IR 05000254/2025004
| ML26041A307 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 02/11/2026 |
| From: | Robert Ruiz NRC/RGN-III/DORS/RPB1 |
| To: | Mudrick C Constellation Energy Generation |
| References | |
| IR 2025004 | |
| Download: ML26041A307 (0) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000254/2025004 AND 05000265/2025004
Dear Christopher H. Mudrick:
On December 31, 2025, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station. On January 20, 2026, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Doug Hild, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station.
February 11, 2026 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Robert Ruiz, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000254 and 05000265 License Nos. DPR-29 and DPR-30
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000254 and 05000265
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000254/2025004 and 05000265/2025004
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2025-004-0055
Licensee:
Constellation Nuclear
Facility:
Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station
Location:
Cordova, IL
Inspection Dates:
October 1, 2025, to December 31, 2025
Inspectors:
P. Gresh, Operations Engineer
B. Jebbia, Senior Operations Engineer
E. Kokkinis, Resident Inspector
J. Kutlesa, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector
C. Norton, Senior Resident Inspector
P. Timm, Illinois Emergency Management Agency
Approved By:
Robert Ruiz, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 1
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Implement Adequate Preventative Maintenance Schedule Resulted in Failure of HPCI Turbine Steam Supply Valve Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000254,05000265/2025004-01 Open/Closed
[P.3] -
Resolution 71111.12 A finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated non-cited violation (NCV)of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1, Procedures, was self-revealed, for the failure to implement component inspection and testing due to incorrect component classification of breaker 1-8351-A1-G1. As a result, component degradation went undetected, and on September 4, 2025, breaker 1-8351-A1-G1 failed during a surveillance test resulting in the Unit 1 high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) inlet valve failing to open, rendering the Unit 1 HPCI system inoperable.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000254,07200053/2025-006-00 LER 2025-006-00 for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, High Pressure Coolant Injection Inoperable Due to Turbine Inlet Valve Failure to Open 71153 Closed
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 operated at or near rated thermal power for the entire inspection period.
Unit 2 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On November 15, 2025, the unit was down powered to 80% for a control rod sequence exchange and returned to rated thermal power. On December 17, 2025, the unit was down powered to 75% for a control rod sequence exchange and returned to rated thermal power. The unit remained at rated thermal for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of seasonal hot temperatures for the following systems on October 6, 2025:
- ultimate heat sink and intake bay
- 1B residual heat removal (RHR) heat exchanger in the Unit 1 RHR system This completes the previous partial sample dated June 17, 2025.
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Unit 1 standby liquid control system on October 9, 2025
- (2) Unit 1C residual heat removal service water (RHRSW) during 1A RHRSW maintenance on October 17, 2025
- (4) Unit 1/2 'B' train standby gas treatment system during 'A' train maintenance on November 12, 2025
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Fire Zone 9.2, Unit 2 turbine building, elevation 595'-0", diesel generator room on October 7, 2025
- (2) Fire Zone 1.1.2.5, Unit 2 reactor building, elevation 666'-6", standby gas treatment 4th floor east and standby liquid control 4th floor west on October 16, 2025
- (3) Fire Zone 6.2.A, Unit 2 turbine building, elevation 615'-6", 'A' battery charger room on October 22, 2025
- (4) Fire Zone 8.6.2.C, Unit 1/2 turbine building, elevation 595'-0", electrohydraulic control fluid reservoir on October 30, 2025
- (5) Fire Zone 7.2, Unit 2 turbine building, elevation 628'-6", 250 V battery room on November 5, 2025
Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the onsite fire brigade training and performance during an unannounced fire drill on October 7, 2025.
