ML25224A046
| ML25224A046 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 08/12/2025 |
| From: | Robert Ruiz NRC/RGN-III/DORS/RPB1 |
| To: | Rhoades D Constellation Energy Generation, Constellation Nuclear |
| References | |
| IR 2025002 | |
| Download: ML25224A046 (1) | |
See also: IR 05000254/2025002
Text
David P. Rhoades
Senior Vice President
Constellation Energy Generation, LLC
President and Chief Nuclear Officer (CNO)
Constellation Nuclear
4300 Winfield Road
Warrenville, IL 60555
SUBJECT:
QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION
REPORT 05000254/2025002 AND 05000265/2025002
Dear David Rhoades:
On June 30, 2025, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at
Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station. On June 27, 2025, the NRC inspectors discussed the
results of this inspection with Doug Hild, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff.
The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding
involved a violation of NRC requirements. One Severity Level IV violation without an associated
finding is documented in this report. We are treating these violations as non-cited
violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this
inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection
report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional
Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector
at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a
response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your
disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk,
Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the
NRC Resident Inspector at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station.
August 12, 2025
D. Rhoades
2
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection
and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document
Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public
Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
Robert Ruiz, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 1
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
Docket Nos. 05000254 and 05000265
License Nos. DPR-29 and DPR-30
Enclosure:
As stated
cc w/ encl: Distribution via LISTSERV
Signed by Ruiz, Robert
on 08/12/25
D. Rhoades
3
Letter to David Rhoades from Robert Ruiz dated August 12, 2025.
SUBJECT:
QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION
REPORT 05000254/2025002 AND 05000265/2025002
DISTRIBUTION:
Tim Steadham
RidsNrrDorlLpl3
RidsNrrPMQuadCities Resource
RidsNrrDroIrib Resource
R3-DORS
ADAMS Accession Number: ML25224A046
SUNSI Review
Non-Sensitive
Sensitive
Publicly Available
Non-Publicly Available
OFFICE
RIII
RIII
RIII
NAME
NShah:gmp
DBetancourt-Roldan
via email
RRuiz
DATE
08/12/2025
07/30/2025
08/12/2025
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
Enclosure
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000254 and 05000265
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000254/2025002 and 05000265/2025002
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2025-002-0056
Licensee:
Constellation Nuclear
Facility:
Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station
Location:
Cordova, IL
Inspection Dates:
April 01, 2025, to June 30, 2025
Inspectors:
J. Cassidy, Senior Health Physicist
M. Edwin, Health Physicist
T. Gardner, Technical Assistant
T. Hooker, Health Physicist
C. Hunt, Senior Resident Inspector
B. Jose, Senior Reactor Inspector
A. Shaikh, Senior Reactor Inspector
M. Tatkowski, Reactor Inspector
M. Porfirio, Illinois Emergency Management Agency
Approved By:
Robert Ruiz, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 1
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
2
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees
performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, in
accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs
program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to
https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality Associated with Design Deficiencies in Main
Steam Isolation Valves
Cornerstone
Significance
Cross-Cutting
Aspect
Report
Section
Green
NCV 05000254,05000265/2025002-01
Open/Closed
[H.14] -
Conservative
Bias
A self-revealed Green finding and associated Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, was identified for the licensees failure to
correct a condition adverse to quality associated with the Unit 1 main steam isolation
valves (MSIVs). Specifically, the licensee identified two deficiencies with the design of the
Unit 1 MSIVs but failed to take corrective actions to eliminate those design deficiencies before
exceeding Technical Specification (TS) leakage limits on March 12, 2025, during the Q1R28
refueling outage.
Inaccurate Information Submitted to NRC in LER 05000254/2025-003-00
Cornerstone
Severity
Cross-Cutting
Aspect
Report
Section
Not Applicable
NCV 05000254,05000265/2025002-02
Open/Closed
Not Applicable
The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.9,
Completeness and Accuracy of Information, when the licensee failed to submit accurate
information in Licensee Event Report 05000254/2025-003-00 on May 9, 2025. Specifically,
the licensee misrepresented the status of modifications being completed on the affected main
steam isolation valves that were the subject of the LER.
Additional Tracking Items
Type
Issue Number
Title
Report
Section
Status
LER
05000254,07200053/2025-
003-00
LER 2025-003-00 for Quad
Cities Nuclear Power Station,
Unit 1, Main Steam Isolation
Valves Local Leak Rate Test
Exceed Technical Specification
Limits
Closed
3
LER 2024-002-00 for Quad
Cities Nuclear Power Station,
Unit 2, Turbine Trip and
Automatic Scram due to Digital
EHC Power Supply Intermittent
Failure
Closed
LER
05000254,07200053/2025-
004-00
LER 2025-004-00 for Quad
Cities Nuclear Power Station,
Unit 1, Loss of Suppression
Chamber Vacuum Breaker
Safety Function due to
Configuration Control Error
Closed
4
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1
The unit began the inspection period during ascension to full power following refueling
outage (RFO) Q1R28, where it remained until May 19, 2025, when the unit automatically tripped
due to a transient on the 125 Vdc bus. The unit was restarted on May 28, 2025, where it
remained at full-rated thermal power, with the exception of short-term power reductions for
control rod sequence exchanges, testing, and as requested by the transmission
system operator.
Unit 2
The unit began the inspection period at full-rated thermal power. On May 19, 2025, power was
reduced to approximately 80 percent due to a transient on the 125 Vdc bus. The unit was
returned to full-rated thermal power the same day where it remained at full-rated thermal power,
with the exception of short-term power reductions for control rod sequence exchanges, testing,
and as requested by the transmission system operator.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in
effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with
their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-
rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared
complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met
consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection
Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515,
Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of
IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and
interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules
and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Partial)
(1)
(Partial)
The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to
the onset of seasonal hot temperatures for the following systems on June 16, 2025:
1.
ultimate heat sink and intake bay
2.
