IR 05000250/1992012
| ML17349A272 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 06/05/1992 |
| From: | Rankin W, Sartor W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17349A271 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-250-92-12, 50-251-92-12, NUDOCS 9206230025 | |
| Download: ML17349A272 (52) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.IN.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 gUN 05 SS2 Report No (s):
50-250/92-12, 50-251/92-12 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Corporation 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102 Docket No.(s):
50-250, 50-251 License No.(s):
DPR-31 and DPR-41 Facility Name:
Turkey Point Inspection Conducted:
Ma 4-8, 1992 Inspector:
W. M. Sartor, Jr.,
Team Leader Date Signed Accompanying Personnel:
A. Qooden, RII D. Barss, NRR J. Wills, Sonalysts, L. Trocine, Resident Inc.
Inspector Approved by:
W. H. Rankin, Chief Emergency Preparedness Section Radiological Protection and Emergency Preparedness Branch Division of Reactor Safety and Safeguards D te igned Scope:
This routine, announced inspection was conducted to assess the adequacy of the licensee's emergency response program, the implementation of the emergency plans and procedures, and the training program by observing the licensee's emergency organization response to a simulated accident during the annual exercise.
Results:
The licensee successfully demonstrated adequate response to the simulated accident by implementing the emergency plan and procedures to mitigate the accident.
One exercise weakness was identified for incorrectly interpreting the reactor vessel level indicating system (RVLIS)
reading which resulted in overly 9206230025 920605 PDR ADOCK 05000250 PDR
conservative protective actions.
Exercise strengths included emergency classification; notification; and the staffing of the emergency response facilities; and the 25 repair teams that were assembled, briefed, and dispatched by the Operational Support Cente REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- T. Abbatiello, Site Quality Manager
- G. Casto, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
- J. Goldberg, President, Nuclear Division
- R. Grazio, Director, Nuclear Licensing
- A. Horvath, Health Physics Procedure Training C
- M. Jimenez, Nuclear Energy Specialist
- H. Johnson, Operations Supervisor
- F. King, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
- J. Knorr, Regulatory Compliance Specialist
- V. Laudato, Fire Protection System Analyst
- D. Lettsome, Quality Assurance Engineer
- W. Lightfoot, Nuclear Training Supervisor
- J. Lindsay, Health Physics Supervisor
- K. Lovell, Simulator Engineering Supervisor
- F. Marcussen, Security System Coordinator
- D. Mothena, Manager, Nuclear Emergency Prepared
- L. Pearce, Plant General Manager
- T. Plunkett, Site Vice President
- G. Romonawicz, Chemistry Training Analyst
- J. Rosado, Shift Technical Advisor
- R. Rose, Materials Superintendent
- C. Rossi, Quality Assurance Supervisor
- A. Taylor, Emergency Preparedness Specialist
- F. Timmons, Acting Services Manager
- D. Taylor, System Enhancement Analyst
- L. Thomas, Health Physics Instructor/Developer
- G. Traczyk, Fire Protection Supervisor
- E. Weinkam, Licensing Manager oordinator ness Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included engineers, operators, mechanics, security force members, technicians, and administrative personnel.
NRC Resident Inspector(s)
- R. Butcher
- G. Schnebli
- L. Trocine
- Attended Exit Interview
Exercise Scenario (82302)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine that provisions had been made to test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements existing within the licensee, state and local emergency plans and organization as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14),
CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.F and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
The scenario was reviewed in advance of the s'cheduled exercise date and was discussed with licensee representatives on May 4, 1992.
The scenario developed for this exercise was sufficiently detailed to test the emergency plan and implementing procedures within the context of.the scope and objectives.
A concern of similarities between the initiating events for the graded exercise and those of training exercises conducted on April 15 and 28, 1992 was identified by the inspector.
These concerns were discussed with licensee representatives.
The licensee acknowledged the inspectors concerns and indicated the basis for the training exercises was to support a high quality emergency preparedness program and was not solely directed for good performance for the graded exercise.
The inspector acknowledged the licensee's commitment to a
high quality program.
The inspector identified the scenario similarities as an Inspector Followup Item (IFI) for the next graded exercise.
IFI 50-250, 251/92-2-01:
Review scenarios for practice exercises with the graded exercise for similarity of events.
The attachment to this report is an extract of the licensee's scope, obj ectives, narrative summary, and scenario timeline from the complete scenario package.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Assignment of Responsibility (82301)
This area was observed to determine that primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee have been specifically established and that adequate staff is available to respond to an emergency as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1),
10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.A.
The inspectors observed that specific emergency assignments had been made for the licensee's emergency response organization and there were adequate staff available to respond to the simulated emergency.
The initial response organization was augmented by designated licensee representatives.
Real time activation of the Emergency
Operations Facility (EOF) and the Emergency News Center (ENC)
was demonstrated with new minimum/initial staffing by site personnel.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)
The licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to determine that the responsibilities for emergency response are unambiguously defined, that adequate staffing is provided to insure initial facility accident response in key functional areas at all times, and that the interfaces are specified as required by
CR 50.47(b)(2),
CFR 50, Appendix E,
paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.B.
The inspectors determined that the licensee's onsite emergency organization was effective in dealing with the simulated emergency.
Because the Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE)
was based on the transportation off-site of a contaminated individual, the initial emergency organization was augmented by the Operations Manager prior to an emergency declaration.
Adequate staf fing of the emergency response facilities was provided for the initial accident response and the interfaces between the onsite organization and offsite support agencies appeared to be adequate.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)
This area was observed to determine that arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources had been made, that arrangements to accommodate State and local staff at the licensee's Emergency Operations Facility have been made, and that other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response have been identified as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3),
10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.A and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.C.
State staff were accommodated at the Emergency Operations Facility.
Licensee contact with offsite organizations was prompt and assistance resources from various agencies were prepared to assist in the simulated emergency.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Emergency Classification System (82301)
This area was observed to determine that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme is in use by the
nuclear facility licensee as required by,10 CFR 50.47(b) (4),
CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.C, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.D.
An emergency action level scheme was used to promptly identify and properly classify the emergency and escalate to more severe emergency classes as the simulated emergency progressed.
Following the NOUE declaration for transport of a
contaminated injured individual, an Alert was promptly classified for loss of all annunciators for greater than five minutes.
A Site Area Emergency was classified on the basis of a steam generator tube rupture with loss of offsite power.
