IR 05000244/1988021
| ML17251A384 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 11/28/1988 |
| From: | Amato C, Lazarus W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17251A383 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-244-88-21, NUDOCS 8812080212 | |
| Download: ML17251A384 (12) | |
Text
U.S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
6
.
~5-244 Docket No.
50-244 License No.
DPR-18 Priority-------
Category C
Licensee:
Rochester Gas and Electric Cor oration as venue
5 14646-DD
Facility Name:
Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Inspection At:
Ontario and Rochester New York Inspection Conducted:
October 18-20 1988 Inspectors:
a o mergency repare ness pecsa >s, Emergency Prepareclness Section, FRSSB, DRSS E: Fox, Jr.
Sr.
EPS C. Marschal),
Sra Resident Inspector, Ginna Plant N. Perry, Resident Inspector, Ginna Plant a e Approved:
azarus, ie
,
mergen epare ness Section, FRSSB, DRSS
/U
~p pP a
e Ins ection Summar:
Ins ection on October 18-20 1988 Ins ection Re ort Areas Ins ected:
Routine, announced, safety inspection of the licensee's emergency preparedness exercise conducted on October 18-20, 1988.
Results:
No violations, deviations or unresolved items were identified.
~e licensee demonstrated the ability to implement their emergency plan in a manner which would have provided adequate protective measures for the health and safety of the public.
8812080212
00244 PDR ADOCY 0 o PNV
1.0 Persons Contacted DETAILS The following'Ginna Nuclear Power Plant and Rochester Gas and Electric personnel attended the exit meeting.
E. Adkins, Director, Government and Community Relations W. Backus, Assistant Operations Manager D. Burke, Corporate Eme'rgency Planner D. Filkins, Manager, Hea1th Physics and Chemistry R. Harchionda, Manager, Ginna Training P. Gorski, Supervisor, Special Projects R. Hecredy, Superintendent of Nuclear 'Power T. Powell, Manager, Risk Management Department B. guinn, Corporate Health Physicist H. Rowley, Vice President, Gas, Transportation R. Smith, Vice President, Engineering and Production B. Snow, Chief Engineer, Rochester Gas and Electric 'Corporation
,S. Spector, Superintendent, R.
E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant P. Wilkens, Director, Nuclear Engineering Services The inspectors also observed the actions of, and interviewed other licensee personnel.
2.0 Emer enc Exercise The Ginna Nuclear Power Plant announced, partial participation exercise was conducted on October 19, 1988, 7:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m.
Subsequently, the State of New York's Office of Emergency Management, Monroe and Wayne Counties participated.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEHA) did not observe off site activities.
2. 1 Pre-exercise Activities The exercise objectives submitted to NRC Region I on May 23,. 1988 were reviewed and, following revision, determined to be adequate to test the licensee's Emergency Plan.
On July 20, 1988, the licensee submitted the complete scenario package for NRC review and evaluation.
Region I representatives had telephone conversations with the licensee's emergency preparedness staff to discuss the scope and content of the scenario.
As a result, minor revisions were made to the-scenario which allowed adequate testing of the major portions of the Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Nuclear Emergency Response Plan (NERP)
and also provided the opportunity for licensee personnel to demonstrate those areas previously identified by the NRC as in need of corrective action.
NRC observers attended a licensee briefing on October 19, 1988.
Suggested NRC changes to the scenario made by the
licensee were discussed during the briefing.
The licensee stated that certain emergency response activities would be simulated and that controllers would intercede in exercise activities to prevent disrup-tion to normal plant operation.
2.2 Exercise Scenario The exercise scenario included the following events:
1.
Sequential fires in both Diesel Electric Generator (DEG) rooms resulting in the loss of ability to generate AC power on site; 2.
High blow down radiation monitor readings; 3;
Safety injection and reactor trip as a result of low pressurizer pressure; 4.
Isolation of steam generator blow down system; 5.
The B steam generator level increased in an uncontrolled manner; 6.
Failure of a Safety Injection pump to start; 7.
Steam generator tube rupture; 8. 'lad damage; 9.
Steam generator automatic relief valve lifts and sticks in a partially open position; 10.
Release of radioactive material off site; and, 11.
Isolation of the failed automatic relief valve and termination of the off site release.
