IR 05000244/1987002
| ML20211P934 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 02/18/1987 |
| From: | Eugene Kelly, Scholl L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20211P914 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-244-87-02, NUDOCS 8703020455 | |
| Download: ML20211P934 (9) | |
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V. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No. 50-244/87-02 Docket No. 50-244 Licensee No. DPR-18 Priority --
Category C Licensee: Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation 49 East Avenue Rochester, New York Facility Name: R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Inspection at: Ontario, New York Inspection Conducted:
January 4,1987 through February 7,1987 Inspector:
T. J. Polich, Senior Resident Inspector, Ginna T. K. Kim, Resident Inspector, Ginna A. J. Lodewyk, Reactor Inspector, Region I
[#M c2-/f-D Reviewed by:
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L. L. Sc(oll, Rdactor Engineer Date React Project Section 2A, DRP Approved by:
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E. K. Kelly, Actin hief, Reactor Date Project Sections o. 2A, DRP Inspection Summary:
. Inspection on January 4,1987 through February 7,1987 (Report No.
50-244/87-02.
Areas Inspected: Routine, on-site, regular, and backshift inspection by the Regional and resident inspectors (140 hours0.00162 days <br />0.0389 hours <br />2.314815e-4 weeks <br />5.327e-5 months <br />). Areas inspected included:
licensee action on previous findings; review of plant operations; operational safety verification; surveillance testing; plant maintenance; Licensee Event Reports; Reactive Inspection (Temporary Instructions), and review of periodic and special reports.
Results:
In the eight areas inspected, no violations were observed.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted During this inspection period, the inspectors held discussions with and
interviewed operators, technicians, engineers and supervisory level personnel.
- J. C. Bodine, Nuclear Assurance Manager D. L. Filkins, Chemistry & Health Physics Manager
- R. W. Kober, Vice President, Electric and Steam Production
- R. A. Marchionda, Training Manager T. A. Marlow, Maintenance Manager T. A. Meyer, Superintendent Ginna Support Services
- T. R. Schuler, Operations Manager M. T. Shaw. Administrative Services Manager B. A. Snow, Superintendent Nuclear Production
- S. M. Spector, Superintendent Ginna Production R. W. Vanderweel, Ginna Modifications Project Manager
- J. A. Widay, Technical Manager R. E. Wood, Supervisor Nuclear Security
- Denotes persons present at Exit Meeting on February 11, 1987.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Violation (50-244/86-02-03) Inadequate inspection of welds on the reactor vessel head lift rig and reactor vessel lifting rig. The licensee's response to this violation was reviewed in inspection report 50-244/86-22 and remained open pending revision and verification of appropriate QC hold points in Ginna Refueling Procedure RF-62.
RF-62 is a Ginna Station Procedure which implements Westinghouse Procedure FP-RGE-R16, Revision 0, "RGE Full Scope Refueling Procedure Cycle XVI-XVII". The inspector has verified the Westinghouse Procedure has been revised to include a QC hold to visually inspect the reactor vessel head lifting rig and its weld in accordance with Material Handling Equipment procedure MHE-1100-1.
(0 pen) Inspector Follow-up Item (86-16-01) Housekeeping and Material Condition of Equipment.
In response to this open item the licensee has:
Removed the hoses and welding leads from the Auxiliary Building
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subbasement.
Cleaned the boric acid deposits from the Safety Injection (SI) and
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Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pumps.
The inspector has verified the above actions and considers the housekeeping issue resolved.
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i i t The material condition portion of this item will remain open pending removal of corrosion and/or replacement of fittings on the SI pump seal water heat exchanger lines.
3.
Review of Plant Operations a.
Throughout the reporting period, the. inspector reviewed routine
' power operations. The reactor operated at 100% power from the start
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of this inspection period until January 12 when a gradual reactor power reduction was initiated to maintain'feedwater pump suction
pressure. On January 22 the end of cycle power coastdown was begun from 95% power and continued until February 6, 1987, when the load
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reduction for the refueling shutdown began from 85% power. At 10:00
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A.M. on February 6,1987 a turbine load reduction was initiated and the turbine was taken off line at 5:00 P.M..
After overspeed
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testing of the turbine was completed, the reactor was shutdown for
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the annual refueling outage.
~b.
On February 2,1987 while performing Periodic Test (PT)-17.2, l
" Process Radiation Monitors R-11-R-22", it was noted by the control
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room operator that R-18, Liquid Radwaste Monitor, did not respond as
required when the test switch was placed in the check source
position.
Further investigation by Instrumentation and Control t~
(I&C) personnel revealed that R-18 has not contained a check source since 1976, when the instrument was last replaced.
i The licensee had not updated PT-17.2 when R-18 was replaced, but has continued to perform this surveillance test monthly, including
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placement of the test switch in the check-source position. However,
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unbeknown to the operators, detector response observed has been due
to background radiation rather than the assumed internal check source.
PT-17.3, "RMS Channel Response to Portable Radiation Sources Area-Monitor R9 Process Monitor 10A, 108, R11 thru R22, R31 and R32", has
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been performed quarterly by Results and Test personnel using a portable (external) check source.