1B residual heat removal (RHR) heat exchanger in the Unit 1 RHR system
5
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following
systems/trains:
(1)
1B train of RHR service water partial walkdown during planned maintenance on the
1A train of RHR service water on April 14, 2025
Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
(1)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the
Unit 1 core spray system on April 7, 2025.
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a
walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality,
material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
(1)
Fire Zone 6.1.a, Unit 1 turbine building, elevation 615'-6", Unit 1 DC panel room on
April 4, 2025
(2)
Fire Zone 6.1.b, Unit 1 turbine building, elevation 615'-6", Unit 1 DC panel room on
April 4, 2025
71111.07A - Heat Exchanger/Sink Performance
Annual Review (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated readiness and performance of:
(1)
2B RHR room cooler, 2-5746-B
71111.08G - Inservice Inspection Activities (BWR)
BWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample - Non-destructive Examination and Welding
Activities (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated boiling water reactor non-destructive testing by reviewing the
following examinations from March 10 through March 14, 2025:
(1)
Non-destructive Testing Activities
1.
Ultrasonic Examination of Reactor Recirculation Pipe to Safe End Weld
2.
Ultrasonic Examination of Reactor Recirculation Safe End Nozzle Dissimilar
Metal Weld
3.
Visual Examination of Core Spray Pump A Support
4.
Magnetic Particle Examination of Core Spray Pump A Support Base
Plate Weld
6
Welding Activities
1.
Repair Welding from Leak on 1/2 EDG CWP Piping Line 0-397-8"-O
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01)
(1 Sample)
(1)
The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control
room during a reactor startup from forced outage Q1F68 on May 28, 2025.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
(1)
The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator requalification cycle
training on May 6, 2025.
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the
following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and
appropriate work controls were addressed:
(1)
work week online and fire risk review for the week of April 21, 2025
(2)
forced outage Q1F68 shutdown safety and emergent work activities associated with
Action Request (AR) 4866961, Transient During U2 125 Vdc Charger Swap, during
the week of May 25, 2025
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the
following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
(1)
AR 4848043, Q1R28 Service Level I Coating Inspection Results, April 11, 2025
(2)
AR 4845568, PSU 1-1201-5 RWCU [reactor water cleanup] Valve did not Close on
Isolation Signal, on April 21, 2025
71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
(1)
The inspectors evaluated Q1R28 refueling outage activities from April 1 through
April 15, 2025.
(2)
The inspectors evaluated forced outage Q1F68 activities from May 19 through
May 28, 2025.
7
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system
operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
(1)
Unit 1 high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) pump operability test after scheduled
maintenance during the Q1R28 refueling outage on April 1, 2025
(2)
Unit 1 reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) pump operability test after scheduled
maintenance during the Q1R28 refueling outage on April 1, 2025
(3)
Work Order (WO) 5633691, PSU 1-1301-27 RCIC Torus CK VLV not Seating, on
April 29, 2025
(4)
QCOS 1300-01, Periodic RCIC Pump Operability Test, following troubleshooting on
May 28, 2025
(5)
QCOS 1300-26, RCIC Pump Comprehensive/Performance Test, following
troubleshooting of the barometric condenser on June 19, 2025
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
(1)
WO 5612772, Unit 2 Division I Low and Low Low Reactor Water Level Analog Trip
System Calibration and Functional Test, on April 9, 2025
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.07 - Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program
Environmental Monitoring Equipment and Sampling (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
(1)
The inspectors evaluated environmental monitoring equipment and observed
collection of environmental samples.
Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
(1)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the licensees radiological
environmental monitoring program.
GPI Implementation (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
(1)
The inspectors evaluated the licensees implementation of the Groundwater
Protection Initiative (GPI) program to identify incomplete or discontinued
program elements.
8
71124.08 - Radioactive Solid Waste Processing & Radioactive Material Handling, Storage,
& Transportation
Radioactive Material Storage (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensees performance in controlling, labeling and securing
the following radioactive materials:
(1)
10 CFR Part 37 material storage location
(2)
sealed sources in the hot lab
Radioactive Waste System Walkdown (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)
The inspectors walked down the following accessible portions of the solid radioactive waste
systems and evaluated system configuration and functionality:
(1)
radioactive waste characterization and storage location
(2)
radioactive waste transfer system
Waste Characterization and Classification (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following characterization and classification of
radioactive waste:
(1)
dry active waste stream
(2)
condensate resin stream
Shipment Preparation (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
(1)
The inspectors observed the preparation of radioactive shipment QC-25-063 of
condensate resin on June 24, 2025.