71111.11A - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Requalification Examination Results (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the licensed operator examination failure rates for the requalification annual operating exam completed on November 19, 2025, and the biennial written examinations completed on November 20, 2025.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator requalification on November 19, 2025.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) Unit 1 250 Vdc [Volts direct current] motor control center 1A cubicles, which completes the previous partial sample dated September 17, 2025
- (2) Unit 2 station black out (SBO) diesel generator on December 9, 2025
Quality Control (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance and quality control activities to ensure the following SSC remains capable of performing its intended function:
(1)125 Vdc batteries and battery procurement following 10 CFR Part 21 notification on October 29, 2025
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
(1)risk management activities associated with Unit 1A RHR unplanned maintenance activities on October 20, 2025
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
(1)availability of Unit 2 SBO diesel with 125 Vdc SBO uninterruptible power supply non-functional (2)operability of the 'A' RHR loop when the minimum flow valve failed to open in the required time (3)operability of the Unit 1 emergency diesel generator after discovery of an issue with the methodology for functionally testing the response of the second level under voltage relay, QCOS 6500-09
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
(1)1/2 'B' diesel driven fire pump capacity test after maintenance activities on October 3, 2025
- (2) Unit 1 125 Vdc battery testing after battery replacement on November 25, 2025
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 1 diesel generator timed start and load test on October 6, 2025
71114.02 - Alert and Notification System Testing
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the following maintenance and testing of the alert and notification system:
annual siren inspection and maintenance records for the period of April 1, 2024, through June 30, 2025
71114.03 - Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the readiness of the emergency preparedness organization.
71114.04 - Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the following submitted Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan changes.
- EP-AA-1000, Standardized Radiological Emergency Plan, Revision 34 This evaluation does not constitute NRC approval.
71114.05 - Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01 - 02.11) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the maintenance of the emergency preparedness program.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS09: Residual Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.08) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2024, through September 30, 2025)
- (2) Unit 2 (October 1, 2024, through September 30, 2025)
MS10: Cooling Water Support Systems (IP Section 02.09) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2024, through September 30, 2025)
- (2) Unit 2 (October 1, 2024, through September 30, 2025)
EP01: Drill/Exercise Performance (DEP) Sample (IP Section 02.12) (1 Sample)
- (1) April 1, 2024, through June 30, 2025 EP02: Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Drill Participation (IP Section 02.13) (1 Sample)
- (1) July 1, 2024, through June 30, 2025 EP04: Emergency Response Facility and Equipment Readiness (ERFER) (IP Section 02.14) (1 Sample)
- (1) January 1, 2025, through June 30, 2025 71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution
Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) Action Request (AR) 4917124, 1-1001-201A Inappropriately Danger Tagged
- (2) Paragon Part 21 extent-of-condition for DC power system batteries
71153 - Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):
- (1) LER 05000254/2025-006-00 "High Pressure Coolant Injection Inoperable Due to Turbine Inlet Valve Failure to Open" (Agencywide Document Access and Management System [ADAMS] Accession No. ML25308A004). The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in this report under Inspection Results Section 71111.12. This LER is closed.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Implement Adequate Preventative Maintenance Schedule Resulted in Failure of HPCI Turbine Steam Supply Valve Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000254,05000265/2025004-01 Open/Closed
[P.3] - Resolution 71111.12 A finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated non-cited violation (NCV)of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1, Procedures, was self-revealed, for the failure to implement component inspection and testing due to incorrect component classification of breaker 1-8351-A1-G1. As a result, component degradation went undetected, and on September 4, 2025, breaker 1-8351-A1-G1 failed during a surveillance test resulting in the Unit 1 high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) inlet valve failing to open, rendering the Unit 1 HPCI system inoperable.
Description:
On September 4, 2025, the Unit 1 HPCI turbine steam supply valve, MO 1-2301-3, failed to open during surveillance testing. The licensee found that the coil on the open contactor for breaker 1-8351-A1-G1 in 250 Vdc motor control center 1A cubicle G1 was bound due to degraded lubrication resulting in MO 1-2301-3 failing to open. The last time MO 1-2301-3 opened as designed was May 30, 2025.
Procedure ER-AA-200, Revision 7, Preventative Maintenance Program, describes key elements of the Preventive Maintenance Program, including determining component classification and vulnerability. Also, the performance centered maintenance (PCM) template development and change process provides standardized generic preventive maintenance (PM)tasks and frequencies based on the criticality of the component, how often its used, and the environment in which it operates. Additionally, ER-AA-200 defines Critical as, Equipment considered necessary for reactor safety or power production. Classification of a component as critical or non-critical is governed by procedure ER-AA-200-1001, Revision 8, Equipment Classification.
