IR 05000255/1982001
| ML20042A047 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 02/24/1982 |
| From: | Boyd D, Dubry N, James Heller, Jorgensen B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20042A040 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-2.B.2, TASK-2.F.1, TASK-TM -255-82-1, 50-255-82-01, 50-255-82-1, IEB-80-15, NUDOCS 8203230015 | |
| Download: ML20042A047 (9) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-255/82-01(DPRP)
Docket No. 50-255 License No. DPR-20 Licensee: Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 Facility Name: Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant Inspection At:
Palisades Site, Covert, MI Inspection Conducted: December 30, 1981 and January 4-8, 11-15, 18-23, and 25-30, 1982 A
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Inspectors:
B. L. Jorgensen h
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P J. K. Heller r-
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N. E. DuBry Z~M~
,oe&g4 Approved By:
D. C. Boyd, Chief d ' M'
Reactor Projects Section IA Inspection Summary l
Inspection during January 1982 (Report No. 50-255/82-01(DPRP))
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Areas Inspected: Routine resident inspection program activities including:
l verification of operational safety; surveillance; maintenance; reportable events; plant trips; TMI action items; and IE Bulletin review. The inspec-tion involved a total of 162 inspector hours onsite by three NRC inspectors including 28 inspector hours onsite during offshifts.
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Results: Of the seven areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or devia-
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tions were identified in six areas. One item of noncompliance (Category 6 -
failure to establish firewatch for an open fire door - Paragraph 2) was identified in the remaining area.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted R. W. Montross, General Manager
- J. S. Rang, Operations / Maintenance Superintendent
- H. J. Palmer, Technical Superintendent
- G. H. R. Petitjean, Technical Engineer
- R. E. McCaleb, Quality Assurance Administrator
- W.'S.
Skibitsky, Operations Superintendent S. Ghidotti, Shift Supervisor A. S. Kanicki, Shift Supervisor-D. W. Kaupa, Shift Supervisor A. F. Brookhouse, Shift Supervisor S. F. Pierce, Radioactive Materials Control Supervisor B. L. Schaner, Operations Supervisor E. I. Thompson, Shift Supervisor K. M. Farr, Public Affairs Director A. D. Kowalczuk, Chemistry / Health Physics Superintendent
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H. Gilmor, Maintenance Superintendent D. P.~ Spry, Property Protection Advisor R. J. Stanton, Reactor Operator D. W. Langschwager, Shift Supervisor T. L. Richards, Reactor Operator G. D. Beecham, Reactor Operator J. F. Ford, Reactor Operator
- Denotes those present at the Management Interview on February 5, 1982.
Numerous other members of plant Operations / Maintenance, technical, training, and Chemistry / Health Physics staffs were also contacted briefly.
2.
Operation Safety Verification
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The inspector made frequent control room observations, reviewed l
applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators
during the month of January 1982. The inspector verified the oper-l ability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components.
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Tours / observations were made in the following areas:
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Turbine Building b.
Auxiliary Building c.
Protected area access control d.
Security fence e.
Feedwater purity building i
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The inspector: verified implementation of radiation protection controls, station security plan, and plant housekeeping / cleanliness controls; observed plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards or fluid leaks; and verified that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of repairs.
During tours of the Turbine and Auxiliary building the inspector noted that cleanliness and housekeeping is not up to the standard that the plant had established prior to the 1981 refueling outage.
This problem was previously identified by plant management and the plant is continuously making efforts to improve.
The licensee experienced serveral incidences of partial flooding of the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room.
In one case the flooding was related to a valve packing leak in a condensate reject line and the inability of the turbine building sump pump to remove the water.
The room which houses both Auxiliary Feed Water pumps is secured with a water tight door. During this event the inspector observed an operator open the water tight door, and water flowed from the room via the open doorway. During a later tour the inspector observed that the water tight door was propped open to prevent flooding of the room.
This situation was discussed with the operations supervisor and agreement reached not to return to power operation from hot standby until the situation was corrected.
Flooding of the Auxiliary Feed Pump Room has been of continuing 12'"
concern to the inspector and was discussed with the licensee.
The licensee is reevaluating short term corrective action and has long term corrective action (addition of a third separately located Auxiliary Feedwater Pump) planned for the 1983 refueling outage.