Shipping Records (IP Section 03.05) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following non-excepted radioactive material shipments through
a record review:
(1)
Shipment QC-24-079; Condensate Resin; UN3321 Radioactive Material low specific
activity (LSA-II)
(2)
Shipment QC-24-330; Control Rod Drives; UN3321 Radioactive Material, low specific
activity (LSA-II)
(3)
Shipment QC-25-057; Used Resin Cask; UN3321 Radioactive Material, low specific
activity (LSA-II)
(4)
Shipment QC-25-063; Used Resin Cask; UN3321 Radioactive Material, low specific
activity (LSA-II)
9
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
71151 - Performance Indicator Verification
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS05: Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs) Sample (IP Section 02.04) (2 Samples)
(1)
Unit 1 (April 1, 2024, through March 31, 2025)
(2)
Unit 2 (April 1, 2024, through March 31, 2025)
MS06: Emergency AC Power Systems (IP Section 02.05) (2 Samples)
(1)
Unit 1 (April 1, 2024, through March 31, 2025)
(2)
Unit 2 (April 1, 2024, through March 31, 2025)
BI01: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity Sample (IP Section 02.10) (2 Samples)
(1)
Unit 1 (April 1, 2024, through April 30, 2025)
(2)
Unit 2 (April 1, 2024, through April 30, 2025)
BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (IP Section 02.11) (2 Samples)
(1)
Unit 1 (April 1, 2024, through March 31, 2025)
(2)
Unit 2 (April 1, 2024, through March 31, 2025)
OR01: Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness Sample (IP Section 02.15) (1 Sample)
(1)
April 1, 2024, through April 30, 2025
PR01: Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
Radiological Effluent Occurrences (RETS/ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences Sample
(IP Section 02.16) (1 Sample)
(1)
April 1, 2024, through April 30, 2025
71152S - Semiannual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution
Semiannual Trend Review (Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
(1)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program to identify potential
trends in the resolution of main steam isolation valve local leak rate testing failures
that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.
71153 - Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
Event Follow Up (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
(1)
The inspectors evaluated a 125 Vdc control power transient and the licensees
response on May 19, 2025. This event also warranted assessment under
Management Directive (MD) 8.3, NRC Incident Investigation Program from which a
10
special inspection resulted. The MD 8.3 evaluation will be publicly available for review
upon completion of the associated special inspection, which will be documented
under inspection report number 2025051.
(2)
The inspectors evaluated a Unit 2 battery fire and the licensees response on
May 22, 2025. Evaluation of this event was also included in the MD 8.3 assessment
described above and was reviewed as part of that special inspection.
(3)
The inspectors evaluated the circumstances around licensee event notification 57647 for both trains of reactor building to suppression chamber vacuum
breakers inoperable due to a configuration control event on April 5, 2025. This event
was also evaluated for consideration for a reactive inspection. The NRC documented
its initial MD 8.3 assessment under ADAMS Accession No. ML25104A006 and
concluded a special inspection was warranted. The special inspection report was
documented under report number 05000254/2025050 (ADAMS Accession
No. ML25161A153).
Event Report (IP Section 03.02) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):
(1)
LER 05000254/2025-003-00, Main Steam Isolation Valves Local Leak Rate Test
Exceed Technical Specification Limits, ADAMS Accession No. ML25129A031). The
inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in this report under
Inspection Results Sections 71152S and 71153. This LER is closed.
(2)
LER 05000265/2024-002-00, Turbine Trip and Automatic Scram due to Digital EHC
Power Supply Intermittent Failure, (ADAMS Accession No. ML24204A105). The
inspectors reviewed the LER submittal and the revision to the LER submittal
documented in Inspection Report QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER
STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000254/2025001 AND
05000265/2025001. The inspectors determined that the cause of the condition
described in the LER was not reasonably within the licensees ability to foresee and
correct and therefore was not reasonably preventable. No performance deficiency nor
violation of NRC requirements was identified. This LER is closed.
(3)
LER 05000254/2025-004-00, Loss of Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breaker Safety
Function due to Configuration Control Error, (ADAMS Accession No. ML25155A098).
This event was evaluated for consideration for a reactive inspection. The NRC
documented its initial assessment in Management Directive 8.3, Decision
Documentation for Reactive Inspection, under ML25104A006 and concluded a
reactive inspection was warranted. The inspection conclusions associated with this
LER are documented in Inspection Report, "QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER
STATION - SPECIAL INSPECTION REACTIVE REPORT
05000254/2025050, under Inspection Results Section 93812. This LER is closed.
11
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality Associated with Design Deficiencies in Main
Steam Isolation Valves
Cornerstone
Significance
Cross-Cutting
Aspect
Report
Section
Green
NCV 05000254,05000265/2025002-01
Open/Closed
[H.14] -
Conservative
Bias
A self-revealed Green finding and associated Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, was identified for the licensees failure to
correct a condition adverse to quality associated with the Unit 1 main steam isolation
valves (MSIVs). Specifically, the licensee identified two deficiencies with the design of the
Unit 1 MSIVs but failed to take corrective actions to eliminate those design deficiencies
before exceeding Technical Specification (TS) leakage limits on March 12, 2025, during the
Q1R28 refueling outage.
Description:
On March 12, 2025, during the Q1R28 refueling outage, the as-found local leak rate test
results on the Unit 1 MSIVs exceeded the leakage limit of TS Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.10 of less than or equal to 62.4 standard cubic feet per hour (scfh) through steam line
C, and 156 scfh for the combined leakage rate for all MSIV leakage paths. The licensee
performed a causal evaluation of the event in the corrective action program under issue
report (AR) 4844848 and submitted LER 2025-003-00, Main Steam Isolation Valves Local
Leak Rate Test Exceed Technical Specification Limits, on May 9, 2025, for a condition
prohibited by Technical Specifications.
