IR 05000254/2025002
| ML25226A199 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 08/14/2025 |
| From: | Robert Ruiz NRC/RGN-III/DORS/RPB1 |
| To: | Rhoades D Constellation Energy Generation |
| References | |
| IR 2025002 | |
| Download: ML25226A199 (1) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
REISSUE - QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000254/2025002 AND 05000265/2025002
Dear David Rhoades:
The NRC identified that the inspection report sent to you dated August 12, 2025 (ML25224A046)
required revision to the summary of non-cited violation no. 05000254,05000265/2025002-02 and its associated write-up to provide additional clarity. As a result, the NRC has re-issued the report in its entirety.
On June 30, 2025, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station. On June 27, 2025, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Doug Hild, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff.
The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. One Severity Level IV violation without an associated finding is documented in this report. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station.
August 14, 2025 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Robert Ruiz, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000254 and 05000265 License Nos. DPR-29 and DPR-30 Enclosure:
As stated cc w/ encl: Distribution via LISTSERV Signed by Ruiz, Robert on 08/14/25
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality Associated with Design Deficiencies in Main Steam Isolation Valves Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Barrier Integrity Green NCV 05000254,05000265/2025002-01 Open/Closed
[H.14] -
Conservative Bias 71152S A self-revealed Green finding and associated Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50,
Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, was identified for the licensees failure to correct a condition adverse to quality associated with the Unit 1 main steam isolation valves (MSIVs). Specifically, the licensee identified two deficiencies with the design of the Unit 1 MSIVs but failed to take corrective actions to eliminate those design deficiencies before exceeding Technical Specification (TS) leakage limits on March 12, 2025, during the Q1R28 refueling outage.
Inaccurate Information Submitted to NRC in LER 05000254/2025-003-00 Cornerstone Severity Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Not Applicable Severity Level IV NCV 05000254,05000265/2025002-02 Open/Closed Not Applicable 71153 The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.9,
Completeness and Accuracy of Information, when the licensee failed to submit accurate information in Licensee Event Report 05000254/2025-003-00 on May 9, 2025. Specifically, the licensee submitted inaccurate information regarding the status of modifications being completed on the affected main steam isolation valves that were the subject of the LER.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000254,07200053/2025-003-00 LER 2025-003-00 for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station,
Unit 1, Main Steam Isolation Valves Local Leak Rate Test Exceed Technical Specification Limits 71153 Closed
LER 05000265/2024-002-00 LER 2024-002-00 for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station,
Unit 2, Turbine Trip and Automatic Scram due to Digital EHC Power Supply Intermittent Failure 71153 Closed LER 05000254,07200053/2025-004-00 LER 2025-004-00 for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station,
Unit 1, Loss of Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breaker Safety Function due to Configuration Control Error 71153 Closed
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 The unit began the inspection period during ascension to full power following refueling outage (RFO) Q1R28, where it remained until May 19, 2025, when the unit automatically tripped due to a transient on the 125 Vdc bus. The unit was restarted on May 28, 2025, where it remained at full-rated thermal power, with the exception of short-term power reductions for control rod sequence exchanges, testing, and as requested by the transmission system operator.
Unit 2 The unit began the inspection period at full-rated thermal power. On May 19, 2025, power was reduced to approximately 80 percent due to a transient on the 125 Vdc bus. The unit was returned to full-rated thermal power the same day where it remained at full-rated thermal power, with the exception of short-term power reductions for control rod sequence exchanges, testing, and as requested by the transmission system operator.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Partial)
(1)
(Partial)
The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of seasonal hot temperatures for the following systems on June 16, 2025:
1. ultimate heat sink and intake bay
2. 1B residual heat removal (RHR) heat exchanger in the Unit 1 RHR system
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
(1)1B train of RHR service water partial walkdown during planned maintenance on the 1A train of RHR service water on April 14, 2025
Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the Unit 1 core spray system on April 7, 2025.
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Fire Zone 6.1.a, Unit 1 turbine building, elevation 615'-6", Unit 1 DC panel room on April 4, 2025
- (2) Fire Zone 6.1.b, Unit 1 turbine building, elevation 615'-6", Unit 1 DC panel room on April 4, 2025
71111.07A - Heat Exchanger/Sink Performance
Annual Review (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated readiness and performance of:
- (1) 2B RHR room cooler, 2-5746-B
71111.08G - Inservice Inspection Activities (BWR)
BWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample - Non-destructive Examination and Welding
Activities (IP Section 03.01)
The inspectors evaluated boiling water reactor non-destructive testing by reviewing the following examinations from March 10 through March 14, 2025:
- (1) Non-destructive Testing Activities
1. Ultrasonic Examination of Reactor Recirculation Pipe to Safe End Weld
2. Ultrasonic Examination of Reactor Recirculation Safe End Nozzle Dissimilar
Metal Weld
3. Visual Examination of Core Spray Pump A Support
4. Magnetic Particle Examination of Core Spray Pump A Support Base
Plate Weld Welding Activities
1. Repair Welding from Leak on 1/2 EDG CWP Piping Line 0-397-8"-O
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during a reactor startup from forced outage Q1F68 on May 28, 2025.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator requalification cycle training on May 6, 2025.
