IR 05000250/1992029
| ML17349A564 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 12/09/1992 |
| From: | Branch M, Matt Thomas NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17349A563 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-250-92-29, 50-251-92-29, NUDOCS 9212290045 | |
| Download: ML17349A564 (22) | |
Text
<gR RE00 P0 fy ClO r
Cy gO
++*++
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-250/92-29 and 50-251/92-29 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Niami, FL 33102 Docket Nos.:
50-250 and 50-251 Facility Name:
Turkey Point 3 and
Inspection Conducted:
November 16-20, 1992 InspectorI N. Tho as Accompanying Inspector:
C. Smith Approved by:
~N. Branch, Chief Test Programs Section Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety License Nos.:
/Q."/8" Date Signed g/
z Date Signed SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection was conducted in the areas of design changes, modifications, and engineering support activities.
Results:
~-
One non-cited violation was identified, associated with the implementation of plant change modification PCH 92-057, concerning failure to update the total equipment data base to reflect the model number change for newly installed relief valve RV-3-6511 in accordance with change request notice CRN-H-5615 (paragraph 2.b).
The licensee has implemented a process for prioritizing plant design changes and real time support activities that address nuclear safety.
This has resulted in engineering being more actively involved in providing timely day-to-day support to the plant, The quality and technical content of the modification packages reviewed was considered good.
The licensee has developed a documented design bases for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4.
The design bases documents are updated and controlled as part of the configuration control program.
92122'II0045 92i2l6 PDR ADOCK 05000250
The licensee has developed and is implementing an effective configuration management control program.
The plant specific probabilistic risk assessment model for Turkey Point was being applied to the design control process and the preventive maintenance program.
The licensee's self assessment efforts have been effective in identifying areas for improvement within the design organization.
This effort is a good demonstration of the licensee's ongoing efforts to enhance the quality of engineering support being provided to the site.
The licensee's Production Engineering Group is gradually assuming more and more design authority responsibility from its architect engineer.
The organization and staffing level of the engineering staff was adequate for providing support to the plant.
Adequate training was being provided to the engineering staf REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees D. Baker, Nuclear Discipline Supervisor, Production Engineering Group (PEG)
S. Brain, Chief, Engineering Assessment, Technical Programs D. Brown, Nuclear Discipline Staff, Technical Programs R. Custis, Configuration Control Supervisor, Configuration Management H. Dryden, Nuclear Licensing Supervisor B. Dunn, Site Hechanical Engineering Supervisor
- R. Earl, Site guality Assurance Supervisor J.
Hoffman, Mechanical Discipline Supervisor, PEG H. Huba, Site Nuclear Engineering Supervisor
- D. Jernigan, Technical Department Manager
- J. Knorr, Site Licensing Engineer
- R. Kundalkar, Site Engineering Manager H. Lacal, Plant Change Control Supervisor T. Luke, Manager, PEG L. Pabst, Nuclear Discipline Senior Engineer, Technical Programs H. Paduano, Jr.,
Manager, Technical Programs, Nuclear Engineering
- L. Pearce, Plant General Hanager
- T. Plunkett, Turkey Point Site Vice President
- D. Powell, Services Hanager R. Renuart, Manager, Configuration Management I. Rioseco, Configuration Supervisor, Plant Change Control T. Schiffley, Supervisor, Outside Services Management, PEG D. Smith, Chief, Electrical/I&C Disciplines, Technical Programs S. Verduci, Licensing Engineer, Nuclear Licensing B. Vincent, Engineer, Probabilistic Risk Analysis Group, Technical Programs
- H. Wayland, Maintenance Manager
- E. Weinkam, Site Licensing Manager Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included craftsmen, engineers, operators, and administrative personnel.
Other Organizations NRC Resident Inspectors
- R. Butcher, Senior Resident Inspector G. Schnebli, Resident Inspector L. Trocine, Resident Inspector H. Janus, NRC Intern
- Attended exit interview
Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.
Design Changes and Plant Hodifications (37700)
a ~
Plant Modifications to Improve Reactor Safety An evaluation of the licensee's initiatives taken to identify and implement plant modifications to improve reactor safety was performed during this inspection.