The inspector found fire door 132 to the Turbine Lube 011 Room was propped open with a twelve inch section of one inch rubber hose on December 30, 1981, at approximately 1230 hours0.0142 days <br />0.342 hours <br />0.00203 weeks <br />4.68015e-4 months <br />. The inspector was informed by the Shift Supervisor that the hose was for ease in opening the door since the door knob was broken and the door was counter-weighted. The situation had existed for at least 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
The inspector inquired if a firewatch was assigned to perform hourly tours since the fire barrier (fire door) was rendered inoperable.
This had not been assigned. The Shift Supervisor took appropriate action to correct the situation. A similar condition was subsequently noted on January 18, 1982 when door 132 was ajar for draining a leaking valve.
In this case, the room was being frequently entered, but not for purposes of maintaining a documented fire watch. Technical Speci-fication 6.8.1.a requires implementation of procedures as recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A (1972), which includes fire
IE Inspection Report No. 50-255/78-17.
IE Inspection Report No. 50-255/78-22.
- IE Inspection Report No. 50-255/78-25.
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IE Inspection Report No. 50-255/81-28.
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protection system operations. Fire Protection Implementing P ccedures, Chapter 4, Paragraph 5.5.6 provides that any time a fire barrJer is breached, a continous fire watch or documented hourly tours shall be established. The above constitues an is em of noncompliance with the referenced Technical Specification. Prior to the completion of the inspection, the licensee initiated corrective and preventive action by disseminetion of information to supervisors that fire doors must be treated as fire barriers within the fire protection plan; by up-grading warning signs on the fire doors; and by modifying the fire protection procedures to clearly treat fire doors as required fire barriers. The inspectors had no further questions on this matter.
The inspector performed a walkdown/ review of the engineered safeguards systems located in the east and west Safeguards room using licensee checklists 3.8, 3.7, and 3.2.
The inspector verified:
that each accessible valve in the flow path was in its correct position; that essential instrumentation was operable; and there were no conditions that degraded the system.
The inspector reviewed one liquid batch release (81-021-R) to verify compliance with regulatory requirements. The batch was terminated and the required paperwork generated when the Shift Supervisor discovered that the dilution flow was less than the Technical Specification limit.
The corrective action document (event report 81-04) identified that the batch card (H.P.6.4.1A) did not identify the minimum dilution flow as required by the Technical Specification. While following up on the changes made to H.P.6.4.1A via temporary change H-81-072 and then Revision 11 to HP 6.4, the inspector discovered that the dilution flow typed on the batch card was 1/10 the minimum Technical Specification dilution rate. The inspector identified this to the Radioactive Materials Control Supervisor and verified that subsequent releases were not made with improper dilution, the improper minimum dilution rate would be corrected, and the dilution rate was an editorial error.
The need to proofread final copies of changes was discussed with plant management.
The plant was taken critical on December 25, 1981, after completion of the 1981 refueling outage. A review of the low power phyLics testing will be performed and documented in a future inspection report.
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under Technical Specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.
One item of noncompliance and no deviations were identified.
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Monthly Surveillance Obseration
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The inspector observed Technical Specifications required surveillance l
testing on the systems listed below and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instru-mentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were
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i met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
The inspector witnessed portions of the following test activites:
a.
M0-24 " Auxiliary Feedwater System Inservice Test Procedure."
b.
DWT-7 " Reactor Internal Noise Monitoring Test."
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MI-2 " Reactor Protective Trip Units Inservice Test Procedure."
d.
MO-19 " Containment Spray Pumps Inservice Test Procedure."
M0-21 " Concentrated Boric Acid Pumps Inservice Test Procedore."
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f.
Inspection of spent fuel No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified during review of this area.
4.
Monthly Maintenance Observations Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with Technical Specifications.
The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to. initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were Inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were
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performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological contrcls were implemented; and, fire prevention controls were implemented.
Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.
The following activities were observed / reviewed:
a.
Changeout of DG 1-1 oil filters b.
Repacking of the "C" service water pump Calibration of 617DE " Starting Air Pres:ure Indicator."
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and 619 DE " Air Tank A Pressure Indicator" for DG 1-1
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Trouble shooting of Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Controller FIC-0636A and FIC-0637A.
