ML20050N687
| ML20050N687 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 03/19/1982 |
| From: | Mills L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20050N678 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8204140416 | |
| Download: ML20050N687 (3) | |
Text
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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CH ATT ANOOG A. TENNESSEE 3740l*
400 Chestnut Street Tower II March 19, 1982
'[p*? N U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II ATTN: James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
This is in response to R. C. Lewis' February 22, 1982 letter to H. G. Parris, Report Nos. 50-259/82-01, -260/82-01, and -296/82-01, concerning activities at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant which appeared to violate NRC requirements. Enclosed is our response to Appendix A, Notice of Violation.
If you have any questions, please call Jim Domer at FTS 858-2725.
To the best of my knowledge, I declare the statements contained herein are complete and true.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY L. M. Mill Nuclear Regulation and Safety Enclosure 8204140416 820326 PDR ADOCK 05000259 G
PDR An Equal Oppertunity Employer
ENCLOSURE i
RESPOUSE - NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS.
50-259/82-01, 50-260/82-01, AND 50-296/82-01 R. C. LEWIS' LETTER TO H. G. PARRIS DATED FEBRUARY 22, 1982 l
Appendix A - (259/B2-01-01)
Technical Specification 3 2.b requires th'e limiting conditions for operation for the instrumentation that initiates or controls the core and containment cooling systems as given in Table 3.2.B.
Table 3 2.B requires that there shall be minimum of two operab,le channels per trip system for Pressure Switches PS-64-58A thru D.s Contrary to the above, the requirement that there be two operable channels per trip system for PS-64-58 was nopgmet in that on January 6, 1982, at 1330 it was determined by the resident inspLetor during a routine tour of the Reactor Building that PS-64-58c. had it's assee^1ted isolation valve shut rendering the switch inoperable, tGus having only one channel operable in one trip system.
This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement I.L.'2.).
1.
Admission or Denial of the Alleged _ Violation f
TVA admits the violation occuredd ah tated.
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2.
Reasons for the Violation if Adnitted On January 4, 1982, assigned instrument maintenance personnel performed Surveillance Instruction (SI) 4.2.B-5, Drywell High-Pressure Switches PS-64-58(A-D). All SI steps were signed off as completed, including step 4.11 for PS64-58C, verifying the isolation valve was opened. Statements from the two senior instrument mechanics involved in the calibration related that the valve in question was verified to be opened by the three instrument mechanics working at the valve's instrument panel.
As a result of an in-depth investigation, it was concluded that this valve could have been: (1) left closed during performance of the SI related to the switch or (2) closed during performance of another SI which was performed at the panel later in the day on January 4, 1982.
3 Corrective Steps Which Have Been Taken and the Results Achieved The unit 1 instrument foreman and the assistant instrument maintenance supervisor were immediately notified of the valve closure and went to panel 25-6 and opened the instrument isolation valve and verified proper valve alignment for companion switches.
On January 7,1982, an independent verification of all the isolation and drain valve alignment on panels 25-5, 25-6, 25-51, 25-52, 25-7, and 25-56 was performed on units 1 and 2.
Unit 3 remained in refueling outage. No anomalies on isolation or drain valve alignment were found during this verification.
o
. Responsible foremen were then instructed that subsequent to the performance of any sis in which valving alignment could not be verified from the control room, they were to inspect and verify that all instruments were properly returned to service.
A review of instrument mechanic valving errors for 1980-81 was made.
The individuals involved in this incident were not involved in any identified valving errors during that period.
4.
Corrective Steps Which Will Be Taken to Avoid Further Violations A review of the instrument surveillance tests which involve valve manipulations during SI performance will be made and those which do not have control room indication of the instrumentation being in service (i.e., annunciator, indicator, or recorder) will have a separate verification of correct valve alignment following performance. The sis affected will have a step added for initialed signoff of the verification.
Until the instructions are revised, the instrument foreman will perform a verification of alignment following each SI performance involving valve manipulations in which valving alignment cannot be verified from the control room. This verification will be recorded in the remarks section of the instruction.
Additionally, the installation of cages around and on top of critical plant panels is planned. These cages will be lockable to provide accountability for entry into the panel. An Engineering Change Notice ECN (P0039) for this work has been issued by the Division of Engineering Design and drawing release is expected in the near fature.
5.
Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved All procedure changes will be accomplished by May 1, 1982. The panel cage modification has been factored into the overall Browns Ferry commitment integrated schedule which was presented to NRC-NRR in the fall of 1981 and was subsequently formally submitted to NRC on October 28, 1981, by letter from L. M. Mills to H. R. Denton and will be worked accordingly. We estimate completion based on that schedule to be fall 1984.