IR 05000244/1988012
| ML17251A199 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 07/22/1988 |
| From: | Cowgill C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17251A197 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-244-88-12, NUDOCS 8808040227 | |
| Download: ML17251A199 (24) | |
Text
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
50-244/88-12 Licensee No.
DPR-18 Priority Category C
Licensee:
Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation 49 East Avenue Rochester, New York Facility:
Location:
R.
E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Ontario, New York Inspection Conducted:
June 13 through July 10, 1988 Inspectors:
C.
S. Marschall, Senior Resident Inspector, Ginna N.
S. Perry, Resident Inspector, Ginna Approved by:
C. J.
owgil ie
, Reactor Projects Section lA Date
~Summa r:
A~:R I
I I
I I
I A
ties including plant operations, Engineered Safety Feature system walkdown, opera-tional safety verification, surveillance testing, maintenance, radiological pro-tection, physical security, written reports, periodic and special reports, storage battery adequacy audit, special report late submittal, and action on previous in-spection findings.
Results:
In the twelve areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
One unresolved item was closed out (section 3) and another unresolved item remains open pending further licensee corrective actions (section 3).
Overall, the plant was operated safely during the inspection period.
8808040227 880725 PDR ADOCK 05000244
PNU
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted During this inspection period, inspectors held discussions with and inter-viewed operators, technicians, engineers and supervisory level personnel.
The following people were among those contacted:
- J.
C.
J.
C.
~D L
R.
W.
R. A.
T. A.
T. A.
C.
E.
~J.
T.
T.
R.
L.
F.
"B. A.
- S.
M.
- J. A.
R.
E.
Bodine, Nuclear Assurance Manager Clas, Electrical Preventive, Maintenance Analyst Filkins, Chemistry
& Health Physics Man'ager Kober, Senior Vice President, Production and Engineering Marchionda, Training Manager Marlow, Maintenance Manager Meyer, Superintendent, Ginna Support. Services Rauber, Electrician Foreman St. Martin, Station Engineer Schuler, Operations Manager Smith, Operations Supervisor Snow, Superintendent, Nuclear Production Spector, Superintendent, Ginna Station Widay, Technical Manager Wood, Supervisor, Nuclear Security
"Denotes persons present at exit meeting on July 15, 1988.
2.
Functional or Pro ram Areas I~os ected a.
Review of Plant 0 erations 71707 At the beginning of the inspection period, the plant was operating at full power.
The plant operated at full power throughout the inspection period.
b.
En ineered Safet Feature ESF S stem Walkdown 71710 A complete walkdown of accessible portions of the Containment Spray and NaOH Additive System was performed to verify its operability.
The in-spectors verified the licensee's lineup matched plant drawings and as-built configurations.
System components were checked for labeling, cleanliness, and state of repair.
In two instances, the as-built con-figurations differed from as-built drawings.
The inspectors provided the discrepancies to licensee management.
No conditions adverse to safety were identified.
C.
0 erational Safet Verification 71707 On a daily basis, inspectors observed shift turnover and conduct of operations in the control room.
Operators were attentive and responsive to plant parameters and condition d..
Monthl Survei 1 lance Observation 61726 Inspectors observed portions of surveillance test procedures to verify test instrumentation was properly calibrated, approved procedures were used, work was performed by qualified personnel, Limiting Conditions for Operation were met, and the system was correctly restored following testing.
The following surveillance activities were observed:
Periodic Test (PT)-3, Revision 42, "Containment Spray Pumps and NaOH Additive System", effective date August 1, 1986, observed June 30, 1988.
During the last inspection period, the inspectors noted personnel were climbing on plant equipment to access valves.
This period, the inspec-tors observed personnel properly using ladders to access valves.
The ladders were brought to the work area prior to starting work.
The in-spectors will revi ew further progress in future inspection reports.
Monthl
.Maintenance Observations 62703 The inspectors observed portions of various safety-related maintenance activities to determine that redundant components were operable, activi-ties did not violate Limiting Conditions for Operation, required admini-strative approvals and tagouts were obtained prior to initiating work, approved procedures were used or the activity was within the "skills of the trade", appropriate radiological controls were implemented, ignition/
fire prevention controls were properly implemented, and equipment was properly tested prior to returning it to service.
Maintenance (M)-11. 15,
"RHR Pumps Inspection/Maintenance",
effective date March 19, 1988, observed July 6, 1988.
Calibration Procedure (CP)-210B, "Calibration and/or Maintenance of RMS Channel", effective date January 11, 1988, observed June 23, 1988.
Technicians were knowledgeable and well-qualified to perform the indi-cated work.
Licensee control of these activities was ade'quate to ensure component operability.
f.
Radiolo ical Protection Review 71709 During this inspection period, the resident inspectors verified on a
random basis:
RWPs were implemented properly; dosimetry was properly worn in controlled areas; dosimeter readings were recorded properly; access control at entrances to high radiation areas was adequate; work conducted in high radiation areas was performed in compliance with the RWP; per-
sonnel used contamination monitors as required when exiting controlled areas, and postings and labeling were in compliance with regulations and procedures'.
Ph sical Securit Review 71881 During this inspection period, the resident inspectors verified on a
random basis:
x-ray machines and metal and explosive detectors were operational; Protected Area (PA) and Vital Area (VA) barriers were well maintained; access control during security turnover was adequate; per-sonnel were properly badged for unescorted or escorted access, and the minimum guard compliment was maintained with a director for onsite security activities over at least one 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period.
h.
Review of Written Re orts of Nonroutine Events 90712 Written reports submitted to the NRC were reviewed to determine whether details were clearly reported, causes properly identified and corrective actions appropriate.
The inspectors also determined whether assessment of potential safety consequences had been properly evaluated, generic implications were indicated, events warranted onsite follow-up, reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 were applicable, and requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 had been properly met.
The following LER was reviewed and found to be satisfactory (Note: date indicated is event date):
88-005, 6/1/88, Low Steam Generator Water Level Due to Blown Fuse in Controlling Feedwater Flow Channel Causes Reactor Trip and Sub-sequent Safety Injection.
This event was the subject of a special inspection (88-11).
Review of Periodic and S ecial Re orts 90713 Upon receipt, periodic and special reports submitted by the licensee pursuant to Technical Specifications 6.9. 1 and 6.9.3 were reviewed by the inspectors.
This review included the following considerations:
re-ports contained information required by the NRC; test results and/or supporting information were consistent with design predictions and per-formance specifications; and reported information was valid.
Within this scope, the following report was reviewed by the inspectors:
Monthly Operating Report for May 1988.
The report was considered adequate to meet regulatory requirement Stora e Batter Ade uacy Audit 71707 In accordance with Region I Temporary Instruction (TI) 87-07, Storage Battery Adequacy Audit, the inspectors reviewed the adequacy of control over storage battery operability and compliance with existing NRC requirements, using At-tachment 1 to TI 87-07 as guidance.
Attachment 2 to TI 87-07 was provided to the licensee to assist the utility in providing information efficiently; a copy of Attachment 2 is included as Appendix 1 to this inspection report.
The 2 vital batteries in service are Gould type NA)(-1200.
The "A" battery was installed on March 12, 1985 and the "B" battery was installed on February 19, 1986; each battery is comprised of 60 cells.
Additionally, three cells were purchased as replacement cells for the batteries that were replaced; one of these cells was installed in 1982 and the'other two cells were installed in 1984.
The three replacement cells are retained as spare cells.
In 1986, the three spare cells were seismically tested in accordance with IEEE 344-1975 by National Technical Systems, Acton, Massachusetts; no evidence of anomaly, physical damage or failure to meet the stipulated acceptance criteria was reported.
The licensee is developing a program to periodically test the spare cells, which are two or three years older than the installed cells, for age effects.
The three spare cells are not, being load tested comparably to the installed cells; however, the licensee has committed to developing a program to incorporate the spare cells into an annual test and to perform additional load tests to get the testing back on a schedule comparable to the installed cells.
The battery racks were seismically qualified by analysis in 1981.
Both battery racks and cells are visually inspected on a monthly and quarterly basis for general condition.
The licensee verified the size of the battery through analysis and acceptance testing after installation.
Loads are not added to the battery without proper engineering evaluations.
The effects of jumpered out cells are considered in the five year performance test which determines capacity through an eight hour load test.
The battery rooms are equipped with an emergency OC fan and a normally oper-ating exhaust fan.
Licensee analysis indicates that during the worst case, hydrogen concentration will remain below
. 1 percent.
Adequate ventilation is verified during the annual service test.
Additionally, loss of battery room ventilation is alarmed in the control room.
Surveillance procedures contain precautions prohibiting sparks and flames near the batteries, and heaters installed in the battery rooms are explosion-resistant electrical heaters.
The licensee's quarterly surveillance procedure requires the electrical fore-man to determine if an equalizing charge is required.
An equalizing charge is required if water was added, equalizing charge has not been performed within three months, the specific gravity of a cell is more than 10 points below the average, the average specific gravity of all cells drops more than 10 points from the average installation values, or the floating voltage of
any cell is below 2.13 volts.
Procedures require. only D.I. water be used for water additions.
A Maintenance Mork Request (MWR) is initiated if cell tem-perature deviates more than 5 degrees F from each other.
The inspectors reviewed the initial acceptance testing for the batteries, the licensee's annual service test procedure, and the five year performance test procedure.
The performance test is required to be performed annually if the battery capacity drops more than 10 percent of rated capacity from its ca-pacity on the previous performance test, has reached less than or equal to 90 percent of the manufacturer's rating, or the battery has reached 85 percent of its service life.
Procedures recommend replacing the battery if its ca-pacity is below 80 percent of the manufacturer's rating.
Other safety-significant wet cell batteries were reviewed by the inspectors to verify adequate procedures exi sted to verify operability.
The following batteries were reviewed:
Technical Support Center (TSC) battery, security battery, fire system batteries, diesel fire pump battery, and TSC diesel bat-tery.
The inspectors examined all batteries listed and concluded that the general condition of all batteries and surroundings was adequate.
No combustibles or localized heat sources were observed; area ventilation systems were in operation, cells were properly secured, battery caps were in place with no thermometers installed, and access to the vital batteries was key card re-stricted.
The following procedures were reviewed by the inspectors:
PT-10.2, Station Battery 1B Service Test, effective 2-5-88 PT-10.3, Station Battery lA Service Test, effective 3-24-88 PT-10.4, 1A Station Battery Performance Test, effective 2-5-88 PT-10.5, 1B Station Battery Performance Test, effective 3-24-88 PT-10.6, TSC Battery Discharge Test, effective 8-19-86 PT-ll, 60 Cell Battery Banks 'A'nd 'B', effective 2-11-88 PT-11.2, Security 60 Cell Battery Bank, effective 8-21-88 PT-11.4, Technical Support Center 60 Cell Battery Bank, effective 8-4-87 PT-11
~ 5, Fire System Batteries - SSA and SSC, effective 10-16-87 PT-12.3, Security Emergency Diesel Test, effective 11-18-87 PT-12.5, Technical Support Center Emergency Diesel Test, effective 6-2-88
PT-13.3, Fire Pump Electrical Equipment Surveillance, effective 5-18-88 The licensee's program for control over storage battery operability and com-pliance with NRC requirements appears to be adequate.
No unacceptable condi-tions were identified.
S ecial Re ort Late Submittal 71707 On July 8, 1988, the licensee informed the resident inspector that a 30 day Special Report had not been submitted to the NRC Regional Office as required by Technical Specification (T.S.) 6.9,2.4.
On May 16, 1988, the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump was declared inoperable; it was returned to operable status on Hay 25, 1988.
T.S. 3.4.2 requires in part, the licensee submit a Special Report within 30 days if the pump is not restored to operable status within 7 days; this Special Report should have been submitted by June 22, 1988.
The licensee stated the responsibility for submitting the report was transferred from the plant to the corporate office and was misplaced during this process; normally the responsibility is not transferred during the review process.
I The licensee took the immediate corrective action'f sending out the Special Report on July 8, 1988.
To prevent recurrence, the licensee intends to avoid transferring responsibility during a report's review process.
A Notice of Violation is not issued for this event since: it was licensee identified; it was of minor safety significance; it was properly reported; immediate correc-tive measures were appropriate and actions are being taken to prevent recur-rence; and no previous violations were identified in this area for which licensee actions would have prevented its occurrence (no violation, 50-244/
88-12-01).
Action on Previous Ins ection Findin s
71707 (Closed)
Unresolved Item (88-01-02):
The inspector s were unable to identify any step in current procedures to meet a
1976 licensee commitment to minimize the time during which the plant is in a water-solid condition.
Licensee investigation revealed a change was made to Operating Procedure 0-2.2 (Plant Shutdown From Hot Shutdown to Cold Shutdown) in 1976 to limit the time spent in a water-solid condition.
This step was deleted in 1978 after the Reactor Vessel Over Pressurization System (RYOPS) was installed.
The licensee concluded that the step should be in procedure 0-2.2 to limit time spent in a water-solid condition.
Corrective actions included placing the step back into procedure 0-2.2 (step 5.37),
and referencing the 1976 commitment, in the step, to prevent future removal of the step.
This item is closed.
(Open) Unresolved Item (87-23-01):
Large wooden blocks covered with foam are used as spacers in the vital battery racks.
Potential degradation of these spacers warrants periodic attention.propriate action is neede :
Licensee corrective actions included adding steps -to quarterly survei llances of batteries requiring inspection of foam/wood spacers.
Through discussions with electrical maintenance personnel, the inspectors determined the inspec-tion conducted was inadequate to assure the quality of the wood.
The licensee recognized the fact that the resilience of the substantially large piece of wood cannot be assured by surface examination for long term.
The Electrical Engineering Services is currently exploring other methods.
This item remains unresolved pending review of additional licensee actions.
4.
Exit Interview 30703 At periodic intervals during the inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss inspection scope and findings; During this inspection period, one violation and one unresolved item were identified.
The violation deals with the licensee's control of equipment alignment and the unresolved item deals with the licensee's reviews to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59.
Additionally, a commitment made in 1980, to meet NUREG 0737 requirements regarding verification of proper system alignment was not pro-perly implemented.
Based on NRC Region I review of this report and discussion held with licensee representatives, it was determined this report does not contain information subject to
CFR 2.790 restriction APPENDIX
ATTACHMENT 2 STORAGE BATTERY INSPECTION SAMPLE The following identifies the wet cell battery inspection sample.
It may be provided to the licensee for more efficient identification of data relevant to assessing compliance with the current licensing basis.
1.
General Batter Information Document the below information for batteries which carry vital loads.
( 1)
Qualified, or design, seismic life.
(2)
Qualified,,or design, electrical life.
(3)
Age.
(4)
Time in service.
(5)
Plans for, replacement.
2.
Previous Licensee Actions Identify actions taken on the following IE Information Notices:
83-11, Possible Seismic Vulnerability of Old Lead Storage Batteries; 84-83, Various-Battery Problems; 85-74, Station Battery Problems; and 86-37, Degradation of Station Batteries'.
Seismic Lifetime and Qualification For batteries "supplying vital loads, identify the following information.
( 1)
Licensee and/or manufacturer's establishment of seismic lifetime.
This maybe through documentation allowing verification by competent personnel other than the qualifiers and containing design specifica-tions, the qualification method, results, and justifications (ref:
(2)
Seismic qualification maintenance.
Identify how the criteria for assuring that the battery and rack will maintain seismic qualifica-tion are defined, available, and used for periodic inspections and cell replacements.
Identify the criteria for determination of seismic end of life based upon the in-service condition of the battery.
A2-1
i
~i
4.
Electrical Sizin and uglification For batteries supplying vital loads, identify the following information.
Confirmation that the battery size is sufficient to handle the load profile with a suitable margin.
(2)
The means of tracking and control of battery loads such that the batteries and their replacements will have sufficient capacity throughout design life, if worst case electrolyte temperature and other worst case conditions exist when the battery is called upon.to perform its design function.
(3)
The provisions for consideration of the effect of jumpered out cells upon the ability of a battery to perform under worst case conditions.
5.
Batter Ventilation and Protection From I nition Hazards For batteries carrying vital loads, identify the following.
( 1)
The provisions for assuring adequacy battery ventilation during normal operation, outages, charging, and discharge.
(2)
Adequacy of checks of battery ventilation flow.
(3)
(4)
(5)
Adequacy of controls over battery ventilation impediments such as enclosing the battery space or its ventilation with plastic sheeting, or any other ventilation obstructions, during outages and other periods.
Adequacy of hydrogen detection equipment and its calibration and use, or of the technical justification for not using such equipment.
Knowledge of the hydrogen hazard on the part of plant management, operating shift management, and personnel who access the battery spaces.
(6)
(8)
Prohibition of hot work and smoking in battery spaces, including checking the spaces for the residue of such activity.
Assurance that battery cells are secured, with post-to-case and top-to-jar seals tight.
Thermometers should not be left in cells after temperatures are measured.
Caps on the filler openings should be properly secured when not required to be off.
(Cells should be vented only through the flash arrestors.)
The means of assuring proper elimination of water-carrying pipes (e.g.,
HVAC lines) from battery spaces, especially those which may carry salt water.
A2-2
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(9)
The means of positive control over the quality of water added to the batteries to assure that the manufacturer's recommendations or an appropriate licensee standard are met or exceeded.
(10) The assurance of elimination of combustibles, and loose equipment and conductors, from battery spaces.
6.
Electrol te Tem erature Control For batteries supplying vital loads, identify the adequacy of the following.
(1)
Avoidance of localized heat sources such as direct sunlight, radiators, steam pipes, and space heaters, (2)
That the location/arrangement provides for no more than a
SF difference in cell temperature, as confirmed by measurements representati ve of operating conditions.
If this is not the case, then the licensee and manufacturer should have identified the consequent impact on expected battery and individual cell capacity and life, and surveillance procedures should reflect the additional allowable temperature variation.
7.
~Char in For batteries carrying vital loads, identify the adequacy of the following.
(1)
Provision for a freshening charge after more than 3 months of being on open circuit, unless determined by the manufacturer to be unnecessary to assure rated capacity throughout life.
(2)
Accomplishment of equalizing charges at 18 month intervals, and when the corrected specified gravity (SG) of an individual cell is more than 10 point (0.010) below the average of all the cells, and when the average corrected SG of all cell.s drop more than 10 points below the average installation value, and if any cell voltage is below 2a 13V.
(Specific manufacturer's provisions and assessment may allow the non-performance of some of these recommended charges, or may provide different criteria.)
(3)
Control over battery water quality such that specified purify is confirmed before addition, that water added just prior to charging is added only to bring the electrolyte up to the prescribed minimum (to prevent overflow during charging),
and that water added after and between charges not bring the level above the prescribed maximum (unless manufacturer's instructions provide for other water addition measures).
A2-3
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(4)
That routine float and final end of charge SGs not be taken before
hours of float operation after completion of the charge and the last water addition, unless the manufacturer's instructions provided otherwise.
(The need is for measurement of representative cell levels and average them.)
(5)
Establishment and maintenance of float voltage on accordance with the manufacturer's instructions.
(6)
Assurance that single-cell charger use does not violate Class 1E independence from non-class 1E equipment.
8.
Performance Tests and Re lacement Criteria For batteries carrying vital loads, identify the following.
( 1)
Initial acceptance testing which demonstrates the ability of the batteries to meet the manufacturer's rating.
(2)
Service testing which demonstrates the ability to carry the load profile with an appropriate margin for worst case conditions, including end of life loss of capacity under the worst case electrolyte temperature.
(3)
Accomplishment of a performance test (capacity test discharge)
within the first two years of service and at 5 year intervals until signs of degradation are evident or 85% of the qualified service life is reached.
(4)
Annual performance testing of batteries which show signs of degradation or which have reached 85", of the qualified service life is reached.
(5)
End of electrical life criteria which consider the rapid end of life drop-off in capacity, worst case state of charge during float service, worst case electrolyte temperature, current DC loads, and the time needed to replace the battery while it can still handle worst case conditions.
9.
Other Safet -Si nificant Wet Cell Batteries For safety-significant wet cell batteries not used for vital loads, show how the maintenance program periodically determines the ability to perform the design function and provides for timely replacement of batteries and for maintaining associated equipment (e.g.,
chargers)
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