IR 05000250/1992023
| ML17349A454 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 10/22/1992 |
| From: | Jape F, Wiseman G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17349A453 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-250-92-23, 50-251-92-23, NUDOCS 9211030045 | |
| Download: ML17349A454 (13) | |
Text
~p,R AEgII P0 Cy I
'u, n +p*gk UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-250/92-23 and 50-251/92-23 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102 Docket Nos.:
50-250 and 50-251 License Nos.:
DPR-31 and DPR-41 Facility Name:
Turkey Point 3 and
Inspection Conducted:
October 5-9, 1992 Inspector:
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G.
R. Wiseman lu/p ~
Date Signed Approved by:
F. Jape, Chief Test Programs Section Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety Date Si ned SUMMARY Scope:
This routine announced inspection was conducted to evaluate the implementation of the plant's fire protection/prevention program and the plantIs efforts for restoration of the fire protection water supply following hurricane Andrew.
Results:
In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.
The following strengths and one weakness were identified:
e Strengths:
Strong Fire Protection Department programs for monitoring and trending plant fire protection performance are utilized and provided to senior plant management (paragraph 2.a).
Restoration of fire protection impairments are generally performed in a timely manner (paragraph 2.b).
9211030045 9'21029 PDR ADOCK 05000250 PDR
Completion of fire protection TS survelliances on schedule has improved (paragraph 2.c).
Results of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) for fire events has been incorporated into fire protection procedures and fire brigade training (paragraph 2.e.(4).
Weakness:
Improvement was needed to prevent the excessive buildup of trash in containers and dumpsters provided for cleanup activities (paragraph 2.f).
REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- T. Abbatiello, Site Quality Manager K. Arnold, Fire Protection Coordinator F. Busch, Fire Protection Brigade Trainer
- D. Jern, Acting Plant Manager
- J. Knorr, Licensing Engineer V. Laudato, Fire Protection System Analyst
- J. Marchese, Site Construction Manager
- G. Traczyk, Fire Protection Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included craftsmen, engineers, operators, mechanics, fire watches, security force members, technicians, and administrative personnel.
NRC Resident Inspector
- R. Butcher e
- Attended exit interview 2.
Fire Protection/Prevention Program (64704)
The inspector evaluated the overall adequacy and implementation of the licensee's Fire Protection Program.
The fire protection program is described in the licensee's Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Appendix 9.6A, and in plant procedure O-ADM-016, "Fire Protection Program."
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Fire Protection Organization The plant services manager has overall responsibility for providing the interface between plant management and the Fire Protection Department which is part of the Services organization.
Staffing of the Fire Protection Department is good.
Four Fire Protection Department staff positions are assigned to coordinate the development and maintenance of the station's Fire Protection Program procedures and policies.
This group also coordinates the actual implementation of the program.
Assistance in the implementation of the program is provided by the Training, Operations, Maintenance, and Construction Services organizations.
The Fire Protection Department has an effective program for monitoring and trending plant fire protection performance.
Daily fire protection priority issues reports are available to plant management.
These
reports address the status of fire protection features such as impairments, surveillance schedules, and fire brigade qualification and manpower.
These provide an effective management tool to monitor the performance of the Fire Protection Department effectiveness.
This is considered a program strength.
Fire Prevention/Administrative Control Procedures The following procedures describe and implement major portions of the plant's Fire Protection Program:
Procedure 0-ADM-016 O-ADM-016.1 O-ADM-016.2 O-ADM-016.3 AP-190.67 Title Fire Protection Program Transient Combustible and Flammable Substances Program Fire Brigade Program Fire Protection Impairments Welding, Cutting, Grinding, and Open Flame Work Safety Procedure These procedures were reviewed and found to conform to commitments made in FSAR Appendix 9.6A.
The Fire Protection Impairment Files and Reports for January 1991 through September 1992 were reviewed.
During this time the number of fire protection feature impairments remaining open during any two month period was significantly reduced from a peak of approximately 260 during the dual unit outage in 1991 to less than twenty through July 1992.
This reduction indicates that the licensee has placed a high priority on maintaining fire protection systems operable.
This is considered a program strength.
Surveillance of Fire Protection Features The following surveillance test procedures were reviewed to verify compliance to the fire protection operability requirements of the Technical Specifications (TS).