In 2016 breaker 1-8351-A1-G1 was originally classified as criticality 4, a critical component, with two preventative maintenance activities associated with it. One activity to replace the breaker with a frequency of 16 years and another activity to inspect and repair the breaker, including cleaning and lubrication of the contactors, with a frequency of 10 years. The breaker was last inspected in 2009 and was last replaced in 2011. On February 10, 2017, the breaker classification was changed from criticality 4 to criticality 8, to a non-critical component. The inspectors could not find a documented justification for the classification change. The change in breaker 1-8351-A1-G1 component criticality was contrary to ER-AA-200-1001, 1, step 1.4 which states If any of the criticality criteria in step 1.4.1 are answered Yes, the component is classified as critical and step 1.4.1.D states A single equipment failure that results in the complete loss of a Maintenance Rule high safety-significant (HSS) or risk significant function, thus requiring the component to be classified as critical.
On April 23, 2018, Preventative Maintenance Modification Request (PMMR) PMC-18-106894 retired the 10-year interval PM for inspection and repair leaving the only PM for breaker 1-8351-A1-G1 to replace the breaker every 16 years. The task analysis for PMC-18-106894 made the incorrect statement that the breaker was not in the scope of the maintenance rule. The breaker is scoped within the maintenance rule program with a HSS function. Additionally, the PCM template recommends a 6-year frequency for inspection and repair and its basis comments the lubricant can be expected to act more like cement if a breaker is cycled scarcely at all in a period less than 6 to 8 years. This period of inactivity would lead to a high likelihood of binding and failure to close or open, which occurred and caused the breaker to fail.
On January 7, 2022, the PM activity to replace the breaker was extended from a 16-year frequency to a 48-year frequency under PMMR PMC-21-128700.
On September 12, 2022, breaker 1-8351-A1-G1 was reclassified from criticality 8 to criticality 4, after the licensee identified that it had been inappropriately downgraded in 2017; however, no updates to the maintenance strategy occurred to reflect the classification change.
This was not in accordance with ER-AA-200-1001 step 4.1.5 which states When a component classification changes, it is an expectation that the Maintenance Strategy tab be reviewed to verify or change the maintenance strategy to ensure it is in line with the new component classification such as adding or canceling PMs, as the previous inspection and repair PM schedules were not reinstated.
On August 24, 2024, NRC inspectors identified NCV 05000254,05000265/2024010-01 where the licensee failed to classify various components and/or sub-components for which a single equipment failure results in the complete loss of a maintenance rule HSS function. Some of the components that were identified to have been misclassified from critical to non-critical were within the 250 Vdc system. As part of the corrective actions from that NCV, the licensee initiated corrective actions to perform an extent of condition and to update the associated maintenance strategies. Those corrective actions failed to correct the inappropriate changes made to breaker 1-8351-A1-G1 maintenance strategy allowing degradation to continue undetected.
Corrective Actions:
Corrective actions include, but were not limited to, breaker component replacement, system restoration, and review of retired PM activities.
Corrective Action References: AR 4895381, MO 1-2301-3 Not Opening from Control Switch
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency:
The licensees failure to properly classify breaker 1-8351-A1-G1 as critical between 2017 and 2022 and consequently, to implement the appropriate maintenance strategy contrary to ER-AA-200-1001 and ER-AA-200 constituted a performance deficiency.
Specifically, improperly classifying breaker 1-8351-A1-G1 as non-critical and failing to implement the inspection and testing PM activities led to degradation of the breaker that ultimately failed, rendering Unit 1 HPCI inoperable.
Screening:
The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensee failed to implement preventative maintenance activities which led to failure to identify the deficient condition.
Significance:
The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The affected cornerstone was Mitigating Systems, as determined by Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings. The inspectors dispositioned the finding per Exhibit 2, Section A, Mitigating SSCs and PRA Functionality.