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Troubleshooting of log Range Power Instrument NI-004
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Construction of small purge suppy/ exhaust system Following completion of maintenance listed above, the inspector verified that these systems had been returned to service properly.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
5.
Licensee Event Reports Followup Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications.
(C'losed) LER-81-031 "Misposition of Low Pressure Safety Injection a.
Pump Suction (LPSI) Valves During Shutdown." While performing plant startup checklist G-CL-1, it was determined.that the LPSI-pump suction valves were misaligned. Misalignment occurred when checklist 3.2, which realigns the LPSI pumps from shutdown cooling to normal operation, incorrectly identified suction valve position. The error was introduced during a previous revision and was clerical in nature. Administrative controls for revision of checklists were changed to require proofreading by the orginator and provide evidence of the review. The inspector verified that the valve had not been misaligned during the previous operation cycle and that'the error was clerical in nature. Additionally, the inspector reviewed this event with the operations clerk and found that changes-are sent to the STA's for review but no evidence of review is on record. This was brought to the atten-tion of the Operations' Superintendent.
The inspector reviewed temporary changes for other procedures and found'that only checklist changes are sent back to the originator for approval, whereas the. changes for other procedures are not sent back to the reviewer. This item was discussed with plant management.
b.
(C1cced) LER-80-027 " Iodine Removal Hydrazine Tank (T-102) Inoper-able."
During sampling of tank 102 the hydrazine concentration was found to be 2.4 percent above the Technical Specification upper limit. Concentration was restored to the Technical Specification limit within the time limits of the Technical Specification. The-licensee determined that'the surveillance proceduro did not require the proper analytical method to determine hydrazine concentration.
The procedure has been revised.
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c.
(Closed) LER-81-024 " Failure of Cooling Water Supply Valve to Diesel Generator." During operator rounds, a normally closed cooling water supply valve to the 1-1 diesel generator was observed to be passing full flow. Disassembly of the valve revealed a key that holds the valve shaft to the operator had sheared, permitting misalignment of the shaft and disc.
Inspection of the valve internals revealed a damaged rubber liner. The diesel generator was returned to service within the time limits of the Technical Specifications.
d.
(Closed) LER-81-021 " Inoperable Fire Detection Instrumentation."
Following a routine test of the fire detection annunicator panels, the alarms would not reset.
Immediate action requirements of the Technical Specification were observed until the alarms were returned to service. The failure was attributed to a relay coil failure.
6.
Plant Trips Following the plant trips, as listed below, the inspector ascertained the status of the reactor and safety systems by observation of control room indicators or review of logs and discussions with licensee person-nel concerning plant parameters, emergency system status, communications and rnactor chemistry, a.
The reactor tripped on December 31, 1981, at 2225 hours0.0258 days <br />0.618 hours <br />0.00368 weeks <br />8.466125e-4 months <br /> as the result of a generator reverse power trip from mismatched reactor and turbine power. The reactor was taken critical on January 1, 1982 at 1546 hours0.0179 days <br />0.429 hours <br />0.00256 weeks <br />5.88253e-4 months <br />.
b.
The reactor tripped on January 2, 1982, at 0740 hours0.00856 days <br />0.206 hours <br />0.00122 weeks <br />2.8157e-4 months <br />, again due to reverse power trip on the generator Resulting in a turbine trip then a reactor trip.
An MSR control valve was found cycling, causing MSR relief valve actuation and consequent loss of reactor energy away from the turbine. The control valve was repaired.
The reactor was taken critical on January 2, 1982, at 2156 hours0.025 days <br />0.599 hours <br />0.00356 weeks <br />8.20358e-4 months <br />.
c.
The reactor tripped on January 24, 1982, at 0449 hours0.0052 days <br />0.125 hours <br />7.423942e-4 weeks <br />1.708445e-4 months <br /> as a result of a low primary coolant flow signal spike which occurred when transferring station power to the startup transformer during a planned shutdown. The reactor was taken critical on January 26, 1981, at 1745 hours0.0202 days <br />0.485 hours <br />0.00289 weeks <br />6.639725e-4 months <br />.
d.
The reactor was manually tripped on January 30, 1982, at 0910 hours0.0105 days <br />0.253 hours <br />0.0015 weeks <br />3.46255e-4 months <br /> when the operators were unable to obtain the desired feedwater flow.