A General Emergency was neither required nor declared.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)
This area was observed to determine that procedures had been established for notification by the licensee of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel, and that the content of initial and followup messages to response organizations had been established; and means to provide early notification to the populace with the plume exposure pathway had been established as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5),
10 CR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.D, and specific criteria in
-. NUREG-0654,Section II.E.
An inspector observed that notification methods and procedures had been established and were used to provide information concerning the simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State and local response organizations and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response organizations.
The notification procedures appeared to be timely and adequate.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Emergency Communications (82301)
This area was observed to determine that provisions existed for prompt communications among principal response organizations and emergency personnel as required by
CFR 50.47(b)(6),
CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.F.
Communications among the licensee's emergency response facilities and emergency organization and between the licensee's emergency response organization and offsite authorities were good.
No communications related problems were identified during this exercise.
No violations or deviations were identifie Public Education and Information (82301)
This area was observed to determine that the information concerning the simulated emergency was made available for dissemination to the public as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7),
CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.D, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.G.
Information was provided to the media and the public in advance of the exercise.
The information included details on how the public would be notified and what initial actions they should take in an emergency.
A rumor control program was also in place.
An Emergency News Center (ENC)
was established at the general office in Miami.
An inspector observed that one press release was not numbered nor did it contain a time. It was also noted that some schematics or charts would have been useful in discussions with the media.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)
This area was observed to determine that adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b) (8),
CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.H.
The inspectors observed the activation, staffing and operation of the Technical Support Center (TSC),
Operational Support Center (OSC),
and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).
The facilities were well laid out and provided for good management control of the emergency response.
The supplies and equipment available to the facilities were fully adequate for this exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Accident Assessment (82301)
This area was observed to determine that adequate methods, systems and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9),
CFR 50, Appendix B, paragraph IV.B, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.I.
A.
The accident assessment program included both an engineering assessment of plant status and an assessment of radiological hazards to both onsite and offsite personnel resulting form the accident.
During the
exercise, the engineering accident assessment team functioned effectively in analyzing the plant status with one exception.
The exception was the understanding of the reactor water level percentage data shown on the plant parameter status board.
When this value read zero and was questioned by the personnel in the EOF, the Emergency Coordinator, on the basis of information provided him by technical support, provided the EOF with an erroneous explanation of the data which in turn led to overly conservative Protective Action Recommendations (PARs)
by the State and counties.
Because the shift personnel in the Control Room (Simulator)
should have been able to resolve this issue of reactor vessel level had they been consulted, the issue was identified as an exercise weakness for failing to meet exercise objective B.3,
"Demonstrate the ability of the Emergency Response Facility Managers/Supervisors to provide overall direction including 'command and control'y initiating coordinating, and implementing timely and effective decisions during a radiological emergency."
Exercise Weakness, 50-250, 251/92-12-02:
Overly conservative PARs were implemented by the State and counties based on an erroneous reactor vessel level reading provided to the EOF from the TSC.
No violations or deviations were identified.
12.
Medical and Public Health Support (82301)
This area was observed to determine that arrangements were made for medical services for contaminated injured individuals as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b) (12),
CFR 50, Appendix E,
paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.L.
An inspector observed the emergency medical rescue activities at the accident scene, and transport of the victim from the scene to the on-site medical facility.
In all portions of the exercise, appropriate judgement was displayed with regard to medical practices, decontamination of the patient (s),
and contamination control.
No violations or deviations were identified.
13.
Exercise Critique (82301)
The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine that deficiencies identified as a result of the exercise and weaknesses noted in the licensee's emergency response organization were formally
as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b) (14),
CFR 50, Appendix E,
paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
The exercise critique was conducted on May 8,
1992.
Licensee management, key exercise participants and NRC representatives were present.
The licensee discussed areas of the exercise in which items for possible improvement were identified.
The inspectors determined that the critique was comprehensive and adequately addressed weaknesses identified in the licensee's emergency response program during this exercise.
14.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)
(Closed)
IFI 50-250, 50-251/90-38-02:
Ensuring that OSC procedure are completely checked for OTSCs and signed off as verified prior to use.
There were no procedures observed to have been incorrectly signed off during'the exercises.
15.
Exit (Closed)
IFI 250, 50-251/91-49-01:
Review licensee corrective actions for defining EC/RM responsibilities.
The inspector reviewed EPIP-1102, Duties of the Recovery Manager, dated April 10, 1992, and found it to define the RM responsibilities.
Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on May 8, 1992, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed below.
Proprietary information is not contained in this report.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
m N r
D cri i n nd R f r nce 50-250/
251/92-12-01 IFI:
Review the graded exercise scenario against the practice drills for excessive similarities.
50-250 I 251/92-12- 02 Attachment:
Scope, Objectives and Timeline EW:
Overly conservative PARs implemented because of erroneous reactor vessel level transmitted to EO ~P,S RECC,
0O
/y
+p*y4 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 JUg 05 892 Report No(s):
50-250/92-12, 50-251/92-12 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Corporation 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102 Docket No. (s):
50-250, 50-251 License No.(s):
DPR-31 and DPR-41 Facility Name:
Turkey Point Inspection Conducted:
Ma 4-8, 1992 Inspector:
W. M. Sartor, Jr.,
Team Leader by Date Signed Accompanying Personnel:
A. Gooden, RII D. Barss, NRR J. Wills, Sonalysts, L. Trocine, Resident Inc.
Inspector Approved by:
W. H. Rankin, Chief Emergency Preparedness Section Radiological Protection and Emergency Preparedness Branch Division of Reactor Safety and Safeguards D te igned Scope:
This routine, announced inspection was conducted to assess the adequacy of the licensee's emergency response program, the implementation of the emergency plans and procedures, and the training program by observing the licensee's emergency organization response to a simulated accident during the annual exercise.
Results:
The licensee successfully demonstrated adequate response to the simulated accident by implementing the emergency plan and procedures to mitigate the accident.
One exercise weakness was identified for incorrectly interpreting the reactor vessel level indicating system (RVLIS)
reading which resulted in overly
conservative protective actions.
