IR 05000259/1990028
| ML18033B527 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 10/10/1990 |
| From: | Rankin W, Testa E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18033B526 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259-90-28, 50-260-90-28, 50-296-90-28, NUDOCS 9010300221 | |
| Download: ML18033B527 (31) | |
Text
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'"n spp*yW UNITEDSTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Og <5 $90 Report Noser 50-259/90-28, 50-260/90-28, and 50-296/90-28 Licensee:
Tennessee Valley Authority 6N 38A Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Docket Noser 50-259, 50-260 and 50-296 License Nos.:
DPR-33, DPR-52, and DPR-68 Facility Name:
Browns Ferry 1, 2, and
Inspection Conducted:
September 17-21, 1990 Inspector:
emcee
'u~6 E.
D. Testa Accompanying Personnel:
G. Arthur (Sonalysts, Inc.)
D. Carpenter P. Kellogg Approved by:
~..M
[rI'.
H. Rankin, Iief Emergency Preparedness Section Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards Date Si ne D+e igned SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection included observation and evaluation of the annual emergency response exercise.
Emergency organizations'ctivities and responses were selectively observed in the Control Room, Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center, Field Monitoring Teams, and Central Emergency Control Center.
The inspection also included a review of the exercise objectives and scenario details, as well as observation of the licensee's post-exercise critique activities.
The exercise was a small-scale exercise with partial participation by the State of Alabama and local emergency response agencies.
The exercise was conducted on September 19, 1990, between the hours of 8:00 a.m.
and 2:00 p.m.
CD Results:
In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.
The following strengths were identified in the licensee's emergency organization:
1.
Effective exercise critique and self identification of items needing improvement.
2.
Excellent command and control by the Shift Operations Supervisor and the Site Emergency Director.
3.
Aggressive management approach to investigating and solving problems.
4.
In-plant radio system provided good communication capabilities to 17 Operations Support Center dispatched repair teams.
Within the scope of the observed exercise, the licensee fully demonstrated the capability of implementing its Emergency Plan and procedures to provide for the health and safety of the public in a radiological emergenc REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- C
- D
- p
- N.
- T
- R.
- N.
- R.
- B
- L
- S
- R.
- J
- K.
Beasley, Communication Specialist/BFN Bohlender, Health Physicist/Radcon Carier, Manager/Site Licensing Catron, EP Manager/Sequoyah Cornelius, EP Manager/Browns Ferry
'ones, Operations Superintendent Kazannas, VP Operations Kitts, EP Manager - Chattanooga Marks, Manager, EP Programs Myers, Plant Manager Rudge, Site Programs/Support Manager Tuttle, Manager, Site Security Wallace, Site Licensing Engineer Whittenburg, Communciation Specialist Other licensee employees contacted during this in'spection included craftsmen, engineers, operators, mechanics, security force members, technicians, and administrative personnel.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- D. Carpenter, Senior Resident Inspector
- P. Kellogg, Chief, TYA Projects, Section
- B. Wilson, Chief, TVA Projects, Region II
- Attended exit interview Exercise Scenario (82302)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine that provisions had been made to test an integrated emergency response capability as well as the basic elements existing within the licensee, State and local Emergency Plans and organization as required by
CFR 50.47(b)(14),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
The scenario was reviewed and discussed with licensee representatives in advance of the exercise.
The final exercise data and message package were distributed during a pre-exercise licensee briefing held September 18, 199 The scenario developed for this day shift 'exercise was detailed and fully exercised the licensee's emergency organization.
The exercise began during the regular day shift at about 8:00 a.m.
CDT with Unit 1 in a
prolonged outage with no fuel loaded in the vessel.
Unit 2 reactor was operating at 100 percent power.
Unit 3 was in a refueling outage with no fuel loaded in the vessel.
The scenario terminated after six hours at approximately 2:00 p.m.
CDT.
The controllers provided adequate guidance throughout the exercise.
The inspector observed adequate interactions between the controllers and the players, no controller prompting was observed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Assignment of Responsibility (82301)
This area was observed to assure that primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee had been specifically established and that adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(l),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.A.
The inspector observed that specific emergency assignments were made for the licensee's onsite emergency response organization, and that adequate staff were available to respond to the simulated emergency.
The initial response organization was augmented by designated licensee representatives.
Because of the scenario scope and conditions, long-term or continuous staffing of -the emergency response organization was not required.
Discussions with licensee representatives indicated that sufficient technical staff were, available to provide for continuous staffing of the augmented emergency organization, if needed.