On May 10, 2025, the inspectors reviewed the sites Corrective Action Program
Evaluation (CAPE) under AR 4844848, the maintenance history of the affected MSIVs,
previous licensee event reports involving MSIV local leak rate test failures, and previous
corrective action program actions to address those failures. The inspectors noted that in an
apparent cause evaluation under AR 130565130565 Design Deficiency Induces MSIV Seat Wear
Resulting in Unacceptable Leak Rate Performance, dated November 7, 2002, the licensee
identified a design deficiency which caused localized seat wear due to the valve plug
dragging across the seating edge of the seat ring during valve closure. This design deficiency
causes excessive leakage past the valve seat and was determined by the licensee to be the
cause of exceeding TS Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.10 limits in LER 2012-001-00,
dated May 18, 2012, LER 2015-003-00, dated April 29, 2015, and LER 2016-001-00, dated
May 19, 2016. In addition to the design deficiency associated with the valve plug, the licensee
identified a separate design deficiency associated with MSIV pilot disc stem wear. This
additional design deficiency caused excessive leakage past the pilot valve seat and was
determined to be a contributing cause of exceeding TS Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.10
limits in LER 2016-001-00, dated May 19, 2016, and evaluated by the licensee in an apparent
cause evaluation under AR 2643434, As-Found LLRT Results on MSIVs Exceeded Tech
Spec Limits during Q2R23, dated March 21, 2016.
Licensee Technical Specification 5.5.12, states, in part, that the primary containment leakage
rate testing program will be in accordance with the guidelines contained in NEI 94-01
Industry Guideline for Implementing Performance-Based Option of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J,
revision 3-A, dated July 2012, and the conditions and limitations specified in NEI 94-01,
12
revision 2-A, dated October 2008. NEI 94-01, Section 10.2.3.4, Corrective Action, states
that if Type C test results are not acceptable, then a cause determination should be
performed and corrective actions identified that focus on those activities that can eliminate
the identified cause of a failure with appropriate steps to eliminate recurrence. Cause
determination and corrective action should reinforce achieving acceptable performance. As
stated in the licensees multiple LERs, the licensee developed corrective actions to modify the
valve design to address both deficiencies.
In response to fleet operating experience with MSIV design vulnerabilities, the licensee
documented AR 4187756, Recommended Reassessment of MSIV Design Vulnerability,
dated October 25, 2018. The assessment performed under AR 4187756 highlighted the risks
of delaying the implementation of the needed modifications and created actions to develop a
more aggressive implementation schedule. In an associated risk assessment documented
under QDC-0-2018-0464, the site acknowledged the potential consequences of continued
operation of the MSIVs without performing the modifications, to include exceeding the
leakage limits of TS Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.10 in future outages and determined
that the risk of exceeding TS leakage limits was acceptable until the modifications were
installed. The site approved a plan that included performing the planned modifications on one
valve in each subsequent outage, with the possibility of two valves per outage if resources
were available.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees revised installation schedule and noted that prior to
the refueling outage in 2021 (Q1R26) the site received a license amendment to raise the
leakage limits for TS Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.10 (ADAMS Accession
No. ML20150A328). Subsequently, during Q1R26, the site chose not to install the planned
modifications in any of the MSIVs, as all the valves passed their local leak rate tests with the
new elevated limits, despite the leakage results on the 'C' main steam line indicating an
increasing trend and despite developing a plan to proactively complete the modifications to
correct the deficiencies in the valve design. In 2023, the site completed the Q1R27 refueling
outage and MSIV 1-0203-2C, 1-0203-2A, and 1-0203-2D had yet to receive the corrective
modifications to address the design deficiencies. MSIV 1-0203-1C had received one of the
two modifications in a previous outage, but following a local leak rate test failure in Q1R27,
the site chose to flush the valve to obtain more favorable leak rate results rather than
complete the second corrective modification. The post flush local leak rate test met the
acceptance criteria for as-left testing and the site credited the flush as a maintenance activity.
The sites historical use of flushing as a maintenance activity is further discussed in the
Results section of this inspection report.
Ultimately, the inspectors concluded that the licensee had identified deficiencies with the
MSIV design that were the cause of multiple local leak rate test failures since 2002. These
design deficiencies resulted in the licensee exceeding TS leakage requirements on multiple
occasions and were conditions adverse to quality. The inspectors determined that the
licensee failed to correct the design deficiencies before exceeding TS leakage requirements
on March 12, 2025, despite multiple opportunities to complete the modifications prior to that
refueling outage, because the licensee failed to prioritize the corrective modifications and
routinely accepted the risk of violating the Technical Specification leakage limits as a
potential consequence.
Corrective Actions: The site completed the remaining modifications to address the design
deficiencies on MSIV 1-0203-1C, 1-0203-2C, 1-0203-2A, and 1-0203-2D during the
Q1R28 outage.
13
Corrective Action References: AR 4844848, Q1R28 1-0203-1C LLRT Leakage Above Tech
Spec Limit
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the failure to correct a condition
adverse to quality with the MSIV design was a performance deficiency. Specifically, while
performing activities governed by TS 5.5.12, Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing
Program, the licensee identified that design deficiencies within the MSIVs were the cause of
multiple instances of exceeding the leakage limits of TS Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.10
but, contrary to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, failed to correct the condition
adverse to quality prior to exceeding TS limits again during the Q1R28 refueling outage
in 2025.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor
because it was associated with the SSC and Barrier Performance attribute of the Barrier
Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable
assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused
by accidents or events. Specifically, TS-allowable leakage limits were exceeded for the
individual leakage path on steam line 'C' as well as the combined leakage for all MSIV
leakage paths.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609
Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The
inspectors screened the finding in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, exhibit 3, Section
C, and answered No to both screening questions. Therefore, the finding screens to very low
safety significance (Green).
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.14 - Conservative Bias: Individuals use decision making practices
that emphasize prudent choices over those that are simply allowable. A proposed action is
determined to be safe in order to proceed, rather than unsafe in order to stop. Specifically,
over multiple years the licensee accepted the risk of not performing modifications to correct
the MSIV design deficiencies prior to exceeding TS leakage limits. In addition, during the
Q1R27 refueling outage, after the 1-0203-1C MSIV had failed its as-found local leak rate test,
the licensee rationalized the performance of valve flushing as a maintenance activity to
achieve more favorable local leak rate testing results rather than completing the intended
modifications on MSIV 1-0203-1C.
