IR 05000245/1988004

Insp Repts 50-245/88-04,50-336/88-08 & 50-423/88-06 on 880328-0401.No Noncompliances Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Plan & Implementing Procedures,Mgt Effectiveness,Program Audit,Records & Repts & Detection Aids

ML20153F355
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	04/27/1988
From:	Bailey R, Keimig R, Madden T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20153F348	List: IR 05000245/1988004 ML20153F343
References
50-245-88-04, 50-245-88-4, 50-336-88-08, 50-336-88-8, 50-423-88-06, 50-423-88-6, NUDOCS 8805100306
Download: ML20153F355 (7)

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REGION I

Report No /88-04; 50-336/88-08; and 50-423/88-06 Docket No ; 50-336; and 50-423 License Nos. OPR-21; DPR-65; and NPF-49 Licensee: Northeast Nuclear Energy Corporation P. O. Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06141-0270 Facility Name: Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Inspection At: Waterford, Connecticut Inspection Conducted: March 28 - April 1, 1988 Date of Last Physical Security Inspection: August 31 - September 4, 1987 Type of Inspectim Routin annpunced Physical Security Inspection Inspectors: /&wr 2f en, Phys 1 Se wrjty Inspector '

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(jfR. Bailey,PhysicalSecurityInspector d'a te Approved By: - /N / sEp Safeguards Section M47-88

/R. R. Keim%-Chi date Inspection Summary: Routine unannourced Physical Security Inspection on March 28 - April 1,1988 (Report Nos. 50-245/88-04, 50-336/88-08, and 50-423/88-06)

Areas Inspected: Previously Identified Unresolved Items and Violations; Plan and Implementing Procedures; Management Effectiveness; Organization; Program

, Audit; Records and Reports; Testing and Maintenance; Locks, Keys, and Combinations; l

Physical Barriers - Protected and Vital Areas; Power Supply; Lighting; Compensa-tory Measures; Assessment Aids; Detection Aids; Alarm Stations; Communications; Training and Qualifications; and Safeguards Contingency Plan Exercise Results: The licensee was in compliance with NRC requirements in the areas l'

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DETAILS Key Persons Contacte Licensee and Contractor. Personnel:

H. Haynes - Station Services Superintendent G. Hallberg - Manager, Nuclear Security, P. Weekley - Security Supervisor J. Provencal - Station Services Engineer P. Anhalt - Assistant Security Supervisor - Operations L. Brown - Assistant Security Supervisor - Administration S. Horn - Acting Security Chief, Burns International U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Personnel:

W. Raymond - Senior Resident Inspector L. Kolonanski - Resident Inspector, Unit 1 P. Habighorst - Resident Inspector, Unit 2 The inspectors also interviewed other licensee and contractor security personne . Inspector Follow-Up on Unresolved Item (UI) and Violations (Closed) UI (50-245/87-22-07; 50-336/87-20-07; 50-423/87-18-07) The licensee provided engineering calculations that demonstrated that the control room wall in question does meet the criteria committed to in paragraph 8.3.1 of the NRC-approved Physical Security Plan-(the Plan).

(Closed) Violation (50-245/87-22-01; 50-336/87-20-01; 50-423/87-18-01)

The licensee's security organization was ir full compliance with the commitments made in the Pla (Closed) Violation (50-245/87-22-02; 50-336/87-20-02; 50-423/87-18-02)

The protected area barrier has been modified and is as committed to in the Pla (Closed) Violation (50-245/87-22-03; 50-336/87-20-03; 50-423/87-18-03)

The opening in the vital area barrier has been properly secure (Closed) Violation (50-245/87-22-04; 50-336/87-20-04; 50-423/87-18-04)

The vital area barrier opening has been secured as committed to in para-grcph 5.3.1 of the Pla (Closed) Violation (50-245/87-22-05; 50-336/87-20-05; 50-423/87-18-05)

The opening in the vital area barrier has been properly secure (Closed) Violation (50-245/87-22-08; 50-336/87-20-08; 50-423/87-18-08)

The vital area barrier opening has been secured as committed to in para-graph 5.3.1 of the Pla ,

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(Closed) Violation (50-245/87-22-10; 50-336/87-20-10; 50-423/87-18-10)

The exterior lighting is as committed by paragraph 7.3 of the Pla (Closed) Violation (50-245/87-22-11; 50-336/87-20-11; 50-423/87-18-11)

Compensatory measures were as committed to in paragraph 4.2.4.6 of the Pla (Closed) Violation (50-245/87-22-12; 50-336/87-20-12; 50-423/87-18-12)

Hands on searches of non-regular employees were being conducted as committed to in paragraph 6.4.1.4 of the Pla (Closed) Violation (50-245/87-22-13; 50-336/87-20-13; 50-423/87-18-13)

The licensee demonstrated that the switches used met NRC performance objectives and this apparent violation was withdrawn by the NR . Security Plan and Implementing Procedures The inspectors met with licensee representatives and discussed the Plan and its implementing procedures. As a result of these discussions, and a review of the plan and procedures, it was determined that implementing procedures were current, clear, concise and consistent with commitments in the Pla . Management Effectiveness - Security Programs The inspectors determined through discussions with licensee representatives that the following actions had been initiated to enhance the effectiveness of the security program:

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The licensee has initiated a total security system upgrade (barriers, detection aids, and assessment aids) in preparation for a forthcoming NRC Regulatory Effectiveness Review (RER). This upgrade is approximately 60% complet New administrative offices and classroom facilities for the security force contractor (Burns International) were constructe A security review committee to review changes to security plans, procedures, instructions, training aids, and security related events has been established. This committee included plant management, security management, security force contractor management, security force contractor training management, and contractor security force representatio Two additional patrol vehicles were added for use by the security organizatio >

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6. Security Organization The inspectors reviewed the security organization and determined by observation and interview that all positions were filled, responsibilities were clearly defined and understood, and the organization was as committed to in the Pla . Security Program Audit The inspectors reviewed security program audit reports and verified that the audits had been conducted in accordance with the Plan. The audits were comprehensive in scope and the results were reported to the appropciate level of management. The inspector's review included the response of th.)

security organization to the audit findings and the corrective action taken to remedy any adverse findings. The documented corrective actions appeared appropriate for the findings, however, in some cases, the corrective action follow-up was not accomplished until the following audit. The inspectors discussed this with the licensee who agreed to consider incorporating quality assurance type follow up activities within the program procedure . Records and Reports Tne inspectors reviewed testing and maintenance records. The testing and maintenance records committed to in the Plan were on file and readily available for licensee review and NRC inspectio . Testing and Maintenance The inspectors reviewed the testing and maintenance records and procedures for the intrusion detection system, card readers, X-ray machines, metal detectors, explosives detectors, and assessment aids. The inspectors determined that the licensee had established a computerized tracking system to expedite the initiation of maintenance requests on security related equipment. The inspectors were advised that the licensee plans to assign an I&E Technician to the security organization in the near futur No discrepancies were identified relative to either the records or proce-dures.

l 1 Locks, Keys, and Combinations The inspectors reviewed the installation, storage, rotation, and appropriate records for all locks, keys, and combinations and determined them to be as committed to in the Pla ,

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1 Physical Barriers - Protected Area The inspectors conducted a physical inspection of the protected area barriers. The inspectors determined, by observation, that the barriers were installed and maintained as described in the Pla . Physical Barriers - Vital Areas The inspectors conducted a physical inspection of the vital area barriers and determined, by observation, that the barriers were installed and maintained as described in the Plan, except for those previously identified (50-245/87-22-06; 50-336/87-20-06; 50-423/87-18- 06) and (50-245/87-22-09; 50-336/87-20-09; 50-423/87-18-09) for which the licensee had instituted appropriate compensatory measures and was actively trying to correct the identified problem . Security System power Supply The inspectors reviewed the security uninterruptible power supply and determined that the system functioned and was tested and maintained as committed to in the Pla . Lighting The inspectors observed the lighting within the protected area on March 30, 1988. All areas observed were lighted to a minimum of 0.2 foot-candle as required by NRC regulations and as committed to in the Pla . Cempensatory Measures The inspectors reviewed the licensee's use of compensatory measures and actermined them to be as committed to in the Pla . Assessment Aids The inspectors observed the operation of the assessment aids and deter-mined that they were functioning as committed by the Pla . Access Control - Personnel, Packages, and Vehicles The inspectors reviewed the personnel, package, and vehicle access control procedures and determined that they were consistent with commitments in the Plan. This determination was made by observing personnel access processing during shift changes, visitor access processing, and discussions with members of the security force about personnel, package, and vehicle access procedure '

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1 Detection Aids - Protected Area The inspectors observed the protected area perimeter detection aids and determined that they were installed, maintained, and operated as committed to in the Pla T";. n;e rer n gng7;7j.;p.g .'3 SDS llF J , ". 3 ." 't F ;,.. . :na p;ggg

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1 Detection Aids - Vital Areas The inspectors observed the vital area detection aids and determined that they were installed, maintained, and operated as committed to in the Pla . Alarm Stations The inspectors observed the operation of both the CAS and SAS and found them to be operating as committed to in the Plan. CAS and SAS operators were interviewed by the inspectors and were found to be knowledgeable of their duties and responsibilitie . Communications The inspectors observed tests of all communication capabilities in both the CAS and the SAS and reviewed testing records for the various means of communications available to the security force. They were found to be as committed to in the Plan.

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22. Personnel Training and Qualification - General Requirements The inspectors randomiy selected and reviewed training lesson plans. In addition, the inspectors reviewed a videotape of the licensee's basic tactical training and interviewed training personnel, both instructor and management. The inspectors determined that all required training was being conducted in accordance with the pla . Safeguards Contingency Plan Implementation Review The inspectors reviewed the critiques of security response force drills that have been conducted since December 1987 and determined that, while each threat situation identified in the NRC-approved Security Contingency Plan (SCP) was exercised, the drills conducted in response to several threats were all conducted in the same general site area. In addition, the inspectors determined that the drill scenarios for dealing with these did not include all of the elements of the design basis threat as outlined in the SCP. Further, participation by operating shift personnel in these security contingency drills was extremely limited and not to the degree anticipated by the NRC in Information Notice 83-27. The Station Services Superintendent acknowledged these observations and stated that his staff would develop additional drill scenarios to incorporate more active participation by the plant operating staff and to ensure that exercise locations were varie . Physical Protection Safeguards Information The inspectors determined, by observation and by review of selected records, that the physical protection of safeguards information on site was as committed to in the Pla . Exit Interview The inspectors met with the licensee representatives lis* ad in paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the inspection on March 31, 1988. At that time, the purpose and scope of the inspection were reviewed and the findings were presente At no time during this inspection was written material provided to the licensee by the inspectors.

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