Exercise strengths included emergency classification; notification; and the staffing of the emergency response facilities; and the 25 repair teams that were assembled, briefed, and dispatched by the Operational Support Cente REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- T. Abbatiello, Site Quality Manager
- G. Casto, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
- J. Goldberg, President, Nuclear Division
- R. Grazio, Director, Nuclear Licensing
- A. Horvath, Health Physics Procedure Training
- M. Jimenez, Nuclear Energy Specialist
- H. Johnson, Operations Supervisor
- F. King, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
- J. Knorr, Regulatory Compliance Specialist
- V. Laudato, Fire Protection System Analyst
- D. Lettsome, Quality Assurance Engineer
- W. Lightfoot, Nuclear Training Supervisor
- J. Lindsay, Health Physics Supervisor
- K. Lovell, Simulator Engineering Supervisor
- F. Marcussen, Security System Coordinator
- D. Mothena, Manager, Nuclear Emergency Prepare
- L. Pearce, Plant General Manager
- T. Plunkett, Site Vice President
- G. Romonawicz, Chemistry Training Analyst
- J. Rosado, Shift Technical Advisor
- R. Rose, Materials Superintendent
- C. Rossi, Quality Assurance Supervisor
- A. Taylor, Emergency Preparedness Specialist
- F. Timmons, Acting Services Manager
- D. Taylor, System Enhancement Analyst
- L. Thomas, Health Physics Instructor/Developer
- G. Traczyk, Fire Protection Supexvisor
- E. Weinkam, Licensing Manager Coordinator dness Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included engineers, operators, mechanics, security force members, technicians, and administrative personnel.
NRC Resident Inspector(s)
- R. Butcher
- G. Schnebli
- L. Trocine
- Attended Exit Interview
Exercise Scenario (82302)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine that provisions had been made to test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements existing within the licensee, state and local emergency plans and organization as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14),
CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.F and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
The scenario was reviewed in advance of the scheduled exercise date and was discussed with licensee representatives on May 4, 1992.
The scenario developed for this exercise was sufficiently detailed to test the emergency plan and implementing procedures within the context of. the scope and objectives.
A concern of similarities between the initiating events for the graded exercise and those of training exercises conducted on April 15 and 28, 1992 was identified by the inspector.
These concerns were discussed with licensee representatives.
The licensee acknowledged the inspectors concerns and indicated the basis for the training exercises was to support a high quality emergency preparedness program and was not solely directed for good performance for the graded exercise.
The inspector acknowledged the licensee's commitment to a
high quality program.
The inspector identified the scenario similarities as an Inspector Followup Item (IFI) for the next graded exercise.
IFI 50-250, 251/92-2-01:
Review scenarios for practice exercises with the graded exercise for similarity of events.
The attachment to this report is an extract of the licensee's scope, objectives, narrative summary, and scenario timeline from the complete scenario package.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Assignment of Responsibility (82301)
This area was observed to determine that primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee have been specifically established and that adequate staff is available to respond to an emergency as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1),
10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.A.
The inspectors observed that specific emergency assignments had been made for the licensee's emergency response organization and there were adequate staff available to respond to the simulated emerg'ency.
The initial response organization was augmented by designated licensee representatives.
Real time activation of the Emergency
Operations Facility (EOF) and the Emergency News Center (ENC)
was demonstrated with new minimum/initial staffing by site personnel.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)
The licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to determine that the responsibilities for emergency response are unambiguously defined, that adequate staffing is provided to insure initial facility accident response in key functional areas at all times, and that the interfaces are specified as required by
CR 50.47(b)(2),
CFR 50, Appendix E,
paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.B.
The inspectors determined that the licensee's onsite emergency organization was effective in dealing with the simulated emergency.
Because the Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE)
was based on the transportation off-site of a contaminated individual, the initial emergency organization was augmented by the Operations Manager prior to an emergency declaration.
Adequate staffing of the emergency response facilities was provided for the initial accident response and the interfaces between the onsite organization and offsite support agencies appeared to be adequate.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)
This area was observed to determine that arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources had been made, that arrangements to accommodate State and local staff at the licensee's Emergency Operations Facility have been made, and that other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response have been identified as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3),
10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.A and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.C.
State staff were accommodated at the Emergency Operations Facility.
Licensee contact with offsite organizations was prompt and assistance resources from various agencies were prepared to assist in the simulated emergency.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Emergency Classification System (82301)
This area was observed to determine that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme is in use by the
nuclear facility licensee as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b) (4),
CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.C, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.D.
An emergency action level scheme was used to promptly identify and properly classify the emergency and escalate to more severe emergency classes as the simulated emergency progressed.
Following the NOUE declaration for transport of a
contaminated injured individual, an Alert was promptly classified for loss of all annunciators for greater than five minutes.
A Site Area Emergency was classified on the basis of a steam generator tube rupture with loss of offsite power.
A General Emergency was neither required nor declared.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)
This area was observed to determine that procedures had been established for notification by the licensee of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel, and that the content of initial and followup messages to response organizations had been established; and means to provide early notification to the populace with the plume exposure pathway had been established as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5),
CR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.D, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.E.
An inspector observed that notification methods and procedures had been established and were used to provide information concerning the simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State and local response organizations and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response organizations.
The notification procedures appeared to be timely and adequate.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Emergency Communications (82301)
This area was observed to determine that provisions existed for prompt communications among principal response organizations and emergency personnel as required by
CFR 50.47(b)(6),
CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.F.
Communications among the licensee's emergency response facilities and emergency organi'zation and between the licensee's emergency response organization and offsite authorities were good.
No communications related problems were identified during this exercise.
No violations or deviations were identifie Public Education and Information (82301)
This area was observed to determine that the information concerning the simulated emergency was made available for dissemination to the public as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7),
CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.D, and specific criteria in
'I NUREG-0654,Section II.G.
Information was provided to the media and the public in advance of the exercise.
The information included details on how the public would be notified and what initial actions they should take in an emergency.
A rumor control program was also in place.
An Emergency News Center (ENC)
was established at the general office in Miami.
An inspector observed that one press release was not numbered nor did it contain a time. It was also noted that some schematics or charts would have been useful in discussions with the media.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)
This area was observed to determine that adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8),
CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.H.
The inspectors observed the activation, staffing and operation of the Technical Support Center (TSC),
Operational Support Center (OSC),
and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).
The facilities were well laid out and provided for good management control of the emergency response.
The supplies and equipment available to the facilities were fully adequate for this exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Accident Assessment (82301)
This area was observed to determine that adequate methods, systems and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b) (9),
CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.B, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.I.
A.
The accident assessment program included both an engineering assessment of plant status and an assessment of radiological hazards to both onsite and offsite personnel resulting form the accident.