Repairs were made to the feedpump driving steam controls. The reactor was taken critical on January 30, 1981, at 1500 hours0.0174 days <br />0.417 hours <br />0.00248 weeks <br />5.7075e-4 months <br />.
While reviewing the package for the January 26 startup, the inspector discovered that Revision 1 to page 2 of CL 6.2 " Reactor Coolant System Checklist" was used, whereas the list of effective checklists iden-tified Revision 4 as the correct revision. The Shift Supervisor and
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the inspector reviewed this item and verified that Revision 4 was the correct revision, but also verified that Revision 4 and Revision 1 were identical.
Identification of the sheet used as Revision 1 was apparently a typographical error. This item was also discussed with the Operations Superintendent.
No' items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
7.
TMI Action Items The inspection included a review of licensee actions on selected action items identified in NUREG-0737, " Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements."
a.
Item II.F.1.4 - containment pressure recorder: the licensee installed two separate 10-200 psia continuous recorders during the recent refueling outage, which were apparently available for
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service January 1, 1982, thus meeting the committments as stated in the licensee's letters of December 19, 1980 and September 1981.
After calibration of the system January 1, 1982,'however, the j
instruments were not actually placed in service. This was brought to'the attention of licensee personnel in mid January and the (
recorders were placed in service, but not all control operators
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were informed the system was officially operational. The inspector
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discussed instrument use and parameters with control operators. The operators contacted did not exhibit good understanding of the system and indicated weaknesses in training on use and meaning of the infor-
mation provided. This was discussed at the Management Interview.
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b.
Item II.F.1.5 - containment water level recorner: the licensee installed two separate water level recording channels (each with
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two detectors covering different portions of the overall span)
during the recent refueling outage. These channels feed the same multi-point recorders used for containment pressure as described
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i above, and were similarly not'placed in service effective January 1,1982; nor were they well understood by the control operators contacted. -The licensee's September 1981, letter i
identifies a system design exception for water level monitoring in that the range oF the system does not extend to 600,000 gallons as provided in NUREG-0737, Appendix B and Regulatory
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l Guide 1.89 criteria. This'is considered acceptable based on l
plant-specific analyses that onsite water capacity which could
end up in the containment building totals less than 600,000
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gallons.
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Item II.B.2 plant shielding:
the inspector verified plant
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shielding was modified in accordance with the licensee's letter
of December 19, 1980. The modifications, completed during the i
refueling outage, included concrete plugs in the 48" containment purge supply and exhaust penetrations, providing remote manual
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(powered) operators for LPSI suction valves, relocating the manual controller for a LPSI discharge valve, and instelling a shield wall in the vicinity of the personnel airlock.
Based on the above reviews and discussions at the Management Interview, the above items are considered closed.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
8.
IE Bulletin This inspection included followup review to IE Bulletin 80-15 "Possible Loss of Emergency Notification System (ENS) With Loss of Offsite Power."
During a previous inspection' it was noted the licensee planned a test schedule different from the Bulletin provision, stating in his letter of September 4, 1980, that a system test with loss of offsite power would be conducted during the next scheduled refueling outage. A successful ENS test with loss of offsite power was observed by the inspector on December 21, 1981, and the test results were reviewed during this inspection. This item is considered closed.
No items of noncomp'11ance or deviations were identified.
9.
Management Interview A management interview was conducted (attended by licensee personnel as indicated in Paragraph 1) following completion of the inspection.
The following items were addressed.
a.
The inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.
b.
The noncompliance was specifically identified and discussed. The inspectors stated licensee corrective actions appeared appropriate (Paragraph 2).
c.
Inspector concerns relative to water leakage control into and around the auxiliary feedwater room were discussed. The licensee indicated they share the same concern.
(Paragraph 2)
d.
Licensee actions with respect to control of clerical errors in the document revision process were discussed. The inspectors stated the current administrative procedures (revised pursuant to LER 81-031) were apparently being implemented only in the Operations Department. The licensee stated the procedures and his practices would be reconciled, e.
Followup to TMI Action Items was reviewed. The licensee acknow-ledged minor " loose ends" remain to be tied up with respect to the containment pressure and water level recorders; and these are being actively pursued.
- IE Inspection Report No. 255/81-05.
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