IR 05000259/1990001
| ML18033B213 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 03/12/1990 |
| From: | Carpenter D, Little W, Patterson C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II), Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18033B212 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259-90-01, 50-260-90-01, 50-296-90-01, NUDOCS 9003210107 | |
| Download: ML18033B213 (19) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-259/90-01, 50-260/90-01, and 50-296/90-01 Licensee:
Tennessee Valley Authority 6N 38A Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Docket Nos.:
50-259, 50-260, and 50-296 License Nos.:
DPR-33, DPR-52, and DPR-68 Facility Name:
Browns Ferry Units 1, 2, and
Inspection at Browns Ferry Site near Decatur, Alabama Inspection Conducted:
January 15 - February 16, 1990 Inspector
.
Ca r,
N Site Manager D te v
ne t erson, estart oor inator te gne Accompanied by:
E. Christnot, Resident Inspector W. Bearden, Resident Inspector K. Ivey, Resident Inspector Approved by:
. S. L't
,
ection se
,
Inspection Programs, TVA Projects Division a
e sgne SUMMARY Scope:
This routine resident inspection included operational safety verification, surveillance observation, modifications, system plant acceptance evaluation, power ascension test program, and site management and organization.
Results:
The licensee continues to experience problems with the RPS alternate power supply, paragraph 2.a.
Although this concern was identified in 1988, the problem has not been corrected.
A half scram on January 12, 1990 confused the t
operators because of flickering lights and unusual alarms in the control room.
9003210107 9003i3 PDR ADOCK '0500025'r'
Two NCVs were identified concerning cable pulling activities in paragraph 4.c.
Both of those items were identified by the licensee's gC inspectors.
The licensee completed defueling of Unit 2 during this period.
This activity was conducted in a conservative and methodical manne REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees:
0. Zeringue, Site Director
- G. Campbell, Plant Manager
- M. Herrell, Plant Operations Manager R. Smith, Project Engineer
- J. Hutton, Operations Superintendent A. Sorrell, Maintenance Superintendent G. Turner, Site guality Assurance Manager P. Carier, Site Licensing Manager
- P. Salas, Compliance Super visor J. Corey, Site Radiological Control Superintendent R. Tuttle, Site Security Manager Other licensee employees or contractors contacted included licensed reactor operators, auxiliary operators, craftsmen, technicians, and public safety officers; and quality assurance, design, and engineering personnel.
NRC Attendees
- D. Carpenter, Site Manager
- C. Patterson, Restart Coordinator
- E. Chr istnot, Resident Inspector
- W. Bearden, Resident Inspector
- K. Ivey, Resident Inspector
"Attended exit interview Acronyms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The NRC inspectors were kept informed of the overall plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant operations.
Daily discussions were held with plant management and various members of the plant operating staff.
The inspectors made routine visits to the control rooms.
Inspection observations included instrument readings, setpoints and recordings; status of operating systems; status and alignments of emergency standby systems; onsite and offsite emergency power sources available for automatic operation; purpose of temporary tags on equipment controls and switches; annunciator alarm status; adherence to procedures; adherence to limiting conditions for operations; nuclear instruments operability; temporary alterations in effect; daily journals and logs; stack monitor
recorder traces; and control room manning.
This inspection activity also included numerous informal discussions with operators and supervisors.
General plant tours were conducted.
Portions of the turbine buildings, each reactor building, and general plant areas were visited.
Observations included valve positions and system alignment; snubber and hanger conditions; containment isolation alignments; instrument readings; housekeeping; proper power supply and breaker alignments; radiation area controls; tag controls on equipment; work activities in progress; and radiation-protection controls.
Informal discussions were held with selected plant personnel in their functional areas during these tours.
a ~
RPS Power Supply Concerns At 8:12 p.m.
on January 12, 1990, a
Unit 2 half scram was received from the 2B RPS which was being fed from its alternate source (unit preferred transformer)
to allow maintenance on the 281 and 2B2 circuit protectors.
Prior to the half scram, the following alarms were received in the control room:
APRM HIGH; APRM B, D, and F HI HI/INOP; RBM DOWNSCALE; and REACTOR CHANNEL B MANUAL SCRAM.
The unit operator also noted that the LPRM detector bypass lights (4 rods display)
and the drywell floor and equipment drain inboard/outboard isolation valve indicating lights were flickering.
At 8:45 p.m., the half scram was reset following an investigation which revealed no apparent cause.