During the
exercise, the engineering accident assessment team functioned effectively in analyzing the plant status with one exception.
The exception was the understanding of the reactor water level percentage data shown on the plant parameter status board.
When this value read zero and was questioned by the personnel in the EOF, the Emergency Coordinator, on the basis of information provided him by technical support, provided the EOF with an erroneous explanation of the data which in turn led to overly conservative Protective Action Recommendations (PARs)
by the State and counties.
Because the shift personnel in the Control Room (Simulator)
should have been able to resolve this issue of reactor vessel level had they been consulted, the issue was identified as an exercise weakness for failing to meet exercise objective B.3,
"Demonstrate the ability of the Emergency Response Facility Managers/Supervisors to provide overall direction including 'command and control'y initiating coordinating, and implementing timely and effective decisions during a radiological emergency."
Exercise Weakness, 50-250, 251/92-12-02:
Overly conservative PARs were implemented by the State and counties based on an erroneous reactor vessel level reading provided to the EOF from the TSC.
No violations or deviations were identified.
12.
Medical and Public Health Support (82301)
This area was observed to determine that arrangements were made for medical services for contaminated injured individuals as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b) (12),
CFR 50, Appendix E,
paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.L.
An inspector observed the emergency medical rescue activities at the accident scene, and transport of the victim from the scene to the on-site medical facility.
In all portions of the exercise, appropriate judgement was displayed with regard to medical practices, decontamination of the patient(s),
and contamination control.
No violations or deviations were identified.
13.
Exercise Critique (82301)
The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine that deficiencies identified as a
result of the exercise and weaknesses noted in the licensee's emergency response organization were formally
as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b) (14),
CFR 50, Appendix E,
paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
The exercise critique was conducted on May 8,
1992.
Licensee management, key exercise participants and NRC representatives were present.
The licensee discussed areas of the exercise in which items for possible improvement were identified.
The inspectors determined that the critique was comprehensive and adequately addressed weaknesses identified in the licensee's emergency response program during this exercise.
14.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)
(Closed)
IFI 50-250, 50-251/90-38-02:
Ensuring that OSC procedure are completely checked for OTSCs and signed off as verified prior to use.
There were no procedures observed to have been incorrectly signed off during the exercises.
(Closed)
IFI 250, 50-251/91-49-01:
Review licensee corrective actions for defining EC/RM responsibilities.
The inspector reviewed EPIP-1102, Duties of the Recovery Manager, dated April 10, 1992, and found it to define the RM responsibilities.
15.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on May 8, 1992, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed below.
Proprietary information is not contained in this report.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
m N r
D ri i n and Refer nc 50-250, 251/92-12-01 IFI:
Review the graded exercise scenario against the practice drills for excessive similarities.
50-250, 251/92-12-02
\\
Attachment:
Scope, Objectives and Timeline EW:
Overly conservative PARs implemented because of erroneous reactor vessel level transmitted to EO FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR PLANT 1992 EMERGENCY PREPAtuH)NESS EVALUATEDEXERCISE MAY6, 1992 21 KGQZE To assure that the health and safety of the general public is protected in the event of an accident at Turkey Point Nuclear Plant (PTN), it is necessary for the Florida Power and Light Company (FPL) to conduct an annual emergency preparedness exercise.
This exercise involves mobilization of FPL, State of Florida and Local Government Agency personnel and resources to respond to a simulated accident scenario.
The exercise willbe evaluated onsite by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). An FPL Controller organization willcontrol, observe, evaluate and critique the PTN portion of the exercise and the NRC willevaluate the FPL performance so that the emergency response capabilities of the utilitymay be assessed.
The State of Florida, and Dade and Monroe County emergency response organizations will participate for training purposes only, and willnot be evaluated.
Due to the compressed timeline of the exercise, some portions of the FPL Emergency Response Organization may be prepositioned.
Allonsite Emergency Response Facilities willbe activated in accordance with simulated conditions and appropriate emergency response procedures for the exercise.
Exercise participants ("players" ) willnot have any prior knowledge of the simulated accident events, operational sequence, radiological effiuents or weather conditions.
A radiological medical emergency willbe integrated into the operational and radiological portion of the exercise scenario in order to evaluate the ability of the PTN plant staff to effectively respond to a contaminated/injured individual. The medical emergency willalso test the ability of the designated hospital, Baptist Hospital, to treat a contaminated/injured patient.
In addition, the exercise incorporates the following:
Radiological Monitoring Drill-both onsite and off-site teams willbe dispatched during the exercise to obtain required air samples and measurements associated with a simulated offsite release of radioactivity and communicate these results to the appropriate Emergency Response Facility (ERF).
(Field monitoring team protective clothing and respiratory protection willbe simulated in the field.)
Health Physics Drill-involves the response to and analysis of simulated elevated activity anborne or liquid samples, radiation exposure control, emergency dosimetry and the use ofprotective equipment onsite; Communications Drill-Actual usage and demonstration of the integrity of emergency'esponse communications links and equipment.
Fire Drill - a demonstration of the onsite Fire Team to respond to and extinguish a simulated fire with Offsite Assistance.
2.1-1
2.1 5QQPE (Continued)
Medical Emergency Drill - a demonstration of the response to a simulated medical emergency situation involving radiological considerations including the packaging and transport of the simulated injured person to the designated off-site treatment facility.
The preceding sub-drills are incorporated into the exercise scenario and will be demonstrated concurrently in the course of the exercise.
The overall intent of the exercise is to demonstrate that the FPL staff assigned responsibilities in an emergency situation are adequately trained to perform in accordance with the Emergency Plan and its implementing procedures.
2.1-2
FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHTCOMPANY TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR PLANT 1992 EMHtGENCY PREPAID)NESS EVALUATEDEXERCISE MAY6, 1992 2.2 The Turkey Point Nuclear Plant (PTN) emergency preparedness evaluated exercise objectives are based upon Nuclear Regulatory Commission requirements provided in 10 CFR 50:
a) 50.47, Emergency Plans; and b) Appendix E, Emergency Planning and Preparedness forProducrion and Utilization Facilities. Additional guidance provided in NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluasion of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support ofNuclear Power Plants, was utilized in developing the objectives.
The exercise will be conducted and evaluated using a realistic basis for activities.
The following objectives for the PTN portion of the exercise are consistent with the aforementioned documents:
1.
Conduct an exercise of the PTN Emergency Plan.
2.