Documentation reviewed during this effort included:
Procedure O-ADM-510, Request for Engineering Assistance (REA), January 27, 1992 Top 20 Prioritized Plant Mods List, Unit 3, Cycle 13, November 17, 1992 Top 30 Prioritized Plant Mods List November 17, 1992 List of Minor PC/Ms to be worked during Unit 3, Cycle 13, November 17, 1992 Unit 3 Top 20 Cycle 13, 1992 Budget List of Projects Project Review Board Estimate Summary Sheets for Unit 3 Top 20 Prioritized Mods, Cycle 13.
The inspectors determined that responsibility has been assigned to the Plant Change Control Supervisor for maintaining a list of prioritized plant modifications.
The process used for prioritizing the plant modifications are described in procedure O-ADM-510, and consists of a minimum of (1) performance of an operability review by the system engineer and (2) assignment of a prioritization number by the Plant Change Control Supervisor in accordance with established screening criteria.
A PRB which consists of senior site managers, reviews and dispositions proposed plant modifications.
The PRB reviews the agenda packages to ensure that they meet the needs of the plant.
A top 20 list of prioritized major scope plant modifications list is approved by the PRB for work during the upcoming RFO.
Additionally, a top 30 list of prioritized plant modifications list is approved by the PRB for work during non-outage or short notice outage (SNO).
To ensure the expeditious implementation of plant modifications on the top 20 or top 30 list, requirements have been established to cancel a top 20 plant modification if it is not implemented within one fuel cycle; and to cancel a top 30 plant modification if it is not implemented within 52 weeks.
Based on review of the above documentation and discussions with licensee engineering personnel the inspectors concluded that the licensee had demonstrated the use of a prioritization process for
identifying and implementing plant modifications to improve reactor safety.
Additionally, in anticipation of perceived plant needs caused by nuclear safety or other requirements, the licensee has also developed a top 20 list for Units 3 and 4 Cycle
RFO.
Engineering estimates were being prepared for the proposed work and upon completion will be incorporated into the Capital and Operations/Maintenance Budget required for funding the plant modifications.
In addition to the PRB reviewing and prioritizing REAs for the top 20 and top 30 lists, the licensee also holds a bi-weekly real time REA prioritization meeting.
The purpose of this meeting is to prioritize open/active real time support REAs for assignment to site engineering.
A real time REA is defined as a
REA that requires 200 or fewer engineering manhours and can be accomplished by the site engineering group.
The first real time prioritization meeting was held Hay 7, 1992 and consisted of representatives from the various plant departments (operations, maintenance, technical, etc)
and site engineering.
From these meetings a real time engineering top 20 list is developed for site engineering work to be performed by the various disciplines.
The real time engineering top 20 list consists of items from the real time REA list.
The real time top 20 list is different from the PRB top 20 and top 30 lists.
This permits timely scheduling of required maintenance activities and efficient use of real time engineering support resources.
REAs on the list are prioritized in accordance with site administrative procedure 0-ADH-510.
In addition to REAs, items reviewed and considered for the real time engineering top 20 list include NCRs and items from the plan of the day meeting.
The inspectors reviewed selected real time engineering top 20 lists and meeting minutes from Hay 7, 1992 to November 13, 1992.
The inspectors concluded that the licensee had a process for prioritizing and assigning real time support work for site engineering.
The process provided an effective and efficient use of site engineering resources.
Planning, Development and Implementation of Plant Modifications The inspectors reviewed the PCMs listed below to:
1) determine the adequacy of the evaluations performed to meet
CFR 50.59 requirements; 2) verify that the PCHs were reviewed and approved in accordance with TS and administrative controls; 3) ensure the subject modifications were installed (for those physically inspectable)
in accordance with the PCH packages; 4) verify that applicable plant operating documents (drawings, plant procedures, FSAR, TS, etc.)
were revised to reflect the subject modifications; 5) verify that the modifications were reviewed and incorporated in
operations training programs as applicable; and 6) ensure that post modification test requirements were specified and that adequate testing was performed.
PCH 90-294, Replacement of Obsolete HEW Speedomax Recorders REA No.
TPN 89-564 was prepared to request replacement of obsolete model HIKW Speedomax Recorders mounted on the Hain Control Panel.
A DEEP was developed for replacing seven HIIW recorders with Leeds and Northrup Speedomax 165 and 250 series recorders.
The recorders do not perform any safety function, however, because of seismic considerations the DEEP was classified as safety related.
The
CFR 50.59 nuclear safety evaluation screening bounded the activities specified in the design scope and was determined to be technically adequate.
Additionally, adequate post modification test requirements were specified within the design change package.