The inspector also observed activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency organization in the Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC), Central Emergency Control Center (CECC),
and Joint Information Center (JIC).
At each 'response center the required staffing and assignment of responsibility was consistent with the licensee's approved Emergency Plan.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Onsite Emergency'rganization (82301)
The -licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to assure that
.
the following requirements were implemented pursuant to
CFR 50.47(b)(2),
Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E
to
CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.B of NUREG-0654:
(1) unambiguous definition of responsibilities for emergency response; (2) provision of adequate staffing to assure initial facility accident response in key functional areas at all times; and (3) specification of onsite and offsite support organization interaction The inspector observed that the initial onsite emergency organization was adequately defined, and that staff was available to fill key functional positions within the organization.
Augmentation of the initial emergency response organization was accomplished through mobilization of the additional day shift personnel.
The shift supervisor assigned to the exercise assumed the duties of the emergency coordinator promptly upon initiation of the simulated emergency, and directed the response until formally relieved by the Plant Manager.
The -shift team in the control room performed their duties and carried out their responsibilities in.an outstanding manner.
The Shift Operations Supervisor (SOS)
extensively used procedures and schematics.
The extensive depth of knowledge of systems and the resources available combined with a "can do" spirit of this team resulted in an extraordinary effort throughout the exercise.
The Plant Manager skillfully used his technical, and adminstrative resources to effectively demonstrate command and control of the TSC in prioritizing and resolving scenario
'induced casualties.
Supporting technical information and management assistance were made available as requested.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Emergency Classification System (82301)
This area was observed to assure that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by the nuclear facility licensee pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4),
Paragraph IV.C of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50,
'specific guidance promulgated in Section II.D of NUREG-0654, and guidance recommended in NRC Information Notice 83-28.
Emergency Plan implementing procedure EPIP-1 titled,
"Emergency Plan Classification Logic" was used to promptly identify and properly classify the scenario simulated events.
The Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE),
Alert, Site Area Emergency (SAE),
and General Emergency classifications were timely and correct by procedure.
The NOUE occurred at approximately 8:15 a.m.
CDT when the SOS entered the EPIP and Technical
"
Specification 4.5.B LCO requiring a 24-hour shutdown.
The Alert occurred at approximately 8:30 a.m.
due to loss of all annunciators in groups 1 or 2 for greater than 15 minutes.
The SAE was declared at approximately 10:00 a.m.
based upon degraded core with a possible loss of eoolable geometry.
The General Emergency was declared at approximately 12:15 p.m.
, based upon dry well temperature greater than 280'F.
The drill was terminated at approximately 2:00 p.m.
No violations or deviations were identifie Notification methods and Procedures (82301)
This area was observed to determine that procedures had been established for notification by the licensee of State arid local response organizations and emergency personnel, and that the content of initial and followup messages to response organizations had been established; and means to provide early notification to the populace within the. plume exposure pathway had been established as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IY.D, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.E.
The inspector observed that notification methods and procedures had been established and were used to provide information concerning the simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State, and local response organizations and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response organization.
Notification of the State and designated local offsite organizations were completed within 15 minutes following the decl. aration of the emergency event.
The Alert Notification System (ANS) for alerting the public within the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ) was not actuated during this exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Emergency Communications (82301)
This area was observed to verify that provisions existed for prompt communications among principal response organizations and emergency personnel as required by
CFR 50.47(b)(6),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.F..
The inspector observed that adequate communication existed among the licensee's emeroency organizations, and between the licensee's emergency response organization and offsite authorities.
Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)
This area 'was observed to determine that adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support an emergency response are provided and maintained as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.H.
The inspector observed activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency response facilities.
In spite of computer malfunctions for paging responders and the necessity to resort to manual call-out and resetting the computer, initial pager activation of the emergency response facilities was accomplished within the 60 minute guideline.
No other major equipment deficiencies were observe o
Facilities observed by the NRC evaluation team included:
a ~
b.
c ~
d.
e.
Control Room -
The exercise control room used was Unit 2 Control Room.
The inspector observed that following review and analysis of
, the sequence of accident events, control room operations personnel acted promptly to initiate required response to the simulated emergency.
Emergency procedures were available and followed.
The designated exercise shift supervisor evaluated the significance of each degradation of plant condition and quickly and continuously prioritized repair activities.
Command and control was demonstrated in a positive, competent manner.