Provide an opportunity for the State of Florida and Dade and Monroe Counties to participate in an exercise.
3.
Prepare an exercise information package to include:
4.
a.
The objectives of the exercise and appropriate evaluation criteria.
b.
The date, time period, place, and a list of participating organizations c.
The simulated sequence of events.
d.
The time schedule of real and simulated initiating events.
e.
The narrative summary.
Conduct a critique of the exercise and prepare an evaluation report.
5.
Demonstrate that corrective actions are tracked until completion, (Critique Report and Proposed Corrective Actions willbe issued within 15 working days of the exercise.)
2.2-1
2.2 (Continued)
Demonstrate the prompt activation, adequacy of the staffing and set up, as appropriate, of emergency response facilities as follows:
-Control Room-Technical Support Center (TSC)
-Operations Support Center (OSC)
-Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
-Emergency News Center (ENC)
2.
Demonstrate the capability of the FPL Emergency Response Organization to implement their Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.
3.
Demonstrate the ability of the Emergency Response Facility Managers/Supervisors to provide overall direction, including "command and control" by initiating, coordinating, and implementing timely and effective decisions during a radiological emergency.
4.
5.
Demonstrate the ability to effectively transfer command and control of emergency response functions from the Control Room to the TSC/EOF.
~
Demonstrate the provisions for continuous staffing of the emergency facilities.
6.
Demonstrate the interface capability between the FPL Emergency Response Organization and the State of Florida and Dade and Monroe Counties for effective response coordination to a radiological emergency and adequate protection of the health and safety of the public.
7.
Demonstrate the ability to control access to emergency facilities.
8.
Demonstrate the ability to provide a liaison at each participating offsite governmental emergency operations center (EOC).
9.
Demonstrate adequacy of designated facilities and equipment to support emergency operations.
10..
Demonstrate the availability of outside support agencies and organizations who may be requested to provide assistance in an emergency.
Demonstrate the ability of corporate personnel to augment the Emergency Response Organization and support the plant staff.
12.
Demonstrate the ability to notify emergency response personnel.
2.2-2 92.EElRnO I4'44 L'
2.2 (Continued)
C.
nA mn l
ifi i
Demonstrate the availability of methods, equipment, and expertise to make rapid assessments ofthe consequences ofany radiological hazards, including the dispatch and coordination of Field Monitoring Teams.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to recognize emergency action levels (EALs) and properly classify emergencies in accordance with the Turkey Point Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.
D.
N if in n
mmni i
Demonstrate the ability to notify offsite emergency organizations within approximately 15 minutes of each emergency classification.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to notify the NRC of any emergency classification within approximately one hour of the declaration.
3.
Demonstrate the ability to notify FPL Emergency Response Organization personnel.
4.
Demonstrate the ability to develop and send timely information to State and local authorities as required by the Emergency Plan.
5.
Demonstrate the ability to communicate among the Control Room, TSC, OSC, EOF, and ENC, as appropriate.
6.
Demonstrate that adequate communication capabilities exist between FPL, and the State and local Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs).
7.
Demonstrate that adequate communications capabilities exist among FPL, the State Radiation Monitoring Teams and the Turkey Point Plant.
Demonstrate the ability to communicate among the Control Room, TSC, EOF, and NRC Operations Center in Bethesda (simulated).
E.
2.
Demonstrate methods and techniques for determining the source term of releases or potential releases of radioactive material.
I Demonstrate the adequacy of methods and techniques for determining the magnitude of the releases of radioactive materials based on plant system parameters and effluent monitors, 3.
Demonstrate the ability to estimate integrated dose from projected or actual dose rates and to formulate Protective Action Recommendations (PARs).
2.2-3 9'EE/Rcv0 1 0.44 9
2.2 (Continued)
4.
Demonstrate the ability to monitor and control emergency worker radiation exposure and implement exposure guidelines as appropriate, 5.
Demonstrate the availability of respiratory protection, and protective clothing for onsite emergency response personnel.
6.
Demonstrate the availability of a procedural mechanism to expeditiously evaluate risks and authorize emergency workers to receive doses in excess of 10 CFR 20 limits, as appropriate.
7.
Demonstrate the capability for onsite contamination control.
8.
Demonstrate, the ability to decontaminate onsite personnel, as appropriate.
9.
Demonstrate the capability to transport a contaminated injured person offsite.
10.
Demonstrate the ability to evaluate the radiation exposure and contamination levels {external) of an accident victim.
Demonstrate the capability for onsite and offsite radiological monitoring, to include collection, and analysis of sample media (e.g. air) and provisions for communications and record keeping.
12.
Demonstrate the ability to collect and prepare, for shipment simulated elevated airborne or liquid samples as required.
13.
Demonstrate the capability to use the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) (walk-through/simulate).
14.
Demonstrate the ability to analyze fluid samples and provide the isotopic and chemical results of the analysis within three hours of the time the sample was first requested.
'v A
Demonstrate the ability to recommend protective actions to appropriate offsite authorities.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to advise individuals onsite or in owner controlled areas of emergency conditions.
3.
Demonstrate the capability for onsite first aid.
4.
Demonstrate the ability to conduct search and rescue procedures for the persons identified as missing during accountability procedures.
2.2-4
2.2 E
(Continued)
1.
Demonstrate the operations of the ENC and the availability of space for the media.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate and timely manner.
3.
Demonstrate. coordination of information prior to its release.
4.
Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control in a
coordinated fashion.
1.
Demonstrate the availability ofprocedures to support re-entry and recovery.
a.
De-escalation/termination from the emergency phase, and transition to recovery phase.
b.
Inform the State of the opportunity to reduce the need for protective actions.
i Emr 1.
Demonstrate the ability to respond to a radiation medical emergency in a timely manner 2.
Demonstrate the capability of the First Aid and Personnel Decontamination Teams to respond to a medical emergency, administer first aid, and survey for contamination on a simulated contaminated, injured individual.
3.
Demonstrate the capability to arrange for and obtain transportation and off-site medical support for a radiological accident victim.
4.
Demonstrate the ability of Baptist Hospital personnel to treat a
contaminated, injured patient.
1.
Demonstrate the ability of the Fire Brigade to respond to a fire emergency in a timely and appropriate manner.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to obtain and utilize offsite assistance in fighting a fire within the Protected Area.
2.2-5
2.2 QRJRRK (Continued)
K.
Rizmgihns Areas of the PTN Emergency Plan that will~T be demonstrated during this exercise include:
1.