PCH 92-040, Addition of Reverse Power Relay and Hain Generator Protection Hodification The above plant change modified the Unit 3 main generator protection circuit by adding a reverse power relay, an out-of-step relay, and a main generator output breaker emergency trip control switch.
The modification also included realigning the existing 125V DC vital power sources to the main generator protection circuit to provide backup power and to upgrade and enhance the main generator protection scheme.
The main generator protection system does not perform any safety related function.
However, to preclude seismic interactions with existing and nearby safety related equipment the plant modification package was classified as safety related.
The inspectors reviewed the
CFR 50.59 nuclear safety evaluation and determined it to be technically adequate.
Functional tests specified in the modification package to be performed were also determined to be technically adequate for demonstrating achievement of the design objective.
PCH 91-128, 480 Volt Undervoltage Protection Scheme Hodification The above PCH modified the 480 Volt load center degraded voltage scheme by installing two additional ITE-27N definite time delay Under Voltage (UV) relays to the existing two 1AV55C relays (one per logic channel).
Additionally, the existing auxiliary relays associated with the lAV55C relays were disabled by removal from the circuit.
The design objectives were (1) to mitigate the effects of the 1AV relays drifting from the required under voltage setpoints specified in the Technical Specification (TS)
and (2) to
revise the existing test circuit to enable testing for failure of the actuating UV relays.
The four protective relays for each load center are interconnected in a two-out-of-two channel trip logic which is actuated if degraded voltage is detected by either logic channel 1 lAVC55 or ITE-27N relay concurrently with either logic 2 1AVC55 OR ITE-27N relay.
The ITE relay protects the 480 VAC System from degraded voltage over a long duration while the IAV relay protects the system during a large voltage transient for a short duration.
The inspectors reviewed the
CFR 50.59 nuclear safety evaluation and determined that it was technically adequate and bounded the scope of activities specified in the engineering package.
A minor TS change request required to eliminate reference to a specific type of relay in the TS was submitted by the Licensee to NRR for approval.
This TS change request has been approved by the NRC.
Additional reviews of the engineering package revealed that adequate post modification testing requirements had been specified.
Within this area no violations or deviations were identified.
PCH 91-166, Replacement of Seal Table Fittings and Thimble Tube Lengthening This PCM involved replacement of the existing seal table fittings with new fittings that contain an integral low pressure seal for refueling.
This PCH also involved lengthening of the thimble tubes to compensate for reduced core inserted thimble and elevations.
The PCH also documented the fact that two of the thimbles in Unit 3 were abandoned and provided a thimble tube isolation design.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's
CFR 50.59 safety evaluation and the
CFR 50.59 safety evaluations provided by Westinghouse to cover installation of the new seal table fittings and to address the thimble tube extension and the abandoning of thimble tubes.
The inspectors determined that the
CFR 50.59 safety evaluations adequately addressed the scope of activities covered by the PCM.
PCM 92-057, HHSI Thermal Relief Valve This PCM involved adding a thermal relief valve on the hot leg SI line associated with containment penetration number 18.
This portion of the SI system was originally provided for over pressure protection by relief valve RV-3-859.
The relief valve was isolated by a manual cross-tie valve used to alleviate operational problems experienced during routine SI accumulator filling operations.
The need for the new relief valve was identified during the DBD review of the SI syste The inspectors reviewed the
CFR 50.59 safety evaluation, PMT results, CGD for the relief valve, stress analysis evaluation, and associated CRNs for the completed PCM.
During review of the CRNs, the inspectors noted that CRN-M-5615 was written to identify an administrative part number change for the relief valve.
The valve par t number change had no impact on the valve materials, rating or configuration.
The inspectors further noted that the plant TEDB was not updated to reflect the change provided by the vendor.
The TEDB is a licensee design document and is part of the licensee's configuration control program.
The inspectors questioned licensee personnel concerning updating of the TEDB and found that licensee personnel had failed to follow procedures by not updating the TEDB.
guality Instruction JPN-gI 3. 1-6, Change Request Notices (CRNs), Revision 2, dated January 1992, requires that when the final disposition for a CRN is provided the cognizant engineer shall review the change to ensure that all affected documents are identified and updated.
This included the TEDB.
During further discussions with licensee personnel, the inspectors found that the CRN incorrectly referred to the change provided by the vendor as a part number change.
However, the change was actually a model number change.
Part numbers and associated changes are not required to be entered in the TEDB, but model numbers and changes are.
This error appeared to contribute to licensee personnel not recognizing the need to update the TEDB.
