IR 05000244/1988019
| ML17251A348 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 11/08/1988 |
| From: | Cowgill C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17251A347 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-244-88-19, NUDOCS 8811160559 | |
| Download: ML17251A348 (20) | |
Text
I U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
50-244/88-19 Licensee No.
OPR-18 Pri o'rity Category C
Licensee:
Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation 49 East Avenue Rochester, New York Facility:
R.
E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Location:'ntario, New York Inspection Conducted:
September 12 through October 16, 1988 Inspectors:
C.
S. Marschall, Senior Resident Inspector, Ginna N. S. Perry, Resident Inspector, Ginna Approved by:
C.
.
Cowgill Chief, Reactor Projects Section 1A Date
~Summar:
a Areas Ins ected:
Routine ins ection b
the resident iris ectors of st p
Y p
ation activi-ties including plant operations, operational safety verification, surveillance testing, maintenance, ra'diological protection, physical security, written reports, periodic and special reports, and action on previous inspection findings.
Results:
An Unusual Event,due to loss of site security lighting was responded to during off hours by the Senior Resident Inspector (section 2.i.).
Significant improvement in housekeeping was noted in the Auxiliary Building (section 2.j.).
The resident inspectors attended a meeting of the Nuclear Safety Audit and Review Board (NSARB) and discussed plans for improvement with the NSARB chairman (section 2.k.).
guality Assurance audits for 1987 and 1988 of operations and maintenance activities were compared; significant improvement was noted in the 1988 audits (section 2.1.).
Licensee efforts to identify and reduce an increase in Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leakage were closely monitored (section 3.).
Followup of violation 50-244/88-16-02 revealed additional examples of nonadherence to proce-dures in the area of guality Control (section 4.).
8811 ih0559 881108 PDR ADOCK 05000244
PNV
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted During this inspection period, inspector s held discussions with and inter-viewed operators, technicians, engineers and supervisory level personnel.
The following people were among those contacted:
"C.
R.
- J.
C.
'AD R.
M.
'R. A.
- T. A.
J.
T.
T.
R.
L. F.
"S.
M.
"J, A.
R.
E.
Anderson, Quality Assurance Manager Bodine, Nuclear Assurance Manager Filkins, Chemistry
& Health Physics Manager Kober, Senior Vice President, Production and Engineering Marchionda, Training Manager Marlow, Maintenance Manager St. Martin, Station Engineer Schuler, Operations Manager Smith, Operations Supervisor Spector, Superintendent, Ginna Station Widay, Technical Manager Mood, Supervisor, Nuclear Security
- Denotes persons present at exit meeting on October 27, 1988.
2.
Functional or Pro ram Areas Ins ected a.
Review of Plant 0 erations (71707)
The plant operated at full power throughout the inspection period.
On September 18, 1988 an Unusual Event was declared when security lighting was lost at 7:51 p.m.
due to failure of a electric cable terminal lug in an automatic switching device.
Electricians restored power at 1:00 a.m.
on September 19, 1988, and the Unusual Event was terminated.
The Unusual Event is discussed in detail in section 2.i.
b.
0 erational Safet Verification (71707)
On a daily basis, inspectors observed shift turnover and conduct of operations in the control room.
Proper control room staffing was main-tained and control room access was controlled.
Operators were attentive, responsive to plant parameters and conditions, and adhered to approved procedures for ongoing activities.
Control room log books were reviewed to 'obtain information concerning activities and out-of-service equipment and use of overtime was audited for compliance with licensee
.and regula-tory requirements.
On a weekly basis, the inspectors checked an Engineered Safety Feature System train for operability.
The following were verified: accessible valves in the flow path in proper position; proper power supply and breaker alignment, and appropriate MOVs deenergize Additionally, trains were inspected for leakage,. lubrication, cooling and general condition.
The inspectors regularly toured all accessible areas of the plant and observed general conditions of the plant and equipment, potential fire hazards, control of activities in progress, control of housekeeping (section 2.j.) and the presence of potential missile hazards.