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
(1)work week online and fire risk review for the week of April 21, 2025 (2)forced outage Q1F68 shutdown safety and emergent work activities associated with Action Request (AR) 4866961, Transient During U2 125 Vdc Charger Swap, during the week of May 25, 2025
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) AR 4848043, Q1R28 Service Level I Coating Inspection Results, April 11, 2025
- (2) AR 4845568, PSU 1-1201-5 RWCU [reactor water cleanup] Valve did not Close on Isolation Signal, on April 21, 2025
71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated Q1R28 refueling outage activities from April 1 through April 15, 2025.
- (2) The inspectors evaluated forced outage Q1F68 activities from May 19 through May 28, 2025.
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) pump operability test after scheduled maintenance during the Q1R28 refueling outage on April 1, 2025
- (2) Unit 1 reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) pump operability test after scheduled maintenance during the Q1R28 refueling outage on April 1, 2025
- (4) QCOS 1300-01, Periodic RCIC Pump Operability Test, following troubleshooting on May 28, 2025
- (5) QCOS 1300-26, RCIC Pump Comprehensive/Performance Test, following troubleshooting of the barometric condenser on June 19, 2025
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) WO 5612772, Unit 2 Division I Low and Low Low Reactor Water Level Analog Trip System Calibration and Functional Test, on April 9,
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.07 - Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program
Environmental Monitoring Equipment and Sampling (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated environmental monitoring equipment and observed collection of environmental samples.
Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the licensees radiological environmental monitoring program.
GPI Implementation (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees implementation of the Groundwater Protection Initiative (GPI) program to identify incomplete or discontinued program elements.
71124.08 - Radioactive Solid Waste Processing & Radioactive Material Handling, Storage,
& Transportation
Radioactive Material Storage (IP Section 03.01)
The inspectors evaluated the licensees performance in controlling, labeling and securing the following radioactive materials:
(1)10 CFR Part 37 material storage location (2)sealed sources in the hot lab
Radioactive Waste System Walkdown (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)
The inspectors walked down the following accessible portions of the solid radioactive waste systems and evaluated system configuration and functionality:
(1)radioactive waste characterization and storage location (2)radioactive waste transfer system
Waste Characterization and Classification (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following characterization and classification of radioactive waste: (1)dry active waste stream (2)condensate resin stream
Shipment Preparation (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed the preparation of radioactive shipment QC-25-063 of condensate resin on June 24, 2025.
Shipping Records (IP Section 03.05) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following non-excepted radioactive material shipments through a record review:
- (1) Shipment QC-24-079; Condensate Resin; UN3321 Radioactive Material low specific activity (LSA-II)
- (2) Shipment QC-24-330; Control Rod Drives; UN3321 Radioactive Material, low specific activity (LSA-II)
- (3) Shipment QC-25-057; Used Resin Cask; UN3321 Radioactive Material, low specific activity (LSA-II)
- (4) Shipment QC-25-063; Used Resin Cask; UN3321 Radioactive Material, low specific activity (LSA-II)
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS05: Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs) Sample (IP Section 02.04)===
- (1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2024, through March 31, 2025)
- (2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2024, through March 31, 2025)
MS06: Emergency AC Power Systems (IP Section 02.05) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2024, through March 31, 2025)
- (2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2024, through March 31, 2025)
BI01: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity Sample (IP Section 02.10) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2024, through April 30, 2025)
- (2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2024, through April 30, 2025)
BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (IP Section 02.11) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2024, through March 31, 2025)
- (2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2024, through March 31, 2025)
OR01: Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness Sample (IP Section 02.15) (1 Sample)
- (1) April 1, 2024, through April 30, 2025 PR01: Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Effluent Occurrences (RETS/ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences Sample (IP Section 02.16) (1 Sample)
- (1) April 1, 2024, through April 30, 2025
71152S - Semiannual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution Semiannual Trend Review (Section 03.02)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program to identify potential trends in the resolution of main steam isolation valve local leak rate testing failures that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.
71153 - Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Follow Up (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated a 125 Vdc control power transient and the licensees response on May 19, 2025. This event also warranted assessment under Management Directive (MD) 8.3, NRC Incident Investigation Program from which a special inspection resulted. The MD 8.3 evaluation will be publicly available for review upon completion of the associated special inspection, which will be documented under inspection report number 2025051.
- (2) The inspectors evaluated a Unit 2 battery fire and the licensees response on May 22, 2025. Evaluation of this event was also included in the MD 8.3 assessment described above and was reviewed as part of that special inspection.
- (3) The inspectors evaluated the circumstances around licensee event notification 57647 for both trains of reactor building to suppression chamber vacuum breakers inoperable due to a configuration control event on April 5, 2025. This event was also evaluated for consideration for a reactive inspection. The NRC documented its initial MD 8.3 assessment under ADAMS Accession No. ML25104A006 and concluded a special inspection was warranted. The special inspection report was documented under report number 05000254/2025050 (ADAMS Accession No. ML25161A153).