The licensee wrote DCR-TPM-92-371 dated November 19, 1992, to revise the TEDB to reflect the new part number (model number) for valve RV-3-6511 in accordance with CRN-M-5615 associated with PCM 92-057.
In addition, the licensee also provided training/counseling to site engineering personnel concerning review and evaluation of all PCM documentation to ensure accuracy prior to closure of the PCM.
The inspectors considered that the above item was a
documentation Severity Level V violation which had minor safety significance.
The licensee took appropriate corrective actions to address the finding prior to the inspectors leaving the site.
Therefore, this NRC identified Severity Level V violation is not being cited because criteria specified in Section VII.B of the NRC Enforcement Policy were satisfied.
The finding will be identified as item NCV-50-251/92-29-01, Failure to Update the Total Equipment Data Base to Reflect Vendor Model Number Change.
This item will be opened and closed in this inspection repor i,
PCM 92-063, Reactor Coolant Pump 3B Motor Refurbishment/
Upgrade The PCH documented the replacement of the previously installed RCP motor with a spare motor which was refurbished at the Westinghouse Electro-Mechanical Division facility.
The RCP motor modifications included the following:
Oil Lift System Modification Lower Cooling Coil Modification Thrust Runner Seal Modification Spare Resistance Temperature Detector Modification Lower Bearing Seal Upgrade Oil Pan Upgrade This modification was part of the licensee's on-going program to improve the reliability and performance of all RCPs at Turkey Point.
The inspectors reviewed licensee's safety evaluation and the Westinghouse
CFR 50.59 safety evaluation for the work scope and determined that safety evaluations adequately addressed the work scope.
PCH 92-069, Replacement of Exposed Portions of the Lube Oil Transfer Lines This PCH was prepared as a
HEP by the Site Engineering group and involved replacing portions of the carbon steel lube oil transfer piping with type 316L stainless steel.
The transfer line goes from the lube oil storage tank to the Unit 3 and Unit 4 lube oil reservoir.
The inspectors reviewed the
CFR 50.59 screening and design evaluation and determined that this evaluation adequately addressed the activity scope.
This included the use of different materials, weight, pressure stresses, etc.
No deficiencies were identified.
Design Basis Documentation An evaluation was made to determine if the licensee had a good documented design basis for plant modifications.
A limited review of the licensee's activities in this functional area revealed that the licensee had a good documented design basis program as demonstrated by FPRL Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 DBDs.
The DBD program consists of 18 volumes of which volume 1 addressed licensing commitments and conformance to the requirements of specified codes and standards.
The remaining 17 volumes consisted of CDRs for various safety related and non-safety related systems.
The CDRs are system level descriptions which (1) address how design bases and design constraints have been incorporated into existing system configurations and (2) specify technical design basis requirements and constraint for major system component i
Discussions with the licensee's engineering staff revealed that DBDs are controlled and updated as part of the Configuration Control Program activities.
The inspectors determined, however, that plant modifications implemented during the recent dual unit outage have not yet been incorporated into the DBD.
No deficiencies were identified in this area.
Configuration Control Program The inspectors reviewed the controls developed and implemented by the licensee to assure that the as-built plant is consistent with the documented design basis.
The following documents were reviewed by the inspectors during the performance of this task:
Configuration Management Manual, Revision 0, FP&L Nuclear Division Procedure JPN-gI 3. 10, Drawing Change Requests, (DCRs)
Turkey Point P&ID Reconstitution Project Information PTN Drawing Update Program Workoff Actual and Projected Line Graphs NUREG 1397, An Assessment of Design Control Practices Based on the above review the inspectors concluded that the licensee had developed and implemented a configuration management control program.
The procedural controls described in the CHP manual delineate the methodology for making changes to the plant configuration, either through hardware or software changes.
Additionally, the CHP manual provides flow charts which showed the functional and organizational processes and interfaces that controls implementation of the program.
Responsibility for implementing the CHP has been assigned to the Manager, Configuration Management.
He has reporting to him the Supervisor, Configuration Management, with responsibilities for managing the content, structure, and accuracy of engineering data bases.
Included among these engineering data bases are Drawing Change Requests (DCRs) which are implemented in accordance with the administrative controls specified in procedure JPN-gI 3. 10.
Revisions or update of drawings impacted by installed plant modifications are initiated via the Drawing Change Tracking System.