Technical Support Center (TSC) -
The TSC manager (Plant Manager)
demonstrated effective command and control and knowledge of the plant during the exercise.
The facility staff appeared to be cognizant of their duties, authorities and responsibilities.
The TSC manager conducted an indepth detailed discussion concerning the various possibilities of plant casualties and resultant classifications.
The TSC provided timely knowledgeable support to the Control Room during the casualties.
Operations Support Center (OSC)
-
The inspector observed that following the request for activation, personnel responded promptly to staff the facility.
The use of the newly installed plant radio system provided excellent support to the 17 repair teams sent into the plant to perform various repair functions.
The direction and control of these teams demonstrated efficient and effective repair of casualty situations; Central Emergency Control Center (CECC) - The CECC was staffed and activated within one hour of the Alert declaration.
The facility staff were familiar with their emergency duties, authoritie's',
and emergency responsibilitiies.
The CECC was provided with adequate equipment to support the assigned staff.
Security/Access Control was observed to be appropriately established and maintained.
Communications between the CECC and the TSC at the plant were adequate and effective and timely transmission of information was demonstrated.
Status boards and other graphic aids were strategically located and appropriately maintained.
The Joint Information Center (JIC) - The JIC at Browns Ferry was located at the Calhoun State Community College in Decatur, Alabama.
The facility was fully activated and produced simulated news releases.
Joint State and licensee news conferences were conducted.
Technical briefings were provided to real and mock news persons who attended the exercise.
The inspector observed an adequate demonstration and use of the JIC.
Several of the news releases received inadequate technical review and contained some inaccurate plant exercise details.
This item was identified for correction by the licensee critique proces Cl
No violations or deviations were identified.
Accident Assessment (82301)
This area was observed to assure that methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required by
CFR 50.47(b)(9),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV-.B, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.I.
The accident assessment program included both an engineering assessment of plant status and an assessment of radiological hazards to both onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the accident.
Both programs appeared effective during this exercise in analyzing the plant status so as to make recommendations to the emergency director concerning mitigating actions to reduce damage to plant equipment, to prevent release of radioactive materials, and to terminate the emergency condition.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Protective Responses (82301)
This area was observed to verify that guidelines for protective ac'tions during the emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, were developed and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of nonessential personnel, were implemented promptly as required b
CFR 50.47(b)(10),
and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.J.
The inspector verified that the licensee had adequately used emergency procedures for formulating protective action recommendations (PARs) for the offsite populace within the 10 mile EPZ.
The inspector observed that protective actions were initiated for onsite emergency worker's following the Alert declaration by conducting an accountability of those personnel inside the plant protected area.
The licensee's use of a computer based accountability system (PREAS)
demonstrated that all persons'ithin the protected area.
could be accounted for'ithin 30 minutes after accountability was ordered.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Exercise Critique (82301)
.The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine that deficiencies identified as a result of the exercise and weaknesses noted in the licensee's emergency response organization were formally presented to licensee management for corrective actions as required by
CFR 50.47(b)(14),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The inspector observed the licensee's player critique conducted in the Control Room,'TSC, OSC, JIC, and CECC.
The players offered constructive suggestions for improvement; All substantial suggestions were documented for review and correction.
The inspector also observed the licensee's controller critique conducted the following day.
The subject critique involved a detailed discussion and an analysis of required improvements and deficiencies identified during the exercise and players critique.
All,substantive findings were documented for review and correction.
The respective corrective actions implemented to address these findings will be reviewed during future inspections.
A formal presentation of the critique results was made to licensee management on September 21, 1990.
The conduct of the critique was consistent with regulatory requirements and guidelines cited above.
All exercise objectives appeared to be met.
No violations or deviations were identified.
12.
Action on Previous Inspector Findings (92701)
(Closed)
Inspector Follow Item (IFI) 50-259, 260, 296/90-16-01:
Provide a
detailed explanation of the root cause associated with the incorrect reference to th'e deleted EPIP-18 found in SDSP 22.1.
The inspector reviewed the close-out file and determined that the incor rect cross-reference in SDSP 22.1 was corrected on May 10, 1990.
13.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on September 21, 1990, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results.
Proprietary information is not contained in this report.
Licensee management was informed that one IFI was considered closed.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
Attachments:
l.
Exercise Time Line 2.
Exercise Scope and Objectives
BRCNNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT SEPTEMBER I,9i I.990 GRADED EXERT'SE NARRATIVE SUMMARY Detailed initial conditions on plant status and equipment operability are provided to exercise participants or players.