Event Report (IP Section 03.02) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):
- (1) LER 05000254/2025-003-00, Main Steam Isolation Valves Local Leak Rate Test Exceed Technical Specification Limits, ADAMS Accession No. ML25129A031). The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in this report under Inspection Results Sections 71152S and 71153. This LER is closed.
- (2) LER 05000265/2024-002-00, Turbine Trip and Automatic Scram due to Digital EHC Power Supply Intermittent Failure, (ADAMS Accession No. ML24204A105). The inspectors reviewed the LER submittal and the revision to the LER submittal documented in Inspection Report QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000254/2025001 AND 05000265/2025001. The inspectors determined that the cause of the condition described in the LER was not reasonably within the licensees ability to foresee and correct and therefore was not reasonably preventable. No performance deficiency nor violation of NRC requirements was identified. This LER is closed.
- (3) LER 05000254/2025-004-00, Loss of Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breaker Safety Function due to Configuration Control Error, (ADAMS Accession No. ML25155A098).
This event was evaluated for consideration for a reactive inspection. The NRC documented its initial assessment in Management Directive 8.3, Decision Documentation for Reactive Inspection, under ML25104A006 and concluded a reactive inspection was warranted. The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in Inspection Report, "QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION - SPECIAL INSPECTION REACTIVE REPORT 05000254/2025050, under Inspection Results Section 93812. This LER is closed.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality Associated with Design Deficiencies in Main Steam Isolation Valves Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Barrier Integrity Green NCV 05000254,05000265/2025002-01 Open/Closed
[H.14] -
Conservative Bias 71152S A self-revealed Green finding and associated Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, was identified for the licensees failure to correct a condition adverse to quality associated with the Unit 1 main steam isolation valves (MSIVs). Specifically, the licensee identified two deficiencies with the design of the Unit 1 MSIVs but failed to take corrective actions to eliminate those design deficiencies before exceeding Technical Specification (TS) leakage limits on March 12, 2025, during the Q1R28 refueling outage.
Description:
On March 12, 2025, during the Q1R28 refueling outage, the as-found local leak rate test results on the Unit 1 MSIVs exceeded the leakage limit of TS Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.10 of less than or equal to 62.4 standard cubic feet per hour (scfh) through steam line C, and 156 scfh for the combined leakage rate for all MSIV leakage paths. The licensee performed a causal evaluation of the event in the corrective action program under issue report (AR) 4844848 and submitted LER 2025-003-00, Main Steam Isolation Valves Local Leak Rate Test Exceed Technical Specification Limits, on May 9, 2025, for a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications.
On May 10, 2025, the inspectors reviewed the sites Corrective Action Program Evaluation (CAPE) under AR 4844848, the maintenance history of the affected MSIVs, previous licensee event reports involving MSIV local leak rate test failures, and previous corrective action program actions to address those failures. The inspectors noted that in an apparent cause evaluation under AR 130565130565 Design Deficiency Induces MSIV Seat Wear Resulting in Unacceptable Leak Rate Performance, dated November 7, 2002, the licensee identified a design deficiency which caused localized seat wear due to the valve plug dragging across the seating edge of the seat ring during valve closure. This design deficiency causes excessive leakage past the valve seat and was determined by the licensee to be the cause of exceeding TS Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.10 limits in LER 2012-001-00, dated May 18, 2012, LER 2015-003-00, dated April 29, 2015, and LER 2016-001-00, dated May 19, 2016. In addition to the design deficiency associated with the valve plug, the licensee identified a separate design deficiency associated with MSIV pilot disc stem wear. This additional design deficiency caused excessive leakage past the pilot valve seat and was determined to be a contributing cause of exceeding TS Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.10 limits in LER 2016-001-00, dated May 19, 2016, and evaluated by the licensee in an apparent cause evaluation under AR 2643434, As-Found LLRT Results on MSIVs Exceeded Tech Spec Limits during Q2R23, dated March 21, 2016.
Licensee Technical Specification 5.5.12, states, in part, that the primary containment leakage rate testing program will be in accordance with the guidelines contained in NEI 94-01 Industry Guideline for Implementing Performance-Based Option of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, revision 3-A, dated July 2012, and the conditions and limitations specified in NEI 94-01, revision 2-A, dated October 2008. NEI 94-01, Section 10.2.3.4, Corrective Action, states that if Type C test results are not acceptable, then a cause determination should be performed and corrective actions identified that focus on those activities that can eliminate the identified cause of a failure with appropriate steps to eliminate recurrence. Cause determination and corrective action should reinforce achieving acceptable performance. As stated in the licensees multiple LERs, the licensee developed corrective actions to modify the valve design to address both deficiencies.
