspector, Robinson G. Wilson, Resident Inspector, North Anna Approved by:

Randall A. Musser, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY

OF ISSUES

IR 05000261/2006009; Carolina Power & Light Company; on 10/2/2006 - 10/20/2006; H. B.

Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit 2; Identification and Resolution of Problems.

The inspection was conducted by a reactor inspector and two resident inspectors. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.

Identification and Resolution of Problems No findings of significance were identified. The licensee was effective at identifying problems at a low threshold and entering them into the Corrective Action Program (CAP). The licensee properly prioritized issues and routinely performed adequate evaluations that were technically accurate and of sufficient depth. Managements involvement in the review of issues documented in the program was timely and appropriate. Self-assessments and audits of the CAP, and trend reviews were critical, thorough, and effective in identifying program deficiencies. Although not reflective of the general assessment into licensee problem identification, the inspectors identified a trend that was not identified by the licensee. The trend involves equipment failures where the root or contributing cause was identified as vendor-related.

Prioritization and evaluation of problems in the CAP were effective. The technical adequacy and depth of evaluations, proposed corrective actions and timeliness were commensurate with the safety significance of the issue. The inspectors identified only minor deficiencies associated with cause determinations. Overall, this area of the program was considered to be effective.

The CAP was effective in correcting problems consistent with the importance to safety of the issues. Effective management involvement in the process was evident. Outstanding corrective actions were tracked and delays in the implementation of corrective actions received the appropriate level of management attention. During the course of the inspection, the inspectors identified isolated problems with the implementation of corrective actions. However, these issues did not affect the overall assessment of corrective action implementation.

Operating Experience (OE), from within the Progress nuclear fleet, the industry, and the NRC, was being effectively used in the CAP. OE was evaluated for applicability at the station and was also used in the assessment of issues that occurred at Robinson. However, during the inspection the inspectors identified several instances where the licensee did not comply with the requirements of their procedure to enter issues identified by the OE program into the CAP.

These instances had no safety impact and, therefore, were considered to be minor.

Furthermore, these issues did not affect the overall assessment of the use of OE.

Self-assessments were effective in identifying issues, and prioritizing and evaluating them in accordance with their risk significance for operability, reportability, common cause, generic concerns, extent of condition, and extent of cause. Resulting corrective actions were generally effective to prevent recurrence.

Individuals actively utilized the CAP and employee concerns program (ECP). Issues entered into the ECP received the appropriate level of management involvement. Management demonstrated sensitivity to organizational attitude toward the CAP and a safety-conscious work environment. Based on discussions conducted with licensee and contract employees and a review of station activities, site personnel felt free to report safety concerns.

REPORT DETAILS

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

a.

Assessment of the Corrective Action Program

(1) Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed program documents associated with the corrective action program (CAP) which described the administrative process for documenting and resolving issues via Nuclear Condition Reports (NCRs) which are tracked as Action Requests (ARs). The inspectors reviewed ARs selected across the seven cornerstones to verify that problems were being properly identified and prioritized, appropriately characterized and evaluated, and entered into the CAP in accordance with the procedural requirements of the CAP. For the assessment of the CAP, the inspectors focused on several risk-significant systems which included the Residual Heat Removal (RHR), Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW), Safety Injection (SI), Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG), and pressurizer and main steam power-operated relief valves (PORVs). The inspectors reviewed a sampling of approximately 100 ARs from over 4000 that had been generated since the previous problem identification and resolution inspection (October 2004). The review included issues associated with previously identified violations of NRC requirements. The inspectors reviewed cause evaluations to verify that the evaluation was commensurate with the safety significance of the issue, and that the evaluation addressed operability, reportability, common cause, generic concerns, and extent of condition, as appropriate. For significant conditions adverse to quality, the inspectors checked that the licensee adequately identified the causes and corrective actions to prevent recurrence.