Overall plant status is summarized as follows:
Unit I - Unit is in prolonged outage with no fuel loaded in the vessel.
Unit 2 Reactor is at 100
POWER.OPERATION Unit 3 Unit is in a refueling outage with no fuel loaded in the vessel.
The scenario begins with Surveillance Instruction
{SI)
4.5.B.1.C in-progress.
This surveillance instruction (SI)
tests a
number of RHR valves including FCV-74-73, a test valve which.
returns water to the TORUS.
During this activity the valve becomes stuck in a
mid position.
With this valve stuck, full LPCI flow cannot be assured and loop II of LPCI would have to be declared inoperable.
Technical specification 3.5.B.4 would be inforce which requires an orderly reactor shutdown be initiated and the reactor placed in COLD SHUTDOWN within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Conditions exist at this time for an "Notification of Unusual Event" (1).
At T=O:30, control room panel 9-<<4A<<
<<48<<
<<5A<< and
<<5B<<
annunicators are lost.
After 15 minutes, upon verification that the panel annunicators are inoperable conditions exist for an "ALERT"(2).
Additional unit operators should be posted to monitor the system parameters effected by panel.
The SED will activiate the TSC and OSC and make required notifications to the NRC and ODS.
At T=1:00, FCV-74-73 is freed and manually closed at T=l:20.
Due to previous operations the top housing cover and the valve stem has caused significant mechanical binding and the valve will not be able to be reopened for the duration of 1 BFN-EPIP-1, Emergency Classification Level
<<SU1<<,
invokes a declaration of "Notification of Unusual Event", based upon Technical Specification Limiting Condition reached requiring shutdown.
2 BFN-EPIP-l, Emergency Classification Level
<<SA6<<,
invokes a
declaration of
"ALERT",
based upon
"Loss of all annunicators in group I (panel 9-3A. thru F) or II (panel 9-4A, 4B and 9-5A, B) for >15 minutes<<.
this scenario.
This situation causes RHR Loop II of TORUS cooling to be inoperable.
The unit continues shutting down and reaches approximately
4 power at T=l:45.
At T=1:40, the annunicator panels are returned to service after breaker replacement.
T=1:45,
~A" Recirculation Pump spuriously overspeeds resulting in a
reactor (Rx)
power transient and fuel failure.
The Main Steam Line (MSL)
radiation monitors measure a significant increase in steam radiation levels initiating a Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV) closure and subsequent Rx SCRAM.
During this SCRAM a
4 Anticipated Transient, Without SCRAM (ATWS)
occurs.
Thermal and Flux transients caused by..the ATWS results in additional clad failure and
"GAS GAP" releases.
The SCRAM is able to be reset and manually initiated.
Most of the control rods insert although three control rods remain out.
The ATWS was caused by a rod group not receiving a
SCRAM signal due to an electrical malfunction.
At T=2:00, Source Range Monitors (SRM)
and Intermediate Range Monitors (IRM) are inserted as required by the scram procedure.
It is observed that during this process two monitors cannot be fully inserted.
It can be determined that, these monitors are in the same core area as the three control rods which did not fully insert.
Conditions exist at, this for an
"Site Area Emer enc
" classification (3).
Repeated attempts are made to insert the three control rods and monitors without success.
The monitors that did not insert can be withdrawn but will not insert.
Following the Rx SCRAM, operators should have entered Emergency Operating Instruction -
(EOI-1)
which directs actions to control Rx pressure and level.
Rx pressure is controlled by releasing steam to,the TORUS and Rx water level is maintained by the Control Rod Drive, High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI),
and Reactor Core Isolation Coolant (RCIC) systems.
TORUS cooling is initiated utilizing Loop I of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system.
At T=2:15, the Rx starts
"Cool-Down~I.
At T=2:35I Window 13, panel 4C annunciates indicating liRBCCW SURGE TANK LEVEL LOW".
Following these actions at T=2:42, Window 11 Panel 4C annunciates indicating
"DRYWELL FD SUMP PUMP EXCESSIVE OPRN" and will not clear.
This annunciation
BFN-EPIP-1, Emergency Classification Level "FS5",
invokes a declaration of "Site Area Emergency",
based upon "Degraded Core With possible Loss Of Coolable Geometr confirms that leakage into the drywell in excess of 40 gallons per minute is in progress.
At T=2:45, During HPCI operation the steam supply rupture diaphragm blows.
This event releases primary system steam to the reactor building until terminated by HPCI isolation.