In response to fleet operating experience with MSIV design vulnerabilities, the licensee documented AR 4187756, Recommended Reassessment of MSIV Design Vulnerability, dated October 25, 2018. The assessment performed under AR 4187756 highlighted the risks of delaying the implementation of the needed modifications and created actions to develop a more aggressive implementation schedule. In an associated risk assessment documented under QDC-0-2018-0464, the site acknowledged the potential consequences of continued operation of the MSIVs without performing the modifications, to include exceeding the leakage limits of TS Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.10 in future outages and determined that the risk of exceeding TS leakage limits was acceptable until the modifications were installed. The site approved a plan that included performing the planned modifications on one valve in each subsequent outage, with the possibility of two valves per outage if resources were available.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees revised installation schedule and noted that prior to the refueling outage in 2021 (Q1R26) the site received a license amendment to raise the leakage limits for TS Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.10 (ADAMS Accession No. ML20150A328). Subsequently, during Q1R26, the site chose not to install the planned modifications in any of the MSIVs, as all the valves passed their local leak rate tests with the new elevated limits, despite the leakage results on the 'C' main steam line indicating an increasing trend and despite developing a plan to proactively complete the modifications to correct the deficiencies in the valve design. In 2023, the site completed the Q1R27 refueling outage and MSIV 1-0203-2C, 1-0203-2A, and 1-0203-2D had yet to receive the corrective modifications to address the design deficiencies. MSIV 1-0203-1C had received one of the two modifications in a previous outage, but following a local leak rate test failure in Q1R27, the site chose to flush the valve to obtain more favorable leak rate results rather than complete the second corrective modification. The post flush local leak rate test met the acceptance criteria for as-left testing and the site credited the flush as a maintenance activity.
The sites historical use of flushing as a maintenance activity is further discussed in the Results section of this inspection report.
Ultimately, the inspectors concluded that the licensee had identified deficiencies with the MSIV design that were the cause of multiple local leak rate test failures since 2002. These design deficiencies resulted in the licensee exceeding TS leakage requirements on multiple occasions and were conditions adverse to quality. The inspectors determined that the licensee failed to correct the design deficiencies before exceeding TS leakage requirements on March 12, 2025, despite multiple opportunities to complete the modifications prior to that refueling outage, because the licensee failed to prioritize the corrective modifications and routinely accepted the risk of violating the Technical Specification leakage limits as a potential consequence.
Corrective Actions: The site completed the remaining modifications to address the design deficiencies on MSIV 1-0203-1C, 1-0203-2C, 1-0203-2A, and 1-0203-2D during the Q1R28 outage.
Corrective Action References: AR 4844848, Q1R28 1-0203-1C LLRT Leakage Above Tech Spec Limit
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the failure to correct a condition adverse to quality with the MSIV design was a performance deficiency. Specifically, while performing activities governed by TS 5.5.12, Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program, the licensee identified that design deficiencies within the MSIVs were the cause of multiple instances of exceeding the leakage limits of TS Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.10 but, contrary to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, failed to correct the condition adverse to quality prior to exceeding TS limits again during the Q1R28 refueling outage in 2025.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the SSC and Barrier Performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, TS-allowable leakage limits were exceeded for the individual leakage path on steam line 'C' as well as the combined leakage for all MSIV leakage paths.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors screened the finding in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, exhibit 3, Section C, and answered No to both screening questions. Therefore, the finding screens to very low safety significance (Green).
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.14 - Conservative Bias: Individuals use decision making practices that emphasize prudent choices over those that are simply allowable. A proposed action is determined to be safe in order to proceed, rather than unsafe in order to stop. Specifically, over multiple years the licensee accepted the risk of not performing modifications to correct the MSIV design deficiencies prior to exceeding TS leakage limits. In addition, during the Q1R27 refueling outage, after the 1-0203-1C MSIV had failed its as-found local leak rate test, the licensee rationalized the performance of valve flushing as a maintenance activity to achieve more favorable local leak rate testing results rather than completing the intended modifications on MSIV 1-0203-1C.
Enforcement:
Violation: 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, requires, in part, that measures be established to ensure conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, deficiencies, deviations, and nonconformances are corrected.
Technical Specification 3.6.1.3, Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs), states, in part, that each primary containment isolation valve be operable. TS 3.6.1.3, Condition D, MSIV leakage rate not within limits, requires that leakage be restored within limits in 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
TS Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.10 outlines the limits for MSIV leakage and requires that leakage through each MSIV leakage path be less than or equal to 62.4 scfh and 156 scfh for the combined leakage rate for all MSIV leakage paths.