Enforcement:
Violation: 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, requires, in part,
that measures be established to ensure conditions adverse to quality, such as failures,
deficiencies, deviations, and nonconformances are corrected.
Technical Specification 3.6.1.3, Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs), states, in
part, that each primary containment isolation valve be operable. TS 3.6.1.3, Condition D,
MSIV leakage rate not within limits, requires that leakage be restored within limits in 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
TS Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.10 outlines the limits for MSIV leakage and requires that
leakage through each MSIV leakage path be less than or equal to 62.4 scfh and 156 scfh for
the combined leakage rate for all MSIV leakage paths.
Contrary to the above, from November 7, 2002, to approximately March 27, 2025, the
14
licensee failed to correct a condition adverse to quality associated with design deficiencies on
the Unit 1 MSIVs, which are safety related components. Specifically, from November 7, 2002,
to approximately March 27, 2025, the licensee failed to modify MSIV 1-0203-2C, 1-0203-2A,
and 1-0203-2D to correct a design deficiency related to valve plug wear occurring on the
seating edge of the seat ring during valve closure. Additionally, from March 21, 2016, to
approximately March 27, 2025, the licensee failed to modify MSIV 1-0203-1C, 1-0203-2C,
1-0203-2A, and 1-0203-2D to correct a design deficiency related to pilot disc stem wear. On
October 22, 2018, the licensee developed a plan to modify each affected valve to correct the
deficiencies but instead deferred those corrective actions through multiple refueling outages,
to include the use of flushing as a corrective maintenance activity in place of completing the
modifications and instead accepted the risk of exceeding the Technical Specification leakage
limits as a consequence of those deferrals. As a result, on March 12, 2025, the licensee
exceeded the leakage limits of TS Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.10 and violated
TS 3.6.1.3, Condition D, to restore leakage within limits in 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> when leakage was not
within limits during the previous operating cycle.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with
Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Observation: Review of the Sites use of Flushing as a Maintenance Activity
Following a Local Leak Rate Test Failure of a Main Steam Isolation Valve
On March 12, 2025, the as-found local leak rate test results on main steam isolation
valve (MSIV) 1-0203-1C exceeded the leakage limit of Technical Specification Surveillance
Requirement 3.6.1.3.10 of less than or equal to 62.4 standard cubic feet per hour (scfh). In
the previous outage, the 1-0203-1C MSIV was flushed after failing the as-found local leak
rate test to obtain more favorable leakage results. The as-left test following the flush resulted
in acceptable leakage and the site credited the flushing as a maintenance activity without
performing in-valve maintenance. The inspectors reviewed the sites historical use of MSIV
flushing against the performance attributes of inspection procedure (IP) 71152 and
determined that the site was not incorporating the applicable lessons learned from relevant
operating experience and implementing that experience throughout the organizational
decision-making process. Specifically, the site's historical use of flushing as corrective
maintenance following an as-found local leak rate test failure has had no technical
justification for why it met programmatic requirements and how it was appropriate for
the circumstances.
NEI 94-01, Industry Guidance for Implementing Performance-Based Option of 10 CFR
Part 50, Appendix J, revision 3-A, Section 10.2.3.4, Corrective Action, states that if Type C
test results are not acceptable, then a cause determination should be performed and
corrective actions identified that focus on those activities that can eliminate the identified
cause of a failure with appropriate steps to eliminate recurrence. The cause determination
and corrective action should reinforce achieving acceptable performance. As documented in
issue report (AR) 4848760, MSIV flushing Trend Information, the site has credited flushing
as a maintenance activity to obtain more favorable testing results twelve times between 2008
and 2023 after as-found local leak rate test failures. Of those twelve times, ten of the flushed
MSIVs went on to fail their as-found local leak rate tests during the next refueling outage.
Industry benchmarking was also performed by the site under AR 4684879, Appendix J
Owners Group Benchmark IR, which similarly showed that seven out of the nine MSIVs
flushed to obtain more favorable local leak rate results went on to fail their as-found local leak
rate test in the subsequent outage. The use of flushing was challenged internally under
15
AR 4757927, Appendix J ER-AA-380 Fatal Flaw Disposition, and was dispositioned by
corporate engineering as acceptable as long as the flushing is characterized as part of
maintenance following the as-found test failure. The inspectors noted that the sites
justification for crediting the use of flushing as a corrective maintenance activity revolved
around the licensee's assertion that nothing in the regulatory requirements prohibited the use
of flushing and the NRC had not issued any violations associated with flushing.
The inspectors reviewed the applicable regulatory guidance and determined that there is not
a prohibition specifically against the use of flushing as a corrective maintenance activity.
Because MSIV flushing is performed after the site accepts the results of an as-found local
leak rate test failure, by definition, the flushing would not be considered pre-conditioning of
the component. However, as the data suggests, performing a flush of the valve does not
correct design deficiencies or degraded conditions associated with the valve. Additionally, if
the site suspects that wear products or other foreign material are on the seat of an MSIV
causing it to fail its local leak rate test, merely flushing the material from the seat does not
eliminate the source of the foreign material and correct the underlying condition. To know
whether foreign material or other build up on the valve seat is the cause of a local leak rate
test failure, the site needs to assess the condition of the valve seating surface after the test
has failed. Historically, the site has not taken affirmative action to perform this assessment.