For the risk-significant systems selected, the inspectors reviewed ARs/NCRs, system health reports, maintenance history, and completed Work Orders (WOs)to verify that problems were being identified. The inspectors conducted plant walkdowns of the accessible portions of selected systems to assess the material condition and to identify any deficiencies that had not been entered into the CAP.

The inspectors reviewed selected industry and NRC operating experience items associated with the systems and components to verify that these were appropriately evaluated for applicability and that issues identified were entered into the CAP.

The inspectors reviewed licensee audits and self-assessments, including those which focused on problem identification and resolution, to verify that findings were entered into the CAP and to verify that these findings were consistent with the NRCs assessment of the licensees CAP; were being entered into the CAP; and that appropriate corrective action was taken to resolve program deficiencies.

Program trend reports and statistics were reviewed to verify that indicated trends were entered into the CAP at the appropriate level. The inspectors attended site meetings including daily Operational Focus Meeting (plant status, emerging issues, etc.); Management Roundtable (MRT) meetings (AR screening);

Robinson Self-Evaluation Board (RSEB) meeting (focused on effectiveness reviews of the CAP); Unit Evaluator meeting (AR screening and evaluations);and the Operating Experience fleet telecon to assess how issues were raised, discussed, and dispositioned through established programs and to gauge the effectiveness of the screening process in ensuring that problems were properly entered into the CAP. The inspectors reviewed RESB meeting minutes for the review period. The inspectors also met with the Employee Concerns Program Coordinator to discuss the program and how issues raised therein are integrated into the CAP and reviewed selected submittals. The inspectors also held discussions with site personnel, both contract and licensee, to evaluate the threshold for identifying issues and entering them into the CAP. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

(2) Assessment Identification of Issues. The team determined that the licensee was generally effective at identifying problems and entering them into the CAP; the threshold for initiating NCRs/ARs was low; and employees were encouraged to initiate them. Equipment performance issues were being identified at low threshold levels and entered into the CAP for monitoring, follow-up, and resolution.

However, the inspectors identified an adverse equipment performance trend.

The inspectors noted that the four ARs listed below identified vendor-related issues as the root or contributing cause.

• AR 200586200586 Second Trip of D Instrument Air Compressor, has a contributing cause that states Proprietary vendor information not available to RNP personnel.

• AR 179668179668 Failure of CCW Pump A to Start, states that the root cause was that information from Westinghouse concerning the availability of the new style motor cutoff switch was not transmitted to the users of this style breaker by any formal means. The investigation stated that a Corrective Action to Prevent Recurrence (CAPR) would not be identified for the root cause because RNP does not have control over how Westinghouse disseminates information.

• AR 168241168241 A EDG Solenoid DA-23A Failed, Unplanned LCO Entries, states that the Most likely root cause is a change in manufacturing process for these coils prior to 2002.

• AR 160930160930 Number of Functional Failures Exceeded the Criteria. The cause in the AR determined that the vendor (Ronan) failed to properly setup the devices (I/P transducers for the main steam PORVs) at the factory so that they would produce max air pressure when the power was removed.

The inspectors determined that the licensees corrective actions for each vendor-related issue was adequate. However, the inspectors concluded that the licensee did not fully utilize their cognitive trending process to identify the trend.

Subsequently, the licensee acknowledged the trend, but opted not to initiate an AR/NCR because of the lack of current vendor-related issues.

Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues. In general, the licensees prioritization and evaluation of issues in the CAP were considered to be effective. The technical adequacy and depth of evaluations, as documented in individual ARs, were acceptable. The licensee properly prioritized proposed corrective actions in a manner commensurate with the safety significance of the issue. The inspectors determined that site trend reports were thorough and that a low threshold was established for evaluation of potential trends. Based on the total number of ARs reviewed during the inspection, the inspectors concluded that the licensees CAP was generally being effectively implemented with respect to evaluation of problems. However, the inspectors determined that the evaluation for NCR 18366, MCC-6(13C) RHR-759B, Breaker Potential Malfunction, was inadequate because it lacked adequate documentation to support its conclusion.