Contrary to the above, from November 7, 2002, to approximately March 27, 2025, the licensee failed to correct a condition adverse to quality associated with design deficiencies on the Unit 1 MSIVs, which are safety related components. Specifically, from November 7, 2002, to approximately March 27, 2025, the licensee failed to modify MSIV 1-0203-2C, 1-0203-2A, and 1-0203-2D to correct a design deficiency related to valve plug wear occurring on the seating edge of the seat ring during valve closure. Additionally, from March 21, 2016, to approximately March 27, 2025, the licensee failed to modify MSIV 1-0203-1C, 1-0203-2C, 1-0203-2A, and 1-0203-2D to correct a design deficiency related to pilot disc stem wear. On October 22, 2018, the licensee developed a plan to modify each affected valve to correct the deficiencies but instead deferred those corrective actions through multiple refueling outages, to include the use of flushing as a corrective maintenance activity in place of completing the modifications and instead accepted the risk of exceeding the Technical Specification leakage limits as a consequence of those deferrals. As a result, on March 12, 2025, the licensee exceeded the leakage limits of TS Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.10 and violated TS 3.6.1.3, Condition D, to restore leakage within limits in 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> when leakage was not within limits during the previous operating cycle.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Observation: Review of the Sites use of Flushing as a Maintenance Activity Following a Local Leak Rate Test Failure of a Main Steam Isolation Valve 71152S On March 12, 2025, the as-found local leak rate test results on main steam isolation valve (MSIV) 1-0203-1C exceeded the leakage limit of Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.10 of less than or equal to 62.4 standard cubic feet per hour (scfh). In the previous outage, the 1-0203-1C MSIV was flushed after failing the as-found local leak rate test to obtain more favorable leakage results. The as-left test following the flush resulted in acceptable leakage and the site credited the flushing as a maintenance activity without performing in-valve maintenance. The inspectors reviewed the sites historical use of MSIV flushing against the performance attributes of inspection procedure (IP) 71152 and determined that the site was not incorporating the applicable lessons learned from relevant operating experience and implementing that experience throughout the organizational decision-making process. Specifically, the site's historical use of flushing as corrective maintenance following an as-found local leak rate test failure has had no technical justification for why it met programmatic requirements and how it was appropriate for the circumstances.
NEI 94-01, Industry Guidance for Implementing Performance-Based Option of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, revision 3-A, Section 10.2.3.4, Corrective Action, states that if Type C test results are not acceptable, then a cause determination should be performed and corrective actions identified that focus on those activities that can eliminate the identified cause of a failure with appropriate steps to eliminate recurrence. The cause determination and corrective action should reinforce achieving acceptable performance. As documented in issue report (AR) 4848760, MSIV flushing Trend Information, the site has credited flushing as a maintenance activity to obtain more favorable testing results twelve times between 2008 and 2023 after as-found local leak rate test failures. Of those twelve times, ten of the flushed MSIVs went on to fail their as-found local leak rate tests during the next refueling outage.
Industry benchmarking was also performed by the site under AR 4684879, Appendix J Owners Group Benchmark IR, which similarly showed that seven out of the nine MSIVs flushed to obtain more favorable local leak rate results went on to fail their as-found local leak rate test in the subsequent outage. The use of flushing was challenged internally under AR 4757927, Appendix J ER-AA-380 Fatal Flaw Disposition, and was dispositioned by corporate engineering as acceptable as long as the flushing is characterized as part of maintenance following the as-found test failure. The inspectors noted that the sites justification for crediting the use of flushing as a corrective maintenance activity revolved around the licensee's assertion that nothing in the regulatory requirements prohibited the use of flushing and the NRC had not issued any violations associated with flushing.
The inspectors reviewed the applicable regulatory guidance and determined that there is not a prohibition specifically against the use of flushing as a corrective maintenance activity.
Because MSIV flushing is performed after the site accepts the results of an as-found local leak rate test failure, by definition, the flushing would not be considered pre-conditioning of the component. However, as the data suggests, performing a flush of the valve does not correct design deficiencies or degraded conditions associated with the valve. Additionally, if the site suspects that wear products or other foreign material are on the seat of an MSIV causing it to fail its local leak rate test, merely flushing the material from the seat does not eliminate the source of the foreign material and correct the underlying condition. To know whether foreign material or other build up on the valve seat is the cause of a local leak rate test failure, the site needs to assess the condition of the valve seating surface after the test has failed. Historically, the site has not taken affirmative action to perform this assessment.
To the contrary, the site performs a flush of the MSIV following the initial as-found test failure and, if the results are favorable, retroactively attributes the cause of the failure to foreign material without ever assessing the internal condition of the valve. This approach lacks technical rigor and the as-left test results can equally be attributed to cycling the valve open and shut an additional time to obtain a better seating condition. MSIV flushing without validating that the cause of the as-found test failure was eliminated potentially masks a latent degraded condition that the site does not address prior to the next operating cycle. The site has historically accepted flushing as a corrective maintenance activity, despite applicable operating experience showing that the way it was being implemented at the site was not effective, simply because it was allowable and not because it was technically justifiable or appropriate for the circumstances.
The inspectors did not identify any findings or violations in this observation.
Inaccurate Information Submitted to NRC in LER 05000254/2025-003-00 Cornerstone Severity Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Not Applicable Severity Level IV NCV 05000254,05000265/2025002-02 Open/Closed Not Applicable 71153 The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.9, Completeness and Accuracy of Information, when the licensee failed to submit accurate information in Licensee Event Report 05000254/2025-003-00 on May 9, 2025. Specifically, the licensee submitted inaccurate information regarding the status of modifications being completed on the affected main steam isolation valves that were the subject of the LER.