Specifically, the inspectors answered "Yes to question 2.a Does the degraded condition represent a loss of the PRA function of a single train TS system (such as HPCI/HPCS) for greater than its TS allowed outage time? The finding screened into a Detailed Risk Evaluation.
A regional Senior Reactor Analyst (SRA) performed a risk assessment in accordance with NRC IMC 0609, Appendix A. The SRA used SAPHIRE 8 version 8.2.12 and Quad Cities Test Limited Use, QCTY-EQK-HWD-FLEX, SPAR model version 8.83.
Assumptions:
- The exposure time of the degraded condition was T/2 plus repair time or 49.5 days.
- Condition was modelled by setting the basic event, HCI-MOV-CC-F03 to TRUE, HPCI steam line valve 1-2301-3 fails to open.
- FLEX credit was applied by setting FLX-XHE-XE-ELAP to a failure probability of 1E-2 from the TRUE setting in the baseline.
- SPAR model data was used for equipment failure rates, as it is assumed to be the best estimate gathered from Idaho National Laboratories (INL) data.
- The Quad Cities SPAR model does not contain fire events, and therefore Constellations Quad Cities PRA Quantification Notebooks were referenced for fire risk.
- No recovery credit was applied, consistent with the troubleshooting and repair actual timeframes.
Exposure Time:
The HPCI steam admission valve was last proven functional on May 30, 2025. Constellation discovered that the contactors rollers were bound due to degraded lubrication. This prevented initial contact closure, leaving the coil energized for a prolonged amount of time, degrading it to the as-found state. The PCM template noted that inactivity leads to a higher likelihood of binding and failure. The SRA determined that the lubrication issue, along with the time from last cycling of the contacts, was best represented as a time-based degradation. In accordance with the Risk Assessment Standardization Project (RASP) Handbook Volume 1 - Internal Events, for a failure that could have occurred at any time since the component was last operated (e.g., time of actual failure cannot be determined due to the nature of the failure mechanism), the exposure time (T) is equal to one-half of the time period since the last successful functional operation of the component (t/2) plus repair time.
T/2 + repair time = 97/2 + 1 day repair = approximately 49.5 days for the exposure time.
Internal Events Risk:
The SRA ran the model with the steam admission valve failed for 49.5 days. The result was a core damage frequency increase from the baseline of 1E-7/yr. The dominant core damage sequence was a small break loss-of-coolant accident, with failures of the power conversion system, main feedwater, high pressure coolant injection, and failure to depressurize. The internal event evaluation included postulated flooding events.
External Event Risk:
The SPAR model does not include the capability to evaluate the fire risk increase for the degraded condition. Therefore, the SRA reviewed QC-PRA-021.61, Quad Cities Generating Station Fire Probabilistic Risk Analysis, Summary and Quantification Notebook, Revision 3.
The fire model of record (MOR) includes Birnbaum importance measures, which roughly equate to the increase in core damage frequency assuming a component is failed. The fire PRA Birnbaum importance measure for the failure of the steam admission valve to open, scaled to the exposure time of 49.5 days, represents an increase in CDF/yr due to fire of approximately 5E-8/yr. The SRA determined the risk from tornadoes and seismic events were also insignificant with respect to the degraded condition and exposure time.
The SRA estimated the increase in internal and external risk to be 1.5E-7/yr, a finding of very low safety significance (Green).
Sensitivity Evaluation:
Due to the uncertainty with the known exposure time, the SRA conducted a sensitivity analysis assuming the exposure time started from the last successful performance of the steam admission valve to open instead of T/2. This would essentially double the results and still be in the low E-7/yr range and remain of very low safety significance (Green).
Lastly, the SRA determined that any impact on large early release frequency (LERF) was bounded by the results of the CDF evaluation.
Cross-Cutting Aspect:
P.3 - Resolution: The organization takes effective corrective actions to address issues in a timely manner commensurate with their safety significance. Specifically, the licensee had corrective actions in place to perform an extent of condition and update maintenance strategies in the 250 VDC system following a violation identified in 2024, but those corrective actions had not yet been completed prior to the failure of the HPCI valve breaker.