The licensee could not produce a written evaluation for an investigation that was performed by the corporate engineering center. Upon further review, the licensee provided additional information that supported their conclusion. The inspectors considered this issue to be minor because there was no safety impact.

For the period between October 2004 and September 2006, the inspectors determined that the station conducted an adequate number of root cause analyses (RCA) based on the overall number and significance of issues entered into the CAP; more than sixty Priority 1 ARs, which required a RCA to be performed, were issued. In addition, over three thousand Priority 2 ARs, which required an apparent cause analysis to be performed, were generated during this period. The classifications were consistent with established procedures. A variety of RCA techniques were used (barrier analysis, culpability decision trees, cause and effect analysis, support/refute methodology, trend analysis, etc.),

depending upon the type of issue to be analyzed, i.e., equipment failure, human performance, etc. While most of the root cause analyses reviewed by the inspectors were detailed and thorough, an example of a deficient root cause evaluation was identified. Specifically, AR 160930160930 which dealt with set point issues of Ronan I/P transducers used for the main steam PORVs, determined the root cause of the problem to be that "the vendor failed to properly setup the devices at the factory so that they would produce max air pressure when the power was removed." However, the devices were not required by contract/purchase order to be calibrated. Therefore, the root cause was that the calibration was not specified in the original purchase order. However, even if the actual root cause had been identified, the corrective action as determined would still be the desired action to prevent recurrence. Therefore, the inspectors determined this issue to be minor. The licensee generated NCR 208824 to document this information.

Effectiveness of Corrective Actions. Based on a review of numerous corrective action plans and their implementation, the team found, for the most part, that the licensees corrective actions developed and implemented for problems were timely, effective, and commensurate with the safety significance of the issues.

Management involvement in the process was effective; the age of outstanding corrective actions was tracked; the bases for delays in the implementation of corrective actions received the appropriate level of management attention, and the delays were reasonable. Effectiveness reviews and audits were generally of good depth and correctly identified issues. However, the following cases were identified in which effectiveness of the corrective actions was not evident to the inspectors:

• NCR 160962. The inappropriate act was identified as being programmatic with the cause stated as Regulatory clarification of acceptable preconditioning methods. The corrective actions did not address any programmatic concerns.

• NCR 193416. The investigation discusses two inappropriate acts (OST 252-2 and OMM-001-8 not being adhered to); however, corrective action was taken for only OST-252-2. No corrective action was identified for OMM-001-8.

• NCR 106836. This is a Priority 5 AR (an enhancement, not an adverse condition) that was initiated from a trend review in October 2003 which was closed to an Action List in December 2004. Only one action of the list has been completed to date; the remaining actions are on hold due to resource availability. This is a timeliness issue.

• NCR 154571. The enhancement to initiate procedure revision requests for several EPPs and AOPs was not initiated.

• NCR 139933. One of the corrective actions identified was vague in stating what was required. Therefore, it was not possible to determine the adequacy of the corrective actions taken. The documentation for the completion of this action was minimal. CAP-NGGC-0200, Section 9.12.1, requires the completion reviewer to Verify that the completed assignment is adequately documented to clearly establish that the expected results were achieved. Also, an effectiveness review was performed for the NCR and did not identify this deficiency.

The licensee generated NCR 208834 to address the issues of NCR 160962; NCR 208836 to address the issues of NCR 193416; and NCR 208489 to address the issues of NCR 154571. The licensee will make the enhancements identified in NCR 106836 as resources permit and planned no additional action on NCR 139933 because there are sufficient barriers in place to mitigate the issue addressed. The inspectors determined that the licensees actions related to these matters were appropriate.

(3) Findings No findings of significance were identified.

b.