Additional activities that are presently being implemented by the licensee to ensure plant configuration are (1) the PTN Drawing Update Program and (2) the Turkey Point P&ID Reconstitution Project.
The PTN Drawing Update Program involves the update of drawings having priority 2 or greater and is an NRC commitment
which the licensee will meet upon completing the drawing backlog reduction in December 1992.
Activities related to the Turkey Point P&ID Reconstitution Project involves combining four existing drawings into one drawing.
All new P8 IDs will be issued by December 1992 and will supersede the current drawings during the first quarter of 1993.
e.
PRA Application in Daily Work Discussions with licensee management revealed that the licensee has used PRA in the design control process as a design input to review and evaluate reliability and risks associated with various design options.
This innovative approach to the design control process is demonstrated by the application of PRA to the "Turkey Point Instrument Air Study",
and PCM No.92-108, Replacement of the Raw Water and Service Water System Damaged by Hurricane Andrew.
The licensee has also used the plant specific PRA model to optimize the availability of plant equipment.
The PRA model revealed that simultaneous removal of (I) the SSGFP "8" for quarterly preventive maintenance and (2) the Safety Injection Pumps 4A/4B for IST resulted in a perceptible increase in risk contribution to core melt frequency.
The licensee changed the scheduled quarterly preventive maintenance date for SSGFP
"B" to avoid having this configuration of plant operating equipment.
The inspectors concluded that use of the plant specific PRA model in the evaluation of design options and the control of operating equipment configuration should significantly increase the licensee's capability to evaluate and resolve problems from a nuclear safety standpoint.
Organization, Staffing, and Training The inspectors reviewed the licensee's organization and staffing to determine whether the licensee's engineering organization was adequately staffed to provide effective engineering support to the plant.
The Nuclear Engineering organization is comprised of three departments which report via directors and managers to the Vice President Nuclear Engineering and Licensing.
The three departments are Juno Nuclear Engineering, PSL Site Engineering, and PTN Site Engineering.
This inspection focused on Juno Nuclear Engineering and PTN Site Engineering.
Juno Nuclear Engineering is comprised of seven groups which report to the Director Nuclear Engineering.
Groups reviewed included Technical Programs, Configuration Management, and PTN PEG.
Activities of Technical Programs include PRA, engineering assurance and internal assessments, and training.
Some of these activities are discussed further in other sections of this report.
The Configuration Management Group activities are also discussed in paragraph 2.d of this repor The PTN PEG has a staff of 53 personnel and provides support to the plant in the form of minor design changes, major design changes, studies/plant problem analyses, complex safety/engineering evaluations,,
select contractor design reviews, etc.
The PEG group was established in 1990 with the goal of assuming more design authority responsibility and performing more design change work in-house.
The PEG group is gradually assuming more design responsibility as evidenced by the increase in the number of PCHs prepared by PEG.
Most of smaller scope PCHs were prepared by PEG.
The larger scope PCHs were mainly prepared by the contract architect engineer.
The inspectors reviewed selected PCHs prepared by PEG and determined that the quality and technical content of the PCHs were good.
The licensee is currently performing approximately 70 percent of engineering in house.
This has resulted in a significant reduction in the reliance on contracted engineering services.
The timeliness of the engineering support has also improved.
PTN Site Engineering primarily provides day-to-day real time support to the plant, and is comprised of 58 personnel.
Activities performed by Site Engineering include day-to-day plant support, minor design changes, operability assessments, nonconformance dispositions, temporary system alteration evaluations, safety/engineering evaluations, procurement technical evaluations, commercial grade dedications, etc.
The Site Engineering group's involvement in providing day-to-day support was discussed in paragraph 2.a of this report.
~Tra i ni n In addition to reviewing the licensee's organization and staffing, the inspectors also reviewed the training provided to the engineering staffs.
Training is provided in accordance with the Technical Training Program for the Nuclear Engineering Department.
The Nuclear Engineering training curriculum consists of core courses, basic courses, and advanced and/or specialized courses.
The licensee has established a
guideline that about five percent of an engineer's time will be spent in training.
Core courses include
CFR 50.59 safety evaluations, configuration management, design basis, ALARA, etc.
Basic courses include pipe stress analysis, seismic analysis and design, equipment qualification, pump and valve selection, etc.
Advanced or specialized courses include vibration and balancing, digital circuits, PRA methods, etc.
The core courses are offered to all personnel while the basic courses are discipline related.
The advance courses are offered to one or two individuals requiring the specialized expertise.