Enforcement:
Violation:
Technical Specification 5.4.1.a requires, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978.
NRC Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, Section 9 addresses Procedures for Performing Maintenance, and Section 9.b states, in part, preventive maintenance schedules should be developed to specify lubrication schedules, inspections of equipment, replacement of such items as filters and strainers, and inspection or replacement of parts that have a specific lifetime such as wear rings.
The licensee established procedure ER-AA-200, Revision 7, Preventative Maintenance Program, to implement that regulatory requirement and ER-AA-200-1001, Revision 8, Equipment Classification, to establish component classifications for directing PM requirements. Procedure ER-AA-200-1001, Attachment 1, step 1.4 requires, in part, that for a component that any single equipment failure that results in the complete loss of a maintenance rule HSS or risk-significant function be classified as critical.
Contrary to the above, from 2018 to failure of the MO 1-2301-3 valve on September 4, 2025, the licensee failed to implement a preventative maintenance schedule for inspections and testing of breaker 1-8351-A1-G1. Specifically, the licensee had incorrectly reclassified breaker 1-8351-A1-G1 from critical to non-critical subsequently leading to a failure to implement time-based PM activities as inspection and testing schedules were canceled. As a result, degradation of breaker 1-8351-A1-G1 went undetected until its failure on September 4, 2025.
Enforcement Action:
This violation is being treated as a NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On January 20, 2026, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Doug Hild, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On November 20, 2025, the inspectors presented the emergency preparedness inspection results to Fred Muhly, Emergency Preparedness Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On December 9, 2025, the inspectors presented the emergency preparedness inspection results to Fred Muhly, Emergency Preparedness Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
NRC ID RHRSW FT not Calibrated per QIP 1000-19, Rev. 33
07/01/2025
M-22, Sheet 3
Diagram of Service Water Piping Diesel Generator Cooling
Water
M-37
Diagram of RHR Service Water Piping
BP
M-40
Diagram of Standby Liquid Control Piping
AZ
Drawings
M-44
Diagram of Standby Gas Treatment
AQ
QOM 0-6600-01
Unit 0 Diesel Generator Valve Checklist
QOM 0-7500-01
U1/2 Standby Gas Treatment Valve Checklist
QOM 1-1000-05
U1 RHR Service Water Valve Checklist
Procedures
QOM 1-1100-01
Unit 1 Standby Liquid Control Valve Checklist
Corrective Action
Documents
Faulty Smoke Detector 0-4136-603
08/20/2024
FZ 1.1.2.5
Unit 2 RB 666'-6" Elev. Stand-by Gas Treatment 4th Floor
East
08/2022
FZ 6.2.A
Unit 2 TB 615'-6" ELEV. 'A' Battery Charger Room
04/2025
FZ 7.2
Unit 2 TB 628'-6" ELEV. 250V Battery Room
08/2022
FZ 8.2.6.A
Unit 1 TB 595'-0" Elev. 4KV Switch-Gear & U-1 Trackway
08/2022
FZ 8.2.6.C
Unit 1/2 TB 595'-0" Elev. EHC Fluid Reservoir
04/2025
Fire Plans
FZ 9.2
Unit 2 TB 595'-0" Elev. Diesel Generator
08/2022
Miscellaneous
Fire Drill Scenario
No: 2025 4th QTR
- 2
1C 3201 RX Feed Pump
10/02/2025
Miscellaneous
FSI-6442
Manual Fire System Impairment (FSI) Permit for Smoke
Detector 1/2-4136-603
08/20/2024
71111.11Q Miscellaneous
25 LORT NRC Exam Scenario 00-09
MO 1-2301-3 Not Opening from Control Switch
09/04/2025
PM's Have Been Canceled and Need to be Re-Implemented
09/05/2025
Unit 2 SBO UPS Inverter 7B Lights Flickering
10/12/2025
Part 21 - Positive Battery Post Separation