The inspector discussed this event with various operators and based on these interviews, determined that the operators, as a group, were confused as to what had happened.
This was
.due to the unusual alarms, indicating lights, trips occurring at various times, and inconsistent observations.
The inspector was informed that on January 26, 1990, a
RPS trip occurred on Unit 3 RPS Bus A while it was being supplied from the alternate power supply.
The prob'iems are applicable to each unit.
A previous NRC inspection (IR 259, 260, 296/88-28)
documented that the inspectors continued to monitor the performance of and review the initial results of restart test 2-BFP-RTP-099, Reactor Protection System.
During the performance of the RTP, it was noticed that when the power to the RPS was shifted from the normal supply motor-generator set to the alternate supply transformer, clutter was noticed on the
HZ waveform.
This transformer is also used to supply the preferred and non-preferred power source to the instrumentation system.
The clutter is in the form of spikes at the top of the positive section of the waveform and at the bottom of the negative section of the waveform.
This may be contributing to the spurious trips experienced with the 2Cl and 2C2 circuit protectors when Unit 2 RPS A or B is transferred to an alternate source.
IR 88-28 stated that the inspectors wou'ld track the resolution of this issue as IFI 260/88-28-03, Spurious RPS Trips Associated with RPS
Alternate Power Supply and Circuit Protectors.
IR 88-28 noted that on September 23, 1988, the operators transferred the Unit 2 RPS Bus B
to the alternate power source.
Approximately five minutes after the transfer to circuit protectors 2Cl and 2C2, the circuit protectors for the alternate power source momentarily opened and then closed.
It is suspected that the circuit clutter may be contributing to the spurious trips.
IR 88-28 stated that the IFI needed to be adequately addressed prior to criticality.
From the time that the clutter on the
HZ waveform was discovered through the present reporting period, the licensee continued to experience RPS trips due to power supply difficulties.
A total of 10 trips have been documented for all three units involving the RPS power supply and the licensee has continued to explore the causes for these trips.
Some of the licensee's actions included contacting the vendor for additional technical information, modifying the circuit protectors for the normal and alternate supply, and making adjustments to the transformers to improve the
HZ waveform.
Due to the effect of having an ESF actuation from Units 1 and 3 during Unit 2 operation, this IFI is expanded to include all three units (IFI 259, 260, 296/88-28-03, Spurious RPS Trips Associated With RPS Normal Supply, RPS Alternate Supply and All Circuit Protectors).
Engineered Safety Features Walkdown (71710)
An ESF walkdown was completed on system 63, Standby Liquid Control, to confirm that the actual system lineup agreed with the system status file.
The lineup of plant systems is maintained and controlled by procedure PMI 12.15, System Status Control.
The system status file is maintained in the control room and includes marked up copies of the system lineup checklists, indicating the system status.
Changes to the lineup are documented and kept in a configuration log book.
Configuration log sheets are removed once the lineup is returned to agree with the system status file.
The system status file is updated each time the system
'lineup checklists are performed and existing configuration log sheets are dispositioned at that time.
No deficiencies were identified.
Equipment Clear ances The NRC inspectors reviewed the clearances identified below to verify compl,iance with SDSP-14.9, Equipment Clearance Procedure, and that the clearances contained adequate information to properly isolate the affected portions of the systems being tagged.
Clearance 2-90-48 E ui ment/Pur ose Unit 1/2 RHR Crosstie Valve, 2-FCV-74-96.
Isolate valve for replacement of valve packin EA LPCI NG Set.
Isolate output breaker for removal of cables/conduit per hlP 2460-89.
Temporary Alteration Control Forms The inspectors reviewed the TACFs identified below to verify compliance with PMI-8.1,'emporary Alterations, and SDSP-8.8, Conversion of Temporary Alterations.
The inspectors verified that the TACF received the proper licensee review and approval, contained adequate information and instructions to allow for correct installation of the alteration, and that independent verification was specified or accomplished as required.
In each case the attached safety evaluation documentation was reviewed to verify adequate justification for considering any associated safety related -equipment as operable.
TACF E ui ment/Pur ose 2-89-002-90 2-RN-90-136, 2-RN-90-137, 2-RM-90-138, 2-RN-90-139.
Installation of jumpers to remove from service the Group I and MSIV actuation from these radiation monitors until completion of OCN 1263.
2-90-001-79 Unit 2 Refuelin'g Bridge.