To the contrary, the site performs a flush of the MSIV following the initial as-found test failure
and, if the results are favorable, retroactively attributes the cause of the failure to foreign
material without ever assessing the internal condition of the valve. This approach lacks
technical rigor and the as-left test results can equally be attributed to cycling the valve open
and shut an additional time to obtain a better seating condition. MSIV flushing without
validating that the cause of the as-found test failure was eliminated potentially masks a latent
degraded condition that the site does not address prior to the next operating cycle. The site
has historically accepted flushing as a corrective maintenance activity, despite applicable
operating experience showing that the way it was being implemented at the site was not
effective, simply because it was allowable and not because it was technically justifiable or
appropriate for the circumstances.
The inspectors did not identify any findings or violations in this observation.
Inaccurate Information Submitted to NRC in LER 05000254/2025-003-00
Cornerstone
Severity
Cross-Cutting
Aspect
Report
Section
Not
Applicable
NCV 05000254,05000265/2025002-02
Open/Closed
Not
Applicable
The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.9,
Completeness and Accuracy of Information, when the licensee failed to submit accurate
information in Licensee Event Report 05000254/2025-003-00 on May 9, 2025. Specifically,
the licensee misrepresented the status of modifications being completed on the affected main
steam isolation valves that were the subject of the LER.
16
Description
On May 9, 2025, the licensee submitted LER 05000254/2025-003-00, Main Steam Isolation
Valves Local Leak Rate Test Exceed Technical Specification Limits, (ADAMS Accession No.
ML25129A031). The licensee stated in the LER that the cause of the event was attributed to
pilot valve rotation causing stem nut wear which led to a leakage path. The licensee stated in
the LER that three of the four affected valves had not yet been modified to include
anti-rotation pilot keys and one valve included the modification. On June 19, 2025, the
inspectors reviewed the licensee's LER submittal along with the causal evaluation performed
by the licensee under issue report (AR) 4844848 and noted conflicting information concerning
which valves had received planned modifications to eliminate the design deficiencies
identified by the licensee in previous LERs. The inspectors requested the work history
concerning the four affected MSIVs, 1-0203-1C, 1-0203-2A, 1-0203-2C, and 1-2023-2D, and
up on review, identified that none of the valves had received the anti-rotation pilot key
modification.
Corrective Actions: The licensee documented the issue in the corrective action program with
actions to update the LER.
Corrective Action References: AR 4874899, NRC ID: LER U1 2025-003-00 Inaccurate Data
Performance Assessment:
The inspectors determined this violation was associated with a minor performance
deficiency. Specifically, the inaccurate LER represented a minor performance deficiency
because it was not viewed as a precursor to a significant event, would not have led to a more
significant safety concern, nor was it associated with a cornerstone attribute, and it did not
adversely affect any cornerstone objectives.
Enforcement:
The ROPs significance determination process does not specifically consider the regulatory
process impact in its assessment of licensee performance. Therefore, it is necessary to
address this violation which impedes the NRCs ability to regulate using traditional
enforcement to adequately deter non-compliance.
Severity: The inspectors determined that NRC Enforcement Policy, Section 6.9, Inaccurate
and Incomplete Information or Failure to Make a Required Report, example d.1 was the most
applicable to the violation. Therefore, the violation was determined to be Severity Level IV.
Violation: Title 10 CFR 50.9, Completeness and Accuracy of Information, states information
provided to the Commission by an applicant for a license or by a licensee or information
required by statute or by the Commissions regulations, orders, or license conditions to be
maintained by the applicant or the licensee shall be complete and accurate in all
material respects.
Title 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, states, in part, that the holder of an
operating license under this part or a combined license under part 52 of this chapter shall
submit a licensee event report for any operation or condition which was prohibited by the
plant's Technical Specifications.
Contrary to the above, on May 9, 2025, the licensee submitted LER 05000254/2025-003-00,
Main Steam Isolation Valves Local Leak Rate Test Exceed Technical Specification Limits,
17
which contained inaccurate information regarding which valves had been modified as the
result of corrective actions from previous LERs to eliminate the cause of exceeding TS
leakage limits. This information was material to the inspectors as it resulted in expanding the
scope of inspection activities associated with reviewing the LER to understand the regulatory
significance of the event.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with
Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained or documented in
this report.
On June 27, 2025, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to
Doug Hild, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
On March 18, 2025, the inspectors presented the inservice inspection results to
Doug Hild, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
On June 27, 2025, the inspectors presented the radiation protection inspection results to
Doug McLaren, Acting Radiation Protection Manager, and other members of the
licensee staff.