Assessment of the Use of Operating Experience (OE)

(1) Inspection Scope The inspectors interviewed the CAP supervisor, OE coordinator, and attended an OE fleet telecon to assess how issues were raised, discussed, and dispositioned through established programs, and evaluated CAP documentation to determine if OE was being used effectively in the CAP. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the licensees OE database and reviewed evaluations of selected Progress Energy and industry OE information, including ARs from the other plants in the corporate fleet, as well as Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) OE, NRC generic letters and information notices, and generic vendor notifications to ensure that issues applicable to Robinson were appropriately addressed.

Procedure CAP-NGGC-0202, Operating Experience Program, was reviewed to verify that the requirements delineated in the program were being implemented at the station.

(2) Assessment The inspectors determined that operating experience, both from within the Progress nuclear fleet and the industry, was being used regularly in the CAP.

OE was evaluated for applicability at the station and used in the assessment of issues that occurred at Robinson.

The Operating Experience program was coordinated by the corporate office for all four nuclear sites and implemented by the sites OE coordinator. Personnel in the corporate office screen incoming OE from outside the Progress organization and transfer the information deemed to be applicable into the OpEx database.

This database was searchable by station personnel investigating an event. The inspectors determined that the licensee was generally effective in utilizing operating experience as another tool in its efforts to develop corrective actions for plant issues.

During the inspection, the inspectors noted several examples (listed below)where the licensee failed to enter OE issues into the CAP as required by the licensees procedure CAP-NGGC-0202, Operating Experience Program. The licensees procedure requires that all adverse or potentially adverse conditions identified during OE screening reviews or evaluations be entered into the CAP.

However, because this was a failure to implement a procedural requirement that had no safety impact, this was considered to be minor.

• OPEX 195000, Non-Conservative Vortexing Methodology. The licensees screening review determined that the issue was potentially adverse, but failed to enter the issue into the CAP program, as required by the OE procedure.

• OPEX 176513, Sheppard Model 89 Calibrator. The licensees screening review determined that the issue was potentially adverse, but failed to enter the issue into the CAP program, as required by the OE procedure.

• OPEX 193038, NRC IN 2006-09, Performance of Licensed Individuals on Duty. The conclusion of evaluation states that...while expectations are understood, they are not clearly delineated in operating procedures. An NCR should have been generated to clarify the operating procedures.

• OPEX 166395, NRC IN 2005-23, Vibration-Induced Degradation Butterfly Valves. The OE evaluation identified the need to...initiate new procedures for Fischer/Continental butterfly valves and/or Posi-Seal butterfly valves in accordance with AP-048 to inspect taper pins for positive restraint... and to perform inspections during the upcoming outage. An NCR should have been generated to initiate the new procedures.

The inspectors also noted two weaknesses (listed below) in the licensees governing OE procedure.

• Procedure CAP-NGGC-0202, Operating Experience Program, does not provide consistent guidance on when to initiate an NCR.

• Procedure CAP-NGGC-0202, Operating Experience Program, does not provide adequate timeliness guidelines for the completion of OE reviews.

For example, OPEX 195000 was entered on 5/18/06, the screening review was completed on 8/26/06, and the evaluation is scheduled to be completed on 10/31/06. This appears to be untimely for an operating experience item that is applicable to the site.

(3) Findings No findings of significance were identified.

c.

Assessment of the Self-Assessments and Audits

(1) Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed licensee self-assessment procedural guidance (including the scheduling for, planning of, and outlines for required self-assessments, as well as, the qualifications of the respective team leaders);site trend reports; CAP backlogs; CAP performance indicators; and trend ARs to verify that the licensee appropriately prioritized and evaluated problems with the CAP in accordance with their risk significance. The inspectors reviewed licensee adequacy to determine the cause(s) of the problems, and address operability, reportability, common cause, generic concerns, extent of condition, and extent of cause. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees identification and prioritization of corrective actions to prevent recurrence. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

(2) Assessment The team determined that the scopes of self-assessments and audits were adequate. Site-wide and department self-assessments are generally detailed and critical, often identifying several issues, weaknesses, and Items for Management Consideration. Corrective actions developed as a result of these assessments were incorporated back into the CAP via NCRs and tracked to completion. Debriefings of the results were provided to station management at department and site level meetings upon the conclusion of the audit/self-assessment and formal reports were issued within 30 days. However, the inspectors noted that the procedure does not clearly define how issues identified in one self-assessment are explicitly discussed in the following self-assessment.

