IR 05000259/1990019
| ML18033B448 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 07/13/1990 |
| From: | Blake J, Chou R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18033B447 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259-90-19, 50-260-90-19, 50-296-90-19, IEB-79-02, IEB-79-14, NUDOCS 9007260147 | |
| Download: ML18033B448 (12) | |
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Op o'p*y4 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-259/90-19, 50-260/90-19, and 50-296/90-19 Licensee:
Tennessee Valley Authority 6N 38A Lookout Place 1101 Mar ket Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Docket Nos.:
50-259, 50-260 and 50-296 License Nos.:
DPR-33, DPR-52, and DPR-68 Facility Name:
Browns Ferry 1, 2, and
Inspection Condu ted: ~Ju-14, 1990 Inspec op:
R.
C.
hou, Reactor Inspector Approved b
J.
. Blake, hsef Materials and Processes Section Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY ate S'gned ate
)gned Scope:
This routine announced inspection was conducted in the areas of pipe support modifications for the licensee's IEBs 79-02/79-14 program and previous open items.
Results:
In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.
One out of 42 pipe supports was found to have a minor discrepancy.
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) has improved significantly on quality, especially welding workmanship.
9007 60147 90071':
REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
"F. Arant, Mechanical Field Engineer - Modifications
"R.
V. Baird, Civil Engineer
"R.
R. Baron, guality Control (gC) Manager G. Guffey, gC Mechanical and Welding Inspector
- W. A. Massie, Site Licensing Engineer
"J. McCarthy, Regulatory - Licensing Supervisor
"J.
E.
McCord, Civil Engineer Supervisor
~L.
B. Nathan, Engineering Super visor - Modifications
"J.
R. Rupert, Lead Civil Engineer M.
C. Strickland, gC Shift Manager
- E.
F.
Thomas, Project Manager D. Winchester, Mechanical Engineer - Modifications Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included craftsmen, engineers, mechanics, technicians, and administrative personnel.
NRC Resident Inspectors
"D. Carpenter, Senior Resident Inspector
"C. Patterson, Senior Resident Inspector 2.
Licensee Action on Pipe Support Modifications a ~
Reference 1:
"Pipe Support Base Plate Designs Using Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts"
'eference 2:
"Seismic Analyses For As-Built Safety-Related Piping System" (1)
Status The inspection involved pipe support modifications required to meet'EBs 79-02 and 79-14 before the restart of Unit 2.
The last inspection in this area was documented in Inspection Report Nos.
50-259, 260, 296/90"09.
The licensee has completed approximately 1400 pipe support modifications, which represent about 60 percent of the total to be completed before restart.
All pipe support modifications are scheduled to be completed by August 1990 to support a fuel loading schedule of October 199 Malkdown Re-Inspection The inspector randomly selected 42 pipe supports which had previously been inspected and accepted by the licensee construction foreman and gC inspectors.
The 42 pipe supports, in four different systems, included large bore and small bore piping for.safety-related systems located both inside and outside of containment.
The walkdown re-inspection was completed with assistance from licensee engineers and a
gC mechanical inspector who is also qualified as a welding inspector.
The supports were partially re-inspected against detail drawings, including the original walkdown sketches, the Design Change Notices (DCNs),
and the Field Design Change Notices (FDCNs) for configuration, identification, fastener/
anchor installation, anchor size, anchor type, anchor marking, anchor edge distance, base plate size and thickness, plate warpage, member size, weld sizes, component identification numbers, component sizes and settings, dimensions, oxidation accumulation, maintenance, and damage/protection.
The supports re-inspected during the current inspection are listed below.
Table I Malkdown Re-Ins ection Su orts Item No.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
1-47B451R0054 1-47B451S0241 1"47B451S0306 1-47B451S0307 1-47B451S0310 1-47B451S0327 2-47B406S0019 2"47B406S0020 2-47B406S0021 2-478408S0054 2-47B408S0055 2-47B408S0058 2-47B408S0067 2-478408S0075 2-47B464S0228 2-47B452H0014 2"47B452H0016 2-47B452H0119 2-47B452H0178 2-478452S0228 2-478452S0230 2-47B452S0231 2-478452S0233 Comments/Discre ancies Note
Note
Note
Note 4 Note
0 0'
(cont'd)
Notes:
Item No.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
Table I Walkdown Re-Ins ection Su orts Su ort No.
2-478452S0236 2-47B452S0238 2-47B452S0239 2-47B452S0353 2-478452S0354 2-47B452S0355 3-478451R0093 3-47B451R0094 3-47B451R0096 3-47B451S0052 3-478451S0053 3-47B451S0072 3-478451S0179 3-478451S0186 3-478451S 0181 3-47B451S0189 3-478451S0245 3"47B451S0274 3-47B451S0275 Comments/Discre ancies Note
l.
Both rods on this support were found to be loose and did not provide dead w'eight support of the pipe.
This is.the only support found to have discrepancies during this inspection.
Work Request No.
C041152 was issued to correct the problem.
2.
A flex line on Valve 2-FCV-68-35 near this support is broken.
Work Request No.
C033829 was issued.
3.
The spring settings on three supports were found to be outside of the required setting ranges.