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Replacement of R-18, planned prior to this occurrence, will take
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place during the 1988 Refueling Outage. The licensee is evaluating the reportability of this finding. Monthly testing will be performed using portable check source, until R-18 is again replaced.
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This item is considered unresolved pending further investigation by the resident and regional inspectors.
(87-02-01)
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c. ' On February 6,1987 at 9:35 P.M. the licensee found residual heat
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removal refueling water return flow indicator FI-9318 isolated. The licensee's investigation revealed the flow transmitter equalizing valve open and one process sensing line closed. When the equalizing
valve was closed, and the sensing line opened, the flow indicator responded properly.
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The inspector will follow the licensee's cause analysis and resolution of this event.
d.
On February 7, 1987 at 1:50 A.M., the "B" Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) failed to close when the "B" MSIV switch was placeo in the Close position.
Repeated attempts to shut this valve from the main control board failed, as did removing the air from the pneumatic valve operator, disconnecting the valve operator and using a torque wrerch.
The shift supervisor declared the event reportable and made the appropriate notifications to the NRC operations center and the resident inspector. The inspector will continue to follow the troubleshooting and resolution of this valve closure failure.
4.
Operational Safety Verification a.
General During the inspection period, the inspectors observed and examined activities to verify the operational safety of the licensee's facility. The observations and examinations of those activities were conducted on a daily, weekly or monthly basis.
On a daily basis, the inspectors observed control room activities to verify compliance with selected Limiting Condition for Operations (LCOs) as prescribed in the facility Techn1 cal Specifications (TS).
Logs, instrumentation, recorder traces, plant conditions, and trends were reviewed for compliance with regulatory requirements. Shift turnovers were observed on a sample basis to verify that all pertinent information of plant status was relayed.
During each week, the inspectors toured the accessible areas of the facility to observe the following:
General plant and equipment conditions
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Fire hazards and fire fighting equipment
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Radiation protection controls
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Conduct of selected activities for compliance with licensee's administrative controls and approved procedures Interiors of electrical and control panels
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Implementation of selected portions of the licensee's physical security plan
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Plant housekeeping and cleanliness
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Essential safety feature equipment alignment and conditions The inspectors talked with operators in the control room and other personnel. The discussions centered on pertinent topics of general plant conditions, procedures, security, training, and other aspects of the involved work activities.
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b.
Housekeeping-Intermediate Building During a tour of the Intermediate Building (controlled side) the
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= inspector found more than a dozen styrofoam cups, cigar and cigarette packages, and other trash under the Auxiliary Building Exhaust Fan bases. The bases are enclosed except for four access
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holes on each fan base. This area of the Intermediate Building has been radiologically controlled since 1980.
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The same conditions existed several days later when the resident and a regional health physics inspector toured the area. The licensee has subsequently removed the trash.
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The licensee identified the styrofoam cups as a type nc longer used at Ginna. Station and suspects the trash was present prior to the
area becoming radiologically controlled.
c.
Control Room Lighting The fluorescent lights used in the contral room lighting modification described in Inspection Report IR 50-244/36-21 were found to be at too low of an ambient temperature for proper operation. When i
j the lights were replaced with those designed to operate at lower ambient temperatures the " pulsating light" was no longer observed
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and the overall control room light intensity increased.
The licensee continues to adjust the position of the lights and make electrical connection changes for the lights around the control room.
The modification and all testing should be completed during
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the annual refueling outage.
No violations were identified.
5.
Surveillance Testing
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a.
The inspector witnessed the performance of surveillance testing of selected components to verify that:
the test procedure was properly approved and adequately detailed to assure performance of a satisfactory surveillance test; test instrumentation required by the procedure was calibrated and in use; the test was performed by qualified personnel, and the test results satisfied Technical Specifications and procedural acceptance criteria or were properly resolved.
b.
During this inspection period, the inspectors witnessed the j
performance of selected portions of the following tests:
Periodic Test (PT)-2.2, " Residual Heat Removal System", effective November 16, 1985.
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PT-2.8, " Component Cooling _ Water Pump System", effective July 24, 1986.
PT-16, " Auxiliary feedwater System", effective August 19, 1986.
PC-14, " Potentiometric Determination of Boron", effective December 12, 1986.
No violations were identified.
6.
Plant Maintenance a.
During the inspection period, the inspector observed maintenance and problem investigation activities to verify: compliance with regulatory requirements, including those stated in the. Technical Specifications; compliance with administrative and maintenance procedures; required QA/QC involvement; proper use of safety tags; qualifications; and reportability as required by Technical Specifications.
b.
The inspector witnessed selected portions of the following mainte-nance activities:
Calibration Procedure (CP)-218, " Calibration and/or Maintenance of RMS channel R-14", effective September 6, 1985.
Station Modification (SM)-4225.11, " Replacement of local pushbutton on 480v breaker 26D Fire Pump on Bus 17", effective December 11, 1986.
No violations were identified.