10/14/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
CAPE 4895381
Corrective Action Program Evaluation (CAPE) for IR 4895381
11/18/2025
Preventative Maintenance Program
Procedures
Equipment Classification
Shipping Records
Receipt# 328877
Quality Receipt Inspection Package for Battery, Wet Cell, 2.06
to 2.16 VDC, 1496 AMP HR Rating at 100% Capacity
10/02/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
1-1001-18A Slow to Open during QCOS 1000-06
10/18/2025
Procedures
Risk Informed Completion Time
Unit 2 SBO UPS Inverter 7B Lights Flickering
10/12/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
1-1001-18A Slow to Open during QCOS 1000-06
10/18/2025
4E-7870L, Sheet 1 Schematic Diagram Station Blackout 15KVA Inverter 7B
2/18/1997
Drawings
4E-7870L, Sheet 2 Schematic Diagram Station Blackout 15KVA Inverter 7B
2/18/1997
MA-QC-773-523
Quad Cities NOAD Unit 1 Tech Spec Undervoltage Relay and
Degraded Voltage Rwlay Calibration
QCOP 6800-01
Procedures
QCOS 6500-09
Functional Test of Unit 1 Second Level Under Voltage
Work Orders
00017029-01, TS, Bus 14-1 Degraded Voltage Relay Test, E:
1-6706, N/A, R19
01/06/2025
QCMMS 4100-33
1/2-4101B Diesel Driven Fire Pump Capacity Test
QCOS 6600-41
Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generator Load Test
QCOS 6600-44
Unit 1 Diesel Generator Timed Start Test
Procedures
QCOS 6900-02
Station Safety Related Battery Quarterly Surveillance
Procedures
TIC 4005QCOP
6900-25
Transfer of Unit One 125 VDC Bus Between Normal and
Alternate Battery
30a
Miscellaneous
N/A
Semi-Annual Quad Cities Siren Report
April 01, 2024
through June
30, 2025
Standardized Radiological Emergency Plan
Procedures
Radiological Emergency Plan Annex for Quad Cities Station
Calculations
Addendum 1
Quad Cities Station On-Shift Staffing Technical Basis
Sampled 20 EP ERO Training Records
N/A
Miscellaneous
N/A
Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Augmentation Drill
Report
03/14/2024
Procedures
ERO Training and Qualification
Calculations
Evaluation No.:
24-49
§50.54(q) Program Evaluation Assessment Review for
Standardized Radiological Emergency Plan Revision 34
2/28/2025
Miscellaneous
EPID L-2018-LLA-
0045
Issuance of Amendments to Revise the Emergency Response
Organization Staffing Requirements
03/21/2019
Exelon Nuclear Standardized Radiological Emergency Plan
Standardized Radiological Emergency Plan
Procedures
EPA-400/R-17/001 PAG Manual: Protective Action Guides and Planning
Guidance for Radiological Incidents
01/2017
N/A
Quad Cities 2025 Off-Year Exercise Evaluation Report
2/28/2025
Miscellaneous
N/A
Quad Cities May 22, 2025, Unusual Event Report
06/20/2025
Self-Assessments NOS QDC-24-02
Emergency Preparedness Audit Report Quad Cities
Generating Station
05/01/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
EP - Rock Island Siren Controller Failure
07/29/2024
Monthly Data Elements for NRC ROP Indicator - Emergency
Response Organization (ERO) Drill Participation
07/01/2024 -
08/31/2025
71151
Miscellaneous
Monthly Data Elements for NRC ROP
04/01/2024 -
Indicator - Drill/Exercise Performance
06/30/2025
Monthly Data Elements for NRC ROP Indicator - Alert and
Notification System (ANS) Reliability
07/01/2024 -
2/31/2024
Monthly Data Elements for NRC ROP Indicator - Emergency
Response Facility and Equipment Readiness (ERFER)
01/01/2025 -
06/30/2025
Part 21 - Positive Battery Post Seperation
10/14/2025
1-1001-201A Inappropriately Danger Tagged
10/19/2025
Part 21: Interim P21 Update to IR 4905526
11/05/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
Eng Review / Approval for Interim Part 21 Actions
11/13/2025
Drawings
M-37
Diagram of RHR Service Water Piping
BP