18
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
NRC ID RHRSW FT Not Calibrated Per QIP 100-19, Rev 33
02/03/2025
Miscellaneous
SVP-25-029
Certification of 2025 Summer Readiness
05/15/2025
1B RHR HX Thermal Performance Test
02/08/2025
Work Orders
RHR Service Water Bay Inspection
01/14/2025
QOM 1-1000-05
U1 RHR Service Water Valve Checklist
23
QOM 1-1400-09
Unit 1B Core Spray Valve Checklist
8
Miscellaneous
QOM 1-1400-10
Unit 1A Core Spray Valve Checklist
8
FZ 6.1.A
Fire Zone 6.1.A Unit 1, Turbine Building 615'-6", Unit 1 DC
Panel Room
26
Fire Plans
FZ 6.1.B
Fire Zone 6.1.B - Unit 1, Turbine Building 615'-6", Unit 1 DC
Panel Room
26
Calculations
QDC-5700-M-
0806
Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Room Cooler
Performance Calculation Under Design Basis and Degraded
Conditions
1E
Corrective Action
Documents
Degraded Sealing Surface Found IP Inspection of Room
Cooler
04/21/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
NRC Identified Missing Information on Heat Exchanger
Report
05/07/2025
Procedures
Service Water Heat Exchanger Inspection Guide
11
U-2 RHR Room Cooler Air/Water Side Clean/Inspect
07/27/2020
Work Orders
2B RHR Air/Water Side Room CLR CLN/INSP
04/28/2025
ISI Exam RI on 1401-W-204 Base Plate Support
03/12/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Concrete Cracking Identified Next to ISI Support
1401-W-204
03/12/2025
Engineering
Evaluations
641681
Quad Cities Top Guide Rim Weld Inspection Deviation
0
19
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Magnetic Particle Examination of CS Pump Base Plate
03/11/2025
Ultrasonic Examination of RR Safe End Nozzle Dissimilar
Metal Weld
03/13/2025
Ultrasonic Examination of RR Pipe to Safe End Weld
03/13/2025
NDE Reports
Visual Examination of CS Pump A Base Plate
03/11/2025
Magnetic Particle (MT) Examination
10
VT-3 Visual Examination of Component Supports,
Attachments, and Interior of Reactor Vessels
14
GEH-PDI-UT-10
Performance Demonstration Initiative (PDI) Generic
Procedure for the Ultrasonic Examination of Dissimilar Metal
10
Procedures
GEH-PDI-UT-2
Performance Demonstration Initiative (PDI) Generic
Procedure for the Ultrasonic Examination of Austenitic Pipe
14
Work Orders
Repair Welding from Leak on 1/2 EDG CWP Piping Line
0-3967-8"-O
12/30/2024
Procedures
QCGP 1-1
Normal Unit 1 Startup
142
Transformer 11 to Bus 13 Main Feed Failed During PMT
04/01/2025
T11 to Bus 13 PMT Not Performed
04/08/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
1-3901 and 1-3902 Manually Torqued >60hrs Requiring
04/22/2025
Miscellaneous
QC-PSA-005.20
Electrical Power System Notebook
9
Calculation of RMAT and RICT for Risk Informed Completion
Time Program
0
ER-QC-600-2001
Quad Cities RICT System Guidelines
0
Procedures
Risk Informed Completion Time
3
QDC-1600-M-
0545
Quad Cities Units 1 and 2: ECCS Strainer Head Loss
Estimates
3
Calculations
QDC-1600-M-
2013
Quad Cities Unqualified Coatings in Containment
2
PSU: OSP Pitting Found in Centipede
03/14/2025
PSU: 1-1201-5 RWCU Valve did not Close on Isolation
Signal
03/15/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
PSU: Pit Found on Torus Underwater
03/17/2025
20
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Q1R28 Service Level I Coating Inspection Results
03/19/2025
Miscellaneous
UCC Project No.
02-23256.570
Preliminary Summary Report for Torus Immersion Area Work
Activities. WO numbers 05358224-02 and 05362858-01
03/21/2025
Work Orders
QCOS 1600-36 PCI Group 3 Test
03/23/2025
WHR Requirement Deviation - Seconded RXS Boilermaker
03/12/2025
WHR Fatigue Assessment
03/21/2025
WHR Fatigue Assessment
03/24/2025
WHR Fatigue Assessment
03/24/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
WHR Fatigue Assessment Performed
03/22/2025
Miscellaneous
RCN-129
Q1R28 Torus Project Underwater Cleaning, Coating
Inspection and Repair
Procedures
Fatigue Management and Work Hour Limits
17
PSU: 1-1301-27 RCIC Torus CK VLV Not Seating
03/16/2025
1-1301-53 Valve Indicates Potentially Not Closed
04/01/2025
RPS Test Box Lamp Illuminated, Should Be Extinguished
04/15/2025
PSU: U1 RCIC Erratic Flow in Automatic
05/19/2025
RCIC Barometric Condenser Condensate Pump Not
Running
06/19/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
Follow Up to IR 4874684 - U1 RCIC Condensate Pump
06/19/2025
Miscellaneous
TIC 3912
Give an Option to Trip HPCI Turbine Locally with Trip Handle
03/24/2025
QCIS 0200-39
Unit 2 Division I Low and Low Low Reactor Water Level
Analog Trip System Calibration and Functional Test
18
QCOP 1300-01
RCIC System Preparation for Standby Operation
50
QCOS 1300-01
Periodic RCIC Pump Operability Test
47
QCOS 1300-05
RICI Pump Operability Test
67
QCOS 1300-19
RCIC Torus Suction Check Valve Closure Test
13
QCOS 1300-26
RCIC Pump Comprehensive/Performance Test
17
Procedures
QCOS 2300-05
HPCI Pump Operability Test
94a
DIV 1, LO/LO-LO RX WATER LEVEL ANALOG TRIP
CAL/FUNC TEST
04/09/2025
Work Orders
PSU: 1-1301-27 RCIC Torus CK VLV Not Seating
03/24/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
Increase in U2 Service Water Rad Monitor Counts Per
Second
04/07/2024
21
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Detectable Activity U2 SWRM
04/07/2024
NRC ID: RWP RP Coverage Error "COV0013"
06/24/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
06/25/2025
12572325-RPT-1
Hydrogeologic Investigation Report Quad Cities Generating
Station Cordova, Illinois
12/09/2022
Document
Number: 50-
254/50-265
Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report
including Annual Radiological Groundwater Protection
Program Report 2024
05/15/2025
Miscellaneous
SVP-24-034
Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report 2023
05/10/2024
Radioactive Effluent and Environmental Monitoring
Programs
6
Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program and
Meteorological Program Implementation
13
CY-QC-170-301
Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
14
Radiological Groundwater Protection Program
3
Procedures
EN-QC-408-4160
RGPP Reference Material for Quad Cities Generating
Station
8
Self-Assessments AR 4535860
RGPP Five-Year Internal Assessment
10/20/2023
Liquid Radwaste Effluent Flow Monitor Not Fixed in 30 Days
08/12/2023
OC.1 September Radwaste Generated Goal Exceeded
10/04/2023
Blower Motor for Radwaste SERDS Drying Skid Failed
07/09/2024
Resin Liner Shipment with Higher-Than-Normal Dose Rates
08/28/2024
2024 Radwaste Self-Assessment GAP
01/31/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
Liner Shipment Postponed
05/06/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
NRC ID: Vendor Report Legend Enhancement
06/26/2025
Semi-Annual Source Inventory, October 2024
10/28/2024
Semi-Annual Source Inventory, February 2025
02/10/2025
Miscellaneous
Radioactive Material Transportation Specialist Training
Records
various
22
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Semi-Annual Source Inventory, April 2024
04/05/2024
TBE Sample ID:
L109397-2
2024 Condensate Resin Analysis
01/31/2024
TBE Sample ID:
L109397-4
2025 Dry Active Waste Analysis
01/16/2025
Control of RAM Storage Areas and Containers Stored
Outside
15
Radioactive Material/Waste Shipments
19
Radioactive Material and Non-Disposal Site Waste
Shipments
23
Shipment of Category 2 Quantities of Radioactive Material or
Waste (Category 2 RAMQC)
7
Packaging of Radioactive Material Shipments
23
Packaging of Radioactive Material/Waste Shipments
20
Loading Dry Active Waste and Other Waste Forms for
Energy Solutions Waste Acceptance Guide (WAG-501)
2
10 CFR 61 Program
15
Procedures
Process Control Program for Radioactive Wastes
12
Self-Assessments 04716439-12-01
Self-Assessment: Radioactive Solid Waste Processing and
Radioactive Material Handling, Storage, and Transportation -
10/31/2024
QC-24-079
Condensate Resin Shipment
10/01/2024
QC-24-330
Control Rod Drive Shipment
04/02/2024
QC-25-057
Used Resin Cask Shipment
06/03/2025
Shipping Records
QC-25-063
Used Resin Cask Shipment
06/24/2025
Attachment 1
Monthly Data Elements for NRC ROP Indicator - Reactor
Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity
various
Attachment 1
Monthly Data Elements for NRC ROP Indicator -
RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent Occurrences
various
Attachment A
Site Performance Indicator Validation Sheet
various
71151
Miscellaneous
SVP-25-022
Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report 2024
04/30/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
Apparent Cause of MSIV Failures to Meet LLRT Allowable
Limits during D3R21
11/01/2010
23
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
AR 130565130565Design Deficiency Induces MSIV Seat Wear Resulting in
Unacceptable Leak Rate Performance
11/07/2002
'B' Main Steam Line Exceeded Tech. Spec. Limit of < 34
Failures
03/19/2012
AR 203885-19
Perform a CCA on all LLRT Failures during Q2R17
05/19/2004
As-Found LLRT Results on MSIVs Exceeded Tech Spec
Limits during Q1R23
03/02/2015
As-Found LLRT Results on MSIVs Exceeded Tech Spec
Limits during Q2R23
03/21/2016
RECOMMENDED REASSESSMENT OF MSIV DESIGN
VULNERABILITY
10/25/2018
Appendix J Owners Group Benchmark IR
06/15/2023
Appendix J ER-AA-380 Fatal Flaw Disposition (Flushing)
03/14/2024
PSU Q1R28 MSIV 1-0203-2B LLRT Exceeded TS Limit <
62.4 Scfh
03/10/2025
Q1R28 1-0203-1C LLRT Leakage Above Tech Spec Limit
03/12/2025
MSIV Flushing Trend Information
03/25/2025
AR 747103747103Inboard MSIVs Had High Initial Leakage Rates during
Q2R19
03/03/2008
QDC-0-2018-
0464
Simple Issue Risk Assessment: MSIV Pilot Disc Stem Wear
0
QDC-1-2024-
0052
0
Miscellaneous
QDC-1-2025-
0115
1-0203-2B MSIV
0
Procedures
Primary Containment Leakrate Testing Program
17
1-1601-84B Found Closed
04/05/2025
Transient During U2 125VDC Charger Swap
05/19/2025
PSU: U1 RCIC Erratic Flow in Automatic
05/19/2025
U2 SER Fuse F13 Reseated IAW QCOA 0900-01
05/19/2025
PSU: 1A RFP Failed to Trip on +48 in Rx Level
05/19/2025
PSU: U1 RPS B ISBS Controller Fault
05/19/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
U2 RFP Trip
05/19/2025
24
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
1-6706-14-1-ATS1 On Emergency Power
05/20/2025
Bus 23-1 Control Power Found Connected to 7A-1
05/21/2025
PSU: U2 Battery Room Fire
05/22/2025
Battery Discharge Test Failed Modified Load Test
05/22/2025
NRC ID: LER U1 2025-003-00 Inaccurate Data
06/20/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
NRC ID: Error in CAPE 04844848-15
06/20/2025
Miscellaneous
Event Summary Report - Notice of Unusual Event
05/22/2025
Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Technical Support
Guidelines (TSG) Reference Manual
9
QCAN 901(2)-3
B-14
Torus to Reactor Building Negative Differential Pressure
3
QCOA 1600-01
Failure of Reactor Building to Torus Vacuum Breakers
8
QCOS 0100-49
Drywell/Torus Purge Supply Local Leak Rate Test
5
Procedures
QOA 6900-09
Loss of Turbine Building Bus 1B/1B-1
21