Biweekly the inspectors reviewed the sampling program, the problem iden-tification systems, and one safety-related tagout for proper implementa-tion.
In addition, the inspectors verified correct lineup of a portion of the containment isolation system and proper posting of required notices.
No conditions adverse to safety were identified.
c.
Monthl Surveillance Observation (61726)
Inspectors observed portions of surveillance test procedures to verify test instrumentation was properly calibrated, approved procedures were used, work was performed by qualified personnel, Limiting Conditions for Operation were met, and the system was correctly restored following testing.
The following surveillance activity was observed:
Periodic Test (PT)-12.5, Revision 6, "Technical Support Center Emergency Diesel Test", effective date October 13, 1988, observed October 14, 1988.
Licensee control of this surveillance activity was considered adequate to insure operability.
Additional observation of surveillance activity is discussed in section 3., below.
d.
Monthl Maintenance Observations (62703)
The inspectors observed portions of various safety-related maintenance activities to determine redundant components were operable, activities did not violate Li'miting Conditions for Operation, required administra-tive approvals and tagouts were obtained prior to initiating work, ap-proved procedures were used or the activity was within the "skills of the trade", appropriate radiological controls were implemented, igni-tion/fire prevention controls were properly implemented, and equipment was properly tested prior to returning it to service.
Maintenance (M)-32. 1, "DB-25, DB-50 and DB-75 Circuit Breaker Main-tenance and Overcurrent Trip Device Test and/or Replacement",
re-vision 27, effective date July 27, 1988, observed October 14, 198 Calibration Procedure (CP)-64, "Calibration and/or 'Maintenance of the 'A'r 'B'mergency Diesel Generator Instrumentation",
revision 7, effective date August 12, 1988, observed September 15, 1988.
Licensee control of these activities was adequate to ensure component operability.
e.
Radiolo ical Protection Review (71707)
During this inspection period, the resident inspectors periodically verified RWPs were implemented properly, dosimetry was correctly worn in controlled areas and dosimeter readings were accurately recorded, access control at entrances to high radiation areas was adequate, per-sonnel used contamination monitors as required when exiting controlled areas, and postings and labeling were in compliance with regulations and procedures.
As noted in section 2.j., extensive licensee cleaning efforts have been undertaken to open most, areas of the Auxiliary Building to access without the requirement for protective clothing.
This effort also involved ex-tensive surveys and changes to radiation posting by health physics per-sonnel.
guality of postings has improved noticeably during this effort.
Improved cleanliness and radiation area postings are indicative of in-creased management attention in radiological protection.
f.
Ph sical Securit Review (71707)
During this inspection period, the resident inspectors verified x-ray machines and metal and explosive detectors were operational, Protected Area (PA) and Vital Area (VA) barriers were well maintained, access con-trol during security turnover was adequate, personnel were properly badged for unescorted or escorted access and co'mpensatory measures were implemented when necessary.
Security response to an Unusual Event, discussed in section 2.i.,
was monitored for compliance with the security plan.
Compensatory measures taken by security personnel were appropriate and timely.
g.
Review of Written Re orts of Nonroutine Events (90712)
Written reports submitted to the NRC were reviewed to determine whether details were clearly reported, causes properly identified and corrective actions appropriate.
The inspectors also determined whether assessment of potential safety consequences had been properly evaluated, generic implications were indicated, events warranted onsite follow-up, reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 were applicable, and requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 had been properly me The following LERs were reviewed and found to be satisfactory (Note:
dates indicated are event dates):
88-008, October 3, 1988, Safeguards Bus Undervoltage relay actuation due to a failed solid state switch causing automatic start of
'B'mergency Oiesel Generator.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
h.
Review of Periodic and S ecial Re orts (90713)
Upon receipt, periodic and special reports submitted by the licensee pursuant to Technical Specifications 6.9. 1 and 6.9.3 were reviewed by the inspectors.