Site evacuation of non-essential personnel.
2.
Onsite personnel accountability.
3.
Actual shift turnover gong term shift assignments willbe demonstrated by rosters).
4.
Real time activation of the EOF and ENC.
5.
Actual drawing of a sample utilizing the Post-Accident Sampling System (PASS).
2.2-6 L.EBRcvOl 0
FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHTCOMPANY TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR PLANT 1992 EMERGENCY PREPARE)NESS EVALUATEDEXERCISE MAY6, 1992 3.1 NARRATIVE ARY Unit 3 is at 85% power and has just returned to Power Operation following a Short Notice Outage to repair a Conoseal leak (startup at 1200 on May 5, 1992).
The core is in the Middle of Life with Boron concentration of 825 ppm.
Allconditions are satisfied to continue increasing power to 100%.
Unit 4 has been operating at 100% power for 30 days at the End of Core Life, Boron concentration is 200 ppm.
The following items are of interest:
1.
Surveillance testing of the 3A EDG is scheduled for Day Shift.
2.
Unit 3 and 4 AMSAC Systems are out of service for processor modifications.
3.
Unit 3 has elevated RCS iodine concentration due to an Iodine Spike following the Power Transients.
The latest RCS sample results as of 0600 were:
1.71 E-01 pCi/gm DEQ I-131, 5.29 E-0.1 pCi/gm Total Iodine, and 7.68 E-01 pCi/gm Gross Activity. The next RCS sample is due at 1000.
4.
3B Charging Pump is out of service to repair excessive packing leakage.
5.
3B Steam Generator Steam Dump to Atmosphere (RV-1410) is out of service due to excessive leakby.
The isolation valve is closed.
6.
The State of Florida Hot Ring Down (HRD) and NRC Emergency Notification System (ENS) telephones are out of service in the Control Room - Simulator. All notifications from the Control Room - Simulator are to be made via commercial telephone lines.
System Operations:
Demand on the System is moderate with anticipated peak of 11,500 hotVe.
Service area conditions are normal.
St Lucie Unit l.is offline for refueling (expected return May 28); Fort Lauderdale Units
and 2 are offline for forced outages (expected return May 10).
3.1-1
3.1 ARRATIVE ARY (Continued)
Meteorological Conditions:
Current temperature is 73'F, skies are clear, winds are 4 to 6 miles per hour from the southeast.
A late spring cold front has brought cool temperatures to South Florida.
A high pressure system is stationary over the lower, southeaster United States, and should remain stationary for the next 3-4 days.
Forecast high temperature is in the mid to upper seventies with low humidity and 20% chance of rain.
enari Narrative The scenario begins with Unit 3 prepared to continue power escalation from 85% to 100%.
Increased RCS Iodine concentrations due to an Iodine Spike during the power transient is being monitored and concentrations are decreasing with no special RCS cleanup procedures in use.
An Area Radiation Monitor in the Unit 3 Spent Fuel Pit fails due to moisture in the detector preamplifier.
The Control Room crew responds by dispatching a Health Physics RPM to conduct radiological surveys in the area.
When the RPM enters the Unit 3 SFP Area, the security door fails to relatch causing an alarm in the Security Alarm Station requiring a Security Officer to be dispatched to investigate.
The RPM subsequently falls near the SFP, cutting his head and becoming contaminated when his arm falls in the SFP.
He is able to get up and make his way out of the SFP area and proceeds toward the HP Control Point in the AuxiliaryBuilding. On his way, he falls down the stairs from the SFP and breaks his arm.
The First Aid Team and the Onsite Medical Response personnel will be activated, but the injuries will be sufficient to require transport offsite prior to decontamination resulting in an Unusual Event declaration.
The surveillance run of the 3A EDG is commenced and system notifies the Control Room of critical grid conditions due to unexpected outages at several plants.
A ground fault develops on the 3A Annunciator Panel Power Supply which results in a loss of power to the Unit 3 Annunciators.
An Alert Emergency should be declared due to the loss of annunciators.
INC Department should be dispatched to troubleshoot the malfunction and should restore the annunciators within 30 minutes.
The 3A EDG engine oil pomp gasket fails resulting in trip and lockout of the 3A EDG.
The EDQ is declared out of service.
When the annunciators have been restored, a fire develops in the 3E Non-vital Load Center due to deteriorated insulation, and transient combustibles.
The Fire Brigade. is activated but requires.offsite assistance.
As the fire is brought under control, an electrical fault develops on the Yital AC Power Breaker to the PRMS instrumentation for Unit 3. A tube leak develops in the 3C Steam Generator.
Operators should detect the leakage using operational flow balances, and commence a unit shutdown.
The PRMS instrumentation is repaired and the increasing S/G activity is confirmed. After briefly stabilizing, the Steam Generator tube leakage increases requiring the operators to manually trip the reactor.
When the reactor is 3.1-2
3.1 RRATIVE ARY (Continued)
tripped, two Control Rod Assemblies (RCCAs) mechanically bind and damage the clad of the fuel assemblies.
The tube leakage stabilizes at approximately 300 gpm, and a safety valve on the 3C Steam Generator lifts early due to driftof the setpoint, and fails to reseat.
These conditions result in an uncontrolled depressurization of the RCS and affected S/G, and a radioactive release to the environment.
The Control Room Operators carry out Emergency Operating Procedures to stabilize the unit, and Emergency Response Teams are dispatched to repair equipment malfunctions.
Shortly after the S/G tube rupture, electrical faults on the 3A ICW pump and Unit 3 Startup Transformer cause a loss of offsite power to Unit 3.
The 3B EDG starts but fails to energize its bus due to a relay failure and the Operators must respond to a loss of all AC power.
A control circuit malfunction fails the Unit 3 Station Blackout (SBO) Tie Breaker (3AD07), and forces Operators to attempt to power Unit 3 buses from the Blackstart Diesels.
The tube rupture and loss of power willcause a Site Area Emergency to be declared.
The Control Room crew willcarry out the EOPs and ERTs willrepair malfunctioning equipment.
After power has been restored from the Blackstart Diesels, the failed open safety will reseat resulting in termination of the uncontrolled release.
The radioactive plume will continue to be tracked and Protective Action Recommendations generated based on field monitoring results.
Plant cooldown to Cold Shutdown willbe initiated and offsite power will be restored to the Startup Transformer.
As the cooldown and power restoration continue, several equipment malfunctions occur requiring Operations response and ERT investigation.