Reactor building releases are processed by Stand By Gas Treatment prior to being released to the environment via the stack.
At T=3:30, the RBCCW leak in the drywell deteriorates to a
point that it exhausts the supply of water supporting the system.
The RBCCW pumps lose suction and are trip.
Due to the loss of cooling water to the drywell coolers they become ineffective as a
means to maintain drywell temperature.
Drywell temperature begins to rise.
T=3:42 TORUS venting is initiated resulting in a small offsite release through the stack.
This venting is terminated at T=4:05.
At T=4:15, the drywell temperature reaches 280 degrees Fahrenheit.
Conditions exist for an General Emer enc (4).
At T=4:3.9, Rx "480 V
MOV BD 2A" malfunctions resulting in the loss of TORUS cooling Loop I.
Due to the problems earlier associated with RHR valve FCV-74-73 both modes of TORUS cooling are now inoperable.
The TORUS water temperature begins to rise.
At T=S:25 the Rx "480 V MOV BD 2A" is returned to service.
Based upon the return of the
"2A" electrical board, TORUS cooling is returned to service and the temperature and pressure are decreasing.
Drywell temperature and pressure slowly begin to fall due to reactor vessel depressurization.
Make-up water to the reactor vessel is being maintain utilizing the condensate and feedwater systems and reactor pressure is being maintained using MSRVs.
.At T.=6;00, the;DRILL TERMINATES"..
BFN-EPIP-1, Emergency Classification Level
"FG2<<,
invokes a declaration of a "General Emergency",
based upon "Drywell Temperature Greater Than 280 degrees Fahrenheit".
.
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- I 2 )5 RRCCN VOL TUNl I
I )5 VAIVE 74 7)i l(Kl ARHQAUAL IS CLOS(O I
I PUVP A OP I 2, ~ I QH Sl QR SOUP PUUP 8 ON I~ 2 I~ PAH(L IC HHOOVS I I CSC(59VC RUN QN SUVP PUUPS le I 45 PCCSTC OyP RLH ANAT 17258 ATSTS 2'SCRw RtS(1
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I
BROGANS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN)
~
EXERCISE The 1990 BFN EP exercise will be a small-scale exercise requiring full participation by TVA, with partial participatien of the state local local emergency response agencies.
GOALS AND OBJECTIVES TVA's goals for the 1990 BFN exercise are as follows:
EXERCISE GOALS 1.
To allow the plant and the Central Emergency Control Center (CECC) personnel to test and demonstrate, their capability in accordance with the Nuclear Power-Radiological Emergency Plan (NP-REP),
BFN Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs),
and CECC EPIPs to protect the health and safety of TVA employees and the general public.
2.
To provide training for emergency response personnel.
3.
To perform post-exercise critiques to determine any areas requiring additional capability improvement and to identify emergency preparedness weaknesses.
EXERCISE OBJECTIVES A. Control Room Objectives 1. Demonstrate the ability of the Sate Emergency Director (Shift Operations Supervisor SOS) to classify an emergen'cy condition and make required notifications to the Operations Duty Specialist within five minutes and to the NRC within one hour.
2. Demonstrate the ability to provide onsite protective action measures for plant personnel.
Demonstrate the precise and clear transfer of responsibilities from the Control Room staff to the Technical Support Center (TSC) staf. Demonstrate the ability of the SOS to update the Control Room and plant personnel of the status of the emergency situation and actions currently being planned by the TSC.
5. Demonstrate the ability of the Control Room personnel to maintain equipment status, plant status, corrective actions taken and to maintain logs.
6. Demonstrate effective command and control by the SOS in the Control Room.
B.
TSC Objectives 1. Demonstrate the ability to activate the TSC within 60 minutes.
2. Demonstrate effective command and control by the Site Emergency Director (SED) in the TSC.
3. Demonstrate the problem solving capabilities of the TSC staff to identify the cause of the incident, and mitigate the consequences of the incident.
4. Demonstrate the ability of the SED in the TSC to classify an emergency conditions.
5. Demonstrate the ability to effectively utilize inplant radiation monitors.
6.
Demonstrate the ability to perform timely assessments of onsite radiological conditions.
7. Demonstrate the timely updating of TSC status boards.
8. Demonstrate timely updating of the Operation Support Center (OSC)
and the Control Room, and the transfer of technical information to the CECC.
9.
Demonstrate the ability to assemble onsite personnel (in the protected area)
and provide an accountability report to the SED within 30 minutes after sounding the accountability alarms.