(The inspectors did note that the specific issues identified were assigned NCR numbers and tracked in the CAP.) For example, in Self-Assessment 141700, Assessment Task 12A of the Outline for the self-assessment makes a general statement to Include a review of self-identified trends or patterns of corrective action program issues in the previous CAP Self-Assessment... The summary of the Self-Assessment makes a general statement, The NCRs associated with previous assessment findings were reviewed and determined adequate to resolve the concerns. The specific issues raised in the previous self-assessment were not explicitly addressed for effectiveness, etc. The documentation for previously identified items could be better defined.

The inspectors determined that the licensee had adequately prioritized issues entered into the CAP. Generally, the licensee performed evaluations that were technically accurate and of sufficient depth. The inspectors determined that site trend reports were thorough and that a low threshold was established for evaluation of potential trends.

(3) Findings No findings of significance were identified.

d.

Assessment of Safety-Conscious Work Environment

(1) Inspection Scope During technical discussions with members of the plant staff and plant walkdowns with other plant personnel, the inspectors conducted interviews to develop a general perspective of the safety-conscious work environment at the site. The interviews were conducted to determine if any conditions existed that would cause employees to be reluctant to raise safety concerns. Specifically, personnel were asked questions regarding any reluctance to initiate ARs and the adequacy of corrective action for identified issues. The inspectors interviewed managers, attended several meetings, and reviewed several applicable corrective action documents to assess licensee management sensitivity to a safety-conscious work environment. The inspectors reviewed the licensees Employee Concerns Program (ECP), which provides an alternate method to the CAP for employees to raise concerns and remain anonymous, and interviewed the ECP Coordinator to assess the adequacy of procedural control, tracking of concerns, and trending of issues. Several ECP issues and evaluations were reviewed with respect to maintaining and promoting a safety-conscious work environment and to verify that issues affecting nuclear safety were being resolved and entered into the CAP when appropriate. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

(2) Assessment Based on this inspection and the AR reviews, the inspectors concluded that licensee management emphasized the need for all employees to promptly identify and report problems using the appropriate methods established within the administrative programs. The inspectors did not identify any reluctance to report safety concerns.

(3) Findings No findings of significance were identified. Licensee management emphasized the need for all employees to promptly identify and report problems using the appropriate methods established within the administrative programs. Individuals actively utilized the CAP and ECP as evidenced by the low threshold of issues entered into the programs. Issues entered into the ECP received the appropriate level of management involvement. The inspectors determined that a safety-conscious work environment was evident at the site.

40A6 Meetings, Including Exit On October 20, 2006, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Noll and other members of the plant staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel

D. Bailey, Self Evaluation Unit

C. Baucom, Licensing Supervisor

S. Brown, Outage and Scheduling

E. Caba, Superintendent, Design

W. Farmer, Manager, Robinson Engineering Support Section

K. Jensen, Superintendent, Materials and Contract Services

K. Jones, Plant Support Group

E. Kapopoulos, Plant General Manager

A. Kelly, Coordinator, Operating Experience

J. Long, Performance Evaluation Section

J. Lucas, Manager, Nuclear Site Support

G. Ludlam, Training Manager

D. Martrano, Superintendent, Nuclear Assessment Section

W. Noll, Director of Site Operations

G. Sanders, Licensing

J. Stanley, Superintendent, System Engineering

NRC personnel

R. Hagar, Robinson Senior Resident Inspector

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

None.