Exercise play will be terminated when recovery actions are planned and exercise objectives have been evaluated.
FPLVfH 3.1-3 V~EE 'RcAI O~"4 9'
FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHTCOMPANY TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR PLANT 1992 EMERGENCY PREPAI&DNESS EVALUATEDEXERCISE MAY6, 1992 3.2 ENARI TIMELINE TIME g~T~
0715 0730 Shift personnel (Control Room and Field Operators, Health Physics RPMs, Chemistry Technicians) on station Start Exercise 0735 1A ARMs channel 21, Unit 3 Spent Fuel Pit-North Wall, high alarm due to an instrumentation failure.
0740 1B Control Room-Simulator Crew contacts Health Physics to survey Unit 3 SFP.
0745 1C Health Physics dispatches RPM to Unit 3 SFP.
Security Alarm Stations (CAS/SAS) receive door alarm on Unit 3 SFP.
1D 2A Security dispatches officer to Unit 3 SFP to investigate door alarm.
RPM dispatched to Unit 3 SFP trips, cuts his head, and is contaminated.
The injured RPM attempts to walk to the Health Physics Control Point, but he passes out on the stairs leading down from the SFP, and breaks his arm.
He is contaminated, and will require transportation to an offsite medical facility (Baptist Hospital)
~
3A EDG surveillance is started (3-OSP-023.1) for routine, normal start surveillance.
0750 1E Security Officer finds injured RPM conscious but delirious, and reports injured individual to CAS/SAS.
0800 1F CAS/SAS notify Control Room-Simulator of Medical Emergency.
Control Room-Simulator implements EPIP-20101, Duties of the Emergency Coordinator, and activates the First Aid Team.
First Aid Team arrives on the scene of the contaminated/injured individual.
Control Room-Simulator notified ofcontaminated/injured individual's status, and of the need for offsite medical assistance.
3.2-1
3.2 RI L
(Continued)
Evaluated Exercise, May 6, 1992 TIME gVgfl~!
0805 1G 0815 1H Control Room-Simulator Crew contacts offsite medical support.
Injured RPM transported to the onsite medical facility.
0820 A second HP RPM should be dispatched to complete surveying the Unit 3 SFP.
0825 Offsite medical support arrives and transports the contaminated injured RPM to Baptist Hospital.
0830 2B System/Dispatch notifies Control Room-Simulator of Critical Conditions on the System Grid due to unexpected unit outages.
3A A ground alarm is received on the 3A DC Bus (3D01) due to a fault on Unit 3 Annunciator power supply system.
1K HP completes Unit 3 SFP survey - results normal.
0835 3B Breaker 3D01-Ol trips due to a ground fault on Unit 3 annunciator panels resulting in a loss of all Unit 3 annunciators.
IL Control Room-Simulator notified of Unit 3 SFP survey results.
ISAAC Department notified of ARMs channel malfunction, and requested to investigate.
0840 1M An Unusual Event should be declared based upon the transportation of the contaminated injured victim to an offsite medical facility.
Note:
This emergency declaration may not be made ifthis event takes more time than presently postulated.
0845 3C Instrumentation and Control Department contacted to investigate loss of Unit 3 annunciators.
0850 3D An Alert should be declared based upon a loss of most or all Control Room annunciators for greater than five minutes.
2C The 3A EDG surveillance fails due to an oil system failure.
The EDG engine oil pump mechanical seals fail resulting in a loss of oil pressure.
0855 2D 1N The 3A EDG is declared out of service (OOS).
Contaminated/injured victim arrives at Baptist Hospital.
3.2-2
3.2 I
(Continued)
Evaluated Exercise, May 6, 1992 XIKK 3KE1QM KVVEPf Unit 3 annunciator power supply repaired, and annunciators returned to service, 4A The Control Room-Simulator receives annunciator J-3/1, 480 Volt Load Center 3E, 3F, 3G Ground/High Temperature. Voltage drops on 3E Load Center.
0905 4B 0910 4C Operator dispatched to investigate 3E Load Center.
Operator reports fire in Non-Vital 3E Load Center located in the Unit 3 Condensate Polisher Building.
4C The Control Room-Simulator crew deenergizes E Load Center.
The following valves, significant to plant operation, are deenergized due to loss of E Load Center:
LCV-115C, VCT Outlet MOV; and MOV-1433 & 1434, MSR Steam Stop MOVs.
Emergency Response Teams (ERTs) should be dispatched to standby to close LCV-115C, and investigate Transformer trouble alarms (due to loss of backup control power).
0915 4F The onsite Fire Brigade arrives at the scene of the fire. Offsite fire support is required.
0920 3F 0935 4G 0940 SA The TSC and OSC should be operational by this time.
Offsite Fire assistance arrives onsite.
An electrical fault causes breaker 3P23-12 to trip resulting in a loss of power to the Unit 3 Process Radiation Monitor instrumentation rack, 3QR66.
Unit 3 PRMS is OOS including the Common Plant Vent (R-14), Liquid Effluent (R-18) monitors, and the Primary and Backup Meteorological Data Recorders.
Unit 3 SPING radiation monitors, and meteorological instrumentation remain in service, and information is available via ERDADS.
0945 4H Offsite Fire assistance arrives at the scene of the fire.
SB An ERT is dispatched to the Cable Spreading Room to investigate and repair the loss of pow'er to the PRMS.
0950 3G The Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) should be operational with minimum staffing. The Emergency News Center (ENC) should be operational.
302 3 92.EE/RnOI CC.2.2 Rl (Continued)
Evaluated Exercise, May 6, 1992 TIIVIF>>, EVE~
g',VI:~
1000 4I The fire is out but smoldering.
6A A steam generator tube leak develops on the 3C Steam Generator, and slowly increases over the next 15 minutes to 30 gpm.
1005 6B Unit 3 SJAE SPING alarms in response to the SG tube leakage.
Local SPING alarms, and ERDADS alarms provide indication of the tube leakage.
5C The ERT investigating the loss of the PRMS isolates the electrical fault and prepares to restore power.
1010 6C Control Room-Simulator Operators detect the charging/letdown flow mismatch, and commence evaluating the RCS leakage.
1015 5D Breaker 3P23-12 is repaired, and Unit 3 PRMS are returned to service.
Unit 3 PRMS Channels R-15, Air Ejector, and R-19, Blowdown, are in alarm due to the SG tube leakage.