Description On May 9, 2025, the licensee submitted LER 05000254/2025-003-00, Main Steam Isolation Valves Local Leak Rate Test Exceed Technical Specification Limits, (ADAMS Accession No.
ML25129A031). The licensee stated in the LER that the cause of the event was attributed to pilot valve rotation causing stem nut wear which led to a leakage path. The licensee stated in the LER that three of the four affected valves had not yet been modified to include anti-rotation pilot keys and one valve included the modification. On June 19, 2025, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's LER submittal along with the causal evaluation performed by the licensee under issue report (AR) 4844848 and noted conflicting information concerning which valves had received planned modifications to eliminate the design deficiencies identified by the licensee in previous LERs. The inspectors requested the work history concerning the four affected MSIVs, 1-0203-1C, 1-0203-2A, 1-0203-2C, and 1-2023-2D, and up on review, identified that none of the valves had received the anti-rotation pilot key modification.
Corrective Actions: The licensee documented the issue in the corrective action program with actions to update the LER.
Corrective Action References: AR 4874899, NRC ID: LER U1 2025-003-00 Inaccurate Data
Performance Assessment:
The inspectors determined this violation was associated with a minor performance deficiency. Specifically, the inaccurate LER represented a minor performance deficiency because it was not viewed as a precursor to a significant event, would not have led to a more significant safety concern, nor was it associated with a cornerstone attribute, and it did not adversely affect any cornerstone objectives.
Enforcement:
The ROPs significance determination process does not specifically consider the regulatory process impact in its assessment of licensee performance. Therefore, it is necessary to address this violation which impedes the NRCs ability to regulate using traditional enforcement to adequately deter non-compliance.
Severity: The inspectors determined that NRC Enforcement Policy, Section 6.9, Inaccurate and Incomplete Information or Failure to Make a Required Report, example d.1 was the most applicable to the violation. Therefore, the violation was determined to be Severity Level IV.
Violation: Title 10 CFR 50.9, Completeness and Accuracy of Information, states information provided to the Commission by an applicant for a license or by a licensee or information required by statute or by the Commissions regulations, orders, or license conditions to be maintained by the applicant or the licensee shall be complete and accurate in all material respects.
Title 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, states, in part, that the holder of an operating license under this part or a combined license under part 52 of this chapter shall submit a licensee event report for any operation or condition which was prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.
Contrary to the above, on May 9, 2025, the licensee submitted LER 05000254/2025-003-00, Main Steam Isolation Valves Local Leak Rate Test Exceed Technical Specification Limits, which contained inaccurate information regarding which valves had been modified as the result of corrective actions from previous LERs to eliminate the cause of exceeding TS leakage limits. This information was material to the inspectors as it resulted in expanding the scope of inspection activities associated with reviewing the LER to understand the regulatory significance of the event.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On June 27, 2025, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Doug Hild, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On March 18, 2025, the inspectors presented the inservice inspection results to Doug Hild, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On June 27, 2025, the inspectors presented the radiation protection inspection results to Doug McLaren, Acting Radiation Protection Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
NRC ID RHRSW FT Not Calibrated Per QIP 100-19, Rev 33
2/03/2025
Miscellaneous
SVP-25-029
Certification of 2025 Summer Readiness
05/15/2025
1B RHR HX Thermal Performance Test
2/08/2025
Work Orders
RHR Service Water Bay Inspection
01/14/2025
QOM 1-1000-05
U1 RHR Service Water Valve Checklist
QOM 1-1400-09
Unit 1B Core Spray Valve Checklist
Miscellaneous
QOM 1-1400-10
Unit 1A Core Spray Valve Checklist
FZ 6.1.A
Fire Zone 6.1.A Unit 1, Turbine Building 615'-6", Unit 1 DC
Panel Room
Fire Plans
FZ 6.1.B
Fire Zone 6.1.B - Unit 1, Turbine Building 615'-6", Unit 1 DC
Panel Room
Calculations
QDC-5700-M-
0806
Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Room Cooler
Performance Calculation Under Design Basis and Degraded
Conditions
1E
Corrective Action
Documents
Degraded Sealing Surface Found IP Inspection of Room