10.Demonstrate the precise and clear transfer of accurate information between the TSC staff and the CECC staff.
C.
OSC Objectives I'.
Demonstrate the ability to activate the OSC within 60 minute. Demonstrate effective command and control by the OSC manager.
3. Demonstrate the following capabilities:
a.
OSC teams are briefed on plant.conditions prior to field assignments.
b.
Adequate RADCON support is provided.
c.
Protective Clothing is utilized properly.
d.
The exposure of onsite emergency workers is controlled ALARA.
e.
OSC teams are tracked.
4. Demonstrate that there are adequate communications and efficient transfer of information between the OSC and the TSC, RADCON laboratory,,
Chemistry laboratory, and OSC field teams.
5. Demonstrate the timely updating of OSC status boards.
6. Demonstrate the radiological control capability to:
a. Perform effective inplant and site boundary surveys during radiological emergencies.
b.
Monitor changing radiological conditions.
c.
Make timely and effective transfer of survey results form the OSC RADCON Staff to the OSC and TSC.
d.
Track radiological exposures of onsite emergency workers.
e.
Make a timely and effective activation of the plant environmental monitoring van and the establishment of adequate communications with the TSC and/or CECC.
D.
CECC Objectives 1. Demonstrate that the Operations Duty Specialist makes the initial emergency notification to the state within five minutes after plant notification and offsite TVA emergency personnel are notified in a timely manner.
2. Demonstrate the ability to active the CECC within 60 minute. Demonstrate that the CECC Director makes a clear announcement when the CECC is declared operational, maintains effective command and contxol in the CECC, and provides periodic briefing to the CECC staff.
4. Demonstrate the ability to effectively use TVA corporate or outside support organizations and to obtain vendor or other outside resources, if needed.
5.
Demonstrate the precise and clear transfer of accurate information between the TSC staff and the CECC staff.
6.
Demonstrate the ability of the CECC staff to direct and coordinate the deployment of Radiological Monitoring Teams and coordinate TVA dose assessment activities.
7.
Demonstrate the ability of the Dose Assessment Team to
'btain, analyze, and use onsite and/or offsite radiological conditions and meteorological information to produce dose assessments to the CECC Director in a clear and timely manner.
8. Demonstrate the ability to inform, update, and coordinate with State Radiological Health personnel regarding meteorological, dose assessment information, and plant status.
9. Demonstrate the ability of the CECC Plant Assessment Team to analyze current plant conditions, identify projected trends and potential consequences, and provide the information to the CECC Director.
10.
Demonstrate the ability of the CECC to provide at least hourly updates of plant status to the state.
11.
Demonstrate a timely and effective flow of information between CECC Radiological and Plant Assessment Team.
1?.
Demonstrate the timely updating of the CECC status boards.
13.
Demonstrate that proper security is established and maintained for the CECC.
. 14.
Demonstrate the ability to alert federal and industrial emergency contacts as appropriate.
15.
Demonstrate the adequacy of communications links between the CECC and State Emergency Operation Cente o
E.
Environs Assessment Activities 1. Demonstrate the ability of the Radiological Monitoring Teams to effic'iently and effectively utilize their procedures to perform dose rate surveys, collection and analyms of samples, and other prescribed radiological monitoring activities.
2.
Demonstrate the ability of the monitoring teams to follow contaminated control procedures under field conditions if warranted.
3.
Demonstrate the ability to control the exposure of offsite utility emergency workers.
4.
Demonstrate effective command and control of radiological monitoring activities by the plant and/or CECC and that adequate communications links exist.
F.
Public Information Objectives 1.
Demonstrate the ability to coordinate information with non-TVA agencies from the CECC.
2. Demonstrate the ability of the Communications staff in the CECC to develop timely and accurate news releases.
3.
Demonstrate the ability of the JIC to provide timely and
- accurate information to the public during JIC briefing and coordinate public news briefing with state and federal agencies.
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I 4. Demonstrate that the CECC Information Manager exercises effective command and control of the overall Communications response.
5.
Demonstrate that. ability of the media relations at the JIC to answer telephone calls from the media.
6. Demonstrate the ability of TVA's public information staff in the JIC to provide timely and accurate information to employees and the public calling the public information telephone numbers.
G.
Credit will be taken for the following required EP drills.
1.
Environmental Radiological Monitoring drill.
2.
Plant RADCON drill.
3.
TSC/CECC Communications drill.
4.
CECC Dose Assessment dril 'l
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