Structural modification including the installation of a bracket plate for clamps to stabilize the flexible shaft for the vertical (Z axis) position indication.
During the inspector's review of outstanding Unit 2 TACFs it was noted that the licensee has continued with the position of not installing temporary alterations unless necessary.
This represents a
significant improvement over previous inspections in this area.
There have been only three TACFs approved for installation on Unit 2 equipment since the beginning of 1989 and only two of those remain in effect.
There is still work remaining toward conversion of outstanding temporary alterations.
Of eight installed on Unit 2 during 1988, four remain active and numerous TACFs installed prior to 1988 are still active.
Incident Investigation Reports The licensee has an incident report program to investigate a wide range of events and conditions.
SDSP-15.4, Incident Investigation, established the requirements for the program.
Key elements of the program are root cause analysis and corrective action.
The inspector selected a
sample of recently completed reports to assess the effectiveness of. correcting problems.
The following reports were reviewed to determine if the identified corrective actions had been completed:
RCA SUBJECT 89-62 89-21 89-59 89-41 TS Violation Due to Failed Diesel Starting Air Compressor
.
Inadvertent Closure of Drywell Equipment and Floor Drain Sumps Discharge Isolation Valves During the Performance of Special Test 89-03.
Overflow of Radwaste Precoat Tank Contaminates 3,000 sq.ft.
Low Air Flow Through RHR and CS Pump Room Cooler Each of the corrective actions were formally tracked on a computer tracking system.
Except for one action which was still in progress, all actions were completed.
The corrective actions taken were in a file folder and addressed the original concern identified in the incident report.
Further program enhancements were being taken to improve the timeliness of issuing reports and formal closeout.
The formal closeout would require the event team leader to review completion of all corrective actions prior to closure of the report.
The inspector concluded that the corrective actions identified were being completed and efforts to enhance the reports should strengthen the program.
Unit Status All three units remain defueled and in an extended outage as part of the BFNP recovery plans.
Unit
began the report period with defueling in progress.
The final fuel assembly was removed from the core on January 23, 1990.
On January 24, 1990, the licensee changed the method of controlling plant maintenance, modification, and construction activities from performing work as part of planned divisional outages to the use of a bulk work type system.
This change was made possible due the relaxation of operability requirements resulting from the removal of the Unit 2 fuel.
Special Requirements and Compensatory Measures An inspector reviewed the licensee's program governing special requirements and compensatory measures to assess the adequacy and implementation of the program.
The inspection included discussions with operations personnel and reviews of plant procedures, SR/CM notebooks maintained in the NRC Resident Inspector's office and the Unit 2 Control Room, and the Unit 2 T SDSP 12. 11, Special Requirements and Compensatory Measures, established the program to control and track the implementation of compensatory
.measures and those items requiring programmatic monitoring as special requirements.
The program defined a
compensatory measure as
"a measure required to be taken to compensate for defeated safety functions or the lack of an adequate design and is required to mitigate the consequences of accidents evaluated in Chapter 14 or other significant events presented in the FSAR."
Compensatory measures do not include actions taken which are allowed by TS LCOs.
The inspector noted that the program included provisions for trained evaluators to review each SR/CM request; provisions for revision and cancellation of SR/CMs and maintenance of supporting documentation as gA records; and provisions to annotate affected TS sections when a
SR/CM is approved which is more conservative than the TS requirement.
The inspector concluded that the program should ensure effective tracking and implementation of SR/CNs.
No deficiencies were identified during this inspection; however the inspector noted that several SR/CMs were in place which required only procedure upgrades for removal of the SR/CN.
Some had been in place for almost a year.
Further review revealed that each of the subject SR/CMs were in the process of being incorporated into procedures and changes to SDSP 12.11 in the past year had inhibited the process.
The licensee must maintain close control of the SR/CM process to ensure that the procedure change process is not bypassed through the implementation of long term SR/CNs where a
procedure change is required.
No violations or deviations were identified in the Operational Safety Verification area.
3.
Surveillance Observation (61726)
An inspector observed surveillance testing activities and reviewed the SI procedures listed-below.
The inspections consisted of a review of the SIs for technical adequacy, observation of the conduct of the test, confirmation of proper removal'rom service and return to service of systems, and reviews of test data.
The inspector also verified that limiting conditions for operation were met, testing was accomplished by qualified personnel, and the SIs were completed at the required frequency.
a.
2-SI-4.10.A.l Refueling Interlocks Functional Test.
b.