Cooler
04/21/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
NRC Identified Missing Information on Heat Exchanger
Report
05/07/2025
Procedures
Service Water Heat Exchanger Inspection Guide
U-2 RHR Room Cooler Air/Water Side Clean/Inspect
07/27/2020
Work Orders
2B RHR Air/Water Side Room CLR CLN/INSP
04/28/2025
ISI Exam RI on 1401-W-204 Base Plate Support
03/12/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Concrete Cracking Identified Next to ISI Support
1401-W-204
03/12/2025
Engineering
Evaluations
641681
Quad Cities Top Guide Rim Weld Inspection Deviation
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Magnetic Particle Examination of CS Pump Base Plate
03/11/2025
Ultrasonic Examination of RR Safe End Nozzle Dissimilar
Metal Weld
03/13/2025
Ultrasonic Examination of RR Pipe to Safe End Weld
03/13/2025
NDE Reports
Visual Examination of CS Pump A Base Plate
03/11/2025
Magnetic Particle (MT) Examination
VT-3 Visual Examination of Component Supports,
Attachments, and Interior of Reactor Vessels
GEH-PDI-UT-10
Performance Demonstration Initiative (PDI) Generic
Procedure for the Ultrasonic Examination of Dissimilar Metal
Procedures
GEH-PDI-UT-2
Performance Demonstration Initiative (PDI) Generic
Procedure for the Ultrasonic Examination of Austenitic Pipe
Work Orders
Repair Welding from Leak on 1/2 EDG CWP Piping Line
0-3967-8"-O
2/30/2024
Procedures
QCGP 1-1
Normal Unit 1 Startup
2
Transformer 11 to Bus 13 Main Feed Failed During PMT
04/01/2025
T11 to Bus 13 PMT Not Performed
04/08/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
1-3901 and 1-3902 Manually Torqued >60hrs Requiring
04/22/2025
Miscellaneous
QC-PSA-005.20
Electrical Power System Notebook
Calculation of RMAT and RICT for Risk Informed Completion
Time Program
ER-QC-600-2001
Quad Cities RICT System Guidelines
Procedures
Risk Informed Completion Time
QDC-1600-M-
0545
Quad Cities Units 1 and 2: ECCS Strainer Head Loss
Estimates
Calculations
QDC-1600-M-
2013
Quad Cities Unqualified Coatings in Containment
PSU: OSP Pitting Found in Centipede
03/14/2025
PSU: 1-1201-5 RWCU Valve did not Close on Isolation
Signal
03/15/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
PSU: Pit Found on Torus Underwater
03/17/2025
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Q1R28 Service Level I Coating Inspection Results
03/19/2025
Miscellaneous
UCC Project No.
2-23256.570
Preliminary Summary Report for Torus Immersion Area Work
Activities. WO numbers 05358224-02 and 05362858-01
03/21/2025
Work Orders
QCOS 1600-36 PCI Group 3 Test
03/23/2025
WHR Requirement Deviation - Seconded RXS Boilermaker
03/12/2025
WHR Fatigue Assessment
03/21/2025
WHR Fatigue Assessment
03/24/2025
WHR Fatigue Assessment
03/24/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
WHR Fatigue Assessment Performed
03/22/2025
Miscellaneous
RCN-129
Q1R28 Torus Project Underwater Cleaning, Coating
Inspection and Repair
Procedures
Fatigue Management and Work Hour Limits
PSU: 1-1301-27 RCIC Torus CK VLV Not Seating
03/16/2025
1-1301-53 Valve Indicates Potentially Not Closed
04/01/2025
RPS Test Box Lamp Illuminated, Should Be Extinguished
04/15/2025
PSU: U1 RCIC Erratic Flow in Automatic
05/19/2025
RCIC Barometric Condenser Condensate Pump Not
Running
06/19/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
Follow Up to IR 4874684 - U1 RCIC Condensate Pump
06/19/2025
Miscellaneous
TIC 3912
Give an Option to Trip HPCI Turbine Locally with Trip Handle
03/24/2025
QCIS 0200-39
Unit 2 Division I Low and Low Low Reactor Water Level
Analog Trip System Calibration and Functional Test
QCOP 1300-01
RCIC System Preparation for Standby Operation
QCOS 1300-01
Periodic RCIC Pump Operability Test
QCOS 1300-05
RICI Pump Operability Test
QCOS 1300-19
RCIC Torus Suction Check Valve Closure Test
QCOS 1300-26
RCIC Pump Comprehensive/Performance Test
Procedures
QCOS 2300-05
HPCI Pump Operability Test
94a
DIV 1, LO/LO-LO RX WATER LEVEL ANALOG TRIP
CAL/FUNC TEST
04/09/2025
Work Orders
PSU: 1-1301-27 RCIC Torus CK VLV Not Seating
03/24/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
Increase in U2 Service Water Rad Monitor Counts Per
Second
04/07/2024
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Detectable Activity U2 SWRM
04/07/2024
NRC ID: RWP RP Coverage Error "COV0013"
06/24/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
06/25/2025
2572325-RPT-1
Hydrogeologic Investigation Report Quad Cities Generating
Station Cordova, Illinois
2/09/2022
Document
Number: 50-
254/50-265
Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report
including Annual Radiological Groundwater Protection
Program Report 2024
05/15/2025
Miscellaneous
SVP-24-034
Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report 2023
05/10/2024
Radioactive Effluent and Environmental Monitoring
Programs
Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program and
Meteorological Program Implementation