This review included the following considerations:
re-ports contained information required by the NRC; test results and/or supporting information were consistent with design predictions and per-formance specifications and reported information was valid.
Within this scope, the following report was reviewed by the inspectors:
Monthly Operating Report for September 1988.
The report= was considered adequate to meet regulatory requirements.
Unusual 'Event (93702)
On September 18, 1988 at 8:41 P.M.,
an Unusual Event was declared due to loss of site perimeter high mast lighting.
A terminal lug burned up isolating security loads from the normal site power supply and the security emergency diesel generator.
Emergency backup supplies provided temporary power for the security computer and card readers for the doors; however, the site perimeter high mast lighting deenergized since emer-gency supplies do not provide backup power to these lights.
Supplemental security personnel were called to provide compensatory measures and local law enforcement personnel responded.
At 1:00 A.M. on September 19, 1988, the Unusual Event was terminated after electricians completed temporary repairs and restored normal onsite power to security loads.
Permanent repairs to the system were completed on September 20, 1988.
A visiting inspector was in the control room.and the senior resident.
inspector arrived during the Unusual Event.
The inspectors observed that control room personnel were not familiar with security procedures and security reporting requirements.
The supervisor of Nuclear Security indicated he was aware of the problem and committed to address it with the control room shift supervisors.
At the close of the inspection period, the supervisor of Nuclear Security had contacted approximately
.
half of the control room shift supervisor ~Hk i
(717II7)
During this inspection period cleanup efforts continued in the Auxiliary and Intermediate Buildings to open them for general access with street clothing.
The licensee expects both buildings to be opened on November 1,
1988, with isolated areas restricted to access with protective cloth-ing.
The inspectors observed areas in the Auxiliary and Intermediate Buildings roped off and clearly marked as requiring additional protective clothing.
Additionally, areas in the Screenhouse, where service water and fire water pumps are located, recently were thoroughly cleaned.
Extraneous material, such as temporary fans and valve wrenches, was re-moved; the floor was cleaned and painted, and the service water pump casings were cleaned.
Increased management attention was clearly evident in the effectiveness of the licensee's efforts to cleanup the entire plant.
The inspectors will continue to monitor cleaning activities in future inspections.
k.
Offsite Review Committee (71707)
On October 5,
1988 the resident inspectors attended a portion of meeting number 166 of the Nuclear Safety Audit and Review Board (NSARB) for Ginna Station.
On October 14, 1988 the inspectors met with senior corporate officials, including the present and future NSARB chairmen, to discuss observed committee activities.
Corporate officials indicated several changes were being considered to improve the effectiveness of NSARB.
The changes include: filling a currently vacant position normally held by a contractor to increase overall industry perspective, modifications of the NSARB agenda to better focus the review process, board member participation in plant audit activitie's and a revision to the NSARB charter to provide clearer guidance of the committee's objectives.
Ad-ditional review of the effectiveness will be documented in a future in-spection report.
l.
ualit Assurance Audit Review (71707)
Inspectors reviewed the following audits to establish a basis for com-parison of Quality Assurance (QA) audits conducted in 1987 with those conducted in 1988:
Audit of Ginna Station Operations and Technical Specification Ad-herence, Audit Number 87-12:JB, dated April 15, 1987; Audit of Ginna Maintenance 5 Repair Activities, Audit Serial Number 87-17:DB, dated June 22, 1987; Audit of Ginna Station Operations and Technical Specification Ad-herence, Audit Number 88-14:JB, dated April 21, 1988; and
Audit of Ginna Maintenance
& Repair Activities, Audit Serial Number 88-17:BS, dated June 14, 1988.
Audits reviewed for 1987 encompassed an average of 36.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> whereas the audits reviewed for 1988 encompassed an average of 92 hours0.00106 days <br />0.0256 hours <br />1.521164e-4 weeks <br />3.5006e-5 months <br />.
The 1987 audits were conducted by reviewing logs", documents, procedures and records, by discussion with personnel and by'onducting tours of specific areas of the plant.
In 1988, seventy percent of the 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br /> expended on the operations and Technical Specification Adherence audit was in discussion with personnel and observation of their performance; forty-five percent of the 88 hours0.00102 days <br />0.0244 hours <br />1.455026e-4 weeks <br />3.3484e-5 months <br /> expended on the maintenance audit was in direct observation of activities.
The 1987 operations audit had no findings and required no response; the 1987 maintenance audit had two findings related to procedure adherence and the failure to establish a
valve maintenance work list.
The 1988 audit of operations addressed the need for management attention in the areas of operator rounds, special operating instructions, procedural adherence and enhancement, discrepancy tracking, system interaction with moveable objects, operator experience, posting and labeling, housekeeping and "Bypass of Safety Function and Jumper Control"; one finding and four observations requiring individual responses were discussed in the audit.
The 1988 audit of maintenance identified eight findings, all related to the failure to implement pro-cedural requirements; each maintenance finding required response.
The increased emphasis, in 1988 audits, on observations of performance, as opposed to document review, resulted in findings which addressed sig-nificant weaknesses in the areas reviewed; increased emphasis on obser-vation of performance is considered a significant improvement in the quality of gA audits.
3.
Reactor Coolant S stem RCS /Safet Injection SI Leak (61726)
On October 3, 1988 after Periodic Test (PT)-2. 1, Safety Injection (SI) System, was performed, the discharge of the 'A'nd 'B'I pumps rose to 1735 psig and 1780 psig respectively.
A relief valve in the discharge piping, set to open at 1735 psig, lifted, directing the water to the Pressurizer Relief Tank (PRT).
PRT and accumulator level increases indicated Reactor Coolant System (RCS) inleakage to the SI system was approximately
.5 gpm.
Operators took action to stop the relief valve from lifting by throttling open a normally closed valve in the SI test line to the Refueling'ater Storage Tank (RWST).
Plant personnel entered the containment building, took SI piping temperature readings and used a sonic flow detector to look for indications of check valve back leakage.
Although results of the examination were inconclusive, the lic-ensee planned to perform procedure EM-670, Check Valve 878-J Seatin
, which attempts to seat check valve 878-J by striking the cover of the valve several times with a sand mallet.
When the inspectors questioned the motive for striking a valve which did not clear ly evidence leakage, the licensee aborted procedure EM-670.
Operators fully opened the SI test line valve to the RWST and lowered the SI piping pressure as much as possible, creating maximum
pressure differential across the check valves in an attempt to seat them.
The SI test line valve was closed and system response was carefully observed.
'A'nd 'B'I pump discharge pressures stabilized at approximately 1050 psig and 750 psig, respectively.
Over the n'ext few days, the 'A'I pump discharge pressure slowly increased to 1300 psig.
The licensee obtained additional SI piping temperatures both inside and outside containment to determine which check valves might be leaking and developed a special test procedure to iden-tify and potentially seat the suspected leaking check valve.
On October 10, 1988, Special Test (ST)-88.2 was initiated.
Operators closed three SI valves inside the containment building and monitored SI pump di s-charge pressures and accumulator levels.
The resident inspector was in the control room and observed 'A'I pump discharge pressure decrease to the same indication as 'B'I pump discharge pressure.
Additionally, the rate of level increase in the 'B'ccumulator decreased dramatically.
This indicated check valve 878G, in the 'A'I pump discharge piping was leaking.
ST-88,2 was continued on October 11, 1988 with flushing of check valve 878G.
An SI pump was started and valves were aligned to allow flow of approximately
gpm through the check valve.
After the flushing process, inleakage from the RCS to the accumulator halted.
Neither Technical Specification limits on RCS leakage, nor design pressure for any of the components in the SI system were.exceeded during the activities discussed above.