Also, the completed test data for the tests conducted during the indicated dates were reviewed to verify that the tests were being performed within the specified frequenc Procedure Title Dates of Completed Surveillance Reviewed O-SME-016.3 Fire Barrier Penetration 4-4-89; 6-25-91 Seal Inspection (18 month)
O-SME-016.11 Electrical Raceway Protection Inspection (18 month)
9-14-89/
11-25-91 O-SMM-016.6 Fire Door Inspection (monthly)
9-6-91; 10-8-91; 11-12-91/
12-10-91/
1-14-92; 2-28-92 All inspections and tests reviewed were completed within the time specified by the Technical Specification (TS) or within the permitted grace period.
Improvement was noted in the completion of TS fire protection surveillances on schedule during the period October 1991 until August 1992.
Fire Reports The inspector reviewed the station fire incident reports for 1991 and 1992.
These reports indicated that there were 20 incidents of fire in 1991 of which four required fire brigade response.
Thus far in 1992, there have been three fire events including only one that required a fire brigade response, indicating an overall reduction of fire incidents.
Fire events involving electrical equipment have been low.
Trending of fire events by the Fire Protection Department has been effective in identifying potential adverse conditions.
In May, 1991, Problem/Condition Report NPR No.91-045 identified a recurring problem with the use of a combustible duct tape used to secure
"hot work" enclosures.
Fire event reports identified that this material was often ignited causing a number of small fires during hot work processes.
Corrective actions included prohibition of the duct tape in hot work areas and replacement with a flame retardant type of tape.
Plant personnel were effectively informed of these actions and plant hot work procedures were revised to include work control inspections for combustibles in hot work areas including tape.
These actions have been effective at reducing these types of fire events thus far in 199 e.
Fire Brigade (2)
Organization The plant fire brigade consists of six shifts of dedicated fire brigade personnel from the operations and health physics staffs.
Normally a compliment of fire qualified brigade members are assigned on each shift.
Operations provides three qualified individuals, one of which must be a qualified fire brigade leader.
Health physics provides two individuals who are qualified to be fire brigade members.
Additionally, a compliment of qualified brigade personnel are available from the Fire Protection Department to assist in emergency fire fighting efforts if needed.
The inspector verified that sufficient shift personnel were available to staff each shifts'ire brigade with at least five qualified fire brigade members.
Training and Drills The inspector reviewed the training and drill records for the brigade leaders, fire brigade operators, health physics personnel, and Fire Protection Department.
The records reviewed disclosed that those assigned fire brigade duty had received the annual medical review, had attended the required training and participated in the required number of drills.
The inspector also reviewed the shift fire brigade drills conducted for each operations shift in 1992 and noted that the drill requirements for each shift were met.
(3)
Fire Fighting Strategies Fire fighting strategies (pre-fire plans)
are provided for the safety related plant areas and are contained in Operations Procedure O-ONOP-016.10.
This procedure also contains operations manual actions for safe plant shutdown for a fire event as required for Appendix R.
Each of'hese strategies address the fire potential, area location, means of fire brigade approach, fire protection equipment available, fire brigade action, special instructions and hazards to be considered, operational considerations and communications availabl The following strategies were reviewed during this inspection:
Fire Zone No.
25A
54
Zone Name Spare Battery Room Safety Injection Pump Room Unit 3 Component Cooling Pump and Heat Exchanger Area Unit 3 Charging Pump Room Units 3 and
Auxiliary Building Corridor Elevation 18'7 79A
138 Unit 4 4160V Switchgear 4B Room Units 3 and
Auxiliary Building North-South Breezeway Units 3 and 4 Cable Spreading Room EDG Room 4A (4)
Fire Drill Due to both units being shutdown and the high priority work in progress, a fire brigade drill was not conducted during this inspection.
To evaluate drill performance, the drill critique data for the following drill scenarios was reviewed by the inspector.
Unit 4 4160 B Switchgear Room Unit 4 480 V Load Center Units 3 and 4 Cable Spreading Room
Unit 4 Emergency Diesel Generator Room Unit 3 Diesel Oil Storage Area Based on this review, the overall response and participation for these drills were satisfactory.
Following each drill, an exercise critique was conducted to discuss the drill, participants performance and recommendations for improvements.
The inspector noted the plant's Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) for fire has been utilized by the licensee to identify high risk plant areas.