CY-QC-170-301
Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
Radiological Groundwater Protection Program
Procedures
EN-QC-408-4160
RGPP Reference Material for Quad Cities Generating
Station
Self-Assessments AR 4535860
RGPP Five-Year Internal Assessment
10/20/2023
Liquid Radwaste Effluent Flow Monitor Not Fixed in 30 Days
08/12/2023
OC.1 September Radwaste Generated Goal Exceeded
10/04/2023
Blower Motor for Radwaste SERDS Drying Skid Failed
07/09/2024
Resin Liner Shipment with Higher-Than-Normal Dose Rates
08/28/2024
24 Radwaste Self-Assessment GAP
01/31/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
Liner Shipment Postponed
05/06/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
NRC ID: Vendor Report Legend Enhancement
06/26/2025
Semi-Annual Source Inventory, October 2024
10/28/2024
Semi-Annual Source Inventory, February 2025
2/10/2025
Miscellaneous
Radioactive Material Transportation Specialist Training
Records
various
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Semi-Annual Source Inventory, April 2024
04/05/2024
TBE Sample ID:
L109397-2
24 Condensate Resin Analysis
01/31/2024
TBE Sample ID:
L109397-4
25 Dry Active Waste Analysis
01/16/2025
Control of RAM Storage Areas and Containers Stored
Outside
Radioactive Material/Waste Shipments
Radioactive Material and Non-Disposal Site Waste
Shipments
Shipment of Category 2 Quantities of Radioactive Material or
Waste (Category 2 RAMQC)
Packaging of Radioactive Material Shipments
Packaging of Radioactive Material/Waste Shipments
Loading Dry Active Waste and Other Waste Forms for
Energy Solutions Waste Acceptance Guide (WAG-501)
CFR 61 Program
Procedures
Process Control Program for Radioactive Wastes
Self-Assessments 04716439-12-01
Self-Assessment: Radioactive Solid Waste Processing and
Radioactive Material Handling, Storage, and Transportation -
10/31/2024
QC-24-079
Condensate Resin Shipment
10/01/2024
QC-24-330
Control Rod Drive Shipment
04/02/2024
QC-25-057
Used Resin Cask Shipment
06/03/2025
Shipping Records
QC-25-063
Used Resin Cask Shipment
06/24/2025
Monthly Data Elements for NRC ROP Indicator - Reactor
Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity
various
Monthly Data Elements for NRC ROP Indicator -
RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent Occurrences
various
A
Site Performance Indicator Validation Sheet
various
71151
Miscellaneous
SVP-25-022
Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report 2024
04/30/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
Apparent Cause of MSIV Failures to Meet LLRT Allowable
Limits during D3R21
11/01/2010
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
AR 130565130565Design Deficiency Induces MSIV Seat Wear Resulting in
Unacceptable Leak Rate Performance
11/07/2002
'B' Main Steam Line Exceeded Tech. Spec. Limit of < 34
Failures
03/19/2012
AR 203885-19
Perform a CCA on all LLRT Failures during Q2R17
05/19/2004
As-Found LLRT Results on MSIVs Exceeded Tech Spec
Limits during Q1R23
03/02/2015
As-Found LLRT Results on MSIVs Exceeded Tech Spec
Limits during Q2R23
03/21/2016
RECOMMENDED REASSESSMENT OF MSIV DESIGN
VULNERABILITY
10/25/2018
Appendix J Owners Group Benchmark IR
06/15/2023
Appendix J ER-AA-380 Fatal Flaw Disposition (Flushing)
03/14/2024
PSU Q1R28 MSIV 1-0203-2B LLRT Exceeded TS Limit <
2.4 Scfh
03/10/2025
Q1R28 1-0203-1C LLRT Leakage Above Tech Spec Limit
03/12/2025
MSIV Flushing Trend Information
03/25/2025
AR 747103747103Inboard MSIVs Had High Initial Leakage Rates during
Q2R19
03/03/2008
QDC-0-2018-
0464
Simple Issue Risk Assessment: MSIV Pilot Disc Stem Wear
QDC-1-2024-
0052
Miscellaneous
QDC-1-2025-
0115
1-0203-2B MSIV
Procedures
Primary Containment Leakrate Testing Program
1-1601-84B Found Closed
04/05/2025
Transient During U2 125VDC Charger Swap
05/19/2025
PSU: U1 RCIC Erratic Flow in Automatic
05/19/2025
U2 SER Fuse F13 Reseated IAW QCOA 0900-01
05/19/2025
PSU: 1A RFP Failed to Trip on +48 in Rx Level
05/19/2025
PSU: U1 RPS B ISBS Controller Fault
05/19/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
U2 RFP Trip
05/19/2025
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
1-6706-14-1-ATS1 On Emergency Power
05/20/2025
Bus 23-1 Control Power Found Connected to 7A-1
05/21/2025
PSU: U2 Battery Room Fire
05/22/2025
Battery Discharge Test Failed Modified Load Test
05/22/2025
NRC ID: LER U1 2025-003-00 Inaccurate Data
06/20/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
NRC ID: Error in CAPE 04844848-15
06/20/2025
Miscellaneous
Event Summary Report - Notice of Unusual Event
05/22/2025
Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Technical Support
Guidelines (TSG) Reference Manual
QCAN 901(2)-3
B-14
Torus to Reactor Building Negative Differential Pressure
QCOA 1600-01
Failure of Reactor Building to Torus Vacuum Breakers
QCOS 0100-49
Drywell/Torus Purge Supply Local Leak Rate Test
Procedures
QOA 6900-09
Loss of Turbine Building Bus 1B/1B-1
21