The licensee engineer explained that the additional weights from the lead blankets to protect worker radiation exposures and adjustments on piping due to modifications could cause the spring settings to be out of range.
Those problems will be fixed per Pipe Support General Notes 47B435-3, Note 86, which requires that all springs should be reset after all modifications were completed.
The licensee is developing a program to implement the above require-ment.
4.
A channel flange of supporting steel contacted with the spring load bolt of this support.
The modification on the civil structures of this support is not completed.
FDCN No.
12462 was issued to modify the channel flange and ensure that the civil structure will not contact the component of this suppor The drawings used during the inspection included the original walkdown sketches, previous Bergen - Paterson drawing, DCNs, and FDCNs.
All pipe supports are for the large pipes except Item Nos.
27 and 28 for small pipes.
(3)
Support Calculation Review The design calculations listed below on Table II were partially reviewed and evaluated for thoroughness, clarity, consistency, and accuracy.
The calculations contained the purpose, assumptions, references, design loads, support evaluations, summary of results, conclusion, and attachments.
The attach-ments included existing pipe support configuration from walkdowns, proposed support modifications or Design Change Notices (DCNs),
Employee Concerns Checklist, and computer input and output for frame and base plate analyses.
The review included:
that the applied loads used were taken from the latest stress calculation; computer model, computer input and output, check of displacements, member size, weld sizes, and symbols, bolt sizes, and standard component capacity and settings.
In general, the design calculations were of good quality.
TABLE II Su ort Calculations Reviewed Su ort No.
Calculation No.
Rev.
2-47B408S0075 2-47B452502228 2-47B452S0233 2-47B452S0236 2-47B452S0239 2-478452S0353 2-47B452S0354 CDQ-2068870517 CDQ-2074870466 CDQ-207480471 CDQ-2074870474 CDQ-2074870477 CDQ-2074900101 CD Q-2074900102 b.
(Open) Violation 50-260/89-57-01, Pipe Support Discrepancies This violation involved discrepancies found during two previous inspections of the support modification program.
The inspector discussed the violation with the licensee's engineers and reviewed the information provided.
(1)
Item 4 of Violation 89-57-01 The licensee's engineer, based on the latest QC inspection record, used 6.74 sq.
in. for contact area to calculate the bearing stress between two plates.
The bearing stress is below
the allowable stress and is acceptable.
The support calculation was revised to Revision 1 to incorporate the above information.
Therefore, this item is considered closed.
Three New Examples Added to Violation 89-57-01 from Inspection Report No. 90-09 Support No.
2-478400S0201 A 3/8" gap existed between the new cover plate and the old gusset plate.
The licensee evaluation determined that continuity between the new cover plate and the old gusset plate is the intent of design and modification.
Therefore, the licensee issued FDCN F9325A to correct the existing condition by developing continuous connection between the new and existing plates, thereby restoring the proper section properties throughout the area in question.
The licensee also conducted a
review on five support modifications which had a similar construction method - boxing in existing structural
"w" shape.
The five supports are on the Main Steam and Feedwater lines.
All five supports were reviewed and it was determined that none of them required modifications.
The licensee concluded that the gap on Support No.
2-47B400S0201 is an isolated case.
This item is considered closed based on the licensee's issue of FDCN to correct problem and the review of other similar supports.
Supports No.
2-47B450R0025 The 1"g expansion anchor bolts were stated on the drawing without specifying self-drilling (SSD) expansion anchor bolts or wedge anchor bolts.
After a careful review of content of design calculation, computer input, and output for Base Plate II Analysis, the licensee concluded that the 7/8"P SSD expansion anchor bolt allowables (conservative)
were used in analysis and calculation although both allowables (capacities)
of SSD expansion anchor bolts and wedge anchor bolts were stated in the beginning of the calculation.
Therefore, the calculation did use the lower capacity of expansion anchor bolt which is the SSD expansion anchor bolt.
This item is considered closed.
Support No. 2-478462SOOll The location of this support was found to be off one-foot from the location stated in the drawings.
The licensee completed Incident Investigations Report MOD 90-05 on April 2, 1990.
The report stated that the designer mistakenly omitted one foot of dimension when he prepared for issue of Design Change Authorization DCA W4534-039 ROOO and the craft and guality Control personnel performing the work neglected to verify that
the location of support to be modified was as shown in the DCA location plan since this was a previously existing support.
The licensee concluded.that the root cause of this incident was a
simple typographical error and the contribution to this incident was the fact that the dimensions of the DCA location plan were not utilized by the personnel performing or inspecting the work to determine if they were in fact replacing the correct support.
Therefore, the licensee issued an Advanced Authorized FDCN to correct the typographical error and the Engineering and Modification Restart Manager issued a memorandum R28 900405 965, dated April 9, 1990, to the Modifications Manager and guality Control Manager and requested to review this incident with all personnel involved in support installations and stress the fact that no dimension is insignificant and all details count.
This item is considered closed based on the licensee's findings as an isolated case and corrective action taken.
Other aspects of this violation will be reviewed during a future inspection.
3.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on June 14, 1990, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detai 1 the inspection results.
Proprietary information is not contained in this report.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.