6D The steam generator tube leak stabilizes at 30 gpm. Charging pumps are maintaining pressurizer level.
Operators should have estimated the SG tube leakage, and started a unit shutdown at approximately 2% Reactor Power per minute.
Chemistry should be calculating the primary to secondary leak rate using procedure NC-70.
Health Physics should be surveying effected areas.
1020 6E 1030 6F The SG tube leakage begins to increase.
The SG tube leakage increases to 300 gpm.
Charging pumps are unable to maintain pressurizer level, and operators manually trip Unit 3 reactor and initiate safety injection and Phase A Containment Isolation.
The Control Room personnel will manually close Unit 3 Main Steamline Isolation Valves (MSIVs) due to loss ofpower to two" MSR Steam Stop MOVs from 3E Load Center.
- Two Rod Control Cluster Assemblies (RCCAs) mechanically bind on the reactor trip and cause fuel clad damage in two fuel assemblies RCS radioactivity increases rapidly.
FPL/PTN 3.2-4
3.2 RI (Continued)
Evaluated Exercise, May 6, 1992 EVE~
6H On the reactor trip, a safety valve lifts early on the 3C SG due to set point drift. The safety valve fails to reseat and 3C SG is faulted and ruptured resulting in an uncontrolled, radioactive release path to the environment.
6I An ERT should be dispatched to evaluate radiological conditions on the Main Steam platform, and take actions to close the failed open steam generator safety valve.
7A Both Unit 3 A and B 4KV buses automatically transfer to the Startup Transformer, but a malfunction in the 3A Startup Transformer breaker tripping circuit causes loss of both remote and local red
"closed" indicating lights.
(Note:
This malfunction may not be detected by the Control Room-Simulator crew until the breaker receives a "trip" signal.)
1035 7B An electrical ground alarm is received on the 3A 4KV bus due to a fault on the 3A Intake Cooling Water pump. (Pump amps are slightly higher than normal.)
1040 7C A phase to phase fault on the 3A ICW pump results in an overcurrent condition on the breaker, 3AA19.
The 3AA19 breaker fails to trip due to a malfunction of the tripping coil. The overcurrent results in a lockout of the 3A 4KV bus.
Due to the Startup Transformer breaker failure, the breaker fails to trip resulting in backup switchyard breaker protection, and lockout of the Unit 3 Startup Transformer.
The 3B EDG automatically starts but fails to energize its associated bus due to a relay failure ("Ready to Load" (RL) relay).
An ERT should be dispatched to locally synchronize the 3B EDG to 3B 4KV bus, but the relay failure prevents closure.
1050
The Unit 3 Station Blackout (SBO) Tie breaker, 3AD07, fails to close due to a control circuit malfunction.
The Control Room-Simulator, TSC, and OSC personnel take actions to restore power to Unit 3 from the Blackstart Diesels (BSDs).
3H The EOF and ENC should be fully operational.
3.2-5
3.2 (Continued)
Evaluated Exercise, May 6, 1992
+lpga /Vga+
1055 7G A Site Area Emergency should be declared based on either; a) steam generator tube leakage greater than available charging pump capacity and loss ofoffsite power; or b) loss ofall A/C power for greater than 15 minutes.
1100 The following ERTs are dispatched in accordance with Emergency Operating Procedures:
-Isolate RCP Seals by closing valves 297A/B/C, MOV-381, and MOV-626 in the Pipe and Valve Room.
-Post Accident Hydrogen Monitor lineup.
-Realignment of steam supply to Train
AFW due to depressurization of 3C SG which normally supplies steam to Train 1.
-Auxiliary Steam Supply realigned to Unit 3 from Unit 4.
-DC bus local shedding in accordance with Emergency Operating Procedures to preserve battery capacity.
-Investigate and repair Unit 3 Station Blackout Tie Breaker, 3AD07.
-Investigate and repair 3A Startup Transformer Breaker and 3A ICW Pump Breaker malfunctions.
1105 1130 7H-Investigate and repair the 3B EDG relay failure.
Owner Controlled Area Evacuation should be implemented.
Power is restored to Unit 3 from the BSDs.
An ERT should be dispatched to align PASS for online monitoring.
1135 With power restored to one (1) 4KV bus, the following ERTs are dispatched:
-Realignment of Unit 4 HHSI pumps to Unit 3 RWST.
-Re-establish RCP seal cooling by slowly opening MOV-626, CCW to the RCP Thermal Barrier.
3.2-6 92 EBRcvOI4 W9
3.2 (Continued)
Evaluated Exercise, May 6, 1992 TME ~VENT EVENT 1200 6J The failed safety valve on the faulted/ruptured SG reseats following mechanical agitation, and the release is terminated.
Unit 3 SBO Tie Breaker is repaired.
1205 7J ERTs have racked out the failed ICW Pump Breaker, and repaired or replaced the 3A Startup Transformer Breaker.
When the Switchyard Protection Relay is reset, offsite power is available to Unit 3 via the Startup Transformer.
1210 8A The controller fails on an operating Unit 3 Charging Pump resulting in a low speed alarm and pump trip on low oil pressure.
1215 9A The 1T Diesel Instrument Air Compressor runs out of fuel resulting in loss of instrument air to Unit 3.
The 2T Diesel Instrument Air Compressor fails to start due to a dead battery.
1220 8B 1230 9B An ERT is dispatched to investigate the Charging Pump malfunction.
Instrument Air is supplied to Unit 3 from Units 1'/2 emergency supply.
10A An Area Radiation Monitor Channel fails high requiring investigation and surveying by an OSC Team.
1300 9C The instrument air system is returned to service by cross tieing Unit 3/4 Instrument Air System.
Unit 1/2 Emergency Air Supply is isolated.
Offsite power is restored to Unit 3.
6K RCS cooldown to cold shutdo~ is commenced in accordance with EOPs.
1315 6L P
1345 11A Control Room-Simulator Crew reestablished forced circulation RCS cooling in accordance with EOPs and continue cooldown to Cold Shutdown.
FPL Board of Directors will meet atthe General Office in approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, and wants a brief on the situation at Turkey Point by the ECO.
3.2-7
,
3.2 (Continued)
Evaluated Exercise, May 6, 1992
+M%l~~
1400 11B Recovery actions should be considered at this time with identification ofbackshift personnel, possible de-escalation, and logistical needs for continued operation of Emergency Response Facilities.
1500 Exercise is terminated.
3.2-8
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