2.3 Activities Observed During the conduct of the licensee's exercise, four NRC team members made detailed observations of the activation and augmentation of the Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs)
and the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) staff and actions of ERO staff during operation of the ERFs.
The following activities were observed:
1.
Detection, classification, and assessment of scenario events; 2.
Direction and coordination of emergency response;
.3.
Augmentation of the emergency organization and response facility activation;
4.
Notification of licensee personnel and offsite agencies of pertinent plant status information:
5.
Communications/information flow, and record keeping; 6.
Assessment and projection of offsite radiological dose and consideration of protective actions; 7.
Provisions for inplant radiation protection; 8.
Performance of offsite and inplant radiological surveys; 9.
Maintenance of site security and access control; 10.
Performance of technical support, repair and corrective actions; ll.
Fire fighting practices; 12.
Assembly, accountability and evacuation of personnel; and 13.
Preparation of information for dissemination at the Joint News Center.
3.0 Exercise Observations 3. 1 Exercise Stren ths The NRC team noted that the licensee's activation of the Emergency Response Organization, Emergency Response Facilities,and use of these facilities were generally consistent with their Nuclear Emergency Response Plans.
The NRC team also noted the following actions that provide strong indication of the licensee's ability to cope with abnormal plant conditions:
2.
3.
Selection and use of the correct Abnormal Operating Procedures and Emergency Operating Procedures through the exercise; Correct Emergency Action Level classification and timely notifi-cation to off site authorities; Effective command and control within and among ERFs; 4.
Development of Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) with State, monroe and Wayne County participation.
5.
Recognition of the need to consult Evacuation Time Estimates (ETEs);
6.
Consideration given to the use of the radio required by Appendix R to
CFR 50 to maintain inplant communications; 7.
Use of a realistic iodine to noble gas ratio of 0.0001, and default release duration times; 8. 'etection of a serious projected dose calculation error and corrective action including immediate notification to State and County officials and; 9.
Consideration of de-escalation, recovery, and deferment of de-escalation until the plant stabilized and cold shut down conditions would be attained.
3.2 Exercise Meaknesses The NRC team identified the following exercise weaknesses which need to be evaluated and corrected by the licensee.
The licensee also conducted an adequate self critique which identified many of these weaknesses.
One projected dose calculated by the EOF dose assessor was in error.
A value of 9,000 mrem was computed instead of the correct value of 20 mrem.
There was no apparent correlation of this value with plant conditions; this projected dose was checked by entering the incorrect value into a computer which reproduced the erroneous value.
This value was communicated to off site authorities.
Procedures which contained an extraneous step were followed correctly.
2.
3.
Lax Health Physics practices were followed in the Technical Support Center (TSC).
Entering personnel did not always monitor themselves for contamination or correctly use the step off pad when required.
Primary and secondary loop pressures were incorrectly reported
,indicating significant secondary to primary loop flow.
There was no apparent correlation of this magnitude of back flow with plant conditions or release rate.
4.0 Licensee Action on Previousl Identified Items
The following item was identified dur'ing the previous exercise.
Based upon observations made by the NRC team during this exercise, review of the scenario and information provided by the controllers, the following item was not repeated and is closed.
(CLOSED) (50-244/87-24-01)
Inspector Followup Item.
Press releases were not always timely, accurate and clearly understandable to members of the public.
During this exercise, the NRC team determined that press releases were timely, accuracy improved and understandability was ac-ceptable.
The inspectors had no further concerns in this area.
5.0 Licensee Criti ue The NRC team attended the licensee's post exercise critique on October 20, 1988 during which key licensee controllers presented their observations of the exercise.
The critique was adequate.
Licensee participants highlighted areas for improvement which the licensee indicated would be evaluated and appropiate actions taken.
6.0 Exit Meetin and NRC Criti ue Followiny the licensee's self critique, the NRC team met and evaluated the licensee s critique.
Subsequently, the NRC team met with the licensee's representatives listed in Section 1'f this report at the end of the inspection.
The NRC team leader summarized the observations made during the exercise.
The licensee was advised no violations were identified and the previously identified item was adequately addressed.
The NRC team determined that within the scope and limitations of the scenario, and with the weaknesses previously discussed, the licensee demonstrated that they could implement their Nuclear Emergency Response Plan in a manner that would adequately provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public.
At no time during the course of the inspection did the inspectors provide any written information to the license iS