The licensee has provided increased fire prevention measures including a decreased allowance of transient materials allowed through these areas.
Additionally, the licensee has increased drill participation in these plant areas to improve the fire brigade response.
This is considered a fire protection program strength.
The inspector encouraged the licensee to continue expanded efforts in this area to include the conduct of additional fire brigade drills in NRC granted Appendix R exemption areas to improve fire brigade fire fighting operations.
Plant Tour A general plant walkdown inspection was performed by the inspector to verify:
acceptable housekeeping; compliance with the plant's fire prevention procedures such as
"Hot Work" permits and transient combustibles; operability of the fire detection and suppression systems; and installation and operability of fire barriers, fire stops and penetration seals (fire doors, dampers, electrical penetration seals, etc. ).
Within the areas inspected, the general housekeeping was satisfactory considering that Unit 3 was in the refueling outage and cleanup and restoration activities continued from hurricane Andrew.
The housekeeping for all of the diesel generator rooms was good.
There was no apparent excessive leakage of lubrication oil or diesel fuel from the diesel engines and areas were wiped down to remove any leakage that was present.
However, there was excessive buildup of trash in plant containers and dumpsters provided for cleanup activities.
This was an item which needed improvement.
Otherwise, the control of
combustible and hazardous materials and flammable liquids and gases was satisfactory.
An in process
"Hot Work" operation involving grinding was observed in the Control Building.
A Hot Work permit had been issued for the operation and appropriate fire prevention controls were established and implemented.
Restoration of Fire Protection Water Supply System after Hurricane Andrew The inspector reviewed the licensee Hurricane Andrew efforts to restore the Fire Protection Water Supply System back to the pre-hurricane design configuration.
As a result of Hurricane Andrew, the Turkey Point Raw Service Water System high tower collapsed which damaged portions of the Fire Protection Water Supply System.
Fire Protection Water Supply System components damaged during Hurricane Andrew included Raw Water Tank
(RWT 1)
and its appurtenances, the county water supply line to RWT 2, the electric driven fire pump casing and controller, both fire water jockey pumps, a portion of the fire protection piping system and piping system supports, power cabling for the electric driven fire pump and jockey pumps, and space heater and annunciation cables for the electric driven fire pump.
At the time of the inspection the licensee had completed installation of an interim fire protection water supply configuration.
This interim configuration consisted of a water filled Raw Water Tank 2 with both the electric and diesel fire pumps suction aligned to RWT 2.
The tank fill capability is from the RWT 2 county water supply line manual by pass line.
Tank level will be monitored by plant operator using the local tank mounted level indicator.
Both the electric and diesel driven fire pump discharges are aligned to the common electric fire pump discharge piping tie into the plant fire main.
A fire protection jockey pump, used to maintain pressure in the fire water main, was restored such that the pumps suction and recirculation piping are tied into RWT 2.
An alternate source of fire water is provided by the Unit 3 and 4 screen wash pumps and Turkey Point cooling canals.
The three screen wash pumps are connected to a permanent backup fire protection header that is tied into'he fire main by a six inch hose to fire hydrant HY-13.
The inspector walkdown verified alignment of this interim Fire Protection Water Supply System configuration to meet technical specification requirements.
Review of the licensee's Safety Evaluation for the Interim Fire Protection System Configuration JPN-PTN-92-6090, Revision 2, dated September 23, 1992, indicated the
evaluation was thorough, and properly justified that the interim configuration does not impact safe operation of the plant.
The inspector did not identify any deficiencies in the safety evaluation.
Significant progress for Raw Water Tank 1 installation was noted.
The tank had been fabricated and pressure tested.
Piping and valve installation connections were in progress.
Engineering support and involvement in the fire protection restoration has been very good.
Engineering developed in a timely manner fire Plant Change Modifications (PC/M's)92-102, 92-105,92-106, 92-107 and 92-108 to provide the necessary procurement and construction details needed to restore the Fire Water Supply System back to the pre-hurricane design configuration.
The fire protection system will be restored to the existing code standards, however, some design enhancements to the system configuration identified in the modifications were positive.
The root cause of the damage to the fire protection system was the collapse of the elevated water tower.
This tower is being replaced by a diesel motor driven water pump that will automatically maintain a pressure head in the service water system upon loss of offsite power.
The service water system is not a safety related system.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on October 9, 1992, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspectio,