IR 05000244/1988013

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Insp Rept 50-244/88-13 on 880711-0807.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations, ESF Sys Walkdown,Operational Safety Verification,Physical Security,Surveillance Testing,Maint & Periodic Repts
ML17251A245
Person / Time
Site: Ginna Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 08/23/1988
From: Cowgill C
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML17251A244 List:
References
50-244-88-13, NUDOCS 8809010385
Download: ML17251A245 (12)


Text

U.S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report No.

50-244/88-13 Licensee No.

DPR-18 Priority Category C

Licensee:

Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation 49 East Avenue Rochester, New York Facility:

Location:

R.

E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Ontario, New York Inspection Conducted:

July 11 through August 7, 1988 Inspectors:

C.

S. Marschall, Senior Resident Inspector, Ginna N.

S. Perry, Resident Inspector, Ginna Approved by:

C.

.

Cowg

Chief, Reactor Projects Section lA Date

~Summar:

Areas Ins ected:

Routine inspection by the resident inspectors of station activi-ties including plant operations,'ngineered Safety Feature System walkdown, opera-tional safety verification, surveillance testing, maintenance, radiological pro-tection, physical security, periodic and special reports, and substation explosion.

Results:

In the nine areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

Overall, the plant operated safely during the inspection period.

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DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted During this -inspection period, inspectors held discussions with and inter-viewed operator s, technicians, engineers and supervisory level personnel.

The following people were among those contacted:

J.

C. Bodine, Nuclear Assurance Manager

  • D. L. Filkins, Chemistry

& Health Physics Manager R.

W. Kober, Senior Vice President, Production'and Engineering

  • R. A. Marchionda, Training Manager T ~ A. Marlow, Maintenance Manager T. A. Meyer, Superintendent Ginna Support Services J.

T, St. Martin, Station Engineer

"T.

R. Schuler, Operations Manager L.

F. Smith, Operations Supervisor B. A. Snow, Superintendent Nuclear Production

"S.

M. Spector, Superintendent Ginna Station

  • J. A. Widay, Technical Manager
  • R. E. Wood, Supervisor Nuclear Security
  • Denotes persons present at exit meeting on August 12, 1988.

2.

Functional or Pro ram Areas Ins ected a.

Review of Plant 0 erations (71707)

At the beginning of the inspection period, the plant was operating at approximately 100% power.

On July 16, 1988, an Unusual Event was de-clared due to an explosion near the plant in the 115 KV substation.

The plant experienced a turbine runback to approximately 75 percent power, and operators subsequently shut down the plant to effect repairs in the substation, (see section 2.i).

The reactor was brought critical on July 17, 1988, with full power achieved on July 19, 1988.

The plant operated at full power for the remainder of the inspection period.

b.

En ineered Safet Feature ESF S stem Wal kdown (71710)

'

A complete walkdown of accessible portions of the Safety Injection (SI)

System was performed to verify its operability.

The inspectors verified the licensee's lineup matched plant drawings and as-built configurations.

System components were checked for labeling, cleanliness, and state of repair.

Twenty-nine valves were found on licensee print 33013-1262 for SI which were not identified in any procedure lineup; all the valves were drain, vent or sample valves.

Operations personnel were unable to ex-plain the procedural inadequacy and stated the valves would be added to procedure S-16A, Safety Injection System Alignment.

These valves did not affect system operability.

Additionally, the licensee is in the process of upgrading its piping and instrument diagrams, expected to be completed in the spring or summer of 1989.

Operators are involved

tors are involved in the upgrade process and procedures are upgraded as part of the process.

This upgrade program is expected to identify and correct any other inadequacies in all plant systems.

The inspectors will continue to follow licensee efforts on this program.

This is an on-going issue being following by the NRC.

c.

0 erational Safet Verification (71707)

On a daily basis, inspectors observed shift turnover and conduct of

'perations in the control room.

Proper control room staffing was main-tained and control room access was controlled.

Operators were attentive and responsive to plant parameters and conditions.

Approved procedures were adhered to for ongoing activities.

No unacceptable conditions were verified.

d.

Monthl Surveillance Observation (61726)

Inspectors observed portions of surveillance test procedures to verify test instrumentation was properly calibrated, approved procedures were used, work was performed by qualified personnel, Limiting Conditions for Operation were met, and the system was correctly restored following testing.

The following surveillance activities were observed:

Periodic Test (PT)-2.2,

"Residual Heat Removal System", revision 42, effective date June 15, 1988, observed August 4, 1988.

PT-2. 1, "Safety Injection System Pumps", revision 46, effective date February 1,

1988, observed August 5, 1988.

-No unacceptable conditions were identified.

Monthl Maintenance Observations (62703)

The inspectors observed portions of various safety-related maintenance activities to determine that redundant components'ere operable, activi-ties did not violate Limiting Conditions for Operation, 'required admini-strative approvals and tagouts were obtained prior to initiating work, approved procedures were used or the activity was within the "skills of the trade", appropriate radiological controls were implemented, ignition/

fire prevention controls were properly implemented, and equipment was properly tested prior to returning it to service.

Maintenance (M)-32. 1, "DB-25, DB-50 and DB-75 Circuit Breaker Main-tenance and Overcurrent Trip Device Test and/or Replacement",

re-vision 27, effective date July 27, 1988, observed August 1, 1988.

Calibration Procedure (CP)-211, "Calibration and/or Maintenance of RMS Channel R-11", revision 9, effective date March 14, 1988, ob-served August 4, 1988.