2-SI-4.10.B Demonstration of SRM System Operability During Core Alterations.
c.
2-SI-2 Instrument Checks and Observations.
d.
2-SI-4.5.C. 1(2)
EECW Pump Operation Surveillance Instructio No violations or deviations were identified in the Surveillance Observation area.
4.
Modifications (37700, 37828)
The inspector reviewed and observed the licensee's activities in the modifications area.
This included review of procedures; discussions with craft, gC inspectors, supervisors and managers; observations of field activities; and review of WPs, DCNs, and ECNs.
The reviews and observations consisted of the following:
a.
Field Activities The inspector observed the activities associated with the following:
DCN W4676C WP 2104-89 required modifications to the breaker control switch on 4160V shutdown board C,
breaker 1624, alternate supply from shutdown bus 1 to shutdown board C.
DCN W5916A WP 2521-89 required modification to the breaker control switch on 4160V shutdown board B, breaker 1712, alternate supply from 4160V unit board to shutdown bus 2.
This breaker is physically located in the shutdown board B.
DCN W5925B This DCN involved five WPs and required the same type of modification as DCNs W4676C and W5916A.
The modification was performed on five 4160V breakers located in shutdown board C.
All activities were performed in accordance with approved procedures and gC inspector involvement was observed.
b.
Use of Old Raceways The inspector continued to review the licensee's activities associated with DCN W0479A, as previously documented in report 89-38..
The specific review involved WP 2314-88 and IR E9010015, dated January 2,
1990.
These items documented the licensee's installation of cable 2ES625-I for FCV-23-34 and cable 2ES638-I for FCV-23-40.
Additional review of DCN W0479A indicated that approximately
WPs were generated by the DCN.
WP 2304-88 and WP 2306-88 thru 2315-88, required the replacement of undersized cable to approximately 23 flow control valves in the following systems:
Main Steam, Residual Heat Removal Service Water, Emergency Equipment Cooling Water, Reactor Water Cleanup, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling, High Pressure Coolant Injection, Residual Heat Removal, and Core Spray Cooling.
The inspector noted that none of the WPs reviewed addressed changing or upgrading the raceways.
Attempting to place larger cables into
existing raceways could indicate an inadequate walk down verification by the Nuclear Engineering and Modification Groups.
This concern was discussed with the licensee.
A NCV was documented in report 89-46 concerning new cable installations using old raceways.
I ECN/DCN Review Throughout the review of ECN/DCNs, the inspector observed that changes to operating instructions were being called for by the reviewers.
However, no indication was observed that licensee reviewers were calling for changes to labelling.
Several ECN/DCNs require that power feeds be moved from one switchboard to another and new equipment is being installed.
There appears to be a lack of review to ensure that new labelling is also installed.
This concern was discussed with licensee representatives.
During this review, the inspector noted two licensee identified violations.
The first violation involved field activities associated with DCN W0479A and WP 2314-88.
During cable pulling through conduits 2ES625-I and 2ES638-I, both cables became jammed.
Information indicated that the craftsman began pulling on the cable, bypassing the pull link.
This was a violation of procedure MPI 3.2.
This licensee identified violation is not being cited because criteria specified in Section V.G. 1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy were satisfied.
This violation is identified as NCV 259, 260, 296/90-01-01, Bypassing Cable Pull Links.
The second violation involved field activities associated with the replacement of two sump pumps in the Intake Pumping Station.
Both pumps were designated as B sump pumps with one located in the A room and the other located in the C room.
The specific item occurred when craft personnel pulled cable through conduits ES3326-II and ES 3334-II without notifying the gC group.
This was a violation of a quality control mandatory holdpoint.
The licensee issued CARR BFP890776 to document the violation and conducted an incident investigation, RCA 89-85, in accordance with SDSP 15.14.
This was a
violation of procedure MPI 3.2, Cable Pulling for Isolated Cables Up To 15,000 Volts.
This licensee identified violation is not being cited because criteria specified in Section V.G. 1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy were satisfied.
This violation is identified as NCV 259, 260, 296/90-01-02, Bypassing gC Holdpoint 'During Cable Pull.
Cracked Grouting During a routine tour of the Unit 2 reactor building the inspector observed cracks in the grouting of a recently installed support baseplate.
Several cracks and chips were observed which were not seen in other recent support installations.
This item was discussed with a
gA supervisor and applicable modifications personnel.
1024809 was written on January 23, 1990 to repair the baseplate grout.
Two NCVs were identifed in the Modifications Area.
System Plant Acceptance Evaluation The SPAE process provides direction for design engineering to determine that systems are ready for return to service.
The process procedure is
.
BFEP PI 88-07, System Plant Acceptance Evaluation.
Included in the evaluation is the identification of outstanding work on a
system basis performance, a
system engineering evaluation based upon this work being completed, and verification of completion of the work prior to returning
'the system to service.
The "outstanding work is identified by a review of drawing discrepancies, engineering change notices, essential calculations, conditions adverse to quality, EA action items, restart test program, Appendix R and fuel load SPAE package, system restart design criteria, primary and critical drawings, punchlist, and NPP special programs.
The licen'see performed the SPAE for the CS system in November 1989.
New work items were identified during this evaluation.
This prompted a review of the SPAE for all of the Unit 2 systems undergoing a
SPOC review to discover any additional work items not previously addressed.
On February 8, 1990, the inspector reviewed the status of these evaluations with representatives from nuclear/mechanical, electrical, and civil engineering disciplines.
Besides the identification of any new work items, a key element of this review was to tie work items from the various programs to the individual systems.
This review was termed Phase I of the SPAE process.
In the electrical area, it was identified that potentially 10 to
TS changes may be required for instrument setpoints.
Engineering was reviewing whether the TS.values were analytical values or actual limits.
In the civil area, seven examples of flexible hose usage that would require replacement or qualification were identified.
All design work was scheduled to be completed by March 31, 1989.
In the nuclear/mechanical area, an additional five to seven calculations were identified.
Forty-three systems had completed the review, but issues remained open concerning the Appendix R, Eg, and Restart Test programs.
The inspector concluded that the benefit of the review was the connection of the programmatic work items to systems.
It was not clear how the review could provide useful input to a restart schedule until all reviews were completed.
No violations or deviations were identified in the System Plant Acceptance Evaluation are Power Ascension Test Program Status The inspector reviewed the status of the Power Ascension Test Program.
The procedures consist of 24 TI's, a Master Refueling Test Instruction, and a Startup Test Description document.
The Startup Test Description document was completed along with the'ollowing TI's:
TI Number
132 135 152 Title CRD System Testing Recirculation Flow Control Process Computer and Core Performance Startup Testing Data Acquisition Signal Points, Hethods, and Equipment Effective Date 1/26/90 12/29/89 1/26/90 1/8/90 In a letter dated October 30, 1989, TVA provided information to the NRC concerning the Power Ascension Hold Points.
The letter provided a
discussion of the sequence of testing to be performed during the test plateaus and management assessment periods, along with a brief description of each test.
This letter is currently 'under review by the NRC.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 16, 1990 with those persons indicated in paragraph
above.
The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed below.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
Item Descri tion 259, 260, 296/90-01-01 259, 260, 296/90-01-02 Acronyms NCV, Bypassing Cable Pull Links, paragraph 4.c.
NCV, Bypassing gC Holdpoint During Cable Pull, paragraph 4.c.
APRM BFEP BFNP CRD Average Power Range Monitor Browns Ferry Engineering Project Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Control Rod Drive
CS DCN EA ECN EECW ENS EQ ESF IFI IR LCO LIV LPCI LPRM MG MR MSIV NCV NPP NQAM NRC PMI QA QC RBM RHR RPS RTP SDSP SI SPAE SPOC SR/CM SRM TACF TI TS TVA WP Core Spray Design Change Notice Engineering Assurance Engineering Change Notice Emergency Equipment Cooling Water Emergency Notification System Environmental Qualification Engineered Safety Feature Inspector Followup Item Inspection Report Limiting Condition for Operation Licensee Identified Violation Low Pressure Coolant Injection Local Power Range Monitor Motor-Generator Maintenance Request Main Steam Isolation Valve Non Cited Violation Nuclear Performance Plant Nuclear Quality Assurance Manual Nuclear Regulatory Commission Plant Manager Instruction Quality Assurance Quality Control Rod Block Monitor Residual Heat Removal Reactor Protection System Restart Test Program Site Director Standard Practice Surveillance Instruction System Plant Acceptance Evaluation System Pre-Operation Checklist Special Requirements/Compensatory Measures Source Range Monitor Temporary Alteration Control Form Technical Instruction Technical Specification Tennessee Valley Authority Work Plan
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