Although licensee control of troubleshooting and corrective action initially appeared to be based on inconclusive data, overall, plant management insured adequate planning and review for effective control of actions to identify the leakage path and correct the cause of leakage.
ualit Assurance Pro ram Im lementation (71707)
Ouring follow-up of violation 50-244/88-16-02, regarding procedure nonadher-ence, inspectors reviewed administrative procedure A-1501, Control of Non-conformin Items, revision 7, effective February 16, 1987 and A-1502, Non-conformance Re or ts, revision 10, effective March 13, 1987 and inspected for, compliance with the procedures.
Review of a surveillance on the Service Water (SW) system revealed adequate control of operations and maintenance related activities; however, failures to adhere to procedures A-1501 and A-1502 were evident as discussed below:
Among the examples of nonconformances given in procedure A-1502 step 3. 1.3 are physical defects and failure to meet test acceptance criteria.
When PT-2.7, Service Water S stem, revision 42, effective September 12, 1988 was per-formed on September 16, 1988, the C Service Water pump failed to meet the acceptance criteria for developed differential pressure at the specified flow.
A Maintenance Work Request was written and the pump was considered inoperable but available for use.
Operations personnel placed an operator aid tag on the control,.room switch to insure operator awareness of the pump statu Procedure A-1501, step 3.1 requires initiation of a Nonconformance Report (NCR) for items identified as nonconforming in accordance with procedure A-1502.
Procedure A-1501, step 3.4, also requires nonconforming items identi-fied during use, inservice inspection and surveillance testing shall be re-ported to guality Control and, as necessary to prevent inadvertent use, tagged with a yellow hold tag.
Step 3.4 further requires, to preclude use of the item pending NCR disposition approval and eventual disposition implementation, the item should be held per procedure A-1401, Station Holdin Rules or the NCR be approved for interim use by a Ginna Superintendent.
Contrary to the above, plant personnel. failed to initiate an NCR when the C
Service Mater Pump failed to meet acceptance criteria during surveillance testing.
Further, when an NCR was initiated after. inspectors pointed out the requirements of A-1501, plant personnel failed to place an equipment hold to prevent inadvertent use.
Additional examples of nonadherence with procedure A-1501 are failure to place a hold on the reactor head vent solenoids when an NCR was initiated, and failure to place a hold on the B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) when an NCR was issued for use of a commercially available differential pressure switch in the diesel lube oil system, requiring a safety-grade part.
These instances illustrate complacency and lack of formality.
In addition, operators were unaware of the open NCR on the B
EDG until the inspector in-formed them of its existence during the post maintenance surveillance test.
This illustrates the possibility of safety-related equipment being inoperable without knowledge of the control room operators, despite existence of an NCR.
This an identified programmatic weakness and will be followed as part of the inspection program.
The instances of failure to adhere to procedure A-1502 are additional examples of the violation contained in Inspection Report 50-244/88-16.
By letter from Lee H. Bettenhausen (NRC) to Robert Mecredy (RG&E) dated October 5, 1988 and phone conversation between Lee Bettenhausen and Robert Mecredy on October 6, 1988, the licensee agreed to incorporate the broader corrective actions to violation 50-244/88-16-02 within the response to Inspection Report 50-244/88-15, Integrated Performance Assessment Team ( IPAT) findings.
Corrective action for violation 88-16-02 is also expected to provide corrective action for violations identified above; therefore no violation will be issued pending review of licensee response to violation 50-244/88-16-02.
Exit Interview (30703)
At periodic intervals during the inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss inspection scope and finding During this inspection period, a review of implementation of procedures con-trolling Nonconformances revealed additional examples of nonadherence to pro-ceduress in the area of guality Control.
These examples illustrate complacency, lack of formality'and indicate a weakness in"the licensee's ability to insure operability of safety-related equipment.
A review of 1987 and 1988 guality Assurance audits for maintenance and opera-tions revealed significant improvement in the method of conducting audits and the quality of the findings.
Inspectors noted a significant housekeeping improvement in the Auxiliary and Screenhouse Buildings as a result of increased management attention to these areas.
Based on NRC Region I review of this report and discussion held with licensee representatives, it was determined this report does not contain information subject to
CFR 2.790 restriction iS