Planned periodic maintenance was performed on the 'C'ervice water pump breaker.

Two insulators were found to have superficial cracks and were replaced.

The licensee determined these cracks would have no effect on breaker operabilit The insulators were replaced using approved handwritten instructions.

Licensee control of these activities was adequate to ensure component operabi 1 ity.

Radiolo ical Protection Review (71709)

During this inspection period, the resident inspectors verified on a

random basis:

RWPs were implemented properly; dosimetry was properly worn in controlled areas; dosimeter readings were recorded properly; access control at entrances to high radiation areas was adequate; personnel use contamination monitors as required when exiting controlled areas; and postings and labeling were in compliance with regulations and procedures.

Additionally, the status of meeting ALARA goal.s was checked.

The cor-porate ALARA goal 'for 1988 is less than 300 manrem; the plant established an estimate of 297 manrem.

As of the end of July, the plant had accumu-lated 241 manrem; this is below the estimate for this time in the year.

If normal plant activities continue, total manrem for 1988 will be ap-proximately 260.

The licensee expects to test a

new Radiation Dose Management System (RDMS) this autumn and have it fully operational before 1989.

The inspectors had no further questions relating to the radiation protection program.

Ph sical Securit Review (71881)

During this inspection period, the resident inspectors verified on a

random basis:

x-ray machines and metal and explosive detectors were operational; Protected Area (PA) and Vital Area (VA) barriers were well maintained; access control during security turnover was adequate, and personnel were properly badged for unescorted or escorted access.

Ad-ditionally, no obstructions to or hiding places near the PA were identi-

.fied.

Review of Periodic and S ecial Re orts (90713)

Upon receipt, periodic and special reports submitted by the licensee pursuant to Technical Specifications 6.9. 1 and 6.9.3 were reviewed by the inspectors.

This review included the following considerations:

re-ports contained information required by the NRC; test resul,ts and/or supporting information were consistent with design predictions and per-formance specifications; and reported information was valid.

Within this scope, the following report was reviewed by the inspectors:

Monthly Operating Report for June 1988.

The report was considered adequate to meet regulatory requirement Substation Ex losion (93702)

At approximately 1:55 P.M.

on July 16, 1988, breaker 91102 in sub-station 13A failed; substation 13A is located approximately one half mile from the plant.

The 'A'hase bushing's lower plug blew out releasing oil which ignited due to arcing, tripping the breaker open.

Fumes from the 'A'hase fire caused arcing (phase to ground)

on the

'B'hase.

Protective relaying opened four other breakers to isolate the fault causing a loss of offsite power to the safeguards busses.

This loss of offsite power deenergized instrument bus 1B, which has no battery backup, causing a turbine runback due to a dropped rod signal.

After the safeguards busses were reenergized by the emer-gency diesel generators, the plant, initially at full power, was stabilized at approximately 75 percent power.

Both emergency diesel generators automatically started and loaded due to the loss of power.

An oil-filled pipe cable connects the Ginna Plant to station 13A.

The individual phase pipe cables, insulated from ground to accommodate cathodic protection, are attached to the structural steel at station 13A with 'U'-bolts.

A thin insulating material is utilized between the

'U'-bolts and the pipe cable.

Station 13A's ground potential with re-spect to the isolated pipe cable rose sufficiently, during the event, to break down the insulating material on one cable, already worn over time.

The resulting currents burned a small hole through the pipe cable casing allowing oil to escape.

The plant was forced to shut down to repair. the leak.

All worn insulating material identified was replaced.

Plant security heard an explosion, apparently due to the breaker failure, at the time of the event and notified the control room.

An Unusual Event was declared at 2:09 P.M. based on an explosion occurring near the plant.

At 2:45 P.N. substation workers requested the plant shutdown to repair the leaking pipe cable casing, and operators started unloading the turbine generator.

Backup offsite power was established to the safeguards busses at 3: 17 P.M.

.

The turbine was taken off line at 3:39 P.N.

and the reactor was subcriti-cal at 4:05 P.N..

While driving control rod bank 'A'nto the core, rod L-6 failed to move.

Operators drove the rest of the rods in; when they opened the reactor trip breakers, rod L-6 fell into the core.

The plant secured from the Unusual Event at 4:45 P.M..

. Operators and instrument and control technicians verified rod L-6 was operable, and initial repairs were completed in the substation prior to the reactor startup, which commenced at 6:55 A.M. on July 17, 1988.

Re-pairs to breaker 91102 were completed on July 18, 1988 and the breaker was returned to service at 6:32 P.M.

~

Operators are performing weekly operability checks on rod L-6.

Addi-tionally, instrumentation and controls technicians in consulatation with Westinghouse are investigating the problem with rod L-The licensee's overall substation maintenance program was discussed with the licensee.

The licensee has an aggressive maintenance program for maintaining electrical equipment that supports the offsite power supply.

This program includes Doble Testing of transformer bushings, circuit breakers and bushings, and other related electrical insulation systems for long term trending to access any potential degradation.

The power system protective relaying is calibrated every three years.

The event on July 16, 1988 was determined, by the licensee to be an unavoidable catastrophic event.

Based on this being the only such failure at the site,- the inspector had no further questions.

No unacceptable conditions were identified.

3.

Exit Interview (30703)

At periodic intervals during the inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss inspection scope and findings.

Based on NRC Region I review of this report and discussion held with licensee representa-tives, it was determined this report does not contain information subject to

CFR 2.790 restrictions.