Other training includes systems training and site training for those individuals having little or no plant experience.
The licensee has also developed a
training program for entry level engineers.
This program is described in Nuclear Policy NP-901, Entry Engineer Experience and Training Program.
The licensee is in the process of comparing their technical training program to the industry guidelines to determine where their program could be enhance After reviewing the licensee's organization and staff, and the training program, the inspectors concluded that the Juno Nuclear Engineering Department and the PTN Site Engineering group are adequately staffed with knowledgeable engineers who provide timely and effective support to Turkey Point.
The technical training program for engineers was considered above average.
Efforts to enhance the training program were also considered to be a positive indication of managements decision to have a qualified staff.
Violations or deviations were not identified in the areas inspected.
Self Assessment The inspectors reviewed selected licensee activities in this area.
These activities included AE evaluations, PEG evaluations, design reviews, gA audit support, technical alert program, and assessments performed by outside organizations.
The licensee performed evaluations of the major contract AEs and PEG.
These evaluations are performed every six months.
Nine attributes are evaluated with the focus being on engineering packages (PCNs)
and a "report card" is issued.
The inspectors reviewed the last report cards issued for PEG and Bechtel, who is the major contract AE for Turkey Point.
The report cards showed that the overall quality and timeliness of the PCH packages have continued to improve over the most recent six month evaluations.
The licensee has also performed indepth design reviews on selected engineering products and technical assessments of selected PEG activities.
A detailed design review was performed by the discipline chiefs who identified areas where the design control process could be strengthened.
A technical assessment of the PEG PTN/OSH work mix was performed.
This technical assessment reviewed the scope of work which PEG was accepting compared to the scope of work that was being assigned to outside organizations such as the contract AE.
Another aspect of the license's self assessment effort is the Technical Alert Program which was started in 1990.
The technical alerts are a
communication tool which provide quick information.
They are similar to memos and letters.
Sources of technical alerts include information received from vendors, FP&L test programs, identified design package problems, self assessment activities, etc.
There have been five technical alerts issued in 1992.
These have included Appendix R
spurious actuation considerations, stellite wear products in the RCS, fuel reload review, design lessons learned from engineering packages for 1992, and an interpretation of 10 CFR Part 21 substantial safety hazards.
The licensee also had an outside organization (Stone and Webster)
perform an assessment of FPLL's Engineering Assurance, Design Control, and Configuration Nanagement programs.
The assessment report was issued September 29, 1992.
Licensee personnel were reviewing the assessment report to determine what actions were necessary to address the finding '
5.
The inspectors concluded from reviewing the various self assessment activities performed that the licensee has an active self assessment program which critically evaluates the quality of the activities performed by the various engineering organizations.
The inspectors considered the self assessment activities to be positive examples of the licensee's commitment to continue to seek improvement in the quality and timeliness of the engineering support provided to the plant.
Exit Interview e'E ALARA CDR CGD CHP CRN DBD DCR DEEP FPLL FSAR IST JPN HEP NCR NRR OSM P&ID PCH PEG PMT PRA PRB PSL PTN QA RCP RCS Architect Engineer As Low As Reasonably Achievable Component Design Requirement Commercial Grade Dedication Configuration Management Control Program Change Request Notice Design Basis Documentation Drawing Change Request Design Engineering Equivalent Package Florida Power and Light Final Safety Analysis Report Inservice Test Juno Plant Nuclear Minor Engineering Package Nonconformance Report Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Outside Services Management Piping and Instrumentation Drawing Plant Change Modification Production Engineering Group Post Modification Test Probablilistic Risk Assessment Project Review Board Plant Saint Lucie Plant Turkey Nuclear Quality Assurance Reactor Coolant Pump Reactor Coolant System The inspection scope and results were summarized on November 20, 1992, with those person indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed below.
Proprietary information is not contained in this report.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
One non-cited violation was identified, associated with the implementation of plant change modification PCH 92-057, concerning failure to update the total equipment data base to reflect the model number change for newly installed relief valve RV-3-65ll in accordance with change request notice CRN-H-5615 (paragraph 2.b)
Acronyms and Initialisms
REA RFO RV SI SNO SSGFP TEDB TNP TS VAC VDC
Request for Engineering Assistance Refueling Outage Relief Valve Safety Injection Short Notice Outage Standby Steam Generator Feed Pump Total Equipment Data Base Turkey Point Nuclear Technical Specifications Volts Alternating Current Volts Direct Current
l Y
'I
0