7.
Reactive Inspection (Temporary Instructions)
a.
Temporary Inspection Instruction RI-86-03, " Inspection of General Electric Type HGA Relays".
In response to this instruction the inspector requested the licensee identify all GE H3A relays at Ginna used in safety related applicators.
The licensee has determined that four HGA relays are installed at Ginna. Two of these relays are currently not connected to relay schemes or circuitry and are mounted on the right rear section of the main control board.
The licensee plans to remove these relays from the control board.
The other two relays are in a non Class IE application and function as time delay relays associated with the isolation of 4 KV busses 11A and 11B in the event Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) circuit breakers fail to open when required by circuit logic.
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The licensee experienced spurious tripping of the 4 KV busses when RCP breaker cubicle doors were inadvertently bumped or slammed during maintenance. The licensee determined the problem to be the 62 (time delay) relay contacts, which if closed would energize the 86 (bus lockout) relay and thus deenergize the associated 4 KV bus.
To resolve this problem Engineering Work Request (EWR) 4126 was initiated, which rewired the 62 relay in. series with the SOS (overcurrent) relays.
Thus inadvertent actuation of the HGA type relay (i.e. Seismic Event) will not cause a loss of 4 KV bus unless an overcurrent condition simultaneously exists. This EWR was completed during the 1986 Refueling Outage.
This Temporary Instruction is considered closed.
b.
IE Information Notice 86-106, "Feedwater Line break", discusses a recent pipe wall-thinning failure due to an electrochemical form of erosion-corrosion. Subsequently, Region I Temporary Instruction 87-02, " Steam, Feed and Condensate System Surveys", was issued to provide guidance for determining what actions are being taken by licensees to detect potential wall-thinning in plant components.
In response to TI 87-02, the inspector reviewed the station erosion-corrosion history and inspection program to detect this type of failure. The information gathered is summarized below.
In July 1986, Ginna station experienced a main steam reheat elbow failure. Based upon inspections initiated in response to this failure and the Surry feedwater line break, the licensee had systematically identified potential wall-thinning areas. A sample containing representative susceptible areas has been identified for inspection during the February,1987 refueling outage. The results of the erosion-corrosion detection exams are to be kept for future reference and trending.
The augmented inspection program is currently being updated to consider recent industry experience as the conditions apply to the Ginna plant. The licensee's awareness of the potential for a secondary steam system piping failure due to erosion-corrosion is evident by licensee representative awareness and actions in response to this concern.
This Temporary Instruction is considered closed.
8.
Licensee Event Reports (LERs)
The inspector reviewed the following LER to verify that the details of the event were clearly reported, the description of the cause was accurate, and adequate corrective action was taken. The inspector also determined whether further information was required, and whether generic implications were involved.
The inspector further verified that the reporting requirements of Technical Specifications and station administrative and operating procedures had been met; that the event was i
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reviewed by the Plant Operations Review Committee and that continued operation of the facility was conducted within the Technical
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Specification limits.
LER 86-11; Inadvertent Main Steam Isolation Valve Closure (from personnel error) While Depressurizing Containment Causes Automatic Reactor Trip i
From Pressurizer High Pressure.
-On November 28, 1986 at 11:16 A.M., with the reactor at 100% power, while attempting to terminate containment depressurization, a licensed J
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control room operator inadvertently closed both main steam isolation valves. A high pressurizer pressure reactor trip resulted approximately five seconds after the wrong switches were manipulated. The MSIV switches are situated directly below containment depressurization valve switches on the main control board. The MSIV switches have spring loaded plastic covers that must be lifted to gain access. The switches also turn in the opposite direction of the containment depressurization valve switches.
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'The inspector observed the immediate corrective action of stabilizing the
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plant following the reactor trip. The licensee has conducted training of all. shift personnel regarding the sequence of events before and after the plant trip and the need for operator attention while on-shift. Additionally, the licensee plans to relocate the containment depressurization valve switches to the back of the main control _ board during the 1987 Refueling j
Outage. This modification was planned prior to the event.
i The licensee determined the cause of this event to be operator inatten-tiveness. The control room operator involved in this event was removed
from control board duties. The inspector will continue to follow the
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licensee's evaluation of the operator and any subsequent corrective actions.
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9.
Review of Periodic and Special Reports Upon' receipt, periodic and special reports submitted by the licensee pursuant to Technical Specifications 6.9.1 and 6.9.3 were reviewed by the
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inspector. This review included the following considerations: the reports contained the information required to be reported by NRC requirements; test results and/or supporting information were consistent
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with design predictions and performance specifications; and the reported information was valid. Within this scope, the following report was l
reviewed by the inspector:
Monthly Operating Report for December 1986.
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10.
Exit Meeting
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At periodic intervals during the in.spection, meetings were held with
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senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and findings.
On February 11, 1987, an exit meeting was held to review the details of l-this inspection report with licensee management.
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Based on the NRC Region I review of this report and discussion held with
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licensee representatives, it was determined that this report does not contain information subject to 10 CFR 2.790 restrictions.
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